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INTRODUCTION 
In a sense, we are all realists. In our daily goings about, we pretty much take it 
for granted that we are being responsive to a world not of our making. We do not 
seriously entertain the idea that the world we find ourselves situated in is a mere 
figment of the imagination. We experience the world as constraining our thought 
and action. This is common sense. 
Now for the paradox. When philosophers try to justify our pre-theoretical, 
realist intuitions, they run into serious trouble. Their attempts at justification have 
not proved convincing sofar. Rather, their ongoing efforts to establish the 
legitimacy of our realist intuitions have had the paradoxical effect of making these 
intuitions seem ever more questionable. Some philosophers argue that we should 
face up to this predicament and accept that our realist intuitions are actually a set 
of unwarranted assumptions. These philosophers call themselves antirealists. 
According to Arthur Fine, the realist programme in contemporary 
philosophy is dead (Fine, 1984a: 83). There is, to be sure, a variety of positions 
in the philosophical field, which all go under the name of 'realism'. Indeed, the 
variety of ever more sophisticated realisms seems to be growing rather than 
fading. But to Fine's mind, this frantic proliferation is a sign of degeneration. It 
should be seen 'as the first stage in the process of mourning, the stage of denial' 
(ibid). 
Even if Fine's diagnosis may be somewhat exaggerated, it does account 
for a characteristic feature of the current debate on realism. More and more, the 
debate seems to focus not just on the question whether realism is right, but on the 
question how realism should be defined. Whereas some argue that realism is first 
and foremost a claim about the world, viz. a statement about its 'mind-independent 
existence', others hold that realism is a claim about our relation to the world, i.e. 
about our ability to know or refer to the world In other words, whereas some 
argue that realism is primarily an ontological claim, others insist on the 
importance of epistemological and semantical claims for realism Furthermore, 
there are different domains about which one can be a realist. A realist about 
'observable, medium-sized physical objects' need not be a realist about electrons. 
A realist about both of these domains need not be a realist about values. A realist 
about values need not be a realist about electrons. Etcetera Several combinations 
of realism and antirealism are thus conceivable. As Crispin Wright puts it, 'a 
philosopher who asserts that she is a realist about theoretical science, for example, 
or ethics, has probably, for most philosophical audiences, accomplished little more 
than to clear her throat' (Wright, 1992:1). 
The current realism debate shows a bewildering variety of definitions of 
realism. To some extent, then, the debate on realism has become a debate about 
what it is to be a realist. Accordingly, the debate has become increasingly 
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complex and scholastic. We can distinguish between two reactions to this 
situation, a pessimist and an optimist one. The pessimist's reaction, displayed to 
some extent by Fine and also by Richard Rorty1, is a reaction of retreat. The 
pessimist urges us to recognize that the realism controversy has degenerated into 
an unfruitfiil and irrelevant dispute. We should refrain from attempting to justify 
our realist intuitions and simply acquiesce in our pre-theoretical or 'natural 
ontologjcal attitude', as Fine calls it (Fine, 1984a). The optimist reaction is a 
reaction of impatience. According to the optimist, we have to remove the present 
lack of clarity and consensus about how to define realism as quickly as possible, 
so that the real realism debate can get started again. 
In my view, both reactions are misplaced. Both are nurtured by a certain 
view on what the realism debate is about. According to this shared view, the 
realism debate essentially and exclusively aims at justifying our realist intuitions. 
In other words, it centres on the question what can justifiably be counted as real. 
The main conflict between the various realist and antirealist stances is then 
considered to be about which parts of reality deserve a realist interpretation. 
However, the question what can justifiably be counted as real presupposes an 
answer to another, more basic question. This is the question what it means to be 
real. Before justifying one's realist attitude towards some part of the world, one 
has to be clear about what it means to be a realist, about what it means to 
consider some part of the world to be real. In other words, before trying to justify 
our realist intuitions, we have to clarify what these intuitions actually amount to. 
The question what it means to be real, which is at stake in the various attempts 
to define realism, is, in my view, not an annoying preliminary to the realism 
debate. I shall argue that it is the most fundamental and the most interesting 
question raised within this debate. 
Both the optimist and the pessimist fail to address the question what it 
means to be real. The pessimist holds that once we recognize that all our attempts 
to justify our realist intuitions fail, the realism issue stops being interesting. 
However, perhaps the most striking feature of 'the realism issue' is not that we 
seem to be unable to justify our realist intuitions, but that we feel these intuitions 
to be in need of justification. Where does this quest for justification originate 
from? Perhaps the need for justification arises only if we define our realist 
intuitions in a particular way. If so, the current shift of attention from the question 
how to justify realism to the question how to define realism need not be a sign of 
degeneration. It might also be conceived as a stage of transition, which creates 
room for another and, so I will argue, more fruitful type of question. 
'Rortys views will be discussed extensively below. 
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The question what it means to be real and the question what can 
justifiably be counted as real often get intermingled in discussions between realists 
and antirealists. I shall argue that distinguishing between the two questions is 
indispensable for getting a clearer view of what the realism debate is about. 
Within the current realism controversy, a rough dividing line can be drawn 
between metaphysical realism and internal realism.21 will try to show that the 
conflict between these two broad outlooks can be interpreted in two ways. First, 
it can be considered a conflict about what can justifiably be considered as real. In 
this interpretation, metaphysical realism and internal realism share a conception 
of what it means to be real. They differ about where we can justifiably be realists 
about. In the second interpretation, the conflict between metaphysical realism and 
internal realism is conceived as a conflict about what it means to be real. In 
particular, internal realism should, according to this interpretation, be understood 
as an attempt to change the direction of the realism debate by questioning some 
of the metaphysical realist's (tacit) assumptions about what it means to be a realist. 
There is no clear-cut textual evidence that decides in favour of either of 
these two interpretations. Nevertheless, I shall argue that the most enlightening 
interpretation is the second one, which focuses on the meaning of'realism'. I will 
contend that metaphysical realism presupposes four intimately related assumptions 
about what it means to be a realist. I shall argue that internal realism is ambiguous 
with regard to these assumptions. On the one hand, it presupposes the assumptions 
and, in opposing metaphysical realism 'on its own ground', ends up in antirealism. 
On the other hand, internal realism tries to question these assumptions and by that 
to overcome the traditional dualism of realism and antirealism. 
If we stick to the first interpretation of the conflict between metaphysical 
realism and internal realism, which focuses on the question of what can be 
considered real, we get the following 'standard' picture of the battlefield. 
According to the standard picture, there are three levels at which the 
realism debate takes place: the ontologica!, the epistemological and the semanti­
cal.3 On the ontological level, the realism debate is about the question whether the 
world can be said to exist independently of our thinking. This issue of the mind-
independence of the world is related to the question what this world, claimed to 
be either mind-dependent or mind-independent, is like. What are we claiming if 
we are claiming the mind-independent existence of 'the world'? Do we claim the 
2I will consider Putnam and Rorty as the main representatives of internal realism My reasons for doing so 
will be explained below. For now, it should just be noted that, first, there are important differences between the 
two Secondly, Putnam's recent work (especially the 1994 'Dewey Lectures') suggests that he has turned away 
from internal realism I take the label 'internal realism! to apply to Putnam's work of the early eighties. 
'See Horwich (1982), Devitt (199П 
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independent existence of the world-as-we-know-it in ordinary life, which is the 
well-ordered world of medium-sized objects and familiar kinds? Or do we claim 
the independent existence of the not-so-familiar, often unobservable world as 
postulated by science, physics in particular? Or, resisting this kind of specification, 
do we merely claim the independent existence of 'something out there', which is 
the cause of our perceptions and beliefs? The answer to the question what kind 
of world is claimed to be mind-independent or mind-dependent is related to one's 
epistemological views. 
On the epistemological level, the question is whether, or to what extent, 
we can have knowledge of the independent world. Do we, in ordinary perception, 
have direct access to reality as it is in itself? Do our basic perceptual beliefs about 
chairs and tables passively mirror the world's make-up, or is perception shaped by 
conceptual activity so that it is an act of creative construction rather than passive 
mirroring? The question of the knowability of the world is not only a question of 
the truthfulness of perception. It can also be raised at the level of science, which 
often deals with unobservable physical items. Does 'mature science', i.e. physics, 
provide us with knowledge of the fundamental structures of reality? Does the 
success of our best scientific theories show that these theories have more or less 
grasped the essential workings of nature? The question of the epistemic acces-
sibility of the world can also be phrased as the question whether our beliefs about 
the world are (largely) true of, or genuinely refer to, the independent world. On 
the epistemological level, the question is what beliefs we can justifiably hold to 
be true, or which terms we can justifiably consider to genuinely refer to 
independent reality. 
On the semantical level, the realism controversy focuses on the nature of 
truth and reference. What does it mean to call a belief true? Should truth be 
thought of as a relation of correspondence between beliefs and the world, which 
holds whether or not we know it to hold? If so, what kind of relation is involved 
in correspondence? Or, if truth is not to be understood as non-epistemic corres-
pondence, should the notion of truth be essentially linked to rational assertibility, 
making it an epistemic notion? The same sort of question can be raised about 
reference. What is the nature of the reference relation between words and 'chunks 
of reality? Is this relation fixed by a causal mechanism, which is independent of 
our beliefs about the 'chunk1 in question, or does the reference relation get 
determined by our referential intentions, which pick out some chunk in reality as 
the object of reference? In the first case, the reference relation is non-epistemic; 
it is there whether we know about it or not. In the second case, we have an 
epistemic notion of reference, according to which relations of reference are 
relative to interest- or theory-laden descriptions. 
Starting from this three-levelled picture of the realism debate, the standard 
picture defines the positions of metaphysical realism and internal realism roughly 
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as follows. Metaphysical realism consists of the following claims. On the ontol-
ogica! level, it claims the mind-independence of the world. The notion of mind-
independence is generally considered unproblematic by metaphysical realists. It 
is taken to mean that there is a world 'out there' and that its nature is not in any 
way dependent upon the human mind's activity. Full-blown metaphysical realists 
(such as Devitt, Goldman and Boyd4) claim that the independent world comprises 
both the familiar world of objects and kinds that we know through ordinary 
perception, and the world of laws and unobservable particles depicted by science. 
There are more moderate versions of metaphysical realism Some philosophers, 
such as Van Fraassen, argue that 'independent existence' claims can only be 
justified with respect to the observable (commonsense) world.5 Others, such as 
Lewis, think the independence claim can only be upheld with regard to the funda-
mental structure of reality as uncovered by physics.6 On the epistemological level, 
metaphysical realism claims the (at least partial) epistemic accessibility of the 
mind-independent world. The claim is that through perception and/or through 
scientific theories, we gain knowledge of the nature of the external world, where 
knowledge is understood as justified, true belief. On the semantical level, meta-
physical realism claims that truth and reference are non-epistemic notions. 
Relations of truth and reference between language and reality are evidence-
transcendent: they hold whether or not we know them to hold. Most metaphysical 
realists defend a correspondence theory of truth and a causal theory of reference. 
Within this picture of the realism debate, internal realism is liable to be 
understood as the opposite of metaphysical realism. Framed as the counterpart of 
metaphysical realism, internal realism is characterized by the following claims. On 
the ontologjcal level, internal realism claims that the world as we know it is in 
some sense dependent on our conceptual activity. In what sense the world should 
be regarded mind-dependent is a delicate issue. For now, I will just add that the 
dependence should not, according to internal realism, be understood as causal 
dependence7. On the epistemological level, internal realism insists that, already at 
the perceptual level, our access to the world is shaped by conceptual activity that 
is both selective and constructive. The world is not a 'ready-made world' waiting 
to be discovered; we cut up the world into objects and kinds through the applica-
tion of categories that serve our practical or theoretical interests. This is not to say 
4See Devitt (1991a & b), Goldman (1986), Boyd (1984). 
sSee Vm Fraassen (1980). 
'See Lewis (1983). 
7See Putnam (1991:407). 
17 
that the world 'in itself is unknowable in principle. Rather, it is to say that the 
only sensible notion of world is a notion according to which the world is 
epistemically accessible to us since it is partly constituted by our conceptual 
schemes. On the semantical level, internal realism defies non-epistemic theories 
of truth and reference, as these theories appeal precisely to the notion of a com­
pletely independent, ready-made world that internal realists claim makes no sense. 
Truth and reference should not be conceived as radically evidence-transcendent. 
If truth and reference are not conceptually linked to epistemic notions such as 
verifiability or rational acceptability, internal realists argue, the door is open to 
skeptical worries about the accessibility of truth and reference. Internal realism is 
often associated with verificationist (Putnam) or deflationist (Rorty) theories of 
truth and reference. 
The picture of the realism controversy just sketched is, of course, too 
rough to capture the variety of sophisticated positions defended in this debate. 
Still, I will contend that it represents the standard view of what the realism debate 
is about, especially among metaphysical realists. The standard view emphasizes 
what I called the first interpretation of the conflict between metaphysical realism 
and internal realism, according to which a) the conflict is about the question what 
can be counted as real, and b) metaphysical realists and internal realists share a 
conception of what it means to be real. If we adopt this standard interpretation of 
the realism issue, internal realism is liable to appear as metaphysical antirealism. 
According to the second interpretation of the realism debate, which I shall 
defend, the conflict between metaphysical realism and internai realism is a conflict 
about the meaning of'realism', about the question what it means to be real. Taking 
this second interpretation as my lead, I shall argue that the above picture of the 
realism debate embodies four tacit assumptions about what it means to be a realist, 
which are taken for granted by metaphysical realists. The internal realist attitude 
towards these assumptions is much more critical, but not altogether dismissive. 
Internal realism, I shall argue, is ambiguous about the assumptions, which are the 
following: 
I Ontological questions, epistemologjcal questions and semantical questions 
constitute three independent levels of questions, which should be kept 
apart and be addressed separately. 
Π On the ontological level: to be real is to be mind-independent in a causal 
sense; accordingly, the realism issue is about the causal dependence or 
independence of the world 
ΠΙ On the epistemologica! level: the question of the epistemic accessibility 
of the world and the question of the nature of the world can intelligibly 
be distinguished and should be dealt with separately. 
18 
Г On the semantical level: the question of the nature of truth and reference 
and the question of the accessibility of truth and reference can intelligibly 
be distinguished and should be dealt with separately. 
I shall argue that, if one starts from the above assumptions about what it means 
to be a realist, the project of justifying our realist intuitions is bound to fail. 
Although metaphysical realists consider these tenets to be crucial for what it 
means to be a realist, I will argue that these tenets in fact make our realist intui­
tions come out as highly dubious assumptions. I will claim that the internal realist 
critique of metaphysical realism shows that, if one wants to defend realism on the 
above premises, the defence cannot but land one in a vicious circle. The internal 
realist critique reveals that 'metaphysical realism, while initially appealing to the 
realistic spirit in us, can be shown to be irreconcilable with that spirit' (Anderson, 
1992:51). Internal realism, in my reading, should be understood as an attempt to 
save our 'realist intuitions' by defending a different conception of what it means 
to be real. It tries to articulate a conception of the meaning of 'realism' that does 
not rely upon the above assumptions. In this sense, internal realism is 'rejecting 
"realism" in the name of the realistic spirit' (Putnam, 1990:42). 
Although I will argue that the internal realist critique of metaphysical 
realism shows the need for a different conception of what it means to be real, I 
will also argue that internal realism fails to articulate such a conception 
adequately. I will claim that, due to a fundamental ambiguity within the internal 
realist's attitude towards the above assumptions about the meaning of 'realism', 
internal realism is faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, internal realism still 
appeals to, or implicitly relies on, these assumptions. I will argue that insofar as 
it does, internal realism has legitimately been interpreted as 'metaphysical antirea-
lism' (the first interpretation I mentioned above)8. On the other hand, internal 
realism is an attack on the metaphysical realist's conception of the meaning of 
'realism' (the second interpretation). Ignoring the points at which it falls back on 
the above assumptions, it can be read as a rejection of the above assumptions 
about the meaning of 'realism'9. However, I will argue that insofar as internal 
realism consistently abandons the above assumptions, it in a sense blows itself up: 
the phrase 'internal' then loses its intelligibility. The problem with internal realism, 
I will argue, is that it is inherently unstable. Accepting the four standard assump-
8
 As will be explained below, especially the early formulations of internal realism, in Putnam (1981) and 
Rorty (1980), are susceptible to this interpretation. 
'Especially, I will point out below, in the later pitases of internal realism, as expressed in Putnam's and 
Rortys work form, roughly, 1988 onwards. 
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tions about the meaning of 'realism', it ends up in metaphysical antirealism. 
Rejecting them, internal realism cannot be stated intelligibly. 
Still, this does not mean that the four assumptions about the meaning of 
'realism' cannot be denied in an intelligible way. I will argue that John 
McDowell's Mind and World and Putnam's recent 'Dewey Lectures' point in the 
direction of a 'postmodem Aristotelian realism' that constitutes a denial of 
precisely these tenets. Postmodern Aristotelian realism or 'natural realism', as 
Putnam calls it, denies the standard picture of the meaning of 'realism' in the 
following way: 
I It rej ects the distinction between semantical, epistemologica] and ontologi-
cal questions as questions on separate levels. It claims that these levels are 
conceptually interdependent. 
II It rejects the equation of 'being real' with 'being mind-independent in a 
causal sense'. It holds that 'to be real' is 'to have meaning's mode of 
being1. It claims that to define 'real' in terms of causal mind-independence 
is not so much false as beside the point, the point being that the reality 
of meaning is sui generis: it cannot even notionally be split up into mind-
dependent items and mind-independent items. 
ΙΠ It rejects the idea that we can intelligibly separate the question of the 
nature of the world from the question of the epistemic accessibility of the 
world Accordingly, it holds that the (skeptical) notion of an ontological-
cum-epistemological gap between mind and world is not coherently 
statable. 
Г It rejects the idea that we can intelligibly separate the question of the 
nature of truth and reference and the question of our access to truth and 
reference. It suggests notions of truth and reference, which are realist 
without being non-epistemic. 
Postmodem Aristotelian realism seeks to do justice to our realist intuitions not by 
justifying them but by articulating them in such a way that the quest for 
justification does not arise. It denies that our realist intuitions are in need of 
justification. It tries to make way for a 'second naïveté' about our realist intuitions 
(Putnam, 1994a:458). Briefly put, the aim of this dissertation is to show that such 
a second naïveté is possible. 
To show the need for, and the possibility of, a postmodern version of 
Aristotelian realism, I will proceed in the following way. First, I will show how 
the four assumptions about the meaning of 'realism', from now on abbreviated as 
AMR, function within the debate between metaphysical realism and internal 
realism. The tacit presence of AMR is most clear in the context of the problem 
of truth and the related problem of reference. In chapter 1,1 will show how AMR 
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shapes the metaphysical realist's responses to the objections raised by internal 
realism to the correspondence theory of truth. Internal realists have objected to the 
correspondence notion of truth on the grounds that, first, it presupposes a 'God's 
Eye View1, and secondly, it presupposes the notion of'sentence-shaped chunks' in 
reality. I will argue that these internal realist objections allow for a naive and a 
sophisticated interpretation. Metaphysical realism can resist the naive version of 
these objections, since it does not question AMR. In the sophisticated inter-
pretation, however, the objections constitute an attack on AMR. I will claim that 
the standard metaphysical realist defence of the correspondence notion of truth is 
question-begging with respect to this attack. Furthermore, I will argue that 
explaining truth in terms of non-epistemic, causal relations of reference fails for 
the same reason. Finally, I will argue that recent proposals to disentangle the issue 
of realism from the issue of truth cannot save metaphysical realism. In particular, 
I will argue that Michael Devitt's conception of realism as an exclusively ontolo-
gjcal statement is either empty or dependent on unwarranted epistemological and 
semantical claims. I will conclude that, metaphysical realism, as an attempt to 
justify our realist intuitions, gets caught in a vicious circle. In sofar as one relies 
on AMR, a realist notion of truth cannot get off the ground 
In chapter 2,1 will sketch the internal realist's ambiguous relation to AMR 
by discussing Putnam's and Rortys accounts of truth and reference. Putnam's 
notion of truth as 'ideal rational acceptibility1 faces several difficulties, which 
Putnam seeks to alleviate by adopting a quietist attitude towards truth which, so 
I will argue, does not really fit in with his internal realist framework. I will argue 
that Putnam's internal realist approach to the problem of truth is ambivalent about 
AMR in that it equivocates between considering the skeptical question of the 
accessibility of truth a legitimate question (to be answered by a theory of truth) 
and rejecting this question as unintelligible. Rorty adopts an eliminativist approach 
to truth, according to which the concept of truth, while indispensable within 
semantics, is completely redundant within the (epistemological) realm of justifica-
tion. Although Rorty criticizes the correspondence theory for drawing a rigid 
distinction between the question of truth and the question of justification, he 
implicitly appeals to this very distinction (i.e. to AMR) in his own account of 
truth. I will argue that his proposal implies, absurdly, that we can make no sense 
of the notion of normativity anymore. As regards the internal realist conception 
of reference, the same ambivalent attitude towards AMR is at play. To distinguish 
internal realism from metaphysical antirealism, Putnam in his (1981) appeals to 
'experiential inputs', that put external constraints on reference. I will argue that the 
notion of 'experiential inputs' still relies on AMR and that it, paradoxically, 
justifies rather than undermines a reading of internal realism as metaphysical 
antirealism. On the other hand, I will argue that in his (1987), Putnam proposes 
a more thorough rejection of AMR, that opens the door to a 'commonsense' 
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realism about reference, which is neither metaphysical realist nor metaphysical 
antirealist. However, I will argue that insofar as AMR is consistently rejected, 
Putnam's notion of referential objects as 'internal to a conceptual scheme' must be 
abandoned. Within AMR, internal realism ends up with metaphysical antirealism 
Without AMR, internal realism cannot be formulated coherently. As regards 
reference, Rorty claims that our commonsense notion, according to which 
reference is fixed by our referential intentions, is not in need of philosophical 
back-up. Appealing to Davidson's argument against incommensurability, he argues 
that we do not need a 'stronger', i.e. metaphysical realist, notion of reference in 
order to avert the threat of idealism. However, in defending his position against 
the objection of idealism, Rorty falls back on AMR in two ways. First, he appeals 
to a notion of 'theory-independent causality', that does not make any sense by his 
own standards. Secondly, he presents his internal realist stance as a merely 
epistemological claim, whereas his attack on metaphysical realism implies that 
questions of epistemology cannot be separated from questions of ontology. I will 
argue that although Rortys account of reference points at a kind of commonsense 
realism that goes beyond AMR, his implicit reliance on AMR prevents him from 
articulating it in a convincing way. My overall claim in chapter 2 will be that 
internal realism either ends up in metaphysical anrirealism, or the phrase 'internal' 
carries no meaning. 
In chapter 3,1 will start articulating the conception of reality that results 
from rejecting AMR. I shall argue that John McDowell's Mind and World and 
Putnam's recent 'Dewey Lectures' should be interpreted as seeking to formulate a 
kind of realism that abandons AMR. This kind of realism I will call 'postmodem 
Aristotelian realism'. Characteristic of postmodern Aristotelian realism is that it 
is a 'realism without empiricism'. It abandons empiricism in rejecting the so-called 
'Myth of the Given' or 'third dogma of empiricism': the dualism of non-conceptual 
content and conceptual scheme. McDowell argues that to do justice to the realist 
intuition that the world rationally constrains our empirical thinking, we should 
reject the Given without however embracing coherentism, i.e. the view that the 
link between belief and experience is only causal and not cognitive. To dismount 
from the seesaw between the Myth of the Given and coherentism, we should 
conceive of our perceptual access to the world as both direct and conceptual in 
nature. According to this view, sensory impressions already possess conceptual 
content. In other words, perception does not 'start with' non-conceptual input 
which forms an intermediary or interface between us and the world McDowell 
argues in favour of a notion of experience as Openness to the world' or 'respon-
siveness to meaning'. I will discuss two objections to the 'image of openness': the 
argument from theory-ladenness and the argument from illusion. I will argue that 
both arguments are question-begging in that they presuppose rather than prove the 
viability of the interface view of perception (and conception). Finally, I will try 
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to elucidate the notion of openness to the world in terms of the idea that in 
perception, mind and world are formally identical. The notion of formal identity 
is meant to express the point that rejecting the modem interface theory of 
perception means rejecting the idea that mind and world belong to distinct 
ontological realms, between which an epistemologjcal gulf yawns. 
In chapter 4,1 will argue that to make available a notion of experience as 
openness to the world, we need to reconsider our notion of world If we are to 
make sense of 'responsiveness to meaning1, we have to reject the modem notion 
of nature as devoid of meaning. Postmodem Aristotelian realism is a 'realism 
without physicalism' in that it rejects the equation of nature with the 'thinned-out 
world' of physics. I will argue that rejecting physicalism is not incompatible with 
modern science (as Bumyeat holds), since physicalism is a questionable 
philosophical interpretation of science. McDowell argues that we should recognize 
both the 'realm of law", described by physics, and the 'realm of meaning' to be part 
of nature. I will consider two objections to McDowell's proposed 'partial re-
enchantment of nature', as applied to the theory of perception. I will argue that 
these objections can only be overcome by pushing the re-enchantment further, i.e. 
by conceiving of the realm of meaning as not just autonomous, but as conceptual-
ly prior to the realm of law. This involves arguing that the notion of 'respon-
siveness to meaning' is presupposed by information-processing accounts of 
perception, rather than explained -let alone explained away- by it. According to 
the resulting picture, the world coincides with the realm of meaning. Next, I will 
consider the claim that postmodem Aristotelian realism is a form of idealism. I 
will argue that this objection mistakes the point of McDowell's notion of world. 
Trie point is that, although the world is causally independent of the mind, it is not 
'external to' the space of reasons, in the sense that the world is essentially 
'embraceable by thought'. The point of postmodern Aristotelian realism is that the 
notion of a reality inaccessible in principle violates the limits of sense. 
In chapter 5,1 will return to the issue of truth and reference. Postmodern 
Aristotelian realism suggests a notion of truth which is realist without being non-
epistemic. I shall explicate this notion by considering Putnam's claim that while 
truth transcends justifiability, truth and justifiability are nevertheless conceptually 
connected. Moreover, I will discuss in what sense McDowell adopts an identity 
theory of truth, which states that the relation between true propositions and reality 
is a relation of identity rather than correspondence. I will argue that the 
postmodem Aristotelian's account of truth does not run foul of the God's Eye 
View objection and the sentence-shaped chunks objection, which were seen to 
undermine the correpondence theory of truth. I will briefly indicate in what sense 
postmodern Aristotelianism makes available a realist notion of reference, which 
does not conceive of referential relations as non-epistemic, causal relations. In the 
second part of chapter 5,1 shall argue that what makes postmodem Aristotelian 
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realism postmodern is that it is a conceptual claim about the intelligibility of 
skepticism, rather than a re-endorsement of Aristotle's ontologjcal-cwm-
epistemological claims. The notion oí second in 'second naïveté' expresses the fact 
that 'Aristotelian innocence' is only available to us as a formal claim about the 
intelligibility of the modem 'problem of realism'. According to postmodern Aris-
totelianism, the aim of philosophy is not to counter skepticism but to provide a 




The realism debate is marked by two different questions, which should be 
carefully distinguished The first concerns the question what it means to be a 
realist about (some part of) the world, the second question is about what parts of 
the world can justifiedly be considered real. During the past two decades, the 
realism debate has been dominated by the controversy between metaphysical 
realism and internal realism. In this controversy, both of the above questions are 
at play, but often they are not distinguished explicitly. This has led to a certain 
amount of confusion. Symptomatic of this confusion is the fact that both 
metaphysical realists and internal realists call themselves realists. Nonetheless, 
metaphysical realists generally regard internal realism as a form of antirealism or 
even idealism. Internal realists, on the other hand, argue that metaphysical realism 
is compatible with a thoroughgoing skepticism, which poses a threat to realism. 
Since both metaphysical realists and internal realists claim to be realist, and since 
both accuse one another of antirealism, it is clear that within this conflict, different 
conceptions are at work about what it is to be a realist. What these different 
conceptions exactly amount to, however, is not clear, as the conflict between 
metaphysical realism and internal realism is marked by a persistent ambiguity 
about the question which it addresses. Both positions equivocate between 
answering the question what can be counted as real and the question what it 
means to be real. 
In this chapter, I will illustrate this ambiguity by discussing the problem 
of truth as it figures in the controversy between metaphysical realism and internal 
realism. The purpose of this chapter is to establish that 1) the best interpretation 
of the conflict about truth conceives of it as a conflict about the meaning of 
'realism', and 2) if interpreted this way, the metaphysical realist's defence of the 
correspondence theory of truth fails to address the objections raised by internal 
realism. 
Metaphysical realism is widely considered to be intimately connected with 
a particular conception of truth, the so-called 'correspondence theory of truth'. In 
section 1.1 I will explain the nature of this connection and I will briefly sketch 
several versions of the correspondence theory. In section 1.21 will present the two 
major objections to the correspondence theory of truth, raised by internal realists: 
the 'God's Eye View objection' and the 'sentence-shaped chunks objection'. I will 
argue that we should distinguish between a naive and a sophisticated version of 
these objections. The metaphysical realist's standard replies to the internal realist 
critique of correspondence manage to get round the naive version of the 
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objections. In the sophisticated version, the objections constitute an attack on 
AMR. If we pursue this reading, I will argue in section 1.3, the metaphysical 
realist's standard responses to the internal realist objections come out as question-
begging. They take for granted the viability of AMR, in particular the distinction 
between the question of the nature of truth and the question of the accessibility 
of truth. However, a sophisticated reading of the internal realist objection shows 
this distinction to be untenable. It shows that, starting from AMR, a realist 
account of truth cannot get off the ground. In section 1.4 I will consider the 
metaphysical realist's appeal to causal relations of reference as a way of 
explicating the correspondence notion of truth. I shall argue that this appeal fails 
to succeed if we interpret Putnam's critique of the causal theory of reference as 
questioning AMR, in particular as questioning the distinction metaphysical realists 
draw between the level of ontological claims and the level of epistemologica! 
claims. In section 1.51 will consider a second route of escape for the metaphysical 
realist, suggested by Michael Devitt, who proposes a radical separation of the 
issue of truth and the issue of realism. Although Devitt, by redefining realism, 
directly addresses the question of the meaning of 'realism', his position only 
provides an explicit statement, rather than a defence, of AMR. I will argue that 
his proposal to conceive realism in ontological terms solely faces a dilemma: it 
makes metaphysical realism either empty or dependent on unwarranted semantical 
and epistemological claims. 
1.1 Metaphysical realism and the correspondence theory of truth 
Metaphysical realism is widely considered to be essentially linked to a particular 
conception of truth. According to this conception, truth is non-epistemic: the 
nature of truth is independent of, and can be accounted for without mentioning, 
our means of knowing truth. Both proponents and opponents of metaphysical 
realism see an important connection between metaphysical realism and a non-
epistemic notion of truth, as will be clear from the following quotes. Newton-
Smith considers 'the minimal common factor among all realists' to be 
the claim that the sentences of scientific theories are true or false as the 
case may be in virtue of how the world is independently of ourselves 
(1981:21). 
If we look at the list of definitions of realism provided by Jarrett Leplin in his 
editorial introduction to a collection of papers about realism, nearly all of them 
are phrased in terms of non-epistemic truth (Leplin, 1984:1,2). Similarly, Alvin 
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Goldman considere 'the principle of verification-transcendent truth' crucial to 
realism; this principle states that 
a statement is true or false independently of our knowledge, or verifica-
tion, of it (or even our ability to verify it). (..) To put it another way, truth 
must not be an epistemic matter (1986:143). 
Putnam puts the idea that non-epistemic truth is essential to metaphysical realism 
in the following way: 
According to metaphysical realists, the world could be such that the 
theory we were most justified in accepting would not really be true in the 
realist sense. (..) Rational acceptability -even in the ideal limit- is one 
thing, and truth is another. In this sense, the metaphysical realist views 
truth as radically non-epistemic (1994b:352). 
Dummett goes so far as saying that metaphysical realism can be defined exhaus-
tively in terms of a non-epistemic notion of truth: 
Realism I characterize as the belief that statements of the disputed class 
possess an objective truth-value, independently of our means of knowing 
it: they are true or false in virtue of a reality existing independently of us 
(Dummett, 1978:146). 
Both proponents and opponents of metaphysical realism thus consider non-
epistemic truth essential to metaphysical realism.1 To make the link between 
metaphysical realism and non-epistemic truth transparant, it may be helpful to 
reconsider the three-levelled picture of the realism debate, sketched in the Intro-
duction. According to this picture, metaphysical realism consists of three claims: 
respectively ontological, epistemological and semantical in nature. On the 
ontologjcal level, metaphysical realists claim the existence of a mind-independent 
world. On the epistemological level, they claim the (at least partial) knowability 
of this world. On the semantical level, they claim that truth and reference are non-
epistemic relations which hold between language and mind-independent reality. 
It is not very hard to see that the metaphysical realist's semantical stance can be 
linked up with his ontological claim. The very idea of a mind-independent world 
suggests the idea that our statements about the world, if true, are true in virtue of 
'Metaphysical realism is in a similar way associated with the correspondence theory of truth by Putnam 
(1990 30-31), Rorty (1980.294,1991:2,9,22,80,128) and Fine (1984b 52,54). In the final section of this chapter, 
I will consider a deviating position in this respect, which has been put forward by Michael Devitt 
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the mind-independent world's being as stated. And the very idea of evidence-trans-
cendent truth involves the notion of mind-independent facts which make our 
statements true or false whether we know this or not. So, the ontologjcal notion 
of 'mind-independent reality" and the semantical notion of 'non-epistemic truth' 
seem to fit like hand in glove.2 
If one defends a non-epistemic notion of truth, it is natural to conceive of 
truth as a relation oí correspondence between statements (sentences or propositi-
ons) and mind-independent reality. Metaphysical realists have put forward 
different conceptions of the nature of the correspondence-relation. Their reasons 
for defending one particular conception rather than another will be discussed in 
the following two sections. For now, I will just mention them briefly. In my view, 
three kinds of correspondence theories should be distinguished: 
a) correspondence as resemblance 
According to the resemblance theory, the correspondence relation should be under-
stood as a representational relation between propositions, or their constituents, and 
non-propositional reality. According to this notion, 'there is a structural isomor-
phism between truth-bearers and the facts to which they correspond when the 
truth-bearer is true' (Kirkham, 1992:119). О as Moser summarizes this notion: 
'the truth of a proposition consists in its picturing, in terms of isomorphic 
representation, the way things actually are' (Moser, 1989:24). The 'resemblance' 
or 'picture' theory of truth is often attributed to the early Wittgenstein3. According 
to the Tractatus, we should distinguish between elementary and complex proposi­
tions. An elementary proposition is a configuration of terms which is made true 
by a configuration of simple objects, called an 'atomic fact'. An atomic fact 
corresponds to an elementary proposition when their configurations are identical 
and when the terms in the proposition refer to the similarly-placed objects in the 
fact. The truth value of each complex proposition is entailed by the truth values 
of the elementary ones (Sosa & Dancy, 1992:510). 
b) correspondence asfittingness 
According to Alvin Goldman, the resemblance notion of correspondence mistaken­
ly suggests that truth is a matter of 'passively mirroring' nature. He argues that it 
should be replaced by a notion of correspondence as fittingness: 'the sense in 
2At this stage, I only wish to point out why, to many authors, there seems to be a natural link between the 
metaphysical realist's ontologica] stance and the correspondence notion of truth. However, since the claim that 
there is a conceptual link between the two has not remained undisputed, it can only be affirmed after a critical 
discussion of Devitt (1991), who explicitly denies that there is such a link. This will be the subject of the last 
section of this chapter 
3See Dancy & Sosa (1992 510), Goldman (1986 151), Newton Smith (1981 29). 
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which clothes fit a body1 (Goldman, 1986:152). The latter metaphor has the 
advantage of doing more justice to the 'categorizing and statement-creating activity 
of the cognizer-speaker'. This activity may be compared to the elements of style 
and convention at work in designing clothes for the human body. Style and 
convention determine the conditions of fittingness for a given type of garment. 
Whether a given 'garment token' actually satisfies these conditions with respect to 
a particular wearer's body, however, is not a matter of convention. It depends on 
the shape of the particular body. The analogy with truth is this: although it is we 
who specify the conditions offittingness, i.e. truth for a particular proposition, the 
satisfaction or nonsatisfation of these conditions depends on the world. 'Conditions 
of truth are laid down not by the world, but only by thinkers or speakers. (..) 
Truth and falsity, then, consists in the world's "answering" or "not answering" to 
whatever truth-conditions are in question' (Goldman, 1986:153). 
c) correspondence as correlation 
A third notion of correspondence has been proposed by, among others, Austin 
(1950), White (1970) and recently by Moser (1989). According to these authors, 
neither the notion of resemblance nor that offittingness captures the nature of the 
correspondence relation. They prefer to view truth in terms of a relation of 
correlation. In White (1970), two senses of 'correspondence' are distinguished: 
'correspondence with' and 'correspondence to'. 'Correspondence with' is similar to 
fittingness. It applies for instance to a key corresponding with (i.e. fitting) a key­
hole. White argues that this sense of correspondence is not appropriate to grasp 
the relation between proposition and fact. It misleadingly suggests a congruence 
or fit between two things. Instead, he proposes 'correspondence to' as the adequate 
notion. 'Correspondence to' marks a relation of correlation, similar to the way in 
which a rank in the army can correspond to a rank in the navy. As Austin has put 
it, the correspondence between the truth bearer and the world should be viewed 
as 'absolutely and purely conventional' (Austin, 1950:124). Paul Moser has tried 
to elucidate the idea of truth as correlation by appeal to Aristotle's definition of 
correspondence, which he rephrases in the following way: 
The claim that a proposition, P, is true means that things are as they are 
stated to be by Ρ (Moser, 1989:26). 
According to Moser, this is a 'minimal correspondence definition', which does not 
involve the notion of one-to-one correspondence relations, or isomorphic represen­
tation, between true propositions and features of the world (Moser, 1989:27). 
Proponents of the correlation notion hold that 'a truth bearer as a whole is 
correlated to a state of affairs as a whole' (Kirkham, 1992:118). Accordingly, it 
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only requires 'the notion of a proposition's stating how things actually are 
(ibid.34). 
Although the above three notions of correspondence are competing accounts of 
truth, they agree on the non-epistemic nature of truth. To put it differently, they 
reject verificationist theories of truth, which define truth in terms of epistemic 
notions such as verifiability, warranted assertibility, or rational acceptibility. Meta-
physical realists insist that, while these latter notions may qualify as criteria of 
truth, they cannot be offered as definitions of truth. 
1.2 Objections to the correspondence theory raised by internal realism 
Criticism of the correspondence theory makes for a long-standing tradition in 
philosophy. A common feature of correspondence theories is that they employ the 
notion of a truth bearer (beliefs, propositions, sentences, etcetera), the notion of 
a truth maker (facts, situations, states of affairs, etcetera) and the notion of a truth-
making relation (resemblance, fittingness or correlation). Accordingly, three kinds 
of criticism have been levelled against the correspondence theory, concerning the 
nature of the truth bearer, the nature of the truth maker and the nature of the 
relation between truth bearer and truth maker.4 
Since the purpose of this chapter is to give a diagnosis of the controversy 
between metaphysical realism and internal realism, I will only focus on the objec-
tions as put forward within this contemporary debate. Within this debate, the 
question of the nature of the truth-bearer plays a minor part. The problem of what 
sort of thing can have truth value, i.e. what sort ofthing can be true or false, has 
been answered in various ways (see Kirkham, 1992:54-58). To name some can-
didates: truth bearers may be conceived as beliefs, statements, propositions, 
judgements, sentences, sentence types, sentence tokens, assertions, utterances or 
speech acts. Nowadays, most proponents of correspondence theories have nomina-
list inclinations; they by and large agree that truth bearers are to be identified with 
sentences or sentence tokens rather than with propositions (Deviti, 1991a:27, 
Kirkham, 1992:63-66). Moreover, many authors argue that the question of the 
nature of truth bearers is not relevant to the question of the validity of cor-
respondence theories.5 These two considerations account for the current lack of 
interest in the question of the nature of truth-bearers. Below, I will follow the 
prevailing consensus in the sense that I shall ignore this question. I will simply 
'See White ( 1970:103), Kirkham (1992:134), Armour, (1969:29-80). 
sSee White (1970:103), Kirkham (1992:59-66), Vision (1988:27). 
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use the term 'statement' to indicate the truth-bearer, however conceived. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that from the perspective of an Aristotelian realist 
view of truth, which will be discussed in chapter 5, the question what counts as 
a truth-bearer regains relevance.6 
Internal realists have raised two major objections to correspondence 
theories of truth. One objection concerns the nature of the truth-making relation 
and the other focuses on the nature of truth-makers. As to the first issue, internal 
realists have argued that the notion of a correspondence relation between 
statements and the world is untenable since it presupposes the possibility of a 
'God's Eye View1. Regarding the second issue, they have argued that the notion 
of a truth-making fact is untenable, since it forces us to posit peculiar 'sentence-
shaped chunks' in reality. I will argue that the internal realist objections permit 
two interpretations: a naive and a sophisticated one. In this section I will sketch 
the naive version of the objections and the metaphysical realist's reply to them. In 
section 1.3 I shall argue that there is a more sophisticated version of the internal 
realist objections, which constitutes an attack on AMR. If the objections are 
interpreted this way, the metaphysical realist's replies will tum out question-
begging. 
1.2.1 The naive version of the God's Eye View objection and the 
metaphysical realist's standard reply 
The first objection to correspondence notions of truth, raised by internal realism, 
is widely known as the 'God's Eye View objection'. The drift of the objection, in 
its 'naive version', is captured by the following quote from Arthur Fine: 
The problem is one of access. The correspondence relation would map 
true statements (..) to states of affairs. But if we want to conpare a 
statement with its corresponding state of affairs, how do we proceed?... 
The difficulty is that whatever we observe, or, more generously, whatever 
we causally interact with, is certainly not independent of us. This is the 
problem of'reciprocity. Moreover, whatever information we retrieve from 
such interaction is, prima facie, information about interacted-with things. 
This is the problem oí contamination. (Fine, 1986:151) 
The phenomena of'reciprocity" and 'contamination' point at the fact that we cannot 
have direct, unmediated access to the facts or states of affairs which are alleged 
to correspond with our sentences. So the problem is that there is no theory-neutral 
'See Putnam (1994a) Although my discussion of truth in chapter 5 implicitly touches the issue of what 
counts as a truth-bearer, I will not explicitly address this question. 
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point of view from which to judge whether a relation of correspondence obtains 
between a sentence and the world. As Gupta puts it: 'conflicting theories cannot 
be adjudicated by turning to correspondence to the real "goings on" in (..) the 
world as such' (Gupta, 1993:321). Or as Putnam puts it, 'to single out a corres-
pondence between domains one needs some independent access to both domains' 
(Putnam, 1981:74). But to have independent access, one would have to transcend 
all conceptual schemes and take up a God's Eye View. To assess the extent to 
which a proposition or sentence corresponds to reality, one would have to obtain 
unmediated access to reality, which is impossible. In this sense, the internal realist 
argues, the correspondence theory of truth asks us to 'climb outside of our own 
minds' (Rorty, 1991:7), forces us to 'stand outside the arena' (Fine, 1984a: 99), in 
short requires a God's Eye View (Putnam, 1981:49). 
The standard metaphysical realist response to the God's Eye View 
objection is to point out that it mistakes the intent of the correspondence theory 
of truth.7 The common reaction is to agree that, indeed, the correspondence theory 
does not tell us how we know whether a sentence corresponds to reality. But this 
cannot be a viewed as a drawback of the correspondence theory, since the theory 
does not intend to provide us with criteria or tests of truth in the first place. 
As Vision puts it: 
Correspondence is not primarily a theory about ways of discovering that 
a statement is true. (..) Correspondence does not require that the relation 
making a statement true be an especially handy or helpful method for our 
discovering whether it is true. (Vision, 1988:34/5) 
The point of correspondence theories is to give a definition of truth, which 
captures the nature of truth. According to many metaphysical realists, the God's 
Eye View objection to correspondence-truth is guilty of confusing the question of 
the definition of truth with the question of the test of truth. In other words, 
internal realists fail to distinguish between the ontologjcal question of the nature 
of truth and the epistemological question of the accessibility of truth. In accusing 
correspondence theorists of aspiring to a God's Eye View, internal realists are 
rejecting the correspondence theory for reasons that would apply only if the 
correspondence notion of truth be conceived as a test of truth, i.e. as a criterion 
of justified belief. However, as Rescher has pointed out, 'the correspondence 
theory is doubtless best construed as attempting to answer the question of the 
definition of truth' (Rescher, 1973:9). In this construal, correspondence theories 
7The standard response has been put forward by, among others, Moser (1989:31,33), Vision (1988:17,34/5), 
Kirkham, (1992:25/6), Trigg (1993:46), Goldman (1986:144), Devitt (1991:4,39-60), Horwich (1990:8,54,60,124) 
and Rescher (1973:9,23-31). 
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define the nature of truth. To find out if a relation of correspondence between 
language and reality actually obtains is the subject of a different quest. As 
Kirkham urges, determining the nature of truth does not and need not supply us 
with criteria we could actually use to determine if a proposition is true: 
We cannot (..) directly apprehend whether or not a given proposition 
agrees with reality (..). Hence, being told that agreement with reality is the 
sole necessary and sufficient condition for truth is of little help in 
deciding whether a given proposition is probably true. ..It is the justifica­
tion project that attempts to provide a practical criterion for truth. It 
attempts to identify some characteristic that, though it may be among the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for truth, correlates well (though 
perhaps imperfectly) with truth and whose possession or nonpossession by 
a given statement can be determined with relative ease. (Kirkham, 
1992:25,26) 
Distinguishing the project of defining truth from the 'justification project' is meant 
to bring out the point that the notion of correspondence does not depend for its 
intelligibility on an account of the accessibility of truth. Metaphysical realists thus 
claim that the correspondence notion of truth is not damaged by the God's Eye 
View objection. Moser puts the point very clearly: 
As a definition, the (..) correspondence approach has no bearing what­
soever on the issue whether we can compare propositions with uncon-
ceptualized reality (Moser, 1989:31) 
1.2.2 The naive version of the sentence-shaped chunks objection and the meta­
physical realist's standard reply 
The second objection to the correspondence notion of truth, raised by internal 
realism, may be called the 'sentence-shaped chunks' objection. This objection 
concerns the notion of facts as truth-makers, involved in correspondence theories. 
The best known recent formulation of this criticism, which goes back to Strawson, 
is Davidson's. He argues that 'the chief difficulty1 for correspondence theories 'is 
in finding a notion of fact that explains anything, that does not lapse, when spelled 
out, into the trivial or the empty1 (Davidson, 1984:37). Correspondence theories 
claim that true sentences correspond with mind-independent facts. But if we try 
to identify these facts, we find that there is no way of distinguishing facts except 
by predications of truth. To say that the statement that/7 corresponds to the facts, 
or to the fact that p, is just to say that the statement that ρ is true. The only way 
in which we can conceive of facts is to conceive of them as the kinds of entities 
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that would exactly and uniquely correspond to sentences or propositions. But if 
facts are distinguished as finely as statements, we cannot hope to explain truth by 
appeal to them (Davidson, 1984:43). As Vision puts the objection: 
The fit is too good. There are not statement-exclusive ways of identifying 
or individuating facts. We conclude that our 'fact' vocabulary, instead of 
providing a means for discoursing about an independent realm of potential 
non-linguistic correlates for our utterances, merely supplies a stylistic 
variant for presenting the contents of statements claimed to be true. (...) 
Facts should be identifiable independently of specifications that are also 
identifications of their correlative statements (Vision, 1988:53). 
Talk of facts simply does not add anything to talk of truth. Moreover, talk of facts 
forces us 'to bloat our ontology with what Collingwood called "a kind of ghostly 
double of the grammarian's sentence" ' (Putnam, 1994b:301). By insisting on the 
existence of facts which cannot be identified independently of predications of 
truth, the metaphysical realist gets stuck with peculiar 'sentence-shaped chunks' in 
his ontology. 
Metaphysical realists have responded differently to this objection. I will 
distinguish two responses. The first reaction to the 'sentence-shaped chunks' 
objection is to reject the resemblance notion of correspondence in favour of the 
fittingness or correlation notion of correspondence. The idea is that it is only if 
correspondence is conceived as isomorphic representation that we are forced to 
embrace the notion of sentence-shaped chunks. The second response is to argue 
that although facts are epistemically accessible only via true sentences, they can 
still be conceived as ontologically independent. 
Before discussing these two responses, I briefly want to point at one other 
possible response to the sentence-shaped chunks objection, that I will discuss later 
in a different context. This response is to understand the correspondence notion 
of truth in terms of Tarski's so-called 'semantic conception of truth'. To put it very 
briefly, Tarski suggests that the key to understanding the concept of truth is the 
idea of disquotation. To understand Ρ is true, where Ρ is a sentence in quotes, just 
'disquote' Ρ - take off the the quotation marks. Kg. 
'Snow is white' is true 
means 
Snow is white 
To define truth in terms of its disquotational feature may seem to provide a way 
of explicating correspondence that avoids the notion of sentence-shaped chunks. 
However, the problem is that Tarski's definition of truth is philosophically neutral 
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with regard to the question of realism The equivalence of Ρ is true and Ρ does 
not say anything about how the disquoted sentence Ρ should be interpreted in 
ontological or epistemological terms. To regard 'true' as a device for 'semantic 
ascent', i.e. to regard 'Snow is white' as equi-assertible with ' "Snow is white" is 
true', does not commit one epistemologically or metaphysically (Putnam, 1978:10, 
see also 46). Thus, considering Tarski's definition as an exhaustive account of 
truth is actually to claim that the issue of truth is indifferent to the issue of 
realism This claim has been defended by both metaphysical realists (e.g. Deviti) 
and internal realists (e.g. Rorty). Devitt's position will be under discussion in 
section 1.4. In chapter 2, section 2.2,1 will go into Rorty*s view on this issue. For 
now, I just want to make clear that an appeal to Tarski does not help the 
metaphysical realist who purports to offer a substantial (i.e. ontologjcally 
committed), non-epistemic notion of correspondence. 
I will presently rum to the first response put forward by metaphysical 
realists against the claim that the correspondence theory of truth involves the 
notion of sentence-shaped chunks. According to this response, it is only if 
correspondence is considered to be one-to-one relation of resemblance between 
parts of sentences and parts of reality, that we have to think of facts as 'sentence-
shaped items'. Moreover, starting from this notion of correspondence as isomor­
phic representation, it gets very difficult to account for negative, conditional and 
disjunctive facts (Moser, 1989:25). The correspondence theory is however not 
necessarily linked to the notion of resemblance or isomorphic representation. One 
alternative, proposed by Goldman, is to understand correspondence as a kind of 
'fittingness'. The other, defended by White and Moser, is to conceive of 
correspondence as 'correlation'. Proponents of both the 'fittingness' and the 
'correlation' view of correspondence claim that they are able to avoid the 
'sentence-shaped chunks objection'. 
Goldman argues that the correspondence theory need not portray the world 
as being 'prestructured into truthlike entities', since the world need not resemble, 
but only answer, the truth-conditions for a statement. The notion of 'truth-like 
entities' is, according to Goldman, inescapable only if we hold that it is the world 
which 'contains' the truth-conditions for a statement. But the metaphysical realist 
can go along with the idea that specifying truth-conditions involves the 'catego­
rizing and statement-creating activity of the cognizer-speaker1, which is determined 
by convention and style. He should point out that, although it is we who specify 
which conditions must be satisfied, it is the world that determines whether these 
conditions are satisfied or not. 
Goldman's answer to the 'sentence-shaped chunks objection' is somewhat 
similar to the response to this objection by the defenders of a correlation notion 
of correspondence. As mentioned in the previous section, proponents of a correla­
tion notion of truth hold that a truth bearer as a whole is conventionally correlated 
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to a state of affairs as a whole. They reject the idea of facts which exactly mirror 
the constituents of true propositions. According to Moser, understanding 
correspondence as correlation relieves the notion of a truth-making fact of its con­
troversial implications. The ontological import of the 'minimal correspondence 
definition' is innocuous, he argues. The only notion required to make sense of this 
correlation relation is that of 'a proposition's stating how things actually are 
(Moser, 1989:34).8 The notion of Tiow things are' is perfectly commonsensical, 
Moser claims. It cannot be accused of ontological queerness. Moreover, it enables 
us to handle negative, conditional and disjunctive facts quite easily (ibid.). Thus, 
both Goldman and Moser argue that the correspondence theory of truth is immune 
to the sentence-shaped chunks objection once we drop the resemblance notion of 
correspondence. 
The second reply to the sentence-shaped chunks objection has been 
formulated by Vision, and partly by Kirkham. Vision argues that the sentence-
shaped chunks objection is ambiguous. The objection can be interpreted I) as 
claiming the reductive identity of facts and true sentences, or Π) as claiming the 
logical dependency of facts on truth. In the first case, the objection claims that 
there are no facts in addition to true sentences. In the second case, it claims that 
we cannot know that there are facts independently of knowing that some sentences 
are true. Vision argues that only the first interpretation poses a real threat to the 
correspondence theory. However, according to Vision, internal realists can only 
establish the second, weaker version of the objection. 
Vision argues that from the claim that we cannot identify or individuate 
a fact save by mentioning its corresponding sentence, it does not follow that there 
are no facts. The reason it does not follow is that claiming the non-existence of 
facts constitutes only one possible explanation for the lack of independent criteria 
for identifying facts. Vision claims 'there are many other potential explanations for 
the absence of differentiating formulations. For example, the absence may be due 
to a scarcity of vocabulary and syntactic structures, or to an inflexibility in our 
language for inventing new forms of expression' (Vision, 1988:55). Given the 
possibility of alternative explanations, internal realists can only establish Π), which 
is too weak to defeat fact-based correspondence theories. 
Vision realizes that merely to point at the possibility of rival explanations 
is not altogether convincing. So he goes on arguing that there is in fact a plausible 
alternative explanation for the lack of'differentiating formulations', that does not 
injure the claim that facts can have a distinct identity. To account for the impos­
sibility of identifying facts save by predications of truth, we should recognize that 
'the causes leading us to note facts are largely the same as those for which we 
"Cf. White (1970:79-87). 
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could be expected to utilize statements' (Vision, 1988:55). Vision argues that 
statements and facts are ontologically different, but since making statements and 
noting facts are caused by the same things in the world, statements and facts 
cannot be separately identified on the epistemological level. 
It is not that talk about facts and talk about statements are talk about the 
same things, but rather that talk about facts and statements themselves 
(not talk about them) talk about the same things. (Vision, 1988:55) 
So far, Vision has claimed that there can be ontological differences which do not 
appear at the epistemological level. Furthermore, he has argued that there is a 
plausible explanation of why this situation arises in the case of facts and state­
ments. Vision's argument is not finished yet. He is aware of the fact that internal 
realists will point out that postulating an ontological difference which does not 
make any difference on the фійегпок^саі level is suspicious. Therefore, Vision 
goes on to state the ontological difference between facts and statements explicitly. 
Facts cause things, while true statements cannot. Surely, the act of stating a 
statement can have causal impact, but a statement in the sense of its content, i.e. 
in the sense in which statements could be identical to facts, cannot. In a similar 
vein, Kirkham points out that 'facts can enter into causal relations in a way that 
true sentences cannot' (138). Hence, there is a general feature displayed by facts 
and not by statements, which accounts for their ontological difference. 
So far, I have discussed two objections against the correspondence theory 
of truth raised by internal realism. Furthermore, I have sketched the metaphysical 
realist replies to these objections. In the following section I will discuss whether 
these replies constitute a sufficient rebuttal of the internal realist's worries. 
1J The impossibility of a non-circular defence of truth as correspondence 
In this section I will argue that the standard metaphysical realist answers to the 
internal realist's twofold criticism of the correspondence theory are question-
begging. In both cases, I will argue, the reply takes for granted the very distinc­
tions that internal realism seeks to attack. A sophisticated interpretation of the 
internal realist objections reads these objections as an attack on AMR. In this 
reading, the metaphysical realist's standard replies do not suffice to save the cor­
respondence theory of truth. As a reminder, I here repeat the content of AMR: 
I Ontological questions, epistemological questions and semantical questions 
constitute three independent levels of questions, which should be kept 
apart and be addressed separately. 
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Π On the ontologica! level: to be real is to be mind-independent in a causal 
sense; accordingly, the realism issue is about the causal dependence or 
independence of the world 
Ш On the epistemologjcal level: the question of the epistemic accessibility 
of the world and the question of the nature of the world can intelligibly 
be distinguished and should be dealt with separately. 
Г On the semantical level: the question of the nature of truth and reference 
and the question of the accessibility of truth and reference can intelligibly 
be distinguished and should be dealt with separately. 
I will contend that what strength the metaphysical realist defence of truth as 
correspondence has depends on a naive reading of the internal realist objections, 
that leaves AMR intact. In a more sophisticated reading of the objections, 
however, the apparent obviousness of AMR fades away. What the internal realist 
objections show, I will argue, is that, starting from AMR, a realist theory of truth 
cannot get off the ground. 
1.3.1 The sophisticated version of the God's Eye View objection and the failure 
of the metaphysical realist's standard reply 
As regards the 'God's Eye View* objection to correspondence theories, the meta­
physical realist's answer clearly relies on separating the question of the nature of 
truth from the question of the accessibility of truth. Starting from this separation, 
worries about the accessibility of the correspondence relation seem misguided as 
an objection to correspondence as the definition of truth. Metaphysical realists 
argue that the question of the epistemic accessibility of truth is simply not 
addressed by the correspondence theory of truth. The problem of access is claimed 
to belong to the 'project of justification', which is the quest for criteria of justified, 
true belief. 
The first thing to note about this separation of projects is that the quest 
for criteria of truth cannot be pursued without already having a definition of truth. 
The 'justification project', as Kirkham calls it, aims at finding criteria which are 
indicative of truth. Truth serves as a regulator for testing standards of evidence or 
justifiability. Thus, in arguing for specific criteria of justification, one implicitly 
takes a stance towards the question of the nature or definition of truth. As 
Davidson puts it, 'it is clear that the two issues are related, since what falls under 
the concept obviously depends on what the concept is' (Davidson, 1990a: 280). 
Justification must be defined or analyzed with reference to truth, so the concept 
of justification presupposes the concept of truth. Moreover, the very quest for 
truth-linked criteria as a separate proj ect only makes sense against the background 
of a non-epistemic notion of truth. It is only when an intrinsic link between the 
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concept of truth and the concept of justification is denied, that we need a separate 
theory of justification that links up justification criteria with truth. Thus, the 
metaphysical realist's concept of a separate 'justification project' is premised on a 
conception of truth as non-epistemic. 
This connection, however, need not threaten the distinction between the 
nature and the accessibility of truth, which underlies the metaphysical realist's 
reply to the God's Eye View objection. The metaphysical realist may grant that 
the project of defining truth is prior to the justification project. This hierarchical 
relation does not really affect the distinction between the nature of truth and the 
test of truth. This distinction would be affected, however, if there was shown to 
be a conceptual dependency the other way around as well. If the metaphysical 
realist's definition of truth as correspondence somehow relied on the availability 
of truth-linked criteria, the question of the nature of truth could not be answered 
independently from the question whether the justification project is succesful. 
Hence, to resist the God's Eye View objection, metaphysical realists should hold 
that the correspondence notion of truth is not in any way dependent upon the 
secured presence of tests of truth. To prevent the distinction between the nature 
and the test of truth from collapsing, metaphysical realists must defend what 
Vision calls 'the most extreme form for a correspondence theory - a form in which 
correspondence does not require the truth of any, or at least very many, of the 
statements or beliefs we normally take to be true' (Vision, 1988:17). According 
to Lesley Armour, this demand 'verges on the logically absurd': 
(...) no theory of truth will be worth anything if it is set up in such a way 
that nothing counts as finding out whether or not the truth has been 
attained. One could, I suppose, imagine (..) a situation in which, as it 
happened, we knew that a certain theory of truth was correct and also 
knew that we could not know anything else. This verges on the logically 
absurd (given that we know the sort ofthing that a theory of truth is), but 
it also happens, of course, not to be the case. Perhaps even more 
importantly, there are, I am sure, things which we know with substantially 
more certainty than we should want to accord to any theory of truth. Thus 
we should be able to rule out any theory of truth which precluded the 
possibility of some claims to knowledge and we should be able to test 
theories, in part, by their ability to mesh with appropiate claims to 
knowledge. (Armour, 1969:53/4) 
According to Armour, the fact that the correspondence theory of truth implies the 
possibility that none of our statements be actually true constitutes a reductio of the 
correspondence theory. Strictly speaking, the reason why Armour thinks this 
constitutes a reductio seems to be a point of philosophical method, rather than a 
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logical point. Why does it verge on the logically absurd to suppose that we could 
know a theory of truth to be correct and also know we could not know anything 
else? According to Armour, for a theory of truth to be acceptable, it should do 
justice to the fact that we consider a more or less generally agreed-on set of state-
ments to be true. A theory of truth should make sense of our actual practice of 
attributing truth to particular, well established statements. A parallel could be 
drawn with the philosophy of science. In trying to pinpoint the essential charac-
teristics of scientific rationality, philosophy of science starts with certain paradigm 
cases of scientific rationality, such as Newton's theory of gravitation or Einstein's 
theory of relativity. Any definition of rationality, which makes these theories come 
out as irrational, is unsatisfactory for that reason. Armour argues that the same 
goes for the question of truth. Philosophy doesn't start from scratch. Rather, it 
starts from some widely held intuitions that it seeks to account for in a way that 
makes the most sense of these intuitions. Applying this methodological point to 
the question of truth, it follows that the project of defining truth cannot be pursued 
independently of the assumption that we justifiedly hold some statements to be 
true. Without this assumption, a theory of truth could not even get started. 
If Armour is right, the question of the nature of truth cannot be raised 
prior to the question of the accessibility of truth. But then a kind of circularity 
would be at play in the metaphysical realist's response to the God's Eye View 
objection. Not only would the project of defining truth be regulative for the 
justification project. The justification project would be regulative for the project 
of defining truth as well. The two quests could not be pursued independently. 
Still, Armours argument relies oñ a principle of philosophical method, that the 
metaphysical realist could simply reject. The metaphysical realist could argue that 
we should not accept at face value our actual practices of taking certain truth-
claims as unproblematic. Rather, these knowledge claims require independent 
justification, since it could be the case that none of them is actually justified. So, 
the metaphysical realist could insist on taking seriously the possibility of radical 
skepticism with regard to all of our knowledge claims. 
Although Armour's argument shows that separating the correspondence 
theory from the justification project entails the possibility of global skepticism, it 
does not decisively show that this would constitute a reductio of correspondence 
as a definition of truth. To do so would require showing that this kind of 
skepticism is not only unsatisfactory or improbable, but incoherent. The 
sophisticated version of the God's Eye View objection seeks to establish precisely 
this point. By claiming that truth is correspondence with mind-independent reality, 
while retaining complete agnosticism with regard to possible tests of truth, 
metaphysical realism commits itself to anotion of'world' that is completely empty 
of meaning. Since the definition of truth as correspondence with the external 
world cannot rely on the truth of any particular account of this world, the only 
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thing to be said about this world is that it exists. But what does it mean to say 
that something exists although we cannot explain what it is that exists? What 
would it mean to claim the existence of this something? According to Rorty, the 
notion of 'world' here employed 
must be the notion of something completely unspecified and unspecifiable 
- the thing in itself, in fact. As soon as we start thinking of 'the world' as 
atoms and the void, or sense data and awareness of them, or 'stimuli' of 
a certain sort brought to bear upon organs of a certain sort, we have 
changed the name of the game. For we are now well within some particu-
lar theory about how the world is. But for purposes of developing a 
controversial and nontrivial doctrine of truth as correspondence, only an 
utterly vague characterization in some such terms as 'cause of the impacts 
upon our receptivity and goal of our faculty of spontaneity1 will do. 
(Rorty, 1982:14/15) 
The notion of world or 'external reality' presupposed by the correspondence theory 
is vacuous. And it does not help when the metaphysical realist insists that, 
although the notion of world implied by the correspondence theory per se is 
utterly vague, we need it for explanatory purposes. The only explanatory purpose 
served by this notion of world is to flesh out the correspondence theory of truth! 
But the credibility of this theory is precisely what is under discussion. 
The sophisticated version of the 'God's Eye View* objection does consti-
tute a reductio of the correspondence theory as based on the distinction between 
the nature of truth and the accessibility of truth. The reductio can be summarized 
as follows. If the correspondence theory of truth is considered separable from and 
prior to the justification project, it implies the possibility of radical skepticism 
regarding the justification project: it implies that it could be the case that none of 
our statements are actually true. But to say that all of our statements could be 
false, one needs the notion of an independent world with which our statements 
could fail to correspond. So to state this skeptical position, one needs a notion of 
world, that can be given content without appealing to any particular theory of the 
world. However, to suppose that a notion can be given conceptual content by 
something -some 'authority'- outside the realm of knowledge is utterly unintel-
ligible. It is precisely at this point, that the metaphysical realist is forced to appeal 
to the possibility of a God's Eye View. Hence, the correspondence notion of truth 
leads to absurdity. 
The 'naive' version of the God's Eye View objection was answered by the 
metaphysical realist by appealing to the distinction between the question of the 
nature (definition) of truth and the question of the accessibility (tests) of truth. The 
'sophisticated' version of the God's Eye View, however, constitutes an attack on 
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this very distinction between nature and access. It shows that to make sense of this 
distinction, one needs the notion of a God's Eye View, which lacks any sense. 
Therefore, the distinction is untenable. 
If the metaphysical realist's distinction between nature and access cannot 
be maintained, does this show conclusively that the correspondence theory of truth 
is untenable? The metaphysical realist may object that we haven't provided a 
knock-down argument yet. What the sophisticated God's Eye View objection 
shows, he might reply, is that in arguing for correspondence as the definition of 
truth, the metaphysical realist cannot ignore the 'problem of access', as was his 
initial response. But if the problem of access would be recognized as part of 'the 
problem of the nature of truth, couldn't the metaphysical realist come up with an 
actual account of the tests of truth?9 By providing an account of truth-linked 
entena, could not truth as correspondence be shown to be accessible without 
appealing to a God's Eye View? 
The problem with this suggestion is that it misjudges the full impact of 
the sophisticated God's Eye View objection. The very notion of saving the corres-
pondence theory by providing an account of our tests of truth is question-begging, 
since the very quest for truth-linked entena, i.e. entena which are indicative of 
correspondence to mind-independent reality, is premised on the idea that truth 
should be conceived as correspondence. As stated at the beginning of this section, 
the concept of justification presupposes the concept of truth. The correspondence 
notion of truth serves as a regulator for the 'project of justification', i.e. the project 
of finding tests for truth. But if the metaphysical realist is now willing to admit 
that the concept of truth also presupposes the concept of justification, his defence 
of the correspondence theory gets caught in a circle. In suggesting that we might 
come up with an account of truth-linked entena in order to make sense of the 
correpondence notion of truth, the metaphysical realist presupposes that the corres-
pondence notion already makes sense. But this is what should be established on 
independent grounds. 
To get a clear view of the circularity involved in defending the corres-
pondence theory by way of an account of truth-linked entena, let us consider a 
particular approach to the 'problem of access' taken by many metaphysical realists 
Suppose the metaphysical realist agrees that the notions of 'truth and 'world', 
favoured by the correspondence theory, are empty without an account of our 
epistemic access to truth or to the world. Furthermore, suppose he agrees that the 
notion of direct or unmediated access to the world involves the notion of a God's 
Eye View, which is incoherent. But, so the metaphysical realist may insist, this 
does not imply that no account of access can be given. There is still the possibility 
'As Tngk puts it 'Whatever the attractions of defining truth in terms of correspondence with reality we are 
forced by such a definition to face the problem of the access we might have to reality1 (Tngg, 1993 46) 
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that we have /«direct access to the world, which means that we can have indirect 
evidence for the existence of correspondence relations between statements and the 
world. Now, the point of the sophisticated God's Eye View objection is that any 
account of indirect access will presuppose, rather than establish, the intelligibility 
of the correspondence notion of truth. The 'indirect access' approach has been 
summarized by Arthur Fine in the following way: 
(..) realism may well seek to get at the idea of correspondence (..) 
indirectly - perhaps by reasoning along the following lines. Since one 
cannot directly observe the existence of correspondence relations one end 
of which, so to speak, touches an observer-independent realm, perhaps we 
can, nevertheless, have indirect evidence for such correspondence. 
Perhaps, for example, we could have inductive evidence. Since induction 
(..) moves from the particular to the general, the idea might be to move 
inductively from particular cases of correspondence with the World to the 
general realist claim that that is what science is about. But, of course, this 
sort of inductive approach to realism makes no sense. For the issues 
raised by the classical objections challenge the realist idea of correspon-
dence in each, particular case, thereby leaving no foothold for this sort of 
inductive leap. (..) we need something more sophisticated than either 
direct access or narrow inductive inference to get at the problem. What 
the literature seems to have settled on is a form of abductive inference; 
namely, inference to the best explanation, which yields the explanationist 
defence of realism. (Fine, 1986:152) 
The explanationist defence of realism starts from the phenomenon of instrumental 
success, most uncontroversial in the area of science, and argues that realism (in 
particular the correspondence theory of truth) provides us with the best or even 
the only explanation of this phenomenon. According to Fine, the explanationist 
defence of realism is faced with the following dilemma. The explanandum, i.e. the 
phenomenon that the correspondence theory is supposed to explain best, is either 
'realist-laden' or it is not. If it is not realist-laden, then there will always be a 
superior instrumentalist explanation, which accounts for the phenomenon in a 
more economical way. If the explanandum is realist-laden, then the explanatory 
power of the correspondence theory is gratuitous; it does not qualify as an 
independent argument for realism (Fine, 1986:151-4). 
To the metaphysical realist's defence of the correspondence theory against 
the sophisticated God's Eye View objection, the second part of the dilemma 
applies. The thrust of the sophisticated God's Eye View objection was that, once 
we give up the distinction between nature and access, any account of our access 
to truth will be circular in presupposing that the notion of truth-linked criteria (and 
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hence the notion of truth as correspondence) makes sense. In other words, since 
the metaphysical realist's account of access is meant to explain how our criteria 
of justification can be indicative of truth, the explanandwn is already realist-laden. 
The explanandwn presupposes what should be proved independently. Arguing for 
the truth-linkedness of criteria of justification by means of abductive inference in 
order to make sense of the correspondence notion of truth is question-begging. 
Thus, the sophisticated version of the God's Eye View objection consti-
tutes a decisive argument against the correspondence theory of truth. A vital 
element of the sophisticated argument is that it attacks the correspondence theory 
by showing that it rests on problematic assumptions about the meaning of 
'realism'. In other words, it attacks AMR. What proved fatal to the correspondence 
notion of truth is that it relies on a problematic distinction between the question 
of the nature of truth and that of the accessibility of truth. Once the inseparability 
of these questions has been shown, the metaphysical realist's defence of the corres-
pondence notion of truth turns out to be viciously circular. The metaphysical 
realist conception of truth also relies on the problematic assumption that the 
question of the nature of the world can be answered independently of the question 
of the accessibility of the world. It relies on the idea that we can make sense of 
the notion of an independently existing world corresponding to our statements 
without granting the viability of any particular knowledge-claim about this world. 
The sophisticated God's Eye View objection shows this notion of world to be 
devoid of content. 
In the following section I will discuss the metaphysical realist's response 
to the 'sentence-shaped chunks objection'. I will argue that the metaphysical 
realist's defence of the notion of 'fact' again takes for granted the viability of 
AMR. However, just like the sophisticated God's Eye View objection, the internal 
realist criticism of'facts' should be interpreted as undermining AMR. If interpreted 
this way, the metaphysical realist defence of 'facts' against the sentence-shaped 
chunks objection will turn out to be question-begging. 
1.3.2 The sophisticated version of the sentence-shaped chunks objection and the 
failure of the metaphysical realist's standard reply 
Metaphysical realists have offered two responses to the sentence-shaped chunks 
objection, which were sketched in section 1.2. The first is to propose a notion of 
correspondence as fittingness (Goldman) or correlation (Moser) instead of 
isomorphic representation. The second response is to point out that the impos-
sibility of identifying facts independently of true sentences does not show that 
there are no facts (Vision, Kirkham). 
As regards the appeal to correlation or fittingness as more appropriate 
metaphors for correspondence, the question is whether these notions relieve facts 
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of their problematic status. The metaphysical realist's claim is that the notions of 
fittingness or correlation do not carry the suggestion that there are 'sentence-
shaped facts'. Since there is no one-to-one resemblance between parts of sentences 
and parts of the world, there is supposed to be no need for postulating 'truth-like 
entities'. The only notion we need is, according to Goldman, the notion of the 
world answering or satisfying truth conditions. However, what has to be the case 
for the truth-conditions for ρ to be satisfied? The truth conditions for ρ are 
satisfied if it is a fact that p. Facts are here conceived as the world's satisfaction 
of the conditions which make a statement true. But this concept of a fact is still 
just the concept of'what we know to be true'. The world-relatum of the satisfac­
tion relation can only be identified by means of true statements. The notion of 
'what satisfies the truth conditions for/?' has no explanatory power over and above 
the notion of ρ being true. Goldman may retort that the notion of the world 
'answering' the truth conditions for/? is much more innocent than the notion of a 
sentence-shaped chunk corresponding to p. But the notion of fact employed by 
Goldman cannot elucidate or back up a correspondence notion of truth either, 
since it does not address Davidson's point that talk of facts does not add anything 
to talk of truth. Talk of fittingness or satisfaction may seem to make the notion 
of fact more vague and therefore less peculiar, but it still lacks the explanatory 
power wished for. It does not enable us to make sense of facts apart from 
conceiving them as 'what makes sentences true'. 
Moser's response to the sentence-shaped chunks objection is at bottom the 
same as Goldman's. According to Moser, correspondence as correlation only 
requires the ontologically innocent notion of 'how things are'. No queer entities 
like sentence-shaped chunks need to be postulated, he argues. The notion of'how 
things are' is, so he claims, perfectly commonsensical. Again, the problem is that 
this notion of fact lacks any content apart from the content attaching to the notion 
of true statements. So it cannot elucidate, let alone justify, the notion of a 
correspondence relation between sentences and reality. The correspondence 
theorist wants to say that there is something 'out there' corresponding to our state­
ments. But in order to make this claim substantial, he needs to give some content 
to the notion of this something 'out there', which is not derived from the notion 
of true statements. For the notion of true statements is the notion to be explained 
by the notion of facts. 
Neither the fittingness nor the correlation notion of correspondence can 
provide the notion of facts with independent content. Both Goldman's and Moser's 
notion of facts lack explanatory power. Actually, in trying to get rid of'truth-like 
entities', they have made the notion of facts too innocent. If this is all there is to 
say about facts, then the correspondence theory of truth becomes 'a harmless kind 
of truism', as Armour puts it (Armour, 1969:49). Goldman and Moser might retort 
that this is all there is to say about truth. But if the metaphysical realist would 
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acquiesce in the trivial nature of his correspondence notion, then he should admit 
to not having a substantial, realist notion of truth. In the absence of an explanatory 
notion of facts, the correspondence theory is perfectly compatible with idealism 
on the ontological level, as Moser himself remarks (Moser, 1989:33). According 
to Armour, if the metaphysical realist would admit the triviality of corres-
pondence, he would have to recognize that he has actually turned the problem of 
truth aside, leaving us with the problem of knowledge, i.e. the problem of how we 
know statements to be justified. 
In fact, this account is just a disguised form of the theory that 'there is no 
separate problem of truth'. For what has been asserted is (1) the facts are 
whatever it is that we know and (2) correspondence to the facts just 
means 'according with our knowledge'. Thus all that is left is a problem 
of knowledge. (Armour, 1969:49) 
If the metaphysical realist admits not to be able to give an independent, explana-
tory account of facts, he has actually abandoned the project of finding a substan-
tial, non-epistemic concept of truth. This amounts to an admission of defeat. 
However, some metaphysical realists argue that the lack of an explanatory 
concept of truth need not violate the basic tenets of metaphysical realism. The 
metaphysical realist may agree that he cannot provide a notion of fact which has 
explanatory power with respect to the notion of truth. But, so he might argue, the 
most interesting question at stake within the realism debate is not the problem of 
truth but the problem of knowledge. He may argue that we have to acquiesce in 
a trivial notion of correspondence and concentrate on the problem of knowledge, 
i.e. the justification project. Devitt (1991), Horwich (1990), Moser (1989) and 
Field (1982) have put forward the claim mat the correspondence theory of truth 
is not essential to metaphysical realism at all. They argue that we can be 
deflationists or minimalists about truth, and still defend metaphysical realism. The 
proposal of a radical separation of the question of truth from the question of 
realism will be discussed in section 1.5. 
What I have established so far is that the sentence-shaped chunks 
objection confronts the correspondence theory with a dilemma: the notion of fact 
employed by this theory is either ontologjcally queer or completely trivial. If 
correspondence is conceived as a kind of resemblance, we are stuck with peculiar 
'truth-like entities' in our ontology. If correspondence is conceived as fittingness 
or correlation, the notion of facts corresponding to our statements becomes too 
vague or too trivial to have any explanatory power. So Goldman's and Moser's 
reply to the sentence-shaped chunks objection will not do to save the cor-
respondence theory of truth as a distinctly realist account of truth. 
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However, the sentence-shaped chunks obj ection has been attacked not only 
by Goldman and Moser, but also by Vision, who adopts a different strategy. 
Vision argues that the sentence-shaped chunks objection can be interpreted either 
as an epistemological claim (we cannot have independent access to facts) or as an 
ontological claim (there are no facts). Although the epistemological claim is right, 
this does not allow one to infer that there are no facts, since this ontological claim 
constitutes only one of the possible explanations for the epistemological fact that 
facts cannot be identified independently of true statements. Alternative explana-
tions are possible. Vision first suggests that the limited sources of language may 
account for the situation that facts cannot be independently identified. Actually, 
this argument is not very convincing, since our means of identifying facts 
independently of true statements, if there are any, clearly would have to be extra-
linguistic. However rich our means of linguistic expression, they could never 
provide us with independent access to facts, since the criterion for succesfully 
picking out of facts would still simply be the recognition of these new, as yet 
unknown expressions as true statements. However, Vision's argument does not 
really depend on the foregoing argument. He has in mind a more specific 
explanation of the epistemological claim. To account for the impossibility of 
identifying facts save by predications of truth, we should note that identifying 
facts and utilizing statements have largely the same causes. Because they share 
their causal history, noting facts and making (true) statements cannot be separately 
identified. But this, Vision concludes, does not preclude that facts and statements 
can still be distinct classes of items. In particular, facts display a general feature 
which true sentences lack: their ability to cause things. 
The problem with this attempt to save the ontological distinctness of facts 
is that the original objection to facts repeats itself with regard to causes. For to say 
that there are things out there which cause us to note facts and to utilize state-
ments is to posit a 'chunk' in reality which should explain what it means for our 
statements to be true in the sense of correspondence. But the chunks in question, 
i.e. the alleged causes of our talk about facts, can only be identified by noting 
facts, i.e. by predications of truth. Talk of causes does not add anything to talk of 
facts. If causes cannot be identified independently of 'noting facts and utilizing 
statements', then they lack the explanatory power required to uphold a substantial 
correspondence notion of truth. 
But Vision will probably reject the demand that causes should be indepen-
dently identifiable. His argument at bottom turns on the claim that there can be 
ontological differences which do not appear at the epistemological level. The idea 
is that we do not have to be able to identify causes for them to exist in the 
external world. This line of thought is crucial to metaphysical realism - and to 
AMR. It states that claims on the ontological level make sense, apart from claims 
on the epistemological level. Metaphysical realism holds that, although we need 
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to answer the epistemologica! question of the accessibility of some X to know if 
our ontologjcal statements about X are true or false, claiming the existence of X 
is a meaningful statement in the absence of such an epistemological account. 
However, the point of the sophisticated 'sentence-shaped chunks objection' is 
precisely that this distinction does not hold water. The Davidsonian argument 
against facts does not state that there are no facts (Vision's 'strong', ontological 
interpretation). It states that it does not make sense either to affirm or to deny the 
independent existence of facts, as long as the notion of fact has no content apart 
from the content derived from the notion of true statements. The point is not that 
'existence' depends on TDeing identifiable by us', but that, for existence claims 
about X to have meaning at all, we have to know some of the identity conditions 
of X; otherwise we don't know what we are claiming in claiming the existence of 
X So, the sentence-shaped chunks objection is neither an ontological nor an 
epistemological claim; it is a claim about the intelligibility of the notion of facts 
as employed by the correspondence theory. 
And if taken in this way, the objection applies to causes as well. To bring 
out the weakness of Vision's appeal to causality in explaining the ontological dis-
tinctness of facts, it is helpful to link up Vision's defence of the correspondence 
theory with recent discussions about the nature of reference. Vision's defence of 
the ontological independence of causality is strikingly paralleli to a widespread 
metaphysical realist argument in favour of a causal theory of reference. In the next 
section, this argument will be discussed. 
The reason I will go into the issue of reference in some detail is that, apart 
from the link with Vision's argument, it is directly relevant to the issue of truth 
in another way. Some metaphysical realists try to explicate the correspondence 
notion of truth in terms of non-epistemic, causal relations of reference between 
our words or concepts and external things. Michael Devitt, for instance, claims 
that 'the explanation of correspondence truth requires robust reference' (1991:33). 
A robust notion of reference would have to bring out that reference is 'a genuine 
relation in nature between words and the world'. If the metaphysical realist 
succeeds in explaining the correspondence notion of truth in terms of non-
epistemic reference relations, then a shift to reference would, in view of the 
critique of correspondence sketched above, constitute a possible route of escape 
for the metaphysical realist. 
1.4 First route of escape: the shift to reference 
Alongside the issue of truth, the issue of reference plays an important role within 
the conflict between metaphysical realism and internal realism. Whereas the issue 
of truth is concerned with the relation between whole sentences and reality, the 
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issue of reference is about the relation between parts of sentences, i.e. words or 
concepts, and reality. Some metaphysical realists claim that the notion of truth as 
non-epistemic correspondence between sentences and reality should be explained 
in terms of a 'robust', non-epistemic relation of reference between sentence-parts 
and reality. 
To secure the non-epistemic nature of reference relations, metaphysical 
realists cannot allow these relations to be substantially dependent on our ex-
planatory interests, our referential intentions. They therefore adhere to the notion 
of causal relations of reference, which hold between our words or concepts and 
the world mind-independently. Below, I will discuss Putnam's critique of the 
causal theory of reference. This will enable me to elaborate the point raised 
against Vision. The purpose of this section is broader, however. My aim is to 
bring out with respect to the issue of reference, first, that the internal realist 
critique of metaphysical realism should be interpreted as an attack on the distinc-
tion between questions of epistemology and questions of ontology, rather than be 
viewed as a claim about the limits of our capacities to know independent reality. 
In other words, internal realism is an attack on AMR rather than a defence of 
metaphysical anrtrealism. Second, if interpreted this way, metaphysical realism 
cannot stand up against the internal realist objections against a non-epistemic 
notion of reference. Hence, I will argue, the correspondence notion of truth cannot 
be explained in terms of non-epistemic, causal relations of reference. 
Causal theories of reference were first put forward in the early seventies 
by Putnam and Kripke. They objected to the traditional, description theory of 
meaning. According to this theory, the meaning of a general name is given by a 
list of properties, that constitutes an analytic definition of the term involved This 
list of properties, known by the individual speaker, determines the extension of the 
term. The meaning of the term 'horse' for instance is determined by a list of 
properties, that specifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for being a horse 
(Putnam, 1975:140). This set of identity criteria, the term's intension, fixes the 
reference relation between the term 'horse' and external reality. So, according to 
this view, the chains of reference between our terms and the world are determined 
by identifying descriptions 'in the speaker's' head. The description theory of 
reference, within the context of the debate about the rationality and objectivity of 
science, turned out to have relativist consequences. Descriptions are not fixed once 
and for all. The list of essential properties attributed to a referent reflects currently 
accepted theories. Hence, if our theories change, so does reference. By con-
sequence, two radically different theories about for example horses cannot be said 
to refer to the same (type of) thing. Newton and Einstein did not talk about the 
same phenomenon in expounding their theories of mass. Nor can Ptolemaeus and 
Copernicus be said to have referred to the same object, i.e. the sun, since they 
ascribed different essential characteristics to it. The description theory suggests, 
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then, that every theory creates its own referents. This result invited the infamous 
'thesis of incommensurability', which states that between radically different 
theories or worldviews there can be no rational communication or comparison, 
since they lack shared meaning and reference of terms. It seemed that, due to 
meaning-variance and concomitant changes of reference, people belonging to 
different paradigms are talking at cross purposes, even 'living in different worlds', 
as Kuhn provocatively put it.10 The description theory of meaning has idealist con-
sequences, since it regards reference as 'theory dependent' (Putnam, 1975:198). 
The causal account of reference aimed at providing 'an alternative account 
of meaning which allows that people holding competing or successive theories 
may still be talking about the same thing" (Hacking, 1983:75). In 'The Meaning 
of Meaning1 (1975), Putnam rejected the view that psychological states determine 
meaning (intension), and that meaning determines reference (extension). Putnam 
argued that 'meanings aren't in the head'. Instead, the meaning of a word consists 
of different components11, one of which is the objective reference or extension of 
the word. Both the extension of a term and the set of descriptions associated with 
the term are thus conceived as part of its meaning. Although the set of descrip-
tions associated with a word may change, the reference of the word remains 
constant through theory-change. According to the causal theory of reference, 
reference relations are not fixed by sets of defining descriptions. Reference is 
claimed to come about by means of a direct ostensive act, in which a term (for 
example 'horse') gets associated with a representative token (a particular horse) 
through a baptizing-act. From then on, it is claimed, a causal relation between 
term and referent exists which cannot be broken by changes of meaning or theory. 
Although baptizing acts require some theoretical stage-setting, they establish a 
non-epistemic, causal relation between a word and reality. In summary, the causal 
picture of reference, put forward by Putnam in 'The Meaning of Meaning', says 
that the reference of a general name is determined by several factors, which are 
all considered part of the meaning of a term: the individual speaker's concepts, 
expert knowledge and the environment's contribution. 
The extension of a term is not fixed by a concept that the individual 
speaker has in his head, and this is true both because extension is, in 
general, determined socially -there is division of linguistic labor as much 
as of'real' labor -and because extension is, in part, determined indexically. 
'"See Kuhn (1970), especially chapter X (pp. 111-135). 
"The meaning ofa word is a vector of four components, according to Putnam(1975): syntactic markers (the 
grammar of the word), semantic markers (category of items to which the word applies), stereotype (conventional 
ideas associated with a word) and extension. See Hacking (1983:77-81) for a summary. 
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The extension of our terms depends upon the actual nature of the 
particular things that serve as paradigms, and this actual nature is not, in 
general, fully known to the speaker. Traditional semantic theory leaves out 
only two contributions to the determination of extension - the contribution 
of society and the contribution of the real world! (Putnam, 1975:245) 
The latter component of meaning, the world's contribution, allows one to say that 
'concepts in different theories may refer to the same thing' (Putnam, 1975:197). 
Different theories of horses, mass or the sun can now be said to refer to the same 
phenomena. In this way, the causal theory guarantees stability of reference across 
theory change and supports a realist conception of knowledge and science. The 
causal picture of reference is realist in that it conceives of reference as 'trans-
theoretical' (Putnam, 1975:196-198). 
The idea of causal chains of reference has in the past decades been 
developed along several lines, by several authors.12 However, it has also been 
severely criticized, not in the least by Putnam himself. I will focus on Putnam's 
criticism of the causal theory of reference, because of the imporant role it plays 
within the controversy between metaphysical realism and internal realism. In his 
(1978) and (1981), Putnam started to develop the position of internal realism As 
an internal realist, he put forward the so-called 'model theoretic argument', which 
argues that we cannot make sense of a non-epistemic notion of reference. Briefly 
put, the import of his argument is that conceiving of reference as a non-epistemic, 
unique relation between words and mind-independent objects will inevitably make 
reference radically indeterminate. But radical indeterminacy is absurd. Hence, the 
metaphysical realist's conception of reference must go by the board. In this section 
I will first sketch Putnam's attack on the causal theory of reference. I will then 
consider a widespread metaphysical realist objection to Putnam's argument. I will 
argue that this objection fails to undermine the argument, as it fails to come up 
with a defence of the main assumption attacked by it: the metaphysical realist's 
distinction between the order of epistemological questions and the order of 
ontological questions. 
The causal theory of reference, as defended by metaphysical realists13, 
states that the objects of reference are mind-independent and that reference 
relations are both unique and non-epistemic (Putnam, 1994b:354). Reference 
relations are considered unique in the sense that they do not shift with changing 
"According to Devitt, three basic ideas have emerged: explanation in terms of the historical cause, in terms 
of the reliable cause and in terms of a teleofunction. See Devitt (1991a:29). 
"In various forms, the causal theory of reference has been defended by Devitt (1981,1991 a), Boyd ( 1980), 
Fodor (1990), Field (1972), Stampe (1979), Dretske (1981), Papineau (1984, 1987) and Millikan (1984). 
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descriptions of their referents. Reference relations are considered to be non-
epistemic in the sense that they hold independently of our conceptual scheme, 
independently of the 'context of use' in which a word or concept figures. 
According to Putnam, the problem that arises for the metaphysical realist's notion 
of reference is that it cannot explain how reference relations thus conceived are 
to be singled out by us. As the reference relation between a word and reality is 
to persist through different contexts of use and as it is to be independent of these, 
it cannot be singled out with the help of the operational and theoretical constraints 
offered by a context of use. Such constraints would rely on epistemic criteria 
which are relative to a particular conceptual scheme. However, as soon as one 
takes referring expressions out of their epistemic, explanatory context, Putnam 
argues, they have many word-world connections, each of which has an equal claim 
to be called the referential relation and none of which can reasonably be claimed 
to be the exclusively correct one. 
Putnam's argument for the latter claim rests on particular theorems from 
model-theory. In virtue of the so-called Lòwenheim-Skolem theorems, for any 
standard interpretation of singular terms and predicates yielding an assignment of 
truth-values to statements of the language, there are a multitude of alternative, 
'non-standard' interpretations, which will preserve all assignments of truth-values 
in all possible worlds. Neither theoretical constraints (such as consistency, 
simplicity and coherence) nor operational constraints (such as observational re-
quirements) can limit the range of possible interpretations. These constraints can 
at most determine the truth-conditions of whole sentences. But the assignment of 
truth-conditions to statements does not uniquely determine what they refer to. 
Hence, Putnam concludes, if one conceives of reference as a unique and non-
epistemic relation between words and language-independent things, determinate 
relations of reference can never be picked out.14 The metaphysical realist's picture 
of reference ends up making reference radically indeterminate. As such radical 
indeterminacy would bring about thoroughgoing skepticism, this result constitutes 
a reductio of metaphysical realism, according to Putnam. 
Internal realism escapes the threat of indeterminacy, Putnam argues, as it 
denies from the start that mind-independent objects are the objects of our semantic 
reference (Putnam, 1981:52,1983:23-25). According to internal realism, reference 
is neither unique nor non-epistenrric. Since a term may figure in different concep-
tual schemes or 'contexts of use', no unique relation of reference can be said to 
exist between the term 'sec' and mind-independent reality. Within a conceptual 
scheme, however, a determinate referential relation between a term and an object 
can be picked out, as theoretical and operational constraints will be sufficient to 
HSee for the technical details of the model theoretic argument: Putnam (1978:123-138) and (1983:viii-xiii, 
1-25). 
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fix reference once an explanatory context is given (Anderson, 1993: 313n). The 
objects that we refer to within an explanatory practice are in a sense dependent 
on this particular conceptual scheme. 'Since the objects and the signs are alike 
internal to the scheme of description, it is possible to say what matches what' 
(Putnam, 1981:52). So, Putnam claims that we can only save the determinacy of 
reference by giving up on both the idea that reference is unique in an absolute 
sense and on the idea that reference is non-epistemic in the sense of linking up 
our terms to mind-independent, 'ready-made' objects. 
Metaphysical realists, however, argue that the model-theoretic argument 
fails to show the impossibility of a non-epistemic notion of reference. The current 
debate between metaphysical realism and internal realism about reference is 
marked by mutual reproaches of circularity.15 Metaphysical realists claim that the 
threat of indeterminacy can be removed by recognizing causal constraints on 
reference, in addition to operational and theoretical constraints, which fix reference 
in a way which is both unique and independent of our theories or descriptions. As 
Van Geve summarizes this proposal, 'a term t as used by S is correctly interpreta-
ble as referring to Ks only if there are appropiate causal connections between Ks 
and Ss use of the term' (1992:348). But according to Putnam, this move simply 
begs the question: causal explanations of the use of term t only make sense within 
a particular context of use in which t figures. The problem is that the notion of 
causality itself cannot be said to have determinate reference outside a conceptual 
scheme. Appealing to causal constraints on reference does not enable us to pick 
out unique and non-epistemic relations of reference. The causal theory of referen-
ce, as appealed to by metaphysical realists, 'just adds more theory', according to 
Putnam16 
At this stage, metaphysical realists object that Putnam's 'just more theory 
move' is circular in that it fails to appreciate the import of their appeal to causal 
constraints. The point is, so they insist, that causal constraints will fix unique and 
non-epistemic reference relations independently of our ability to identify or single 
out these relations. The response widespread among metaphysical realists is that 
Putnam commits a 'category mistake' in failing to distinguish between the issue 
of the ontological nature of reference and the issue of our epistemic access to 
reference. They urge that 'it is not causal language that fixes reference; it is 
causality itself (Van Geve, 1992:349). Being epistemically inaccessible does not 
make causal relations of reference any less real or any less determinate, they 
argue, as we do not need to know a referential relation for it to be there. Or as 
Moser puts it: 'at least some of [Putnam's] arguments seem to rest on a dubious 
"See Anderson (1992) for a summary of this 'shifting the burden of proof strategy1. 
"Putnam (1978:126), (1981:45/6), (1983:18). 
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verificationist assumption that confuses the conditions for (...) a term's having 
reference and the conditions for one's discerning a (..) term's having reference' 
(Moser, 1990:101). Metaphysical realists insist on a firm distinction between the 
ontological and the epistemological level and argue that there may be determinate, 
causal constraints on reference, even if they may as yet be not (entirely) accessible 
to us. Even if truth and reference are radically indeterminate, this would not make 
reality itself indeterminate (Van Geve, 1992:348) or 'fundamentally perspectival' 
(Sosa, 1993:608). 
To the annoyance of many realists, Putnam has denounced this defence 
of metaphysical realism as still begging the question. In my view, however, it is 
the metaphysical realist who fails to address the central issue. To get at the heart 
of Putnam's argument, the 'just more theory move' should be regarded as an attack 
on the very distinction between the epistemological and the ontological level. To 
claim the existence of determinate causal relations of reference without showing 
the possibility in principle of our knowing these relations is to make a completely 
gratuitous claim. We do not know what we are saying if we say of a completely 
unspecified X that it exists independently of our making. To appeal to mind-
independent causal constraints on reference 'amounts to saying that we-know-not-
what fixes the reference relation we-know-not-how" (Putnam, 1994b: 360). In this 
sense, Putnam's worry about the inaccessibility of non-epistemic referential 
relations should be interpreted as a point about the intelligibility of the notion of 
'mind-independent causal constraints' employed by metaphysical realism, rather 
than as a point about the limits of our cognitive abilities. So Putnam is not putting 
forward the verificationist claim that for some X to exist, it should be episte-
mically accessible in principle. Rather, he is insisting on the conceptual point that, 
if we have not shown the possibility of epistemic access to X, we do not know 
what it means to claim that X exists. The metaphysical realist's distinction 
between the nature of reference and the accessibility of reference relations does 
not make sense. It relies on a distinction between the order of being and the order 
of knowing, to which the metaphysical realist cannot give any intelligible content. 
To see that Putnam's 'just more theory move' is in fact a remark about the 
relation between epistemology and ontology, we should focus on the notion of 
causality. Anderson (1993) has suggested a reading of Putnam's model-theoretic 
argument as confronting the realist with a dilemma concerning causality. To allay 
the indeterminacy of reference, Anderson argues, realists would need 'metaphysical 
causality1, which is entirely independent of explanatory interests. But all they are 
entitled to is 'empirical causality1, i.e. the common-sense notion of cause as 
'bringer about', which essentially depends on an interest-relative distinction 
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between "background conditions' and Tiringer about'.17 In my view, Putnam's 'just 
more theory move' should be interpreted, not as putting forward the epistemolo­
gica! point that 'metaphysical causality' is out of our cognitive reach, but rather 
as showing that the very notion of metaphysical causality is incoherent. 
Transcending our explanatory contexts, metaphysical causes cannot be said to 
have identity conditions; to claim that they may still exist is simply unintelligible, 
for 'to exist' and 'to be individuated' are conceptually inextricable. 
If interpreted in this way, Putnam's 'just more theory move' is a non-
circular, legitimate move, which puts the burden of proof on the side of 
metaphysical realism. The metaphysical realist has to show that the notion of 
independent causal constraints on reference is a coherent notion. But this is what 
he cannot do, since the notion of'cause' has no content apart from the explanatory 
context in which it figures. For the claim that some cause С exists to carry any 
meaning, we have to be able to state (some of) the identity conditions for G 
Otherwise, we do not know what it means to claim the existence of С Identity 
conditions are relative to epistemic constraints specified by a particular ex­
planatory context. So the metaphysical realist's notion of causality, as independent 
of explanatory context, is an empty notion. The same goes for Vision's appeal to 
mind-independent causality. The notion of cause on which his defence of the 
correspondence theory of truth rests is the notion of a 'self-identifying cause'. Just 
like the notion of a sentence-shaped chunk, the notion of a self-identifying cause 
is not an intelligible notion. What goes for facts also goes for causes: there is no 
way of specifying their identity conditions except by claiming the truth of 
particular sentences. Neither Vision's defence of the mind-independence of facts, 
nor the causal theory of reference can provide us with a non-circular account of 
truth as correspondence. Both accounts take for granted AMR. Since however the 
internal realist attack on non-epistemic notions of truth and reference shows AMR 
to be deeply problematic, the metaphysical realist's defence is question-begging. 
1.5 Second route of escape: Devitt's separation of truth and realism 
In section 1.3 I pointed at a possible route of escape for the metaphysical realist 
who admits that he lacks an explanatory notion of truth as correspondence. This 
route of escape consists in arguing that the correspondence notion of truth is not 
central to metaphysical realism and that metaphysical realism can be established 
without it. This strategy has been pursued by Michael Deviti, who has argued that 
realism is basically an ontologica! doctrine, which does not entail, nor is entailed 
"Andereon (1993:317), Putnam (1983: 214/5), (1990: 85-6). 
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by, any doctrine of truth. By implication, criticism of the correspondence theory 
of truth cannot undermine the validity of metaphysical realism. If Deviti is right, 
neither the God's Eye View objections, nor the 'sentence-shaped chunks' objection, 
nor the model-theoretic argument against causal theories of reference pose a threat 
to metaphysical realism. 
The claim that the issue of truth and the issue of realism are separate 
issues constitutes a departure from the widely held view that the correspondence 
notion of truth is central to the doctrine of metaphysical realism. As I mentioned 
in section 1.1, both opponents and proponents often take for granted that to defend 
metaphysical realism is to defend the correspondence theory of truth. However, 
the idea that metaphysical realism and the correspondence notion of truth are 
essentially linked has not only been challenged by Devitt, but also by Horwich 
(1990), Field (1982) and Moser (1989). I will focus on Devitt, as his Realism and 
Truth™ provides the most detailed elaboration on this claim. 
According to Deviti, a rigid distinction should be made between 
ontological (metaphysical) issues, epistemological issues and semantical issues19. 
Realism he holds to be a purely ontological claim Accordingly, it is argued that 
realism does not entail the correspondence theory, nor does the correspondence 
theory entail realism. 
Realism is about the nature of reality in general, about what there is and 
what it is like; it is about the largely inanimate impersonal world. If 
correspondence truth has a place, it is in our theory of only a small part 
of that reality: it is in our theory of people and their language. (Devitt, 
1991a:43) 
In what follows, I will first discuss why Devitt thinks that separating the issue of 
truth from the issue of realism is enlightening and, in particular, helpful for the 
realist. I will then take up the question whether Devitt succeeds in separating the 
issues. 
Devitt clearly holds that the focus on semantical issues, common in the 
current realism debate, is detrimental to metaphysical realism. If realists would 
stick to the ontological claim essential to realism, Devitt suggests, the burden of 
proof on the metaphysical realist's part would be relieved considerably. Why does 
he think so? One might think that Devitt considers the objections raised against 
the correspondence notion of truth powerful, indeed so powerful that metaphysical 
realists had better defend a 'realism without correspondence truth'. But this is not 
"My references are to the second, revised edition oí Realism and Thah (1991). 
"See Devitfs 'Maxim 2, (1991a:3). 
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what Deviti is after. First he argues that realism does not entail the correspondence 
notion of truth, since it is also compatible with a deflationary notion of truth.20 
But later on, once 'realism without correspondence' is established, Devitt argues 
positively for the correspondence notion of truth, claiming that, given realism, we 
can show the need for, and our entitlement to, truth as correspondence by means 
of an abductive argument. So Devitt's point about separating ontologjcal and 
semantic issues is primarily a point about priority. As his 'Maxim 3' says: 'Settle 
the realism issue before any epistemic or semantic issue' (1991a:4). In what sense 
does this maxim make it easier to defend realism? 
Devitt distinguishes between two dimensions of realism conceived as an 
ontologjcal claim: the existence dimension and the independence dimension. 
The very weakest form of realism is completely unspecific about what 
exists; it requires only that something does. When the independence 
dimension is added, this 'weak realism' amounts simply to the claim that 
something objectively exists independently of the mental (Devitt, 
1991a:17). 
The existence-claim and the independence claim together are not enough to state 
the ontologjcal thesis of metaphysical realism. For these claims 'commit realism 
only to an undifferentiated, uncategorized, external world, a Kantian thing-in-itself 
(ibid.). The 'something' which is posited to exist independently of the mental is 
completely unspecified, indeed ineffable. We cannot know or talk about it and it 
has no explanatory role. So for the ontologjcal claim of metaphysical realism to 
amount to more than 'fig-leaf realism' (ibid), it has to be more explicit about what 
exists independently of the mental. Devitt's suggestion is that the metaphysical 
realist should claim the independent existence of both 'common-sense physical 
entities' and 'scientific, unobservable physical entities' (Devitt, 1991a: 17-19). Of 
course, the metaphysical realist need not commit itself to the independent 
existence of all of these entities; flying saucers and phlogiston are to be excluded 
to be sure. 'The realism that is worth fighting for holds that we are more or less 
right in the physical entities we posit. It is committed to the existence of'most of 
those entities' (18). 
Devitt argues that defending this rich ontological definition of metaphysi­
cal realism does not involve defending the correspondence notion of truth. The 
correspondence notion provides us with a definition of truth, but it does not say 
anything about what is out there in the world. Nor does it say anything about what 
we canjustifiedly hold to be true. Whether we are justified in being realists about 
^Devitt (1991a.49). According to deflahonism, the truth-predicate expresses nothing more than 'semantic 
ascent1, to claim that a sentence ρ is true ïsjust to assert ρ The notion of truth is denied any explanatory power. 
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common-sense entities and physical entities depends on whether the truth-claims 
of science and common-sense are more or less justified This question is the 
subject of epistemology. Epistemology provides evidence for metaphysical realism, 
which is itself a purely ontological doctrine. As one of Devitt's maxims says, we 
should distinguish constitutive from evidential issues. The semantical issue of truth 
is indifferent to both of them, Deviti argues. The epistemologjcal question of 
justification, so he claims, is very different from the question of truth. Devitt 
insists we should draw a sharp line between the question of the nature of the 
world (ontology), the question of our epistemic access to the world (epistemology) 
and the question of the nature of truth (semantics). 
In chapters 5 and 7 of Realism and Truth, Devitt takes up the task of 
justifying Common-Sense-plus-Scientific-Realism. This justification proceeds by 
means of arguments, which are partly negative, in criticizing 'antirealist alterna-
tives', and partly positive, in arguing that realism constitutes 'the best explanation' 
of certain agreed-on phenomena. Once his justification of realism is established, 
Devitt argues we can after all defend the correspondence notion of truth since, 
given realism, the correspondence theory of truth provides the best explanation of 
the role of human symbols.21 Thus, the metaphysical realist can after all have all 
that he wants, if only he observes the priority of ontological issues over epistemic 
and semantic ones (Maxim 3). So, in answer to my first question, Devitt thinks 
the separation of semantics and ontology benefits the metaphysical realist in the 
following way. If we start with truth as the focus of the realism issue, the antirea-
list gets too much credit. The antirealist argues from the allegedly problematic 
nature of correspondence theories to the claim that the ontological thesis of 
realism cannot be justified But since the viability of the ontological claim is 
entirely independent of the question of the tenability of the correspondence theory, 
and since the correspondence notion of truth can only be defended after the 
ontological thesis has been established, the antirealist move is unfair. Through this 
move, the realist is knocked out before the game has even started! If we recognize 
the independence of ontological and semantical issues, and the priority of the 
former to the latter, the metaphysical realist can play his cards well. At least, this 
is what Devitt claims. 
I now move on to my second question about Devitt's project. Does Devitt 
succeed in separating the ontological issue of realism from semantical worries? I 
think he does not. I will argue that Devitt's project is confronted with a dilemma. 
In summary, the dilemma is this. There are two ways of defining metaphysical 
realism as an ontological doctrine: either by way of the minimal ontological 
definition or by way of the rich ontological definition. The minimal definition 
21See Devitt (1991axh.6). 
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('fig-leaf realism') is not simply too modest; I will argue that it is not intelligible 
at all. The notion of'world' employed by this definition is completely empty. The 
rich ontological definition, however, involves substantial epistemological and 
semantical claims, so I shall argue. In justifying these claims, the notion of an 
objective, mind-independent world is presupposed rather than independently 
accounted for. So the rich ontological definition of metaphysical realism cannot 
be established in a non-circular way. Hence, my conclusion will be that Devitt's 
maxims, which prescribe a rigid separation of the issue of realism and the issue 
of truth, cannot save metaphysical realism. 
I will start with the first horn of the dilemma The minimal ontological 
definition of metaphysical realism states only that 'something objectively exists 
independently of the mental' (Devitt, 1991a: 17). Deviti admits that this weak form 
of realism is 'not worth fighting for*. It is important to note that this kind of 
minimal ontological realism is not even an intelligible position. In positing the 
objective existence of something 'out there', it employs a notion of 'world' which 
has no content at all. This notion of'world' is completely inarticulate and therefore 
cannot play any explanatory role within a philosophical account of the nature of 
reality or the nature of knowledge. Now to be sure, Devitt may even be willing 
to admit that minimal realism is unintelligible. Interestingly, Devitt holds that 
minimal realism has been defended mainly by enemies of metaphysical realism, 
in particular by 'constructivists' such as Kuhn and Feyerabend Constructivists, 
according to Devitt, reduce the world to an unknowable Ding-an-sich.22 So he 
would not mind an attack on 'fig-leaf realism'. However, I will presently argue 
that any ontological claim richer in content than minimal realism, will essentially 
involve epistemological and semantical claims. Recognizing the incoherence of 
minimal realism is the first step in arguing for my conclusion that there is no such 
thing as an intelligible, purely ontological claim. 
According to Devitt's preferred rich ontological definition, metaphysical 
realism or 'Big-R Realism' is the doctrine that both common-sense physical 
entities and scientific, unobservable physical entities obj ectively exist independent-
ly of the mental (Devitt, 1991a: 17-19). Devitt's denies that this definition contains 
any substantial epistemological or semantical claims. Epistemological claims are 
involved in giving evidence for metaphysical realism, but the doctrine itself is 
constituted solely by ontological tenets (Devitt, 1991b: 49,53). However, I contend 
that epistemological and semantical claims do play a role in the 'constitutive part' 
of metaphysical realism. The first thing to note is that the entities that populate 
the Big-R Realist's world can only be identified as such by means of our theories 
of these entities. As Appiah, in a critical response to Devitt, puts it: 
^Devitt (1991a;17,157) I will come back to this claim in chapter 2, section 2 4, in which I will discuss the 
relation between (Rortys) internal realism and minimal ontological realism 
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How can it be consistent with Big-R Realism to suppose that mind-
independent objects come labelled 'scientific' or 'common sense'. (...) the 
only principled way we have for identifying the relevant entities is exactly 
by a semantical fact: the fact that they are the referents of theories of a 
certain kind. (Appiah, 1991:71) 
To this objection, Devitt may however retort that although the only way of 'picking 
out the relevant entities in his ontology is by their relations to our representations, 
the entities themselves can be conceived as entirely independent of our represen-
tations. But this will not do. The point is rather that the viability of (most of) our 
scientific and commonsense theories is presupposed by the very notion of such 
entities. So in addition to Appiah's remark, it should be noted that epistemological 
and semantical notions are required, not only for identifying the relevant entities 
of Devitt's ontology, but for making sense of the very notion of such entities. The 
very notions of unobservable physical items, natural kinds, causal structures 
etcetera get their content from our scientific theories. So epistemology does not 
merely provide evidence for Big-R Realism, as Devitt holds. It plays a crucial part 
in defining realism. Let me put this point in a slightly different phrasing. Any 
ontological definition of realism richer than minimal realism should say something 
about the nature of the items claimed to exist objectively and independently of the 
mental. But to say something about the nature of the items postulated is to presup-
pose that we have some epistemic access to the items concerned So, epistemo-
logical claims are needed not only to provide evidence for metaphysical realism, 
but to make sense of metaphysical realism at all. There is no such thing as a claim 
which is both intelligible and purely ontological. The distinction between the level 
of ontology and the level of epistemology, crucial to Devitt's program, cannot be 
upheld. His program presupposes AMR, but it does not succeed in justifying it. 
At this point, Devitt may put forward the following line of defence. He 
might argue that although his rich ontological definition of metaphysical realism 
depends on epistemological tenets, it does not depend on semantical tenets and 
still is completely indifferent to the issue of truth. Epistemology deals with the 
'problem of knowledge' or (Kirkham's phrase) 'the project of justification', while 
semantics is concerned with the nature of truth and reference. Big-R Realism, 
Devitt may insist, can still be established without turning to semantic notions. 
This line of defence turns on a strict separation of epistemological and 
semantical issues. In particular, it depends on the assumption that the problem of 
the justification of knowledge-claims can be settled independently of and prior to 
the question of truth. However, I have argued in sections 1.2 and 1.3 that the 
metaphysical realist cannot but formulate the problem of knowledge as the quest 
for truth-linked criteria. Criteria of justification are tested for their liability to lead 
to truth as correspondence with mind-independent reality. In other words, the 
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metaphysical realist's very conception of the problem of knowledge/justification 
presupposes a non-epistemic notion of truth. The problem of how we can have 
epistemic access to the world is a problem only if one starts from the notion of 
truth as non-epistemic correspondence and then asks how we can know whether 
correspondence relations between statements and the world obtain. Thus, the idea 
that there is a 'problem of knowledge' is not innocent. It involves a non-epistemic 
concept of truth, which is implicitly adopted and cannot be independently 
justified. This particular circle in which metaphysical realism is caught, was 
already pointed to in the previous sections. There I wanted to show that the 
metaphysical realist's distinction between question of the nature of truth and the 
question of the accessibility of truth, a central part of AMR, is untenable. In this 
section I have considered one way of trying to escape this circle: a shift from 
semantics to ontology. However, it now appears that Devitt's version of metap-
hysical realism is faced with a similar problem of circularity. His distinction 
between the question of the nature of the world and the question of the epistemic 
accessibility of the world is unintelligible. Rich ontological realism relies on 
epistemological claims. These epistemological claims in turn presuppose the 
viability of the correspondence notion of truth. Therefore, the objections to the 
correspondence notion of truth put forward in the previous sections also apply to 
Devitt's version of metaphysical realism. 
In this chapter I have argued that metaphysical realism essentially rests on 
four interrelated assumptions about the meaning of 'realism'. The crucial idea 
behind these assumptions is that we can intelligibly distinguish between the 
question of the nature of something and the question of the accessibility ofthat 
something. I have argued that a sophisticated reading of the internal realist 
objections to metaphysical realism shows this distinction to be untenable. 
According to Rorty, 
[the internal realist] argues that there is no pragmatic difference (no 
difference that makes a difference) between the nature of truth and the test 
of truth ... All these gambits will be felt by the realist to be question-
begging, since the realist intuits that some differences can be real without 
making a difference, that sometimes the ordo essendi is different from the 
ordo cognoscendi, sometimes the nature of X is not our test for the 
presence of Xness. And so it goes. (Rorty, 1982:xxix) 
I have argued that the metaphysical realist's adherence to AMR actually makes it 
impossible for realist notions of truth, reference and reality to get off the ground. 
The metaphysical realist's defence of the correspondence notion of truth, his 
defence of the causal theory of reference and his defence of the notion of'mind-
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independent reality" are viciously circular. By way of conclusion, the circularity 
involved in defending metaphysical realism can be summarized as follows: 
1) To defend metaphysical realism at the semantic level, one has to presup-
pose realism at the epistemological level. 
The notion of 'correspondence to mind-independent reality1 relies on a notion of 
'mind-independent reality' that is completely devoid of content, unless the epis-
temic accessibility of correspondence relations is presupposed. 
2) To defend metaphysical realism at the epistemological level, one has to 
presuppose realism at the semantical level. 
Defending epistemological realism is defending the claim that there are criteria of 
justification that are indicative of non-epistemic truth. The explanandum of 
epistemology thus conceived is realist-laden: the very idea of a 'problem of know-
ledge' presupposes that semantical realism makes sense. 
3) To defend metaphysical realism on the ontologjcal level, one has to 
presuppose realism at the epistemological level. 
If ontologjcal realism is to amount to more than 'fig-leaf realism', it should say 
something about the nature of the items claimed to exist mind-independently. In 




The controversy between metaphysical realism and internal realism can be inter-
preted in two ways. It can either be viewed as a conflict about what can be 
counted as real, or it can be viewed as a conflict about what it means to be real. 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the internal realist critique of metaphysical 
realism should be understood as an attack on the metaphysical realist's conception 
of the meaning of'realism'. I argued that the standard metaphysical realist defence 
of the correspondence notion of truth relies on particular assumptions about the 
meaning of 'realism' (AMR), which the internal realist objections to the 
correspondence theory show to be untenable. My conclusion was that metaphysi-
cal realism cannot be defended in a non-circular way, either on the semantical, or 
on the epistemological, or on the ontological level. 
In this chapter, I will discuss the internal realist conception of the meaning 
of'realism'. I will consider Putnam and Rorty as the two main representatives of 
internal realism. Although they explicitly disagree on various issues, as we will 
see in the course of this chapter, they share two important views. First, they reject 
metaphysical realism on the same grounds. As shown in chapter 1, they both 
attack the metaphysical realist's implicit assumptions about the meaning of 
'realism' (AMR) and they both hold that, due to these assumptions, metaphysical 
realism cannot be defended in a non-circular way. Second, both Putnam and Rorty 
are concerned to present an alternative to metaphysical realism that avoids 
metaphysical awrirealism In other words, they both try to overcome the duality 
of realism and antirealism. In view of these common starting points, I will 
consider Putnam and Rorty both internal realists. 
Below, I will argue that, although internal realism is critical of AMR, in 
particular of the nature/access distinction, it does not succeed in overcoming 
AMR Rorty and Putnam have each put forward internal realist notions of truth 
and reference. I will discuss the main objections that have been levelled at these 
notions in the literature. The main point I wish to make is that the difficulties 
facing internal realism are due to an ambivalent attitude towards AMR. I want to 
bring out that internal realism is faced with a particular dilemma. On the one 
hand, it still presupposes some elements of AMR Insofar as it does, it leads to 
metaphysical a/tfrrealism. In this respect, the widespread opinion among 
metaphysical realists that internal realism is nothing but a form of antirealism is, 
so I shall argue, not without justification. On the other hand, internal realism 
rejects AMR; it is an attempt to redefine the meaning of 'realism'. However, 
insofar as internal realism leaves AMR behind, it cannot be formulated in a 
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coherent way. The assumption basic to internal realism is that truth, reference and 
existence are somehow 'dependent upon' or 'internal to' a conceptual scheme. I 
shall argue that dropping AMR means that one drops the very dichotomy of 
'internal to a conceptual scheme' and 'external to a conceptual scheme'. In doing 
so, the internal realist's most central claim cannot be stated coherently anymore. 
To show that internal realism is faced with this dilemma, I will focus on 
the issues of truth and reference as approached by internal realism. In section 2.1 
I shall discuss Putnam's view of truth as 'ideal rational acceptibility1 (as put 
forward in the 1980's). I will discuss three objections raised against Putnam's 
internal realist conception of truth. These concern the problem that truth and ideal 
justifiability do not always coincide, the problem that the definition of truth as 
ideal rational acceptibility is circular, and the problem that ideal conditions of 
justification are inaccessible in principle. I will consider Putnam's replies to these 
objections. I will argue that these replies are cogent but that they play down the 
intern realist's claim to provide a theory of truth, alternative to metaphysical realist 
and verificationist conceptions of truth. Putnam's attitude towards truth equivocates 
between providing a theory of truth and adopting a quietisi stance. I will argue 
that Putnam's ambiguous attitude towards the possibility of and the need for a 
theory of truth is due to an ambiguous attitude towards AMR. In section 2.21 will 
go into Rortys view of truth. Rorty rejects both realist and antirealist 
(verificationist) definitions of truth. He argues that we should get rid of the very 
idea that there is a 'problem of truth', to be answered by a 'theory of truth'. 
Although Rorty tries to overcome the realism-antirealism issue, his deflationary 
account of truth relies on a rigid separation of the issue of truth from the issue of 
justification. Rortys deflationism denies the normative role of the truth-notion in 
assessing criteria of justification. Because of this, I will argue, following Putnam, 
McDowell and Wright, that Rorty cannot make sense of our practices of 
justification, nor of basic notions such as 'assertion' and 'belief. His notion of truth 
is highly revisionist. It leads to metaphysical antirealism rather than to an 
Auftiebung of the realism debate. 
As regards the internal realist conception of reference, which will be 
discussed in sections 2.3 and 2.4, the same ambivalent attitude towards AMR is 
at play. This comes out in the tension that, so I will argue in section 2.3, exists 
between Putnam's internal realism and his meaning extemalism. To distinguish 
internal realism from metaphysical antirealism, Putnam in his (1981) appeals to 
'experiential inputs', that put external constraints on reference. I will argue that the 
notion of 'experiential inputs' still relies on AMR and that it, paradoxically, 
justifies rather than undermines a reading of internal realism as metaphysical 
antirealism On the other hand, I will argue that in his (1987), Putnam proposes 
a more thorough rejection of AMR, that opens the door to a 'commonsense' 
realism about reference that is not metaphysical realism. However, I will argue 
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that insofar as AMR is consistently rejected, so is the notion of referential objects 
being 'internal to a conceptual scheme'. Within AMR, internal realism ends up 
with metaphysical antirealism. Without AMR, internal realism cannot be 
formulated coherently. In section 2.4 Rortys view of reference will be under 
discussion. As regards reference, Rorty claims that our commonsense notion, 
according to which reference is fixed by our referential intentions, is not in need 
of philosophical back-up. Appealing to Davidson's argument against incommen­
surability, he argues that we do not need a 'stronger1 notion of reference in order 
to avert the threat of idealism or relativism. However, in defending his position 
against the objection of idealism, Rorty falls back on AMR in two ways. First, he 
appeals to a notion of'theory independent causality", that does not make any sense 
by his own standards. Secondly, he presents his internal realist stance as a merely 
epistemological claim, whereas his attack on metaphysical realism implies that 
questions of epistemology cannot be separated from questions of ontology. I will 
argue that although Rortys account of reference points at a kind of commonsense 
realism that goes beyond AMR, his implicit reliance on AMR prevents him from 
articulating it in a convincing way. The overall claim I hope to establish in this 
chapter is that internal realism either collapses into metaphysical аи/rrealism, or 
the phrase 'internal' carries no meaning. 
2.1 Putnam's conception of truth as ideal rational acceptability 
In this section I will discuss Putnam's theory of truth as put forward in the 1980's. 
In his recent work, Putnam has distanced himself from this theory of truth 
(Putnam, 1995). Putnam's current conception of truth will be discussed in chapter 
5. Here, I will discuss three objections to his internal realist conception of truth, 
raised by Ebbs, Kirkham, Wright, Horwich, Fine, Rorty and by himself. I will 
consider the replies Putnam gave to these criticisms as an internal realist. I shall 
argue that although these replies do undermine the objections to some extent, they 
do not suffice to save Putnam's internal realist theory of truth as a full-fledged 
theory of truth. Rather, they transform the internal realist theory of truth to a kind 
of quietist attitude towards the problem of truth, that refrains from the very project 
of reductively defining truth. I will argue that insofar as Putnam's internal realism 
tries to come up with a reductive explanation of truth, it still relies on AMR It 
does so in considering the problem of the accessibility of truth a genuine problem, 
to be answered by a theory of truth. To this extent, Putnam's theory of truth is 
rightly criticized for implying metaphysical antirealism. However, insofar as 
Putnam rejects the skeptical problem of access as unintelligible, as he does in his 
replies to the three objections mentioned above, he rejects AMR In doing so, the 
need for a theory of truth disappears. I will argue that insofar Putnam rejects 
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AMR, the phrase 'internal' and the phrase 'theory in 'internal realist theory of 
truth' lose their meaning. 
Traditionally, the correspondence notion of truth is opposed to verificatio-
nist or 'antirealist' theories of truth. Verificationists define truth in terms of 
epistemic notions such as verifiability, warranted assertibility or coherence. Strictly 
speaking, verificationism entails that the verifiability of a sentence is the necessary 
and sufficient condition for the sentence to be true. In other words, verificationists 
hold that to be true means to be verifiable or to be rationally acceptable to us. 
They argue that, since the correspondence notion of truth is not a coherent notion, 
there is no alternative but to define truth in terms of an epistemic notion that ties 
truth to our practices of justification. As Fine summarizes the motive behind this 
line of thought: 
For when one sees that the realist conception of truth creates a gap that 
keeps the epistemic access one wants always just beyond reach, it may be 
tempting to try to refashion the idea of truth in epistemic terms in order 
to, literally, make the truth accessible. (Fine, 1984b:54) 
Although Putnam sides with verificationism in rejecting the correspondence 
theory, he has never advocated a full-fledged verificationist conception of truth. 
Internal realism does not equate truth with warranted assertibility or rational 
acceptibility. In his (1981) and (1983), Putnam explains why identifying truth and 
justification is problematic: 
Truth cannot simply be justification, (..) for any number of reasons: truth 
is supposed to be a property of a statement that cannot be lost, whereas 
justification can be lost (in fact, justification is both tensed and relative 
to a person), justification is a matter of degree, whereas truth is not (or 
not in the same way), etc. (Putnam, 1983:84)" 
To identify truth and rational acceptibility is to make truth subject to change, 
whereas truth is generally considered to be stable. According to our common way 
of speaking, if a proposition is true now, it was true in the past too, although it 
might have been not rationally acceptable in the past (Putnam, 1981:55). 
Moreover, to identify 'true' with 'rationally acceptible' is to make the notion of 
truth a gradual one, whereas the truth-predicate, as we commonly use it, functions 
'See also Putnam (1981:55). 
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as an absolute predicate: a proposition is either true or false2. Verificationism 
cannot, according to Putnam, do justice to the way in which the truth-predicate 
actually functions, i.e. as a stable and absolute predicate.3 
In view of the difficulties involved in defining truth in terms of 
justifiability, Putnam argues that we need a conception of truth that avoids the 
pitfalls of both metaphysical realism and verificationism He is 
concerned to present a conception of truth alternative to both the classical 
metaphysical realist conception (truth as correspondence to 'mind-indepen­
dent objects') and to relativisl/positivist views. (Putnam, 1990: vii) 
To this avail, he has introduced the notion of'ideal conditions of acceptibility*. In 
his ( 1983), after having rejected Dummett's identification of truth and justification, 
Putnam explains that truth should be conceived as idealized justification, rather 
than as justification-on-present-evidence. He distinguishes 
two key claims of such an idealization theory of truth: 1) that truth is 
independent of justification here and now, but not independent of all 
possibility of justification. (..); 2) that truth is expected to be stable, or 
'convergent'. (Putnam, 1983:85)" 
Truth is independent of justification according to current criteria; this is the anti-
verificationist, realist part of Putnam's theory of truth. This part takes account of 
the fact that truth is stable (not variable) and absolute (in stead of gradual). But, 
as opposed to the correspondence theory of truth, Putnam holds that truth is not 
independent of all possible justification. Although it always makes sense to say 
of a sentence that it is 'justified but not true', to say that a sentence is 'justified 
under ideal conditions but not true' does not make any sense. Putnam has 
elucidated the notion of 'ideal conditions' in the following way: 
We speak as if there were such things as epistemically ideal conditions, 
and we call a statement 'true' if it would be justified under such condi-
*ΟΓ it lacks a truth-value; the point of calling the truth-predicate absolute is not to preclude that there might 
be statements which are neither true nor false, but to bring out that it does not make sense to call a statement 
'a little bit true' or 'a little bit false'. 
3ln addition, the identification of truth with consensus, i.e. 'what members of the comninity would agree to', 
has to confront the problem of counterfactuals, as pointed out by Putnam in his (1992a· 68-71) and by Fine in 
his (1984b: 55). 
4See also Putnam (1981:56). 
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tions. 'Epistemically ideal conditions', of course, are like 'frictionless 
planes': we cannot really attain epistemically ideal conditions, or even be 
absolutely certain that we have become sufficiently close to them. But 
frictionless planes cannot be attained either, and yet talk of frictionless 
planes has 'cash value' because we can approximate them to a very high 
degree of approximation. (Putnam, 1981:55)5 
2.1.1 Three objections and Putnam's replies 
The notion of 'ideal conditions of acceptibility' has not remained unchallenged. 
Ebbs (1992), Kirkham (1992), Rorty (1991), Fine (1984b), Horwich (1990) and 
Wright (1992) have raised several objections to Putnam's theory of truth, which 
partly overlap. I will distinguish between three difficulties pointed out by the 
above authors: a) the problem of cases where truth and ideal rational acceptibility 
do not overlap, b) the problem of definitional circularity, c) the problem of the 
accessibility of ideal conditions. 
a) The problem of non-overlapping cases 
The way in which Putnam presents the notion of ideal rational acceptibility, in the 
passages quoted above, suggests that internal realism claims to provide us with an 
alternative theory of truth. Therefore, a natural reading of Putnam's internal realist 
conception of truth is to read it as offering a definition of truth. This reading is 
supported by claims such as: 'The picture I propose (..) is the picture that truth 
comes to no more than idealized rational acceptibility1 (Putnam, 1990:41). This 
would mean that the notion of 'ideal rational acceptibility' claims to provide us 
with an account of the necessary and sufficient conditions for truth. It suggests 
that truth is identical to ideal rational acceptibility. As Ebbs puts it: 
Putnam seems to be endorsing the following generalization about the 
relationship between truth and justification: (Q For every statement S, to 
say that S is true is to say that if epistemic conditions were ideal, we 
would be justified in affirming S. (Ebbs, 1992:24) 
However, as Ebbs points out, there are statements for which truth and ideal 
rational acceptibility do not coincide. There are cases in which we know what it 
would mean for a statement S to be true, although we will never be able to 
rationally verify or falsify S. In a recent paper on verificationism, in which he 
'See also Putnam (1983:84-5). 
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distances himself from his former truth conception, Putnam himself mentions such 
a case: 
If the statement: (Γ) There do not happen to be any stars arranged as the 
vertices of a regular 100-gon (in a region of space otherwise free of stars), 
is true, there is no way in which we could know that it is true. (Putnam 
1995:294) 
The point of this example6 is that 'we can know that there are some things which 
are possible (possible according to our scientific world-picture itself), but which 
are such that if they are the case, then we cannot know that they are the case' 
(Putnam, 1995:294). Ebbs even goes as far as saying that truth and ideal rational 
acceptibility can almost never be equated Tor most statements, our present 
conceptions of when they would be correctly affirmed are either subject to fun­
damental revision, or extremely vague, or both' (Ebbs, 1992:26). However, taken 
as a strict definition of truth, Putnam's internal realist theory of truth fails already 
if there are some exceptions to the general claim that truth and ideal rational 
acceptibility are to be identified. The case he discusses shows that, as Putnam now 
admits, ideal rational acceptibility is not even a necessary condition for truth. The 
anti-verificationist dictum that 'true but not rationally justifiable' always makes 
sense also applies to the notion of 'true but not ideally rationally acceptable'. 
b) The problem of circularity 
Another important objection to Putnam's theory of truth is that the notion of'ideal 
rational acceptibility' presupposes the notion of truth rather than explicates it. The 
problem is that it seems that we cannot explain what it means for ideal conditions 
to obtain without invoking the notion of truth. Putnam uses the analogy of 
'frictionless planes' to clarify the nature of 'ideal conditions'. However, we know 
in advance what it means for a plane to be frictionless. But how should we 
conceive of an 'ideal justification context' for a particular statement, apart from 
conceiving it as a situation in which we can judge whether the statement is true 
or false? As Kirkham puts it: 
no sense can be given to the notion of ideal circumstances unless we have 
first made some choice of value at which justification is to aim. Else what 
reason could there be for thinking that observation through smudged 
'See Putnam (1995:293-5) for a detailed discussion of this example. I will come back to this example in 
chapter 5, section 5.1.3. 
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eyeglasses is less ideal than observation through clean ones? (Kirkham, 
1992:54)7 
In other words, the notion of ideal conditions, as opposed to the notion of friction-
less plains, refers to a Grenzbegriff, the meaning of which is not clear at all. It 
looks like the regulative ideal that conditions of justifications aim for is simply 
truth. But it is the notion of truth that is supposed to be explained by the notion 
of ideal rational acceptibility. Putnam's notion of'ideal' is question-begging in that 
it presupposes the notion of truth as the standard by which we evaluate our 
different criteria of justification. 
c) The problem of access 
If we do not know in advance what it means for ideal justification conditions to 
obtain, like we do in the case of frictionless planes, ideal conditions cannot be 
recognized as such. There is a problem of access with regard to 'ideal conditions'. 
It is unclear how we can ever find out if and to what extent we have realized 
'ideal justification' of knowledge claims. Wright argues that, if truth is to be a 
stable and absolute property, then 
to have warrant for a proposition under 'epistemically ideal circumstances' 
involves having a case for it which cannot be defeated (else we wouldn't 
have stability) or improved (else we wouldn't have absoluteness) by any 
further information. (Wright, 1992:45) 
'Ideally justified' thus implies that no further relevant information exists to be had. 
But what could 'relevant' mean here; any piece of information may be relevant to 
any particular belief. As Wright suggests: 'Doesn't it just have to mean: possessing 
all empirical information, period? (ibid).This comes close to the Peircean idea 
that truth is what is justified at an ideal limit of enquiry, when all empirical infor-
mation is in. At this point, the problem of the accessibility of ideal conditions 
arises. As Wright notes: 
it is hard to see how a subject who somehow accomplished a Peircean 
state of comprehensive empirical information, could have any intimation 
that she had done so. By what principle could such a subject discount the 
idea that there was still more to learn? (Wright, 1992:46) 
7
 Fine makes a similar point in his (1984b:55). 
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For this reason, Rorty remarks that a 'limit-concept of ideal truth' cannot have any 
cash value in our current epistemic practices: 'Positing Grenzbegriffe seems merely 
a way of telling ourselves that a non-existent God would, if he did exist, be 
pleased with us' (Rorty, 1991:27). In this respect, the notion of ideal conditions 
is 'as fishy as correspondence' (ibid, 131). 
Reaab) 
In response to the first and second objection, Putnam has replied that, in putting 
forward the notion of'ideal rational acceptibility', he did not intend to provide us 
with a reductive definition of truth. Rather than claiming that truth is identical to 
ideal rational acceptibility, he meant to point out that the notions of truth and ideal 
rational acceptibility are conceptually linked. This response is not wholly fair. In 
the eighties, Putnam did suggest more than once that truth should be identified 
with or defined as 'ideal rational acceptibility1.8 However, it is true that he 
indicated elsewhere, and as early as 1981, that he never intended to offer a 
reductive explanation of truth.9 'The suggestion is simply that truth and rational 
acceptibility are interdependent notions' (Putnam 1988:115). Taking this line, 
Putnam may, in response to objection a), simply agree that truth cannot be identi-
fied with ideal rational acceptibility. He can point out that he did not pretend to 
offer a reductive definition of truth.10 Moreover, in response to objection b), he 
can admit that, if taken as a definition, his account of truth is circular, in the sense 
that the notion of truth and the notion of ideal rational acceptibility mutually 
presuppose one another. The point of the internal realist theory of truth, he 
suggests, is not to provide us with necessary and sufficient conditions for truth to 
begin with. It is rather to show that the notion of truth and the notion of rational 
acceptibility are 'conceptually connected'.11 
Although Putnam's reply does constitute an answer to objections a) and 
b), it does not save his theory of truth as a theory of truth. Rather, it shows that 
internal realism is ambivalent about what an 'account of truth' should amount to. 
On the one hand, internal realism claimed to provide us with a positive theory of 
«See Putnam (1981:49) and (1990:41,115). 
"Putnam (1981:56), (1990:viii, 42). 
'°In his (1992), Ebbs stresses this interpretation of the internal realist conception of truth. He argues that the 
widespread reading of Putnam's internal realism as a reductive explanation of truth rests on a misunderstanding. 
However, this misunderstanding is at least partly due to some of Putnam's own formulations (see previous 
footnote), which strongly suggest that internal realism does purport to give an alternative definition of truth. 
"The idea of a conceptual connection between truth and justifiability will be discussed in greater detail in 
chapter 5, sections 5.1.3 and 5.1.4. 
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truth, alternative to both the correspondence theory and verificationism. On the 
other hand, internal realism after all does not claim to give the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for truth. It even denies the very demand for a theory of truth 
in the sense of a reductive definition. Putnam's reply to objections a) and b) 
implies that the notion of truth cannot be reduced either to non-epistemic notions, 
or to epistemic notions. That means that the notion of truth should be taken as 
primitive. Crispin Wright argues that this is unsatisfactory, since Putnam's 'internal 
realist theory of truth' is then 'survived only by the vague idea that truth is not 
"radically non-epistemic" ' (Wright, 1992:46η). In my view, the idea that we 
should leave truth undefined need not necessarily be vague.12 However, since 
internal realism fails to give us any reasons why the demand for an explanation 
or definition of truth is mistaken, its conception of truth is unsatisfactory. As a 
theory of truth, it fails to give an explanatory definition of truth. As a claim about 
the status of a theory of truth, it fails to explain why the attempt to give a non-
circular definition of truth is mistaken. 
Ree) 
As regards the third objection, the problem of access, Putnam has argued that we 
should interpret ideal conditions, not as referring to the fictional state of'the ideal 
limit of inquiry1, but as the 'sufficiently good conditions' we are all familiar with 
in ordinary life. In the Preface of his (1990), Putnam emphasizes that 'epistemica-
lly ideal' should not be taken in the Utopian Peircean sense (viii). It does not refer 
to a situation of complete knowledge at 'the end of inquiry1. It is just meant to 
indicate that 'there are better and worse epistemic situations with respect to 
particular statements' (ibid). 
If I say 'There is a chair in my studio', an ideal epistemic situation would 
be to be in my study with the lights on or with daylight streaming through 
the window, with nothing wrong with my eyesight, with an unconfused 
mind, without having taken drags or been subjected to hypnosis, and so 
forth, and to look and see if there is a chair there. (Putnam, 1990: viii) 
Thus, 'ideal' should be understood in a fairly commonsensical way, rather like 
'normal' or Optimal' conditions. In Putnam (1981), this was indicated already by 
saying that talk of ideal epistemic conditions, just like talk of frictionless planes, 
"has "cash value" because we can approximate them to a very high degree of 
approximation' (55). 
"See chapter 5, section 5.1. 
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However, this appeal to common sense or the reliability of ordinary 
perception is not altogether convincing. It seems to lead us back to verificatio-
nism. If 'ideal conditions' are nothing but the familiar criteria of justification we 
presently apply to particular statements, then truth is after all equated with 
'justifiability on present evidence'. To distinguish his theory of truth from 
verificationism, Putnam has to draw a distinction between our present criteria of 
justification and an ultimate set of optimal criteria of justification. Solving the 
problem of the accessibility of this latter set of criteria by saying that we in fact 
already have access to it in most situations, is not convincing. How do we know 
that we actually are 'approximating them to a very high degree of approximation'? 
The very idea of ideal criteria as opposed to our present criteria suggests 
that our ordinary criteria are and should be subject to revision. Ideal conditions 
of justification, on the other hand, are stable and unchangeable. In this sense, they 
represent a regulative ideal that is always out of reach. The notion of a regulative 
ideal has content only if we know what it would mean to realize the ideal, even 
if we can never in fact do so. In the case of ideal rational acceptability however, 
we do not know what it means for it to obtain. Ideal conditions of acceptibility 
are inaccessible in principle and not merely in a practical way. Therefore, the very 
notion of'ideal conditions' lacks intelligibility. The dilemma for Putnam's internal 
realist notion of truth then is this. If ideal conditions largely overlap with our 
ordinary criteria of justification, we are back with verificationism. If they don't, 
the notion of ideal conditions cannot be given any content. 
2.1.2 Putnam's equivocation between metaphysical antirealism and quietism 
In my view, the problems facing Putnam's internal realist conception of truth are 
to a large extent due to the ambiguous relation between internal realism and 
AMR. Central to AMR is the idea that the question of the nature of truth can be 
intelligibly distinguished from the question of the epistemic accessibility of truth. 
Once we draw this distinction between 'nature' (ontology) and 'access' (epistemo-
logy), we get stuck with a formidable problem of access, which is nothing but the 
problem of skepticism. Verificationism gets rid of this problem by claiming that 
truth means nothing but rational acceptibility. Since truth is made accessible by 
decree, the problem of access cannot be formulated anymore. However, reducing 
truth to rational acceptibility leads into several paradoxes. As mentioned in the 
beginning of this section, Putnam has pointed out that verificationism cannot do 
justice to the fact that truth is commonly regarded as absolute and stable, whereas 
justifiability is gradual and subject to change. Verificationism is revisionist. It can 
only 'overcome' the problem of access by ignoring vital aspects of the nature of 
truth. Leaving out these aspects (stability and absoluteness) creates room for the 
skeptical question to arise again. Within the framework of verificationism, the 
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problem of skepticism re-appears when we ask how our standards of rational 
acceptibility themselves are justified Since these standards are not to be evaluated 
on the basis of a separate norm of truth, their only justification is their being 
endorsed by the particular community we live in. But this is just to say that the 
ultimate ground for our criteria of justification is arbitrary. Truth is what we 
consider to be true according to our present conceptual scheme. At this point, I 
do not wish to claim that this relativist position is untenable. This issue will be 
dealt with in the next section, where I will discuss Rortys notion of truth. There 
I will argue that if we ignore the role that the notion of truth plays in evaluating 
our criteria of justification, we cannot make sense of the notion of justification, 
nor of such basic notions as 'assertion' and "belief. For now, I just want to point 
out that verificationism does not overcome the problem of access. It rather 
provides us with a relativist answer to it. In this sense, instead of overcoming 
AMR, it leads to metaphysical antirealism. 
Putnam seeks to overcome the problem of access in a way that avoids 
verificationism. By introducing the notion of 'ideal justifiability1, he tries to 
synthesize the intuitions behind realist (non-epistemic) and antirealist (epistemic) 
notions of truth. The three objections just discussed show that this notion does not 
really bring about a synthesis. The notion of'ideal' is deeply problematic. On the 
one hand, Putnam's truth notion is too verificationist: it does not account for the 
fact that 'true but not ideally rationally acceptable' makes sense in several 
situations. On the other hand, it is too realist: ideal conditions are as inaccessible 
as relations of correspondence are. 
Recently, Putnam has argued that what this particular dilemma shows is 
that the notions of truth and justifiability can neither be identified nor rigidly 
separated. Since truth and justifiability are notions that are both primitive and 
interdependent, we should give up the project of reductively analyzing truth in 
favour of an inquiry into the conceptual interconnections between basic notions 
such as truth, justification, meaning, reference, etc.131 shall argue in chapter 5 
that, from the 'postmodem Aristotelian stance' currently adopted by Putnam, we 
can clearly articulate why we should favour a quietisi attitude towards the issue 
of truth. 
Internal realism, however, remains essentially ambiguous with respect to 
the project of a theory of truth. On the one hand, it does claim to provide us with 
a theory of truth, the 'idealization theory of truth' (Putnam, 1981:56), an 
'alternative to both the classical metaphysical realist conception (truth as corres-
pondence to 'mind-independent objects') and to relativist/positivist views' (Putnam, 
1990:vii). In this respect, internal realism still presupposes AMR: it considers the 
"See chapter 5 for a more detailed account of these different types of projects. 
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'problem of access' a legitimate question, to be answered by a theory of truth. On 
the other hand, it rejects the quest for a reductive définition of truth. It is happy 
to admit that its account of truth is circular. This is not considered a drawback, 
since this version of internal realism denies that the problem of truth is a genuine 
problem. This side of internal realism holds that skepticism with regard to the 
accessibility of truth cannot even be intelligibly stated. 
Although this side of internal realism remains rather implicit in Putnam's 
work of the eighties, it represents the extent to which internal realism rejects 
AMR. The quietisi elements in internal realism are, as noted, more prominent in 
Putnam's current position, which he has baptized 'natural realism'. In the next three 
chapters, this position will be discussed extensively. Within the framework of 
internal realism, however, the element of quietism is paradoxical in that it 
undercuts the initial motivation underlying internal realism Internal realism 
claimed to come up with an account of truth, alternative to both metaphysical 
realism and verificatiomsm/relativism. As an alternative theory of truth, internal 
realism combines the most problematic aspects of metaphysical realism and 
metaphysical antirealism, rather than providing a synthesis of the two. When the 
internal realist, faced with these problems, subsequently argues that we should 
distance ourselves from the very project of explaining truth, 'internal realism' as 
a theory of truth in a sense blows itself up. Since the quietist version of internal 
realism recognizes that truth sometimes outruns ideal rational acceptibility, the 
notion 'internal' is not very apt. Since the quietist considers truth to be a primitive 
notion, not to be reductively defined, the notion of a 'theory1 loses its meaning too. 
2.2 Rorty's elimination of truth 
Italy's approach to truth seems to pursue the quietist line in internal realism, that 
remains rather implicit in Putnam's conception of truth. His aim is to show that 
the very idea of a theory of truth is misguided As we have seen in the previous 
section, Rorty rejects Putnam's notion of truth as ideal rational acceptibility. In 
Rorty's view, we should not try to come up with a 'synthesis' of, or a 'middle-road' 
between, the correspondence theory of truth and verificationist notions of truth. 
We should resist the very idea that truth is in need of philosophical explanation 
or reduction. Rorty is sympathetic to Arthur Fine's suggestion that 
it is a typical dialectic that binds the metaphysics of realism to the meta-
physics of behaviorism [i.e. verificationism in my terminology]. Realism 
reaches out for more than can be had. Behaviorism reacts by pulling back 
to the 'secure' ground of human behavior.(..) The limit imposed by 
behaviorism, however, is simply less than what we require. So realism 
7S 
reacts by positing something more, and then reaches out for it again. What 
we can leam from this cycle is just what makes it run, and how to stop 
it. (Fine, 1984b:56) 
What makes the cycle run, according to Rorty, is a set of metaphysical dualisms 
that makes epistemological skepticism 'interesting and arguable' (Rorty, 1991:129): 
(..) the only reason philosophers thought they needed an 'explanation of 
what truth consists in' was that they were held captive by a certain picture 
- the picture which Davidson calls 'dualism of scheme and content' and 
which Dewey thought of as 'the dualism of Subject and Object'. Both 
pictures are of disparate ontological realms, one containing beliefs and the 
other non-beliefs. (Rorty, 1991:129) 
The traditional picture, by suggesting that there is a gap to be crossed between the 
realm of beliefs and the realm of mind-independent reality, invites the skeptical 
problematic. It invites the idea that there is a genuine problem about the epistemic 
accessibility of the world. Both the correspondence theory of truth and verificatio-
nism, according to Rorty, are responding to this problem. The way 'to stop the 
cycle' between them from running is to show the skeptical question to be senseless 
and, by consequence, to stop conceiving of truth as a 'substantial' notion, as in 
need of explanation. Rortys view on the problem of truth has much in common 
with the so-called deflationist or disquotationalist account of truth. According to 
this account, we should not conceive of truth as a 'substantial', explanatory notion. 
The notion of truth does not cany any metaphysical weight. It does not express 
a relation of correspondence between beliefs and non-beliefs, or a relation of 
(ideal) coherence between beliefs. The truth-predicate is merely a device of 
disquotation: to ascribe truth to a sentence is just to 'cancel the quotation marks'. 
The truth-predicate is superflous in the sense that saying that 'snow is white' is 
true is the same as saying that snow is white.14 
2.2.1 Rorty's rejection of verificationism 
Despite these quietist notes, Rorty is often interpreted as defending a verificatio-
nist conception of truth, according to which truth should be equated with 'war-
ranted assertibility' according to our present conceptual scheme.15 In Philosophy 
14For a defence of disquotationalism, see Quine (1990:79ff.) and Horwich (1990). For a summary of current 
versions of deflationism, see Devitt (1991a:30-l) and Kirkham (1992:307-351). 
"Putnam (1981:ix, 1984:235, 1993:67), Vision (1990:77,92), Okrent (1993), Newton Smith (1989). 
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and the Mirror of Nature and in his work prior to it, Rorty indeed suggests at 
various places that truth is nothing but 'success in coping with reality1 or 
'warranted assertibility according to our peers's standards'.16 But he also points out 
that although the correspondence notion of truth is devoid of content, one should 
not give in to the temptation to identify truth with justifiability.17 In his early 
work, Rorty equivocates between verificationism and minimalism about truth. In 
his more recent work, however, the minimalist or deflationist attitude gets more 
and more emphasis. Rorty acknowledges that verificationism is problematic. 'Truth 
is always evidence-transcendent' (Rorty, 1991:147): it is always meaningful to say 
of a statement that it is justified but not true. The truth-predicate has, in his words, 
apart from an endorsing and a disquotational use, a cautionary use. Part of its role 
is 'to express a cautionary note towards our own beliefs and practices' (Okrent, 
1993:384). 'We can never exclude the possibility that some better audience might 
exist, or come to exist, to which a belief which is justifiable to us would not be 
justifiable' (Rorty, 1995:283). So although Rorty agrees with the verificationist 
that we can make no sense of the notion of truth as correspondence, he stresses 
that one should resist the inference that 'truth' must mean something like 
'justifiable': 
The error is to assume that 'truth' needs a definition, and then to infer 
from the fact that it cannot be defined in terms of a relation between 
beliefs and non-beliefs to the view that it must be defined in terms of a 
relation among beliefs. But, as Hilary Putnam has pointed out in his 
'naturalistic fallacy argument', 'it might be true but not X is always 
sensible, no matter what one substitutes for X (Putnam, 1978:108). (Rorty, 
1991:127) 
In Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, Rorty wants to bring out the pseudo-character 
of the 'problem of truth'. His aim is not to supply us with a new theory of truth, 
but to discard with the widely felt need for a theory of truth: 'The pragmatist does 
not want to explicate "true" at all' (Rorty, 1991:59). 
Correspondence theorists consider the notion of truth to be prior to the 
notion of justification, in the sense that it sets the standard by which criteria of 
justification are assessed. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Rorty and 
Putnam argue that insofar as the correspondence theory remains agnostic with 
regard to the question of the tests of truth, its definition of truth is completely 
empty. Verificationists argue that the notion of justification is prior to the notion 
"For ехаіцЯе Rorty (1980:176,308), (1982:162,136). 
"Rorty (1980:280-2, 301η, 177n). See also his (1993:454). 
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of truth in that the notion of truth gets all its content from some notion of 
justifiability. Rorty and Putnam resist this identification of truth and justifiability 
for reasons mentioned above. 
In trying to avoid the whole question of priority, Rorty argues that the 
notion of truth does not play any significant role in the realm of justification and 
that therefore, the notion of truth has no place in an account of knowledge, i.e. in 
the epistemological sphere. 'Truth and assertibility have nothing to do with one 
another1 (Rorty, 1991:154). Rorty does admit that we need the truth notion in 
semantics, but this notion of truth is a lde-epistemologized, one. According to 
Rorty, semantics, properly understood, has no relevance to epistemological con­
cerns. Rorty distinguishes between 'pure' and 'impure' philosophy of language. 
Pure philosophy of language, as exemplified by the Davidsonian theory of 
meaning, 'has no epistemological parti pris' (Rorty, 1980:257) and 'its "ontologj-
cal" results are bound to be bland' (261). Semantics in this sense explicates 'the 
way in which notions like "truth", "meaning", "necessity" and "name" fit together' 
(ibid). It seeks to understand 'how language works, as opposed to how it hooks 
unto the world' (Rorty, 1980:301η). Impure philosophy of language, on the other 
hand, is the project of rephrasing traditional epistemological questions in linguistic 
terms. It makes the mistake of thinking 'that explanations of how language works 
will also help us see how "language hooks unto the world" and thus how truth and 
knowledge are possible' (Rorty, 1980:265). Rortys stance towards truth can be 
summarized as follows. Although the notion of truth plays an important role 
within semantics as pure philosophy of language, this notion of truth is the 
metaphysical light-weight notion of truth as disquotability, which has no bearing 
on epistemological questions about the relation between language and reality. In 
the epistemological sphere, i.e. in the sphere of knowledge and justification, the 
concept of truth is perfectly redundant. 
In the previous section I argued that Putnam's internal realist account of 
truth partly presupposes AMR, in considering the question of the accessibility of 
truth a legitimate project. However, I also argued that Putnam's account might 
overcome AMR if he would come up with a more explicit defence of quietism 
about truth, i.e. if he would point out why the quest for a reductive definition of 
truth is mistaken. Does Rortys version of internal realism pursue this second, 
quietist line further and does it thereby succeed in avoiding both metaphysical 
realism and metaphysical antirealism? 
In my view, there are two ways in which one can deny that truth is in 
need of explanation or definition. The first is to deny that the truth plays any ex­
planatory role in our actual practices of justification. Call this the eliminativist 
line. It says we can make sense of our justification practices without appealing to 
truth. According to this line, which Rorty pursues, we don't need the notion of 
truth over and above the notion of justification. The notion of truth is in this sense 
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redundant. So the proper way of dealing with the notion of truth is 'elimination 
rather than identification'. In stead of identifying truth with either non-epistemic 
correspondence or some notion of verifiability, we should acquiesce in the 
completely trivial nature of the truth notion. The second way of denying that truth 
is in need of an explanatory or reductive définition is to hold that the notion of 
truth is both undefinable and indispensable. Call this the primitivist line. This line 
of reasoning, suggested by Putnam's recent work, urges that we need the 
normative appeal inherent in the notion of truth to make sense of our justification 
practices. On this view, it would be a mistake to say that the truth notion is 
redundant. We need the notion of truth in addition to the notion of justification. 
Truth and justification are interdependent notions; they mutually presuppose one 
another but they cannot be reduced to one another. Thus, according to this 
conception, the notion of truth is primitive in the sense that, although we can 
articulate how the notion of truth functions, how it is related to other notions, we 
cannot give a non-circular account of truth. This approach was hinted at in the 
previous section and it will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 5, section 5.1. 
I will presently argue that Rortys eliminativist strategy with regard to 
truth is problematic and that it, against all appearances, still relies on AMR. In 
criticizing the correspondence theory, Rorty stresses the way in which the notion 
of truth depends on the notion of justification.18 But he denies that the dependence 
goes the other way around. I will argue that the dependence goes both ways. In 
other words, my claim will be that 'truth without justification is empty1, but 
'justification without truth is blind'. Eliminativism about truth fails to recognize 
the extent to which the notion of justification depends on the notion of truth. 
Following Putnam, Wright and McDowell, I will argue that by denying the 
regulative, normative role played by the truth notion, Rorty cannot make sense of 
our justification practices, nor of fundamental notions like 'asserting' and 
"believing'. His account of truth implies a version of metaphysical antirealism. In 
stead of overcoming the realism-antirealism issue, Rortys account of truth and 
justification provides a pessimistic, relativist answer to the skeptic. 
2.2.2 Rorty's equivocation between metaphysical antirealism and quietism 
According to Rorty, the idea that we need the notion of truth in epistemology, in 
addition to the notion of assertibility, rests on the mistaken idea that the reliability 
and convergence of scientific knowledge can only be explained by appeal to truth 
(Rorty, 1980:282, 1991:140/1). Truth is supposed to explain the success of our 
"Rorty denies this dependence with respect to his own notion of truth as disquotabihty, but this he argues 
is 'a purely semantical notion' His point is that within the epistemologica] realm, the truth notion gets its content 
from the notion of justification 
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best theories. Rorty objects to this defence of truth as an explanatory concept on 
two grounds. First, he argues that the explanandum is loaded with realist 
prejudice: ' "convergence" is an inevitable artifact of historiography (1980:282).' 
Secondly, he points out that it is not the 'property of truth' that serves as an 
explanation, but the content of true beliefs: 
(..) it would be a mistake to think of 'true' as having an explanatory use 
on the basis of such examples as 'He found the correct house because his 
belief about its location was true' and 'Priestley failed to understand the 
nature of oxygen because his beliefs about the nature of combustion were 
false.' The quoted sentences are not explanations but promissory notes. To 
get them cashed, to get real explanations, we need to say things like Tie 
found the correct house because he believed it was located at...' or 
'Priestley failed because he thought that phlogiston...'. The explanation of 
success and failure is given by the details about what was true or what 
was false, not by truth or falsity itself (..). If truth itself is to be an 
explanation of something, that explanandum must be of something which 
can be caused by truth, but not caused by the content of true beliefs. 
(Rorty, 1991:140/1) 
I think Rorty is right in arguing that we cannot appeal to the property of truth to 
explain a theory's success. The reason that this appeal fails to explain anything, 
according to Rorty, is not that false theories can be very succesful, while true 
theories may not be.19 The problem is rather that it rests on the deeply puzzling 
notion that truth is, as Levin has put it, a kind of mechanism, that causes or 
creates the issuance of succesful predictions (Levin, 1984:126). To argue that the 
property of truth causes a theory's success, like throwing a stone causes a window 
to break, is rather mysterious. 
I will not discuss Rortys objections any further, since I have already 
argued, in chapter 1, that the abductive defence of a 'substantial', explanatory 
notion of truth, as put forward by many metaphysical realists, is guilty of vicious 
circularity (as pointed out by Fine). So I agree with Rorty that we don't need truth 
to explain 'why science works'. We need it for another reason, as Putnam, 
McDowell and Wright have pointed out. We need a 'substantial' concept of truth, 
not to explain the success of our theories, but to make sense of justification as a 
normative notion. Justification involves the notion of a non-arbitrary adjudication 
of conflicts. The non-arbitrary, normative aspect of justification can only be 
explained by its link to truth (however conceived). If we drop the notion of truth, 
"This is Laudan's line of arguing against the alleged link between truth and explanatory or predictive succes 
(see Laudan 1984). 
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then there is no way to make sense of justification as a non-arbitrary adjudication 
of conflicts. Another way of putting this is to say that there is a conceptual link 
between truth and assertibility. Putnam expresses this point by saying that 'Asser­
ting is guided by notions οι correctness and incorrectness' (Putnam, 1983:xiv). 
Language is meaningful, i.e. is not mere noise, because it embodies assertibility 
conditions. These conditions specify when we are justified in asserting something 
and when not. Our linguistic practices cannot be rendered meaningful without 
attributing to it criteria of justification, which are supposed to be indicative of 
truth. By denying the link between truth and assertibility, i.e. by denying the 
normative aspect of assertions, deflationism 'reduces our thoughts to mere 
subvocalizations' (Putnam, 1983:246). To deny that there is a property of truth, or 
lightness or correctness, 'is to deny that our thoughts and assertions are thoughts 
and assertions' (Putnam, 1983:xv). What distinguishes assertions from mere noises 
and what distinguishes thoughts or beliefs from mere dispositions to utter certain 
noises is that assertions, thoughts and beliefs make a truth-claim. As Wright puts 
it: 
One essential aspect omitted by a bare disquotational account of truth is 
normativity: Truth is what assertions aim for. Now, if aiming at truth is 
to supply a substantial constraint on assertorie practice, an assertion's 
being true cannot be guaranteed simply by the assertor's taking it to be 
true. A constraint is substantial only if we can make sense of the idea of 
a misapprehension about whether or not it is satisfied or of its being 
satisfied independently of any particular subject's opinion about the 
matter. The normativity of truth is respected by an assertorie practice only 
if a role is provided within that practice for the notions of ignorance, 
error, and improved assessment. (....) It appears then (..) that truth, 
assertion, ignorance, error and significant embedding constitute a package 
deal. We get all of them off the ground together, or none of them. 
(Wright, 1987:36) 
It is important to note that stressing the conceptual link between truth and 
justification is not to take a stance about what truth is. It is just to say that we 
need truth in some sense, not necessarily in the sense of correspondence. Rorty 
suggests that Wright's claim that we need truth, in addition to warranted 
assertibility, is entangled with the attempt to keep the correspondence notion of 
truth alive (Rorty,1995:288). To stress the need for the truth notion in order to 
account for the normative aspect of assertibility is, according to Rorty, to fall back 
on a metaphysical craving for objectivity. However, the point Putnam and Wright 
make is not that we need the correspondence notion of truth to save Objectivity, 
but that we need some notion of truth if we want to make sense of such 
fundamental notions as 'assertion', 'thought' and Tielief. What is wrong with 
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Rortys eliminativist stance is that it implies that truth is redundant, not just in the 
realist sense but in any sense (Putnam, 1983:xv). The problem is not that on 
Rortys account, we lack ultimate objective criteria to evaluate our knowledge 
claims; Putnam and Wright would grant that this is impossible. The problem is 
rather that we cannot make sense of our knowledge claims being knowledge 
claims to begin with. We cannot make sense of our beliefs as beliefs, our thoughts 
as thoughts, our assertions as assertions, if we leave out their claim to truth. If we 
deny that justifiability is guided by the norm of truth, justification stops being a 
normative notion. If the reason for considering an assertion to be correct is just 
that Ί take it to be correct' or that 'my peers take it to be correct', there is no sense 
in which our beliefs are about anything (Putnam, 1983:246). We end up with 
'solipsism with a we' (Putnam, 1990:ix). 
The same point is made by McDowell in a slightly different way. 
McDowell argues that Rortys distinction between semantics as 'pure philosophy 
of language' and epistemology is problematic. Semantics in Rortys sense provides 
us with a causal account of our linguistic behavior qua production of noises. 'It 
links beliefs with objects and circumstances in the believer's environment, in a 
structure whose constitutive relations are causal' (McDowell, 1994b: 147). In this 
account, truth as disquotability serves as an explanatory notion. Semantics in this 
sense is an outsider's view on linguistic practices. The epistemologjcal realm, on 
the other hand, is characterized by an insider's perspective on linguistic behavior; 
it deals with linguistic behavior as guided by norms. 'The inside view is (..) a 
point of view in which beliefs are linked with what is taken to give them their 
rational credentials' (McDowell, 1994b: 147). According to Rorty, the causal story 
and the normative story about linguistic behavior have nothing to do with each 
other. The normative story, in which 'warranted assertibility is the key concept, 
has nothing to do with the causal story, in which 'truth as disquotability is the 
central notion. McDowell argues that if one keeps the causal story and the 
normative story about linguistic behavior apart in this way, there actually is no 
genuine notion of normativity left. If the stories are kept separate, 
that implies that if we occupy a standpoint from which our beliefs are in 
view along with their objects and our causal engagements with the 
objects, then we cannot, from that standpoint, bring the beliefs under the 
norms of inquiry. And Putnam's worry about this is well placed: the result 
is to make it a mystery how what we are talking about can be beliefs, 
stances with respect to how things are in the world, at all. (1994b: 150) 
According to McDowell, breaking the link between truth (as disquotability) and 
'norms of inquiry makes it incomprehensible in what sense norms of inquiry are 
normative. 'Norms of inquiry are normative for the process of inquiry precisely 
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because disquotability is the norm for its results' (1994b: 150). If our criteria of 
justification are not linked to truth, then there is no way to understand our beliefs 
as claims about the world. And as McDowell emphasizes, the notion of world 
here employed is not the inscrutable metaphysical notion of the world 'in itself. 
On Rortys account, there is no way to conceive of beliefs as claims about 
anything. 
The world as I invoke it here (..) is [the] ordinary world on which our 
thinking bears in a way that Rortys separation of viewpoints leaves 
looking mysterious, precisely because it separates relatedness to the world 
from the normative surroundings that are needed to make sense of the 
idea of bearing - rational bearing - on anything. It is loss ofthat ordinary 
world that Rorty threatens us with, when he insulates norms of inquiry 
from disquotability. (McDowell, 1994b: 151) 
What Putnam's, Wright's and McDowell's arguments show is that by eliminating 
truth, one cannot account for justification as a normative notion anymore. 
Justification without truth is blind. By eliminating normativity, one also eliminates 
the notions of'assertion', "belief and 'thought' as we ordinarily conceive of them. 
As McDowell and Putnam argue, we even lose the notion of a world on which 
our assertions, beliefs and thoughts bear. We don't just lose the metaphysical 
realist's noumenal world, we lose the phenomenal world as well. In this sense, 
Rortys stance leads to metaphysical antirealism or 'solipsism with a we'. 
Now, at this point Rorty might simply reply 'So what7. In a recent article 
on truth, Rorty frankly admits that pragmatism is revisionist. Rorty doesn't care 
if his outlook violates our realist intuitions. 'Pragmatism should not claim to be 
a commonsensical philosophy (Rorty, 1995:295). Pragmatism tries to change our 
contemporary self-understanding so that we stop craving for transcendent notions 
of truth and objectivity. 
However, Rortys eliminativist approach to truth does not only undermine 
Truth and Objectivity in the transcendent sense. It undermines the very idea of 
normativity. Rortys revisionism has the radical implication that, with the notion 
of truth, we should eliminate our notions of'belief and 'thought' as well. But this 
is a self-refuting enterprise. On Rortys account, we could not even conceive of 
ourselves as thinkers. As Putnam puts it: 'The elimination of the normative is 
attempted mental suicide' (1983:246). 
Because of the implausible consequences of Rortys eliminativism about 
truth, his quietist attitude towards the problem of truth is not very convincing. As 
McDowell puts it: 
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We should indeed want philosophical problems about how thought can be 
in touch with the world to stand revealed as illusory, but Rorty deprives 
himself of the right to take that attitude. His own thinking makes those 
problems urgent, so that his refusal to address them can only be an act of 
will, a deliberate plugging of the ears. (McDowell, 1994b: 151) 
In my view, Rortys failure to genuinely overcome the problem of truth is due to 
his ambiguous attitude towards AMR. On the one hand, Rorty rejects the 
distinction between the question of the nature of truth and the question of the 
accessibility of truth (i.e. the question of justification). In criticizing the 
correspondence theory of truth (see chapter 1), he argued that the issue of truth 
cannot be settled independently of the issue of our criteria of justification. From 
this, it seems to follow that the issue of truth and the issue of justification cannot 
be separated. However, on the other hand, Rortys own position relies on a strict 
distinction between semantics and epistemology. Rorty proposes to 'de-epistemo-
logjze truth' and to 'de-semanticize justification'. This proposal reflects a strict 
distinction between the question of truth and the question of justification. De-
epistemologizing truth is incompatible with the tenet, endorsed by Rorty himself, 
that truth without justification is empty. De-semanticizing justification, I have 
argued, makes justification blind. By denying that truth plays a regulative role in 
our practices of justification, Rorty reduces our assertions to mere noises. Rortys 
attempt to overcome the problem of truth is hampered by his ambiguous attitude 
towards AMR. In chapter 5,1 shall argue that rejecting AMR thoroughly does 
imply that one rejects the quest for a reductive theory of truth, but for reasons 
considerably different from the reasons provided by Rorty. I will argue that 
rejecting AMR makes room for a realist understanding of truth that does not rely 
on the notion of correspondence. McDowell's position inMindand World suggests 
a reading of the Aristotelian definition of truth, that construes truth not as a 
relation of correspondence, but as a relation of identity between propositional 
contents and worldly facts. I will claim that McDowell's 'identity notion of truth', 
in combination with Putnam's notion of a conceptual connection between truth and 
justifiability, enables us to articulate a 'quietisi realism' about truth, which does not 
run foul of the 'God's Eye View objection' and the 'sentence-shaped chunks 
objection', on which the correspondence theory founders. 
23 Putnam's 'internalization' of reference 
In chapter 1, section 1.4, Putnam's criticism of the metaphysical realist notion of 
reference was discussed. The problem with this notion was that it implies that 
reference might be radically indeterminate. The metaphysical realist's appeal to 
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'causal chains of the appropriate type' to secure determinate relations of reference 
was shown to fail; it rests on a problematic distinction between the (ontologjcal) 
nature of reference and our (epistemic) access to reference. In this section I will 
discuss Putnam's internal realist theory of reference. Although Putnam, as an 
internal realist, rejects the notion of non-epistemic causal relations of reference, 
this does not mean that he has withdrawn his criticism of the description theory 
of reference. He still rejects the idea that the reference relation is determined by 
a fixed set of identity criteria, provided by our conceptual scheme, that picks out 
the object in question. He still resists the idea that 'meanings are in the head' 
(Putnam, 1981:24,25). What a speaker means with a term is partly constituted by 
his physical and social environment. Putnam claims that he can reject the idea of 
non-epistemic causal constraints on reference, while retaining his meaning 
externalism. Internal realism seeks to establish a middle road between the 
description theory of reference and the metaphysical realist's causal notion of 
reference, analogous to its attempt to provide a theory of truth that avoids both the 
correspondence theory and verificationism. Internal realism tries to articulate 
notions of truth and reference, that somehow synthesize the intuitions underlying 
both non-epistemic and epistemic notions of truth and reference. In this section 
I will argue that Putnam's conception of reference fails to provide us with such a 
synthesis. I will argue that his internal realist notion of reference is unstable 
because of its ambiguous attitude to AMR. 
How does Putnam go about reconciling internal realism and meaning 
externalism? On the one hand, he still wants to defend the idea that expert 
knowledge and the contribution of the real world are essentially part of the 
meaning of a term. On the other hand, Putnam, as an internal realist, points out 
that 'the contribution of the real world' cannot be understood as the presence of 
a non-epistemic causal relation between a term and mind-independent reality. As 
an internal realist, Putnam argues that neither the traditional theory of meaning nor 
the causal theory of reference can deal with the problem of the indeterminacy of 
reference as posed by the model-theoretic argument. The traditional view hoped 
to explain the way in which determinate relations of reference are fixed by us 
through the notions of operational and theoretical constraints. As we saw in 
chapter 1, these constraints might fix the truth-conditions for whole sentences, but 
they cannot determine what our terms refer to. The point of Quine's and Putnam's 
indeterminacy arguments is precisely that truth-conditions for whole sentences 
imderdetermine reference. The appeal to causal constraints on reference, it was 
shown in the previous chapter, does not alleviate this problem. 
Internal realism starts with the idea that it is absurd to suppose that 
reference might be radically indeterminate. Putnam holds that any theory of 
reference should do justice to the ordinary notion that our terms refer to 'well-
defined counterparts' in the world. A theory of reference that allows for the 
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possibility of radical indeterminacy violates our commonsense realist intuitions 
dramatically and it must be wrong for that very reason.20 Since both the 
description theory of reference and the metaphysical realist's causal notion of 
reference allow for this kind of skepticism, we need to come up with an 
alternative conception that saves determinacy without ignoring the model-theoretic 
argument. Internal realism claims to provide such an alternative in the following 
way. According to Putnam, the central assumption underlying both the traditional 
and the metaphysical realist's outlook is that reference is a one-to-one relation 
between language and mind-independent or discourse-independent things and sets 
of things (Putnam, 1981:41,47). The model-theoretic argument shows us that 
neither operational plus theoretical constraints, nor causal constraints will fix 
determinate relations of reference between terms and mind-independent entities. 
To save the determinacy of reference while accepting the model-theoretic 
argument, we have to drop the assumption that the objects of reference are 
completely mind-independent. Internal realism holds that: 
'Objects' do not exist independently of conceptual schemes. We cut up the 
world into objects when we introduce one or another scheme of descrip-
tion. Since the objects and the signs are alike internal to the scheme of 
description, it is possible to say what matches what. (Putnam, 1981:52) 
The threat of indeterminacy disappears when the objects of reference are 
conceived of as partly 'products of our conceptual invention' (Putnam, 1981:54). 
It then becomes rather trivial that 'objects intrinsically belong under certain labels; 
because those labels are the tools we used to construct a version of the world with 
such objects in the first place' (ibid). 
2.3.1 The metaphysical antirealist face of internal realism 
The question is whether the internal realist conception of reference presents us 
with a coherent alternative to both the description theory of reference, with its 
idealist consequences, and the causal theory of reference as defended by 
xSee Putnam (1994b. 279-81) Although Putnam and Quine agree on the viability of the model-theoretic 
argument, they draw opposite conclusions from it, 'thus illustrating the well known maxim that one philosopher's 
modusponens is another philosopher's modus tollens" (280) Briefly put, Quine argues that reference is ultimately 
indeterminate. Putnam argues that the idea of referential indeterminacy is absurd and that any philosophical 
position that leads to it mist be wrong. The model-theoretic argument, in Putnam's hands, constitutes a reductio 
of metaphysical realism Putnam's justification for interpreting the model-theoretic argument in this way is 
provided ultimately by a principle of philosophical methodology As I will argue in chapter 5, Putnam's approach 
is phenomenological rather than foundational ist it seeks to articulate our realist intuitions rather than to evaluate 
them from an external point of view 
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metaphysical realists. If internal realism is to be distinguished from the relativism 
or antirealism associated with the traditional description theory, it should save a 
place for 'the world's contribution' to meaning and reference. But how are we to 
understand the 'contribution of the real world' to meaning, if the objects of 
reference themselves are partly mind-dependent? 
The answer suggested by Putnam in Reason, Truth and History is that 
internal realism still considers the notion of causal relations of reference to be 
legitimate, as long as one does not conceive of them as radically non-epistemic, 
physical relations. Causal relations of reference should be conceived as relations 
of empirical causality, as opposed to relations of metaphysical causality. As 
pointed out in chapter 1, section 1.4, empirical causality is not independent of the 
explanatory interests we have in particular contexts. Relations of empirical 
causality are characterized by an irreducible element of intentionality. According-
ly, the objects of reference should not be conceived as completely mind-
independent, they are 'as much made as discovered' (Putnam, 1981:54). However, 
the fact that the objects of reference arepartly dependent on the context of use in 
which a term figures, does not preclude that reference relations are also partly 
determined by the external world. The reference of a term is not fixed by either 
'meanings in the head' or 'the external world'. Rather, it is fixed by the world as 
it is disclosed by a particular explanation space. Within a 'categorial system' or 
'context of use', we can specify relations of empirical causality between a term and 
its referent. Empirical causality contains both a passive and a constructive element. 
It is both world-dependent and mind-dependent, so to speak. For this reason, 
Putnam claims that 
Internalism is not a facile relativism that says, 'Anything goes'. (...) Inter-
nalism does not deny that there are experiential inputs to knowledge; 
knowledge is not a story with no constraints except internal coherence; 
but it does deny that there are inputs which are not themselves to some 
extent shaped by our concepts (.·)· The very inputs upon which our 
knowledge is based are conceptually contaminated; but contaminated 
inputs are better than none. (Putnam, 1981:54) 
In my view, the notion of'experiential inputs' here employed by Putnam is much 
more problematic than it seems. As Putnam himself points out, the experiential 
inputs that offer external constraints on meaning cannot be unconceptualized 
'givens'. Internal realism denies that there is a set of unconceptualized sensory data 
that is neutral with regard to our various conceptual schemes. However, Putnam 
insists that even 'contaminated inputs' can put external constraints on knowledge. 
They can do so in virtue of 'the "objective" factor in experience, the factor 
independent of our will' (1981:54). This suggests a picture according to which 
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'experiential inputs' consist of two parts, a conceptual and a non-conceptual one, 
an internal and an external one, an element of construction and an element of 
discovery. It is the non-conceptual, external part in experience that 'does the 
constraining1, but since it is inextricably mingled with the conceptual part, we 
don't know how this non-conceptual, worldly part constrains us. 
What is problematic about this picture is that it rests on the notion of an 
objective factor in experience, that is not epistemically accessible as such. In 
talking about the 'objective' factor in experience, the factor independent of our 
will, or in talking about 'less experiential beliefs' and 'more experiential beliefs' 
(Putnam, 1981:55), Putnam is drawing an ontological distinction between two 
components of experience that cannot be distinguished at the epistemologica! 
level. The problem with this formulation of 'the real world's contribution to 
meaning1 is that the way in which experiental constraints 'make themselves known' 
is left in the dark entirely. To save the idea of'external constraints on knowledge', 
saying that we are constrained is not enough; what needs articulation is how these 
constraints can put rational pressure on our explanatory practice within a context 
of use. As it stands, Putnam's appeal to external experiental constraints on know-
ledge and meaning, ironically, 'just adds more theory1. Since the constraints 
coming from experience are not epistemically accessible as such, Putnam's appeal 
to the stubborness of experience is as empty and question-begging as the metaphy-
sical realist's appeal to causal constraints. It is the same as saying, like the 
metaphysical realist, that a causal constraint on reference 'is there', whether we 
know it or not. Both appeals depend on a strict distinction between nature and 
access: they rest on the assumption that we can say something about the nature 
of something (causal constraints, the objective factor in experience) while 
remaining agnostic with regard to the possibility of epistemic access to this 
something. In chapter 1,1 argued that the internal realist critique of metaphysical 
realism shows this assumption to be unintelligible. The thrust of this critique was 
that claiming the existence of correspondence relations or causal relations of 
reference without showing the accessibility in principle of these relations is to 
make an empty claim. The very idea of a claim, that is both intelligible, in the 
sense of having meaningful content, and purely ontological, presupposes the 
notion of a God's Eye View. Now, ironically, the 'two-component' conception of 
experience adopted in Putnam (1981) reflects an attempt to draw precisely such 
a God's Eye View distinctioa 
Since the notion of 'experiential constraints' does not do any 'real work1 
within the internal realist framework, there is a sense in which internal realism is 
rightly interpreted as metaphysical antirealism. Michael Devitt clearly thinks that 
this is what Putnam's internal realism amounts to. 
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Is there anything that is uncontaminated? Presumably there must be, to 
account for the constraints other than coherence on construction; that is, 
to account for the extent that inputs are not shaped by our concepts. 
Putnam does talk, in a Kantian way, of the noumenal world and of things-
in-themselves (..). However, he seems ultimately to regard this talk as 
'nonsense' (..)· If the talk is nonsense, then there is nothing that Putnam 
can say about the constraints (except coherence). This avoids the 'facile 
relativism' of'anything goes' by fiat: we simply are constrained, and that's 
that. Even if the talk is not nonsense, it lacks any explanatory power. To 
say that our construction is constrained by something beyond reach.of 
knowledge or reference is whistling in the dark. (Devitt, 1991a:230, see 
also 238) 
According to Devitt, Putnam's internal realism is 'constructivism without any 
independent reality1 (ibid.,231). In my view, this reading is on the one hand 
correct, on the other hand simplistic. As I argued before, internal realism has two 
faces. Internal realism is first and foremost an attempt to save our commonsense 
realist intuitions. Metaphysical realism violates our realist intuitions in allowing 
for the possibility of radical scepticism regarding those intuitions. Internal realism 
aims to provide an alternative to metaphysical realism that is more in keeping with 
'the realistic spirit' (Anderson, 1992:50). Given this starting-point, it is clear that 
an interpretation of internal realism as metaphysical antirealism at least flies in the 
face of the internal realist's intentions. The driving motivation behind internal 
realism is to do justice to our commonsense realist intuitions. It tries to do so by 
showing that, in the end, skepticism with regard to those intuitions cannot even 
be formulated coherently. 
In chapter 1,1 have argued that the internal realist's arguments against 
metaphysical realism show that metaphysical realism relies on a set of assump-
tions about the meaning of 'realism' (AMR), which hamper rather than save 'the 
realistic spirit'. By drawing a rigid line between the (ontological) nature of truth 
and reference and their epistemic accessibility, metaphysical realists nolens volens 
invite skepticism about the accessibility of truth and reference. Their subsequent 
attempts to answer this 'problem of access' were shown to be viciously circular. 
The point that the internal realist wants to make is that the idea that there is a 
'problem of access', i.e. the idea that skepticism about the knowability of the world 
makes sense, is misguided. The point of internal realism (in its sophisticated 
version) is that the nature-access distinction is unintelligible. However, as soon as 
we look at the internal realist's positive accounts of truth and reference, we see 
that his own attitude to AMR is rather ambiguous. I have argued that Putnam's 
internal realist account of reference leads to metaphysical antirealism insofar as 
it still presupposes AMR In the remainder of this section I will argue that in his 
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(1987), Putnam rejects the nature-access distinction much more thoroughly that 
in his (1981). I will claim that internal realism without the nature-access 
distinction cannot be interpreted as metaphysical antirealism. However, I will also 
argue that insofar as internal realism really abandons these distinctions, the phrase 
'internal realism' itself loses its meaning. 
2.3.2 The quietisi face of internal realism 
In The Many Faces of Realism, Putnam argues that it is the 'essence of internal 
realism' (1987:28) that it rejects a number of dichotomies that we inherited from 
seventeenth century metaphysics. Two of the most central distinctions he discusses 
are: 
the distinction between (conceptual) scheme and (non-conceptual) content 
the distinction between things 'in themselves' ('intrinsic properties') and 
things 'for us' ('projections') 
Putnam argues that 'far from being constitutive of commonsense realism, [these 
dichotomies] tend to undermine it' (1987:30). They tend to undermine it because 
they introduce the notion of something 'unknowable in principle'. 
In the following chapters, the above dichotomies, which are closely 
associated with the nature-access distinction, will be discussed extensively. Here, 
I want to illustrate, drawing on Putnam (1987), how these distinctions undermine 
commonsense realism about reference and how dropping them can save it. 
The notion of'experiential inputs', as employed by Putnam ( 1981), reflects 
what I called a 'two-components' conception of experience. According to this 
conception, experience contains both an element of passive discovery and an 
element of construction; it is 'to some extent' shaped by our concepts and 'to some 
extent' not. Analogously, objects 'are as much made as discovered'. The 'two-
components conception' clearly relies on the dualism of scheme and content. The 
'objective factor in experience' or 'the factor independent of the will' is made up 
of non-conceptual input, that is subsequently interpreted or 'processed' by some 
conceptual scheme. Non-conceptual input tells us something about external reality 
in itself. It contains information about the intrinsic properties of things, as opposed 
to what we project onto things. In this sense, the 'two components conception' also 
relies on the distinction between 'the thing in itself and 'the thing for us'. 
Although these distinctions may seem very natural, they actually block a 
realist understanding of reference. The problem is that non-conceptual input or 
reality 'in itself are not epistemically accessible to us as such. As we saw above, 
it is unclear how 'the objective factor* in experience can rationally constrain us if 
it is not known to us as such. Now, the point I wish to make is that there are two 
very different ways of responding to this situation, i.e. two ways of responding to 
the problems facing the two-components view of experience: 
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1) to keep the traditional distinctions and to become a metaphysical 
antirealist, saying that all we can know and meaningfully talk about is 
how things are 'for us'; by consequence, the objects of reference are 
internal to a conceptual scheme 
2) to argue that the distinctions are unintelligible and to make way for 
commonsense realism about reference 
Internal realism is ambigous with regard to which of the two options it takes. In 
Reason, Truth and History, Putnam is almost forced into option 1 because he 
considers the notion of 'experiential inputs' to be an intelligible notion. Within 
option 1, internal realism starts from the scheme-content distinction and the 'thing 
in itself- 'thing for us' distinction. It then argues that we have no epistemic access 
to non-conceptual content as such or to the thing in itself. This leads to meta-
physical antirealisra It implies that the only sensible notions of 'object' and 
'reference' are notions according to which objects and reference are internal to or 
dependent upon a conceptual scheme. In The Many Faces of Realism, however, 
Putnam takes the second route. He stresses that internal realism is not a claim 
about what we can(not) know, but a claim about the intelligibility of certain 
traditional distinctions that invite skepticism about what we can know. 
Internal realism says that the notion of a 'thing in itself makes no sense; 
and not because 'we cannot know the things in themselves'. (..) Internal 
realism says that we don't know what we are talking about when we talk 
about 'things in themselves'. And that means that the dichotomy between 
'intrinsic properties' and properties which are not intrinsic also collapses. 
(Putnam, 1987:36) 
Rejecting the dichotomies mentioned above means saying that the notion of'the 
thing in itself and the notion of'non-conceptual input' are literally inconceivable. 
In this sense, internal realism is not expressing 'a sense of epistemological 
confinement'. It is not saying something like 'we are always locked up in our 
particular conceptual system' or 'we just have to accept that we cannot climb out 
of our own minds'. It is not stressing that 'all we can talk about is things for us' 
or that 'the objects of reference only exist within a conceptual scheme'. Rather, it 
makes a claim about the intelligibility of skepticism. The claim is that if the 
notion of 'things in themselves' and the notion of 'non-conceptual input' are 
vacuous, then so are its counterparts, the notion of 'things for us' and the notion 
of 'conceptual scheme'. 
What does this claim amount to? How does rejecting the traditional dicho-
tomies justify or save commonsense realism about reference? According to 
internal realism, relations of reference get their determinacy neither from 
intensions, as grasped by the individual speaker, nor are they fixed by non-
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epistemic, causal relations 'out there'. Rather, referential relations are fixed by the 
particular contexts of use, in which signs figure (Putnam, 1981:52). In The Many 
Faces of Realism, contexts of use are conceived of as 'explanation spaces' which 
suggest criteria of relevance for distinguishing between cause and background 
conditions. These criteria of relevance are interest-relative, to be sure, but once we 
have specified these criteria, it is the world that determines what is the right causal 
explanation for a particular phenomenon. Putnam explains this with the help of 
an example, that I will quote in fidi: 
Imagine that the escape valve on a pressure cooker sticks and the pressure 
cooker explodes. We say (..) 'The stuck valve caused the pressure cooker 
to explode'. We do not say 'The presence of χ caused the pressure cooker 
to explode', where χ is, say, an arbitrary irregularly shaped piece of the 
surface of the cooker, 0.1cm. in area. Yet, in the physics of explosion, the 
role played by the stuck valve is exactly the same as the role of x: the 
absence of either would have permitted the steam to escape, bringing 
down the pressure and averting the explosion. Why, then, do we speak of 
one of these things and not the other as 'causing' the explosion? Well, we 
know that the valve 'should have' let the steam escape - that is its 
'function', what it was designed to do. On the other hand, the surface 
element χ was not doing anything 'wrong1 in preventing the steam from 
escaping; containing the steam is the 'function' of the surface of which χ 
is a part. So when we ask 'Why did the explosion take place?1, knowing 
what we know and having the interests we do have, our 'explanation 
space' consists of the alternatives: 
(1) Explosion taking place 
(2) Everything functioning as it should 
What we want to know, in other words, is why 1 is what happened, as 
opposed to 2. We are simply not interested in why 1 is what happened as 
opposed to such alternatives as: 
(3) The surface element χ is missing, and no explosion takes place. 
This 'explanatory relativity1 is parallelled by a relativity in our use of such 
locutions as 'caused' and 'the cause'. Since the question 'Why did the 
pressure cooker explode? assumes an explanation space which does not 
include the alternative 3, or similar alternatives, we understand such 
factors as the presence of χ to be "background conditions' and not 'causes'. 
This relativity of causes to interests, and to background conditions not 
mentioned in the liard science' explanation of the event in question, does 
not make causation something we simply legislate. Given our interests and 
what we regard as the relevant background conditions, it would simply be 
false to say that it was the wall of the pressure cooker that caused the 
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explosion. (..) Our conceptual scheme restricts the 'space' of descriptions 
available to us; but it does not predetermine the answers to our questions. 
(Putnam, 1987: 37-39) 
The reason I quote this example in full, is that here the articulation of the realist 
element in internal realism does not depend on the notion of inaccessible experien-
tial inputs to knowledge. Given an explanation space, we can say what the world's 
constraints on knowledge are (cf. Putnam 1987:33). Although it does not make 
sense to speak of reality as it is external to our explanation spaces, that does not 
mean that reality as we know it through our explanation spaces is 'internal to a 
conceptual scheme'. The subtle point is that as soon as we give up the notion of 
reality 'in itself, we also give up the notion of reality 'merely for us'. Another way 
of putting this is to say that relations of reference are relations of empirical 
causality, where empirical causality is conceived as a phenomenon that cannot, 
even notionally, be split up into 'extemal' factors and 'internal' ones. The sentence 
'The stuck valve caused the pressure cooker to explode' is a true description of a 
reality that is neither 'extemal' to our context of use, nor 'internal' to it in the sense 
of being 'constructed' by it. This is not to say that this reality is somehow a 
'mixture' or 'product' of both. This would be to fall back on the above dichoto-
mies. Rather, it is to say that the notions of 'internal' and 'external' cannot be 
applied in a meaningful way to the notion of empirical causality. 
I realize that this may sound rather mysterious. Explaining what 'realism 
without the traditional dichotomies' amounts to, and in what sense it overcomes 
the dualism of metaphysical realism and metaphysical antirealism, is the subject 
of both chapter 3 and 4. For now, I will make an initial attempt at elucidation by 
distinguishing the commonsense realist's understanding of the example quoted 
above from the metaphysical realist's interpretation of it. 
Putnam's example shows that what counts as a 'cause' or an Object of 
reference' is interest-relative. Many metaphysical realists have responded that if 
this is what 'internal realism' or 'conceptual relativity1 amounts to, it is no real 
threat to metaphysical realism at all. They argue that the 'interest-relativity of 
causal explanation', as illustrated by Putnam by means of several examples21, is 
perfectly compatible with a metaphysical realist notion of reference. I will call this 
the 'this is trivial response'. It has been put forward by Hacking (1983), Devitt 
(1991), Trigg (1993), Sosa (1993), Brown (1988), Aune (1987) and Wolterstorff 
(1987). What the above example and other examples of Putnam's show, according 
to the metaphysical realist, is that what counts as a good, i.e. useful or relevant, 
explanation is interest-relative. But they do not show that the reality explained is 
2,See Putnam (1978:41-60) and (1983:213/4). 
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interest-relative.22 The interest-relativity of our perspectives on the world does not 
make the world any less mind-independent or objective or external. It merely 
shows that in different contexts, we focus on different aspects of one, mind-
independent reality. As Hacking puts it, there are indeed many 'different ways of 
carving up the world' ( 1983:94), but 'the fact that we cut up the world into various 
possibly incommensurable categories does not in itself imply that all such 
categories are mind-dependent' (1983:95). 
Inuit are said to distinguish ever so many kinds of snow that look pretty 
much the same to us. They cut up the frozen North by introducing a 
scheme of description. It in no way follows that there are not 22 distinct 
mind-independent kinds of snow, precisely those distinguished by the 
Inuit. For all I know, the powder snow, com snow, or Sierra cement 
spoken of by some skiers neither contain nor are contained in any Inuit 
class of snow. The Inuit do not ski, and may never have wanted that 
category. I expect that there is still powder snow and all the Inuit kinds 
of snow, all real mind-independent distinctions in a real world. (Hacking, 
1983:95) 
Trigg makes the same point in more general terms. In discussing what he calls the 
'idealist' approach, which denies the possibility of a 'God's Eye View", he remarks 
that 
This approach characteristically attempts to build a major philosophical 
theory about our relationship with the physical world out of the blindingly 
obvious truism that we cannot think of what we cannot think of. Put more 
positively, the view is that we can only think of reality in the way that we 
can think about it. Yet although our concepts are certainly the means 
through which we approach the world, we are not talking about them, 
when, with their aid, we try to refer to parts of reality. The concept of a 
cause may be a product of the human mind, but (..) causes can operate 
totally independently of minds. (Trigg, 1993:128) 
Or, as Brown puts it: 
one can grant that it is false that the world has one true classification or 
division into objects and kinds of objects without granting that it has no 
organization of its own. A modest realist might well say that the world 
"See Devitt (19910:222), Trigg (1993:128), Sosa (1993:608-9), Aune (1987:283-5), Wolterstorf (1987). 
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has infinitely many classifications, that it contains infinitely many kinds 
of objects. Such a moderate realist could say that when we develop a 
language we are not imposing an organization on the world, but selecting 
one of the world's organizations for our own use. (Brown, 1988: 147/8) 
The metaphysical realist's response might be summarized as follows: the interest-
relativity of causal explanation does not do anything to show that there are no 
mind-independent objects or causes. Interest relativity is a rather trivial phenome-
non that can very well be accounted for by saying that the mind-independent 
world is very rich in structures and kinds, upon which we focus selectively, 
depending on the 'explanation space' we are in. Relations of reference can only be 
fixed from within a context of use, the metaphysical realist willingly admits, but 
this does not make the objects of reference mind-dependent. Sidelle summarizes 
this metaphysical realist interpretation of interest-relativity as follows: 
According to [this picture], the world is populated by entities, replete with 
their own identity conditions, and which stand in numerous relations, 
among them identity, constitution and supervenience. These are all given 
mind-independently. (...) Our conventions select objects of reference - the 
objects are all out there, identity conditions and all and in the relations we 
are discussing, and our choice of identity conditions merely allows us to 
distinguish among them, and so to choose to which we will refer with a 
particular term. (..) While these conditions are needed in order for us to 
say or know these things (or even think them), neither the relations 
themselves, nor the objects they hold between, are in any way dependent 
upon the conventions (Sidelle, 1992:285). 
From the viewpoint of internal realism (within option 2), the metaphysical realist's 
insistence on the mind-independence of a 'rich', multi-layered world allowing for 
many classifications is 'not so much false as otiose' (Putnam, 1981:53). The point 
of'commonsense realism', as defended by Putnam in The Many Faces of Realism, 
is that it does not make any sense either to insist that objects, kinds and relations, 
'replete with their own identity conditions', are there mind-independently, or to 
claim that their existence is mind-dependent (as metaphysical antirealism does). 
Both metaphysical interpretations are gratuitous in the sense that they carry no 
explanatory power and in the sense that we don't need them to explain anything. 
The metaphysical antirealist 'explains' the interest-relativity of reference by saying 
that the world in itself does not have any structure or order, that it is a kind of in-
determinate, inarticulate glob, on which we impose structure like a cookie cutter 
does on a piece of dough. The metaphysical realist 'explains' the interest-relativity 
of reference by saying that the world in itself is very rich in objects, kinds and 
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relations. Contexts of use are merely ways of 'zooming in' on particular aspects 
of this infinitely complex mind-independent world, so the metaphysical realist 
holds. The point is that both metaphysical pictures lead us into antinomies. 
Metaphysical antirealism relies on the utterly unclear notion of a 
'substance' or 'urstoff that we cannot know as such or even rrieaningfully talk 
about.23 Metaphysical realism, on the other hand, relies on the peculiar notion of 
an object that is both mind-independent and self-identifying. It is committed to the 
idea that 'the world, and not thinkers, sorts things into kinds' (Putnam, 1981:53). 
However, Putnam's examples of the interest relativity of causal explanation show 
that 'explanation spaces' are required not merely to 'select' or 'zoom in on' 
particular objects, kinds and relations. The real philosophical message is that 
objects, kinds and relations cannot be said to have any identity conditions apart 
from the explanatory context in which we are talking about them. The notion of 
kinds, for instance, does not make any sense without the notion of similarity, and 
the notion of similarity is empty ('in some ways, anything is "of the same kind" 
as anything else' (Putnam 1981:53)) until we have specified standards of 
similarity. Standards of similarity are clearly related to explanatory interests. The 
notion of identity conditions is thus conceptually tied to the notion of an 
explanation space. For the same reason, the notion of an object is conceptually 
tied to the notion of a context of use. "No entity without identity1, as Quine 
famously put it. 
This may sound like idealism. However, there is an important difference 
between saying that the reality of identity-conditions is (causally) dependent on 
a conceptual scheme (idealism) and saying that the notion of identity conditions 
is conceptually tied to the notion of a conceptual scheme. The first is an 
ontological claim about the relation between mind/language and world, the second 
is a claim about what it means to say that objects, relations etcetera have identity 
conditions 'in themselves'. Internal realism as commonsense realism (option 2) 
considers the notion of a prestructured, ready-made world objectionable, not 
because the world should be considered as somehow mind-dependent, but because 
the notion of something both self-identifying and mind-independent is vacuous. 
The 'this is trivial response', as put forward by Hacking, Trigg, Devitt, 
Brown, Sosa, Aune and Wolterstorff shows how central the distinction between 
epistemology and ontology is within the metaphysical realist picture. From the 
perspective of metaphysical realists, internal realism can be interpreted in two 
ways. Internal realism is either a trivial epistemological doctrine, that states that 
we cannot have theory-independent access to reality. Or it is a shocking 
ontological doctrine, that states that reality itself is theory-dependent (meta-
^See Putnam (1987: 33,36). 
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physical antirealism or idealism). In the first sense, internal realism is considered 
true but innocent, as it is perfectly compatible with metaphysical realism. In the 
second sense, internal realism is considered shocking but false. It is guilty of 
confusing epistemology with ontology. It does not really threaten metaphysical 
realism, it is argued, since insofar as it is incompatible with metaphysical realism, 
it derives its substance entirely from an unwarranted slide from the level of 
epistemological claims to the level of ontologjcal claims. 
In this chapter and the previous one, I have tried to show that internal 
realism should be interpreted as a claim about 'what it means to be real' and not 
as a claim about 'what can be considered real'. In other words, internal realism is 
neither an epistemological claim nor an ontological claim. It is a claim about the 
relation between epistemology and ontology. It is a claim about the intelligibility 
of the nature-access distinction, the intelligibility of the external-internal 
distinction and the intelligibility of the scheme-content distinction. In this 
interpretation, internal realism tries to make a conceptual point about what drives 
the whole realism issue: the idea that skepticism about the accessibility of the 
'external' world makes sense. 
Most metaphysical realists simply refuse even to consider this as a 
possible interpretation of internal realism. In attacking internal realism, they keep 
on accusing it of conflating the order of knowing and the order of being, while 
Putnam and Rorty have repeatedly stated that it is precisely the viability of this 
distinction that is under discussion.24 I have suggested that for this persistent 
misreading of the internal realist's intentions, the metaphysical realist is not solely 
to blame. I have argued that internal realism itself is ambiguous about AMR. It 
equivocates between metaphysical antirealism and commonsense or quietist 
realism. Internal realism is motivated by the desire to do justice to our com-
monsense realist intuitions. Its aim is to overcome skepticism with regard to the 
ordinary world (Lebenswelt). Still, the way it is formulated, especially in Putnam 
(1981), it often comes out as a metaphysical position that is the opposite of 
metaphysical realism I have argued that insofar as internal realism consistently 
abandons the nature-access distinction, and with it the 'in itself-'for us' distinction 
and the dualism of scheme and content, it does not lead to metaphysical 
antirealism. But insofar as it does so, internal realism stops being a meaningful 
position too. After dropping AMR as incoherent, there is no intelligible sense in 
which objects are 'internal to' or 'partly constituted by1 a conceptual scheme. This 
is what I meant by saying that insofar as internal realism consistently rejects 
AMR, it *blows itself up'. 
"Rorty (1980:311), (1982: xxix), Putnam, (1988:120). 
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2.4 Rorty's deflationary notion of reference 
Rorty's approach to reference is similar to his deflationist or eliminativist strategy 
towards truth. He rejects the idea that reference is in need of philosophical 
explanation. The debate about causal versus description theories of reference is, 
according to Rorty, a species of 'impure philosophy of language': the linguistic 
dressing up of epistemological problems (see section 2.2). Rorty argues that the 
issue of reference became relevant to the realism debate after the doctrine of 
incornmensurability was put forward by philosophers such as Kuhn and Feyera-
bend.25 In chapter 1,1 discussed how the description theory of reference implied 
that referential relations are unstable. If the extension of a term, f.i. 'electron', is 
determined by its meaning, and if meaning is understood as a set of identifying 
descriptions, then a change in our beliefs about electrons implies that we are not 
referring to the same thing anymore. The doctrine of incommensurability states 
that two competing theories in science not merely have different conceptions about 
the same thing. Rather, they cannot even be said to be talking about the same 
thing. This view threatens the idea of rational comparison and convergence in 
science. If, as Kuhn put it, the scientist, after a major theory-change or 'paradigm-
shift', works in a different world26, then it seems impossible to conceive of science 
as learning more and more about the same things. Moreover, talk of a multitude 
of worlds sounds like idealism. 
According to Rorty, the causal theory of reference, as put forward by 
Putnam and Kripke in the seventies, aspired to save a realist conception of 
science. 
[The] call for a theory of reference became assimilated to the demand for 
a 'realistic' philosophy of science which would reinstate the pre-Kuhnian 
and pre-Feyerabendian notion that scientific inquiry made progress by 
finding out more and more about the same objects. (...) Their views about 
the incommensurability of alternative theories suggested that the only 
notions of 'truth' and 'reference' we really understood were those which 
were relativized to a 'conceptual scheme'. (Rorty, 1980:275) 
The causal theory of reference claims that there is a non-epistemic component to 
meaning, that guarantees stability of reference while our identifying descriptions 
may change. Thus, meaning variance does not imply incommensurability, since 
referential relations remain stable through theory change. In Rorty's words, this 
"Rorty (1980:284ff.), (1982:128). 
MSee Kuhn (1970), especially ch.X (pp. 111-136). 
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theory pursues the idea 'that if the world reaches up and hooks language in factual 
(e.g. causal) relationships, then we shall always be "in touch with the world" ' 
(Rorty, 1980:288/9). 
Rorty argues that the notion of causal or 'factual', non-intentional relations 
of reference fails because of'Putnam's devastating point that non-intentional relati-
ons are as theory-relative as intentional ones' (Rorty, 1980:299). He agrees with 
Putnam's criticism of the causal theory of reference, as discussed in chapter 1. 
There I argued that the internal realist critique of the metaphysical realist's theory 
of reference shows that the notion of causal reference relations, in the sense of 
physical, non-intentional relations, rests on a rigid nature-access distinction, which 
is not intelligible on closer inspection. 
Internal realism, in both Putnam's and Rortys version, is the attempt to 
steer clear of both metaphysical realism and metaphysical antirealism. Putnam's 
internal realist account of reference, discussed in the previous section, is an 
attempt to reject a non-epistemic notion of reference while avoiding relativism or 
idealism Similarly, Rorty argues that the rejection of the causal theory of 
reference, and of the project of impure philosophy of language tout court, does not 
lead to metaphysical antirealism However, his line of argument is different from 
Putnam's. 
2.4.1 Rorty's reply to the objection of idealism 
Rorty claims that we don't need non-epistemic, causal relations of reference to 
ward of the threat of relativism or idealism. To see that we don't, we have to 
realize, according to Rorty, that the 'problem of reference' is a reformulation in 
quasi-rigorous semantic terms of the mistaken quest for ultimate objective founda-
tions. The causal theory of reference is an attempt to answer the skeptic. It takes 
seriously the possibility that 'none of our terms refer'. The point of internal 
realism, as I argued in this and the previous chapter, is that this kind of skepticism 
is not so much false as empty. To counter the doctrine of incommensurability we 
should not, according to Rorty, appeal to theory-independent, causal relations of 
reference. Rather, we should point out that there is no way of formulating the 
skeptical doctrine of inœmmensurability in a coherent way. 
Rorty here draws on the Davidsonian argument against incommen-
surability, which I will briefly summarize. In 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual 
Scheme', Davidson argues that the doctrine of incommensurability or 'conceptual 
relativism' relies on the notion of an 'alternative conceptual scheme' which 
contains none of the referring expressions used in ours. Davidson claims that this 
notion is problematic on closer inspection: 
99 
The dominant metaphor of conceptual relativism, that of differing points 
of view, seems to betray an underlying paradox. Different points of view 
make sense, but only if there is a common co-ordinate system on which 
to plot them; yet the existence of a common system belies the claim of 
dramatic incomparability. (1984:184) 
Davidson argues that to make sense of conceptual relativism, or of Kuhn's idea 
of scientists 'working in different worlds', we need the notion of 'something 
neutral and common that lies outside all schemes' (Davidson, 1984:190). 
Underlying the doctrine of conceptual relativism is a 'dualism of scheme and 
content, of organizing system and something waiting to be organized' (189). 
Starting from this dualism, different schemes or languages are thought of as 
organizing empirical content or experience in radically different ways. If 
conceptual schemes or languages are to be incommensurable, the common 
something that they organize cannot be their subject matter (190). In that case 
they would talk about the same thing and translation would be possible. So the 
notion of empirical content as employed by the scheme-content distinction is the 
notion of non-conceptual input that is not accessible as such, In 'The World Well 
Lost', Rorty compares this notion with the Kantian notion of an 'unsynthesized 
intuition': 
The possibility of different conceptual schemes highlights the fact that a 
Kantian unsynthesized intuition can exert no influence on how it is to be 
synthesized - or, at best, can exert only an influence we shall have to 
describe in a way as relative to a chosen conceptual scheme as our 
description of everything else. Insofar as a Kantian intuition is effable, it 
is just a perceptual judgement, and thus not merely 'intuitive'. Insofar as 
it is ineffable, it is incapable of having an explanatory function. (Rorty, 
1982:4) 
The problem facing the doctrine of incommensurability is this: conceptual 
relativism only makes sense against the background of shared, non-conceptual 
input, but to suppose that conceptual schemes can be incommensurable is to make 
the notion of non-conceptual input a completely vacuous one. Insofar as it is 
neutral with regard to the different conceptual schemes, non-conceptual content 
is like 'a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it', to use a 
Wittgensteinian phrase (Rorty, 1982: xxxv). In a similar vein, Davidson points out 
that we cannot make sense of the metaphor of'organizing non-conceptual input'. 
The notion of organizing only applies to pluralities. But the plurality inherent in 
non-conceptual input cannot be said to have determinate features, since we cannot 
individuate it according to familiar principles if the notion of incommensurablity 
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is to be sustained Thus, we cannot give any meaning to the notion of what it is 
that is organized by a scheme or language. The notion of non-conceptual input is 
faced with the same problem as Putnam's notion of 'experiential inputs', discussed 
in the previous section. Since it is not accessible as such, non-conceptual content 
lacks explanatory power and it is completely ineffable. As such, it cannot provide 
'an intelligible basis on which it can be said that schemes are different' (Davidson, 
1984:198). Insofar as non-conceptual input is accessible or effable, it must already 
have been interpreted by some conceptual scheme. As such, it cannot serve as the 
common ground needed to make sense of incommensurability. 
Davidson concludes that the attempt to give solid meaning to the idea of 
conceptual relativism or the notion of an untranslatable language has failed. He 
argues that we have to regard translatability into a familiar idiom as a criterion of 
languagehood (192). To recognize a language as a language, as a conceptual 
scheme, it must be partly translatable to us. The idea of a radically incommensu­
rable, alternative conceptual scheme is incoherent. 
I will not discuss Davidson's argument any further here. The distinction 
between scheme and content will be discussed extensively in the next chapter. For 
now, I just want to sketch Rortys approach to the 'problem of reference'. 
Rejecting a non-epistemic, causal notion of reference is not, according to Rorty, 
making reference 'relative to a conceptual scheme'. The very notion of a 
conceptual scheme, as opposed to non-conceptual input 'waiting to be organized', 
is unintelligible. Rorty argues that rejecting the dualism of scheme and content 
means that we can settle for a commonsense notion of refererence. Once we have 
seen that conceptual relativism does not make sense, the need for a theory of 
reference disappears. Rorty claims that our ordinary notion of reference, i.e. the 
notion implicit in our everyday linguistic practices and in science, is not in need 
of philosophical Ъаск-up'. He distinguishes three meanings of the term 'reference': 
(a) 'reference' as a term of philosophical art, meaning 'a factual relation 
which holds between an expression and some other part of reality whether 
anybody knows it holds or not' (1980:289), 
(b) 'talking about', a commonsensical notion, meaning 'a purely "intentio­
nal" relation which can hold between an expression and a nonexistent object', for 
instance Sherlock Holmes. 'Talking about ranges over fictions as well as realities, 
and is useless for realist purposes' (289). Rorty claims that the criterion for 
reference used in ordinary life is simply the speaker's intention: 'the criterion for 
what a statement is "about" is just whatever its utterer....fAmfc he is talking about' 
(Rorty, 1982:12т).27 Moreover, this notion of reference suffices, as long as 
"See also Rorty (1980: 270, 289). 
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questions about what exists do not arise. If they do, we should not appeal to non-
intentional 'reference' to explicate our ontological intuitions, but to a third notion: 
(c) 'really talking about'. Rorty explains: 'Really talking about X is not the 
same as talking about a real X "Really" here is just a matter of "placing" the 
relative ignorance of the person being discussed in the context of the relatively 
greater knowledge claimed by the speaker' (1980:292). 'Really talking about' is the 
only notion we need in cases where people's intentions about what they are 
referring to are in conflict. The non-epistemic notion of reference (a) is, in other 
words, redundant. 
The question is whether Rortys deflationist account of reference succeeds 
in overcoming skepticism. Does Rortys position really avoid both metaphysical 
realism and metaphysical antirealism? Many critics of Rorty hold that his view of 
reference implies idealism or relativism. Houghton points out that, according to 
our common practices, any notion of reference must meet the demand that 
succesful reference is not garantueed automatically (Houghton, 1990:161/2). But 
if intention is the necessary and sufficient condition for succesful reference, then 
no distinction can be drawn between 'referring' and 'thinking that one is referring'. 
And Gark argues that, in accepting Rortys proposal, the common distinction 
between fact and fiction is rendered meaningless (Clarke, 1990). Farrell argues 
that 'Rortys pragmatism collapses into some form of linguistic idealism' (Farrell, 
1994:123). Although Rorty does claim that there is an objective world causing our 
beliefs, Farrell argues that due to his conception of reference, this claim cannot 
safeguard a kind of realism 
Rortys pragmatist will not allow claims about the objective world and its 
causal powers to be interpreted realistically, as founded on a certain 
relation of aboutness between those claims themselves and the world 
Objectivity and language independence are what we constitute as such 
from within conversations that should not be thought of as constrained by 
a reality independent of them. (...) The resistance of the world to thought 
is simply what thought or our conversational habits count as resistance 
(Farrell, 1994:123). 
Before discussing whether Rortys position can be distinguished from idealism, we 
have to take a closer look at the way in which he responds to the objection of 
idealism. According to Rorty, there is no such thing as a genuine relation of 
reference between words and external things. There are, to be sure, causal 
relations between us and reality but there are no semantic relations between beliefs 
and 'non-beliefs'. Rorty holds that our beliefs are caused by, but not justified or 
falsified by, the world. As Putnam puts it, Rorty holds that 'to postulate a semantic 
relation between linguistic items and non-linguistic objects which determines when 
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I am succesfiilly "referring" is to postulate a mystery relation' (Putnam, 
1994b:285). Nevertheless, denying that there is a semantic relation between our 
beliefs and the world does not, according to Rorty, mean that we deny that there 
is an independent world 'out there'. In Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, Rorty 
argues that 'what shows us that life is not just a dream, that our beliefs are in 
touch with reality, is the causal, non-intentional, non-representational link between 
us and the rest of the universe' (Rorty: 1991,159). Or, as he puts it elsewhere in 
the same book: 
if we have causal relations (..) holding between the World and the Self, 
as well as relations of justification Cbeing a reason for') internal to the 
Selfs network of beliefs and desires, we do not need any further relations 
to explain how the Self gets in touch with the World, and conversely. 
(Rorty, 1991:120) 
Rorty stresses that denying that there is a relation of representation between 
thinkers and the world does not prevent one from holding on to the commonsensi-
cal notion that 'the world is out there', and that 'most things in space and time are 
the effects of causes which do not include human mental states' (Rorty, 1989:5). 
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty opposes the objection of 
idealism in a different way. He assures us that his version of pragmatism has 
no sympathy with the notion of nature as malleable to thought, or with the 
inference from 'one cannot give a theory-independent description of a 
thing' to 'there are no theory-independent things' (Rorty, 1980:279). 
Here, Rorty is arguing that his pragmatist tenets are stating an epistemological 
point, rather than an ontologjcal one. In the last section, I discussed a reading of 
internal realism, wide-spread among metaphysical realists, according to which 
internal realism is either a trivial epistemological claim or a shocking and absurd 
ontological claim. In defending himself against the objection of idealism, Rorty 
in fact confirms this reading, thereby trivializing internal realism 
It is one thing to say (absurdly) that we make objects by using words and 
something quite different to say that we do not know how to find a way 
of describing an enduring matrix of past and future inquiry into nature 
except in our own terms - thereby begging the question against 'alternative 
conceptual schemes'. Almost no one wishes to say the former. To say the 
latter is, when disjoined from scary rhetoric about 'losing touch with the 
world', just a way of saying that our present views about nature are our 
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only guide in talking about the relation between nature and our words. 
(Rorty, 1980:276) 
2.4.2 The difficulty of expressing quietism coherently 
Is Rortys twofold reply to the objection of idealism convincing? I will argue that 
the charge of idealism against Rorty is partly right, partly wrong. I will argue 
again that internal realism has two faces. On the one hand, in defending himself 
against the objection of idealism, Rorty appeals to a notion of theory-independent 
causality that is not available to him by his own standards. Moreover, he tries to 
avoid idealism by presenting internal realism as merely making an epistemological 
point, thereby separating ontologjcal from epistemological issues. In both cases, 
I will argue, Rorty falls back on AMR In this respect, I will claim, his position 
does imply idealism. On the other hand, in attacking the scheme-content dualism, 
Rorty rejects the nature-access distinction as unintelligible. I will argue that there 
is a sense in which Rorty may avoid metaphysical antirealism, but that he can do 
so only by dropping his notion of 'causal but not semantic' relations between 
thinkers and the world and by withdrawing his presentation of internal realism as 
an epistemological claim. 
I will first discuss Rortys appeal to the causal, non-semantic links 
between 'us and the rest of the universe'. There is a strange ambiguity in Rortys 
notion of causality. On the one hand, he conceives of causality as an intentional, 
theory-relative notion. In criticizing the causal theory of reference, Rortys urges 
that we acknowledge Putnam's 'devastating point that non-intentional relations are 
as theory-relative as intentional relations.' But on the other hand, causal relations 
are thought of as the non-semantical (non-representational), non-intentional links 
between our concepts and reality out there. In this second sense, causality is 
theory-independent. In fact, Rorty here falls back on a metaphysical notion of 
causality that conceives of causal relations as having ready-made identity condi-
tions, independently of our explanatory interests. To say that the relation between 
the Self and the World is causal but not semantic is to posit a relation 'that is 
there whether we know it or not'. To hold that referential relations are intentional 
relations internal to a speaker's network of beliefs and desires means that the 
causal relations linking us to the world don't make any knowable difference to the 
content of our beliefs. Causal relations are linking our network of beliefs to the 
world, but they do so in a way we could never know about. Does not this move 
make the world a Ding-an-sich, that is inaccessible in principle? Putnam 
summarizes the tension in Rortys notion of causality in the following way: 
Even Rorty has his 'robust realist' moments. He wants to say 'Of course 
there's a world; we're connected to it causally but not semantically.' But 
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Rorty here is treating causality as Kant treated his pseudo-causal notion 
of a 'ground' or "basis' for the world of experience - he is treating it as a 
transcendent relation connecting the story which we and our cultural peers 
make up with a world in itself. Rorty cannot have it both ways; causality 
cannot be just one more relation within a story which is seen as just a 
device for making ourselves Ъарру1 and avoiding 'pain', and also be a 
transcendent relation which connects the whole story (or at least the words 
'Of course there is a world') to a robust reality. (Putnam, 1994b:287) 
The notion of 'causal but not semantic' relations between mind and world relies 
on a rigid distinction between questions of nature and questions of acces, that is 
essential to AMR. Rorty s defence against the objection of idealism relies on the 
assumption that we can intelligibly posit the existence of causal relations between 
the mind and the world without answering the question of the epistemic 
accessibility of these relations. It relies on the assumption that we can make a 
meaningful ontological claim while remaining agnostic on the epistemological 
level. Although Rorty considers the notion of a world-an-sich, as implied by the 
scheme-content distinction, deeply unsatisfactory (a 'world well lost'), his appeal 
to theory-independent, non-intentional causality re-introduces the dualism of nature 
and access, i.e. the dualism of 'things for us' and 'things in themselves'. In this 
respect, Rortys position is indistinguishable from metaphysical antirealism or 
idealism. 
As regards Rortys response to the objection of idealism in Philosophy and 
the Mirror of Nature, a similar retreat to AMR can be observed. In claiming that 
the theory-dependence of descriptions of the world does not make the world 
theory-dependent, Rorty endorses an interpretation of internal realism (mentioned 
in the previous section), according to which internal realism is a rather trivial 
epistemological claim. In this way, Rorty seems to be able to save a kind of 
realism on the ontological level. However, this kind of realism is similar to what 
Devitt calls 'fig-leaf realism' and what I called minimal realism in chapter 1 
(section 1.5). It merely says that 'something exists objectively and independently 
of the mind'. Since we can never have neutral epistemic access to the world 
according to Rorty, we can say nothing about the 'independent world' except that 
it exists. In chapter 1,1 argued that this kind of 'purely ontological realism' is in 
fact indistinguishable from idealism. The notion of'world' employed by mimimal 
realism is vacuous and lacks explanatory power. Stressing the 'independent 
existence' of something that does not make any difference to our epistemic 
practices is not intelligible by Rortys own standards. 
In my view, presenting internal realism as an epistemological claim is very 
misleading. As I argued in the previous section, internal realism (in its sophisti­
cated version) is neither an epistemological claim nor an ontological claim. Rather, 
105 
it is a claim about the relation between ontology and epistemology. Internal 
realism claims that we cannot intelligibly separate questions of nature from 
questions of access. By consequence, the notion of the world in-itself, i.e. the 
notion of something inaccessible in principle, is rejected as unintelligible. This line 
of thought does not make the world 'theory-dependent'. Rather, the idea is that we 
have to conceive of the world as essentially accessible or 'conceptualizable'. While 
granting that there obviously is a lot we do not (yet) know about reality, internal 
realism rejects the notion of a reality that is inaccessible in principle. Skepticism 
about the epistemic accessibility of the world tout court is not intelligible, since 
we cannot intelligibly assume mere to be г. world without already presupposing 
that we have access to it. Gairning the existence of something that could be 
utterly inaccessible is not to claim anything at all. Global skepticism has to put 
forward such an empty claim to get off the ground. It needs to posit some reality, 
in order to raise doubts about the knowability of this reality. But it is exactly the 
skeptic's agnosticism with regard to the possibility of knowledge of this reality, 
that makes his posit of the existence of this reality devoid of content. In other 
words, what Rorty should say in response to the idealism objection, is that 
claiming the existence of the world and claiming the accessibility of the world go 
hand in hand. By separating the level of epistemology from the level of ontology, 
Rorty instead opens the door to skepticism By linking our network of beliefs and 
desires to the 'external world' by means of non-epistemic causal relations, Rorty 
re-introduces the notion of an epistemological gap between mind and world, 
whereas his attack on the scheme-content dualism implies that the very notion of 
such a gap is unintelligible. 
Davidson summarizes the consequences of giving up the scheme-content 
dualism in the following way: 
In giving up dependence on the concept of an uninterpreted reality, 
something outside all schemes and science, we do not relinquish the 
notion of objective truth - quite the contrary. Given the dogma of a 
dualism of scheme and reality, we get conceptual relativity, and truth 
relative to a scheme. Without the dogma, this kind of relativity goes by 
the board Of course truth of sentences remains relative to language, but 
that is as objective as can be. In giving up the dualism of scheme and 
world, we do not give up the world, but re-establish unmediated touch 
with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions 
true or false. (Davidson, 1984:198) 
In talking of an 'unmediated touch' between mind and world and in talking of 
familiar objects making our sentences true or false, Davidson is not reinstating the 
correspondence theory of truth. Rather, he expresses a kind of realism that follows 
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from giving up the notion of 'uninterpreted content', the notion of a non-con-
ceptual intermediary or tertium between us and the world. Davidson, in the 
passage just quoted, formulates the implications of rejecting the dualism of 
scheme and content in a different way than Rorty. He formulates them in a way 
that avoids idealism. As opposed to Rorty, Davidson suggests that the relation 
between beliefs and the world is justificatory and not 'merely causal'. This may 
seem strange, because Davidson stresses elsewhere that sentences or opinions can 
never be 'made true' by things (Davidson, 1984:194, 1990b: 123), by ^ t s of non-
language' (Rorty, 1991:126). However, the 'antics of the familiar objects' that 
make our sentences true or false are not bits of non-language. They are not non-
conceptual items. In other words, the notion of world employed by Davidson here 
is not the notion of uninterpreted reality. And neither is it the complementary 
notion of 'reality as interpreted by us'. The point of rejecting the scheme-content 
dualism is that the distinction between 'reality in itself and 'reality for us' does not 
make sense. In giving up the notion of 'different schemes', Davidson is not 
claiming that mankind snares a common scheme, that we all share the same 
'phenomenal world'. 'If we cannot intelligibly say that schemes are different, 
neither can we intelligibly say that they are one' (Davidson, 1984:198). By 
rejecting as unintelligible the notion of an 'uninterpreted reality1 external to our 
network of beliefs, we are also rejecting as unintelligible its counterpart: the 
notion of a reality 'internal to a conceptual scheme'. Both metaphysical realism 
and metaphysical antirealism (or idealism) are formulated in terms of the internal-
external dualism, the dichotomy of scheme and content. Whereas Rorty falls back 
on these distinctions in his reply to the idealism objection, Davidson rejects them 
in a more consistent manner.28 If Rorty is to overcome the objection of idealism, 
he should abandon the distinction between justificatory relations internal to our 
network of beliefs and causal relations linking this network to external reality. He 
should, in other words, reject both the notion of'theory-dependent reality1 and the 
notion of 'theory-i/zdependent (uninterpreted) reality1. In doing so, however, the 
doctrine of 'internal realism' would become devoid of content, since it relies 
precisely on these distinctions. In this sense, internal realism *blows itself up' 
insofar as it consistently rejects AMR 
In this section I have argued that Rortys defense against the objection of 
idealism fails insofar at is based on AMR Both Rortys appeal to causal as 
opposed to semantic relations between mind and world, and his formulation of 
internal realism as an epistemological claim as opposed to an ontologjcal one, 
reinforce the threat of idealism instead of undermining it. However, there is 
aAt least in the passage quoted from his (1984). In the next chapter (section 3.2) I will discuss McDowell's 
claim that Davidson still adheres to a 'coherentist' picture of knowledge, a picture which does not allow for a 
justificatory relation between beliefs and reality. 
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another side to Rorty"s internal realism. His attack on the scheme-content dualism 
constitutes an attack on the very distinctions that he appeals to in his response to 
the idealism objection. Insofar as it does, Rorty seems to make way for a kind of 
'commonsense realism', as expressed by Davidson in the fragment just quoted and 
as put forward by Putnam in The Many Faces of Realism (see section 2.3.2). How 
close Rorty is to this kind of realism is pointed out by Farrell. Farrell attributes 
to Rorty a twofold Kantian stance: a combination of internal pragmatic realism 
and 'transcendental linguistic' idealism. According to Rorty, 
there is an internal pragmatic stance from which we happily use and 
accept realist-sounding sentences, with their commitment to objectivity 
and world guidance and language-transcendence. But then there is an 
external stance from which we recognize the 'merely1 pragmatic function 
of all such sentences as we use them. (Farrell, 1994:124) 
However, as Farrell points out, the external stance attempts to make a claim about 
the relation between language and reality, that, if Rorty is right, can only be made 
from within the internal stance. The very notion of such an external, transcenden-
tal stance is deemed unintelligible by Rorty. So by Rortys own standards, the 
tenet of linguistic idealism could not be coherently formulated. Neither could its 
counterpart. By consequence, the notion of 'internal' in 'internal (pragmatic) 
realism' becomes vacuous. The notion of'internal' only makes sense if the notion 
of an external stance does. By his own standards, therefore, Rorty 'ought to be a 
realist without qualms' (Farrell, 1994:125). As Taylor puts it, 'really burying 
epistemology leads you back to realism' (Taylor, 1990:271). However, the realism 
hinted at here is not metaphysical realism. "Whereas metaphysical realism claims 
to answer the skeptic by allegedly showing how to bridge the gap between mind 
and world, 'commonsense realism' argues that the very notion of a gap is 
unintelligible. The kind of realism that follows from abandoning AMR suggests 
a new conception of what it means to be real. Within this conception, the reality 
of the world is not phrased in terms of either mind-independence or mind-
dependence. The following chapters are an attempt to articulate this conception, 
which I will call 'postmodem Aristotelian realism'. Postmodem Aristotelian 
realism tries to articulate our realist intuitions without invoking the nature-access 
distinction, the content-scheme dualism or the internal-external distinction. In 
chapter 5, I shall argue that its conception of what it means to be real makes 




REALISM WITHOUT EMPIRICISM 
The controversy between metaphysical realism and internal realism should, I have 
argued, be interpreted as a controversy about the question what it means to be 
real, as opposed to the question what part(s) of the world can be considered real. 
In this reading, I argued, the internal realist critique of metaphysical realism is to 
be interpreted as an attack on AMR, i.e. on (a) the distinction between the 
question of the nature of truth and reference and the question of our epistemic 
access to truth and reference, (b) the distinction between the question of the nature 
of the world and the question of the accessibility of the world, and (c) the idea 
that the realism issue is about the causal independence or dependence of the 
world. I argued that starting from this set of assumptions, a realist understanding 
of truth, reference and the world is not feasible. Although the nature-access 
distinction seems a typically realist distinction, it in fact paves the way for 
extreme versions of skepticism and antirealism, which border on incoherence. In 
claiming the non-epistemic nature of truth, reference and reality, metaphysical 
realism allows for the possibility of radical skepticism about the accessibility of 
truth, reference and the world. In doing so, the metaphysical realist commits 
himself to offering an account of the way we succeed in knowing truth, reference 
and external reality. However, all his attempts to answer the problem of access are 
question-begging in that they assume rather than justify non-epistemic notions of 
truth, reference and reality. 
I have argued that internal realism, in its sophisticated version, is an attack 
on the intelligibility of the nature-access distinction and an attempt to formulate 
realism without the nature-access distinction. Internal realism argues that global 
scepticism about the possibility of epistemic access is unintelligible since notions 
of truth and reality as inaccessible in principle lack conceptual content. To reject 
the problem of access or the problem of knowledge as unintelligible is to adopt 
a kind of realism that differs significantly from metaphysical realism. Metaphysi-
cal realism is a claim about the nature of the world and our capacity to know it. 
As an intelligibility claim, internal realism is not putting forward any positive 
epistemological or ontological claim. Rather, it argues that there is something 
seriously wrong with the problem that metaphysical realists are responding to. In 
the previous two chapters, I have argued that the internal realist critique, as a 
critique of AMR, shows the deficit of metaphysical realism. However, I have also 
argued that internal realism is Janus-faced. Internal realism equivocates between 
offering a positive account of the relation between mind/language and the world 
and making a claim about the intelligibility of the questions underlying such 
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accounts. To put it differently, it equivocates between metaphysical antirealism 
and what I called 'commonsense realism' in chapter 2. Because of its ambiguous 
attitude towards AMR, I argued, internal realism does not succeed in articulating 
a conception of what it means to be real that goes beyond AMR. In particular, its 
notion of reality as (partly) 'internal to' or 'dependent on' a 'conceptual scheme' is 
unfortunate as it relies on AMR in the same way that the metaphysical realist's 
notion of reality as 'external' and 'mind-independent' does. 
In the remainder of this dissertation, I will try to articulate a kind of 
realism that does overcome AMR. This amounts to showing the possibility of a 
kind of realism that does not draw on the nature-access distinction, or the 
external-internal distinction. I shall argue that in Mind and World, John McDowell 
provides the outline for such a conception. In his more recent work, Putnam has 
developed a similar position. He conceives of this position as turning away from 
central aspects of internal realism1 and as making way for 'natural realism', a 
position that seeks to create room for a. second naïveté about our 'realist intuitions'. 
The kind of realism that results from rejecting AMR I will call 'post-
modem Aristotelian realism'. In my view, 'commonsense realism' or 'natural 
realism' are somewhat unfortunate labels for this position as they suggest that it 
is quite clear what our 'ordinary realist intuitions' amount to. They suggest that 
once we have shown the incoherence of global skepticism, we may safely reaffirm 
our 'natural', pre-philosophical notion of reality. Whereas the question is what this 
ordinary notion of reality amounts to. Commonsense intuitions do not constitute 
a philosophical position. They are not given.2 If one wants to reject foundationalist 
or revisionist accounts of our intuitions, one has to show the possibility of an 
articulation of our intuitions that does not invite the 'problem of knowledge'. To 
overcome the duality of metaphysical realism and metaphysical antirealism, we 
have to show that our realist intuitions can be articulated in a way that does not 
draw on AMR. Such an articulation, that I will argue is provided by McDowell's 
Mind and World and Putnam's recent work, may be called 'postmodern Aris-
totelian realist'. The name 'Aristotelian realism' is apt since McDowell and Putnam 
both use Aristotelian terminology and as they are both arguing for a kind of Aris-
totelian realism or a 'regaining of Aristotelian innocence'. Characteristic of 
Aristotelian realism is that it has not yet developed the notion of an 'interface' 
between (perceptual and other) beliefs and the world, a notion that, according to 
McDowell and Putnam, became the hallmark of modem philosophy. I will use the 
term 'postmodem' to emphasize that we cannot simply re-endorse Aristotle's 
position; we can only 'regain Aristotelian innocence' as a second naïveté. I shall 
'See Putnam (1994a 461^464). 
2In chapter 5, section 5.2, this point will be discussed more extensively. See also Kribbe (1996). 
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argue that whereas Aristotelian realism, as a 'first naïveté', is an empirical, 
'material' claim about the relation between mind and world, rx)stmodern 
Aristotelian realism, as a second naïveté, is a conceptual or 'formal' claim about 
the relation between mind and world. 
My elucidation of postmodem Aristotelian realism will proceed as follows. 
In this chapter, I will argue that postmodern Aristotelian realism tries to make 
room for realism without empiricism, in the sense that it conceives of our percep-
tual access to the world as a mode of openness to the world, while rejecting any 
notion of unconceptualized sensory gjvens. In chapter 4,1 shall argue that this 
notion of perceptual experience as openness to the world becomes available only 
if we reject the modem notion of nature as devoid of meaning. Postmodern Aris-
totelian realism requires a kind of're-enchantment of nature', as McDowell calls 
it, or as I will put it, a realism without physicalism. In chapter 5,1 will argue that 
postmodern Aristotelian realism suggests a realist understanding of truth and 
reference without conceiving of truth and reference as non-epistemic notions. 
Moreover, I will discuss the status of the claims put forward by postmodern 
Aristotelian realism, arguing that they should be understood as conceptual claims 
about the 'limits of sense', i.e. as claims about what it means to be real rather than 
as 'positive' claims about what can be counted as real. 
In this chapter, I will start with the articulation of postmodem Aristotelian 
realism by discussing McDowell's conception of our epistemic access to reality, 
or more precisely, McDowell's rejection of the idea that there is a 'problem of 
access'. In section 3.1 I will sketch McDowell's diagnosis of the current realism 
debate as marked by a seesaw between the 'Myth of the Given' or foundationalism 
on the one hand and coherentism on the other. Foundationalists, in trying to 
ground knowledge in something Given or extra-conceptual, rely on a dualism of 
conceptual scheme and non-conceptual content. Coherentists attack this dualism. 
They argue that since knowledge cannot be grounded in non-conceptual content, 
the relation between beliefs and extra-conceptual reality cannot be conceived as 
a relation of justification. The only external constraints on knowledge are thought 
to be causal constraints. Although McDowell agrees with the coherentist's attack 
on the scheme-content dualism, he argues that coherentism is deeply unsatisfactory 
as well, since it deprives us of the notion that the world poses rational constraints 
on our beliefs. Postmodern Aristotelian realism is an attempt to reject the Given 
without lapsing into coherentism. Crucial to this attempt is the rejection of 
empiricism. McDowell shows that the empiricist notion of non-conceptual sensory 
input leads to a view of perception as mediated by an interface or tertium. Bom 
McDowell and Putnam argue that the interface theory of perception rests on 
philosophical confusion rather than empirical fact. They seek to re-establish a kind 
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of'direct realism' about perception3. They argue that we can account for the 'realist 
intuition' that there are rational, justificatory relations between the world and our 
empirical beliefs by conceiving of our perceptual access to the world as both 
direct and conceptual in nature. Realism without empiricism tries to show the 
possibility of conceiving experience as openness to the world. 
In section 3.2 and section 3.3 I will discuss two arguments against 
McDowell's 'image of openness'. Traditionally, two objections have been put 
forward against direct realism about perception: the argument from theory-
ladenness and the argument from illusion. The argument from theory-ladenness, 
which I will discuss in section 3.2, has two forms. In the first version, it is argued 
that since perception is deeply influenced by (variable) conceptual frameworks, 
it cannot be conceived as a direct taking in of how things are. The second version 
of the theory-ladenness objection states that because of the extensive and highly 
complex causal processes taking place in between the input of sensory data and 
the output of full-fledged perceptual beliefs, sensory experience cannot simply be 
conceived as being open to the world I will argue that in both versions, the 
objection of theory-ladenness presupposes rather than establishes the interface 
theory of perception and the scheme-content dualism The objection is question-
begging with respect to the image of openness. However, I will also argue that the 
notion of openness does not imply a reinstatement of the idea of 'neutral 
observation'. I shall argue that there is an interpretation of the theory-ladenness 
tenet which does not draw on the scheme-content dualism. In this interpretation, 
theory-ladenness is compatible with the 'image of openness'. 
The second argument against the 'image of openness', the argument from 
illusion, will be discussed in section 3.3. Starting with an interpretation of non-
veridical experiences, the argument from illusion seeks to establish an overall 
interface theory of perception, according to which both veridical and non-veridical 
perceptual experiences involve epistemic intermediaries. I will sketch a number 
of criticisms levelled against this argument by Austin, McDowell, Putnam, 
Sartwell and Hacker. Their objections, so I will argue, show that the argument 
from illusion presupposes rather than establishes the viability of the interface 
theory. Moreover, I shall argue that the 'image of openness' is compatible with the 
fallibility of perception. 
In section 3.4 I will explain further what the 'image of openness', or 
'realism without empiricism', amounts to. First, I will try to clarify the notion of 
openness by discussing McDowell's claim that 'the mind is not in the head'. 
3McDowell and Putnam also defend direct realism with regard to conception. In this chapter, I will for the 
most part focus on direct realism with regard to perception, except for section 3 4, where McDowell's view on 
the issue of the referential directednessofr/u/ifangwill be under discussion Putnamdiscusses direct realism with 
regard to conception in the third of his Dewey Lectures (Putnam, 1994a). 
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Second, I will suggest an interpretation of'openness to the world' in terms of the 
notion of'formal identity*. Postmodern Aristotelian realism says that in veridical 
perception, the content of our perceptual experience is formally identical to a state 
of affairs in the world. The notion of formal identity, in its postmodern garb, is 
not an empirical notion. With the notion of formal identity, I want to elucidate the 
sense in which McDowell's position lets go of the nature/access distinction 
(AMR). Rejecting AMR as unintelligible makes available the image of openness 
in the sense that it leaves no room for the notion of an epistemological or an 
ontological gap between mind and world. 
3.1 Experience as openness to the world 
Metaphysical realism and internal realism are both attempts to do justice to our 
'realist intuitions'. Metaphysical realism seeks to articulate these intuitions in terms 
of AMR, Internal realism shows that AMR embodies an inadequate conception of 
the meaning of 'realism'. It shows that AMR ultimately violates rather than 
justifies our realist intuitions, bitemal realism is an attempt to formulate realism 
without AMR. However, I have argued that its articulation of the meaning of 
'realism' in important respects still draws on AMR Insofar as it does, internal 
realism is the mirror-image of metaphysical realism. Insofar as the realism debate 
has this constellation, it presents us with an antinomy: it seems that metaphysical 
realism and metaphysical antirealism are the only available alternatives and that 
neither can account for the most basic realist intuition we have, i.e. the idea that 
the world poses rational constraints on our beliefs. In Mind and World, 
McDowell offers a diagnosis of this constellation or this apparent antinomy. In 
particular, he tries to point at a blind spot shared by metaphysical realism and 
metaphysical antirealism alike. To get a grip on McDowell's terminology, I will 
start with a fairly detailed summary of the first three Lectures of Mind and World. 
3.1.1 The seesaw between foundationalism and coherentism 
McDowell characterizes the modem realism debate as dominated by a 'seesaw* 
between a pair of unsatisfying positions: 'on the one side a coherentism that 
threatens to disconnect thought from reality, and on the other side a vain appeal 
to the Given, in the sense of bare presences that are supposed to constitute the 
ultimate grounds of empirical judgements' (1994b:25). Philosophers who appeal 
to a notion of givenness (I will call them 'foundationalists') adhere to a dualism 
of scheme and Given or what Davidson calls a 'dualism of scheme and content'. 
Content is here conceived as non-conceptual content. As opposed to representa-
tional content, which is conceptual in the sense of being given by a 'that' clause, 
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content as it figures in the scheme-content dualism is dualistically set over against 
the conceptual (McDowell, 1994b:3). ' "Content" in Davidson's dualism cor-
responds to [Kantian] intuitions, bits of experiential intake, understood in terms 
of a dualistic conception of this interplay' (4). In the foundationalist picture, the 
interplay between concepts and intuitions explains how representational content 
comes about. 
To understand why the scheme-content dualism is tempting, McDowell 
argues, we have to take into account its Kantian background. Kant conceived of 
empirical knowledge as the result of a co-operation between receptivity and 
spontaneity, between sensibility and understanding. Understanding, as the exercise 
of concepts, is marked by spontaneity in the sense that 'the topography of the 
conceptual sphere is constituted by rational relations' (McDowell, 1994b:5). The 
conceptual sphere should be understood in terms of what Sellars has called 'the 
space of reasons'. Empirical judgements, as embodying a knowledge claim, are 
part of the space of reasons, i.e. the logical space of justifying and being able to 
justify what one says. For Kant, the space of reasons or the space of concepts is 
also the realm of freedom and spontaneity, since he considers rational necessita-
tion as constitutive of freedom (ibid.,5). Now, the dualism of conceptual scheme 
and non-conceptual content is motivated by the need to understand our freedom 
in empirical thinking as constrained from outside the conceptual sphere. If the 
exercise of concepts is not to degenerate into a self-contained game, a play of 
empty forms, empirical judgements should be somehow grounded in a reality 
external to thought. 'The point of the dualism is that it allows us to acknowledge 
an external constraint on our freedom to deploy our empirical concepts' (ibid.,6). 
What makes the idea of the Given tempting is 'the putatively reassuring idea that 
empirical justifications have an ultimate foundation in impingements on the 
conceptual realm from outside' (ibid.,6). 
The next step in McDowell's argument is to show that, although the 
motivation underlying the dualism of scheme and content (Given) is understan-
dable, the idea of the Given cannot provide us with the external constraints wished 
for. 
The idea of the Given is the idea that the space of reasons, the space of 
justifications or warrants, extends more widely than the conceptual sphere. 
The extra extent of the space of reasons is supposed to allow it to incor-
porate non-conceptual impacts from outside the realm of thought. But we 
cannot really understand the relations in virtue of which a judgement is 
warranted except as relations within the space of concepts: relations such 
as implication or probabilification, which hold between potential exercises 
of conceptual exercises of conceptual capacities. The attempt to extend the 
scope of justificatory relations outside the conceptual sphere cannot do 
what it is supposed to do. (McDowell, 1994b: 7) 
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The foundationalist hopes to explicate the way in which the world puts rational 
pressure on our thinking in terms of the idea that the space of reasons is 'at the 
edges' made up of non-conceptual impingements. However, these impingements, 
i.e. mere presences not given by a 'that' clause, cannot justify or falsify judge-
ments, not even the most basic judgements of experience. Pointing at bits of the 
Given cannot provide us with reasons for holding a belief. 
What we wanted was a reassurance that when we use our concepts in 
judgement, our freedom - our spontaneity in the exercise of our under-
standing - is constrained from outside thought, and constrained in a way 
that we can appeal to in displaying the judgements as justified. But when 
we make out that the space of reasons is more extensive than the 
conceptual sphere, so that it can incorporate extra-conceptual impinge-
ments from the world, the result is a picture in which constraint from 
outside is exerted at the outer boundary of the expanded space of reasons, 
in what we are committed to depicting as a brute impact from the 
exterior. Now perhaps this picture secures that we cannot be blamed for 
what happens at that outer boundary, and hence that we cannot be blamed 
for the inward influence of what happens there. What happens there is the 
result of an alien force, the causal impact of the world, operating outside 
the control of our spontaneity. But it is one thing to be exempt from 
blame, on the ground that the position we find ourselves in can be traced 
ultimately to brute force; it is quite another thing to have a justification. 
In effect, the idea of the Given offers exculpations where we wanted 
justifications. (McDowell, 1994b:8) 
To think that the extra-conceptual impingements on sensibility that cause us to 
hold certain beliefs can offer a justification of those beliefs is to confuse explana-
tion with justification.4 Non-conceptual content or extra-conceptual impingements 
may offer causal constraints on thinking, but they cannot present us with rational 
constraints. Therefore, appealing to the idea of the Given fails as an attempt to 
articulate the realist intuition that the world has a rational influence over our 
thinking. 
At this point, it may seem inevitable to acquiesce in an antirealist picture 
of the relation between minds and the world. According to McDowell, this is what 
Davidson and Rorty in fact do. They argue that since the idea of a rational or 
cognitive relation between extra-conceptual input and beliefs is untenable, we have 
'See Rorty (1980:140/1). 
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to conceive of the relation between beliefs and external reality as only causal in 
nature. The resulting position McDowell calls coherentism. 
According to Davidson, experience is causally relevant to a subject's 
beliefs and judgements, but it has no bearing on their status as justified 
or warranted. (...) Davidson recoils from the Myth of the Given all the 
way to denying experience any justificatory role, and the coherentist 
upshot is a version of the conception of spontaneity as frictionless, the 
very thing that makes the idea of the Given attractive. (McDowell, 
1994b: 14) 
Coherentism holds that experience cannot count as a reason for holding a belief 
(ibid.,14) and that therefore the world's impacts on our senses can have nothing 
to do with justification (ibid., 15). According to coherentism, justification is a 
relation that holds between beliefs; it is not a relation that as it were reaches 
outside of the sphere of the conceptual. Although McDowell agrees with the 
Davidsonian critique of the dualism of scheme and content, he argues that the 
coherentist picture leaves it mysterious how empirical thinking can have bearing 
on reality at all. The natural response to this picture, according to McDowell, is 
to recoil to the Myth of the Given. The idea of the Given is motivated by the 
worry that, in attributing to experience a merely causal role, we cannot but 
conceive of the exercise of our conceptual capacities in empirical thinking as a 
frictionless spinning in the void. So as coherentism threatens to disconnect thought 
from reality, we seem to be forced back into the Myth of the Given. In this way, 
the realism debate is marked by a seesaw, a tendency to oscillate between 
coherentism and foundationalism Neither of the two positions can adequately 
articulate the notion of rational constraints posed by experience on our (empirical) 
beliefs. McDowell's aim is to make room for a conception of experience, in which 
the element of receptivity is accounted for without appealing to the Given. In 
other words, he argues that there is a way of rejecting the Given without 
embracing coherentism. 
3.1.2 Coherentism and metaphysical antirealism 
Before going into McDowell's conception of experience, it should be noted that 
Davidson and Rorty deny that their rejection of the Given leads to an antirealist 
stance on their part. As we have seen in the previous chapter, their attack on the 
Given or the scheme-content dualism is at the same time an attack on conceptual 
relativism, on the idea that our beliefs could be completely out of touch with the 
world. Davidson's and Rortys point is that there is a direct link between the Myth 
of the Given and scepticism about the knowability of external reality. The notion 
116 
of 'uninterpreted content' and the notion of 'alternative, incommensurable 
conceptual schemes' are made for one another. Since neither of them can be made 
into an intelligible notion, the kind of antirealism or relativism implied by the 
doctrine of incommensurability cannot be coherently expressed. Therefore, 
Davidson and Rorty conceive of their attack on the Given as reinstating the realist 
intuition that empirical thinking is in touch with and rationally constrained by 
reality. As mentioned in chapter 2, section 2.4, Davidson ends his essay 'On the 
Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme' with the remark that 'in giving up the dualism 
of scheme and world, we do not give up the world, but re-establish unmediated 
touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true 
or false'(1984:198). 
Still, McDowell claims that although Davidson rightly points out that 
philosophy should not make a mystery out of thought's bearing on its objects, his 
conception of experience prevents him from resolving this mystery. The reason 
is that Davidson retains a dualism of sensory impressions that are causally related 
to beliefs, on the one hand, and appearances or perceptual beliefs that stand in a 
rational relation to other beliefs, on the other hand (McDowell, 1994b: 139,142). 
According to McDowell, as long as one retains the notion of sensory impressions 
as extra-conceptual impingements, one cannot make room for the idea that our 
thinking is rationally constrained by the world. The dualism of conceptual sphere 
and extra-conceptual impingements invites the notion of an ontological and 
epistemological gap between the space of reasons and what is outside of it. Since 
sensory impressions, as removed from the space of concepts, are not the kind of 
things that can put rational -as opposed to causal- pressure on our beliefs 
(ontological gap), they cannot give us epistemic access to reality in the way of 
justified, true beliefs (epistemological gap). Davidson argues he can avert the 
ensuing threat of skepticism by arguing that the conceptual link between belief 
(truth) and interpretation (meaning) implies that we have to think of belief as 'in 
its nature veridical'.5 According to McDowell, this line of argument does not 
alleviate the main worry, since in his view the problem with coherentism is not 
so much that it suggests that most of our beliefs might be false but that it cannot 
explain that our beliefs have content at all. 
[Davidson] thinks a merely causal, not rational, linkage between thinking 
and independent reality will do, as an interpretation of the idea that 
empirical content requires friction against something external to thinking. 
But it will not do. Thoughts without intuitions would be empty, as Kant 
almost says; and if we are to avert the threat of emptiness, we need to see 
'See Davidson (1990b). 
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intuitions as standing in rational relations to what we should think, not 
just in causal relations to what we do think. Otherwise the very idea of 
what we think goes missing. (..) Davidson manages to be comfortable 
with his coherentism, which dispenses with rational constraints on 
thinking from outside it, only because he does not see that emptiness is 
the threat. He thinks the point of wanting a rational connection between 
intuitions and thoughts is a reassurance that we are justified in endorsing 
the thoughts, as if we could take for granted in any case that they are 
thoughts, that they possess content. But if we do not let intuitions stand 
in rational relations to them, it is exactly their possession of content that 
is put in question. (McDowell, 1994b:68) 
So, although Davidson's argument for the intrinsic (global) veridicality of a body 
of beliefs might be correct, it simply assumes that the notion of a Txxiy of beliefs' 
is available. For a thought to have content is for it to constitute a claim about 
reality, i.e. to have representational content. To constitute a claim about reality is 
to be part of the space of reasons. Sensory impressions, if conceived as extra-
conceptual impingements, cannot be the content of empirical beliefs, since as bare 
presences, they lack the central feature of thoughts, i.e. claiming that things are 
thus and so. Therefore, the problem with coherentism is that in recognizing only 
a causal relation between sensory impressions and empirical beliefs, the space of 
concepts is reduced to a play of empty forms. Thoughts without content are 
empty, i.e. not thoughts at all (McDowell, 1994b:4). In that sense, Davidson's 
argument for the intrinsic veridicality of belief comes too late to secure a 
conception of empirical knowledge as having content, as making truth claims 
about the world at all. 
My aim is not to discuss whether McDowell does full justice to 
Davidson's views. By sketching his criticism of Davidson's views, I want to bring 
into sharper focus the dilemma that, according to McDowell, drives the realism 
issue. As regards Rorty, McDowell's diagnosis supports a claim for which I argued 
in chapter 2, i.e. the claim that although Rorty rejects the scheme-content dualism, 
his notion of causal as opposed to semantic relations between beliefs and reality 
makes his position vulnerable to the objection of idealism. Although Rorty rejects 
the notion of non-conceptual content, he retains the notion of an extra-conceptual 
reality 'out there' linked to us 'causally but not semantically'. Although the notion 
of such a causal link is meant to midermine the objection of idealism, it 
paradoxically reinforces the threat of idealism by introducing the notion of a 
reality inaccessible in principle, a reality that can put no rational constraints on 
our thinking. I concluded that although Rortys internal realist stance points at the 
possibility of'realism without AMR', it collapses into a version of metaphysical 
antirealism. This point can be phrased in McDowellian terms as follows. Although 
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Rorty argues that with rejecting the scheme-content dualism one also rejects 
skepticism about the accessibility of the world as unintelligible, his coherentism 
does leave foothold for the sceptical question in that it does not allow for the 
notion that our beliefs are rationally constrained by the world. Rorty argues from 
the incoherence of the notion of 'uninterpreted content' to a rejection of the very 
idea of receptivity in experience. His way of overcoming the dualism of scheme 
(spontaneity) and content (receptivity) is by simply abandoning one half of the 
dualism.6 However, by arguing that the notion of non-conceptual content is 
unintelligible in the sense of being 'like a wheel that turns though nothing else 
moves with it', the problem of content becomes ever more pressing. Although the 
notion of non-conceptual content is deeply problematic, we need to make room 
for receptivity in experience, on pains of making spontaneity frictionless and 
thoughts empty.7 
Although McDowell agrees with Davidson's and Rortys attack on the 
scheme-content dualism, he draws very different conclusions from it. His point is 
that we need to reject the Given without lapsing into coherentism. McDowell's 
diagnosis of the oscillation between foundationalism and coherentism shows the 
need for a conception of experience which accounts for both the element of 
receptivity and the element of spontaneity in experience without reverting to the 
dualism of scheme and content or what I called the 'two components conception 
of experience' in chapter 2. It shows that we should 'avoid the Myth of the Given 
without renouncing the claim that experience is a rational constraint on thinking1 
(McDowell, 1994b: 18). 
3.1.3 Openness without givenness 
According to McDowell, the only way we can 'dismount from the seesaw1 is by 
making sense of the idea that 'receptivity does not make an even notionally 
separable contribution to the co-operation [between receptivity and spontaneity]' 
(1994b:9). McDowell explains this idea as follows: 
We should understand what Kant calls 'intuition' -experiential intake- not 
as a bare getting of an extra-conceptual Given, but as a kind of occurence 
or state that already has conceptual content. In experience one takes in, 
for instance sees, that things are thus and so. That is the sort ofthing one 
can also, for instance, judge. (1994b:9) 
«See Knbbe (1994). 
'McDowell's claim that Rortys position ultimately undermines the very notion of thought and belief was also 
discussed in chapter 2, section 2 2, in the context of Rortys ehminativist attitude towards truth 
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McDowell argues that we should understand experience as a taking in that things 
are thus and so, in which conceptual capacities are passively involved. The 
'deliverances of the senses', although they simply happen to us, already posses 
conceptual content (ibid.,47), i.e. an element of Kantian spontaneity. 
When we enjoy experience conceptual capacities are drawn on in 
receptivity, not exercised on some supposedly prior deliverances of 
receptivity. (...) In experience one finds oneself saddled with content. 
One's conceptual capacities have already been brought into play, in the 
content's being available to one, before one has any choice in the matter. 
(1994b: 10) 
Although experience is passive in the sense that one 'finds oneself saddled with 
content before one has any choice in the matter', conceptual capacities are at play 
in experience in that what one finds oneself saddled with is a 'representing', a 
claim that things are thus and so. The difference between saying that conceptual 
capacities are exercised on sensory input and saying that conceptual capacities are 
drawn on in receptivity is the difference between saying that conceptual capacities 
allow us to construct a representation of the environment out of non-
representational sensory input and saying that conceptual capacities allow us to be 
sensitive to features of the environment. The latter claim implies that we have to 
conceive of 'the world's impressions on our senses [as] already possessed of 
conceptual content' (ibid., 18). As such, experiences can both provide 'an external 
control on our freedom in empirical thinking' and 'stand in rational relations to our 
exercises of the freedom that is implicit in the idea of spontaneity1 (ibid.,24). In 
other words, McDowell's conception of experience allows us to do justice to the 
realist intuition that the world rationality constrains our empirical thinking. The 
fact that the world puts constraints on thinking is accounted for by the passivity 
of experience. The fact that the constraint is rational (as opposed to merely 
causal) is accounted for by the idea that experience provides us with representa-
tional content. 
According to McDowell, the possibility of conceiving sensory impressions 
as being both passive and possessed with conceptual content is overlooked by 
foundationalists and coherentists alike. The notion of a passive involvement of 
conceptual capacities in experience enables us to understand experience as an 
immediate but not non-conceptual 'openness to the layout of reality' (1994b:26). 
Now, foundationalists and coherentists would of course deny that McDowell's 
conception of experience constitutes a viable alternative at all. In the next two 
sections I will discuss two objections against McDowell's 'image of openness'. 
What I do think has been established so far is that if we want to do justice to the 
idea that the world rationally constrains empirical thinking, we need to reject both 
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foundationalist and coherentist conceptions of experience. In the remainder of this 
section I will try to elucidate McDowell's notion of experience. 
McDowell's claim that in experience we cannot even notionally separate 
the contribution of receptivity does not amount to saying that in experience, the 
conceptual part and the non-conceptual part are inextricably intertwined, so that 
we should give up on the hope of separating the two.8 This position still retains 
the distinction between scheme and content as a notional distinction. McDowell 
rejects the very notion of 'extra-conceptual deliverances', without however 
rejecting the notion of receptivity, as Rorty does. Conceptual capacities are not 
exercised on an extra-conceptual deliverance of receptivity. Rather, the relevant 
conceptual capacities are drawn on in receptivity (1994b:9). A conception of 
receptivity as itself shaped by conceptual capacities enables us to understand 
experience as having conceptual content 'from the start', i.e. as a state in which 
one takes in that thing are thus and so. 
In a particular experience in which one is not misled, what one takes in 
is that things are thus and so. That things are thus and so is the content 
of the experience, and it can also be the content of a judgement: it 
becomes the content of a judgement if the subject decides to take the 
experience at face value. So it is conceptual content. But that things are 
thus and so is also, when one is not misled, an aspect of the layout of the 
world: it is how things are. Thus the idea of conceptually structured 
operations of receptivity puts us in a position to speak of experience as 
openness to the layout of reality. Experience enables the layout of reality 
itself to exert a rational influence on what a subject thinks. (McDowell, 
1994b:26) 
If receptivity is understood as a conceptually informed mode of openness to the 
world, experiences (in which one is not misled) can be conceived as both part of 
the space of reasons and involving direct access to worldly facts. This enables us 
to do justice to the commonsense notion that for instance my judgement 'there is 
a red chair in front of me' is justified by my perceiving a red chair in front of me. 
The coherentist denies such a justificatory connection between experience and 
judgement since in his view, the relevant experience can at most explain why I 
hold the relevant belief, but it cannot provide me with reasons for holding it. The 
"McDowell attributes this view to Quine (McDowell, 1994b: 129-136). 'Quine's positive picture retains this 
duality of factors on which truth depends. He says: "It is obvious that truth in general depends on both language 
and extralinguistic fact" [Quine, 1961:36]. His claim is not that there are not those two factors, but just that we 
cannot separate them out statement by statement1 (McDowell, 1994b: 130). See chapter 5, section 5.2.2 for further 
discussion of the Quinean view. 
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foundationalist wants to acknowledge a justificatory connection between 
judgements on the one hand and experiences, conceived as Ъаге, non-conceptual 
presences', on the other hand. However, in the case at stake, the content of my 
experience is not non-conceptual. Perceiving that there is a red chair in front of 
me is to have an experience endowed with representational content. McDowell's 
point against the foundationalist is not just that we cannot (not even notionally) 
separate out the 'non-conceptual part' of this experience. His point is that it is only 
as being endowed with representational content, that an experience can enter into 
a relation of justification. By picturing the relation between judgement and 
experience as respectively a causal relation or a relation of givenness, both the 
coherentist and the foundationalist nolens volens violate the commonsense 
intuition that empirical judgements can be, and frequently are, justified by 
experience. To account for such a rational connection between judgement and 
experience, one has to conceive of experience as a mode of openness to the world, 
in which one finds oneself saddled with conceptual content. 
To see how there can be room for McDowell's notion of experience as 
'taking in how things are' is to consider the possibility of 'realism without 
empiricism'. The first chapter of Cora Diamond's The Realistic Spirit starts with 
the following quote from Wittgenstein: T o^t empiricism and yet realism in 
philosophy, that is the hardest thing' (Diamond, 1991:39). Diamond points out that 
at first blush, Wittgenstein's statement is puzzling. Realism and empiricism are 
often considered foes rather than allies. Whereas realism in some way or other 
emphasizes the significance of what is independent of our thought and experience, 
empiricism would seem to deny the significance of what is independent from 
experience (Diamond, 1991:39). Nevertheless, 'the suggestion appears to be that 
empiricism is something we get into in philosophy by trying to be realists but 
going about it in the wrong way, or not hard enough' (ibid.). I think Mind and 
World provides an elucidation of Wittgenstein's remark by pointing at the link 
between (metaphysical) realism and the so-called third dogma of empiricism, i.e. 
the dualism of scheme and content. Mind and World suggests that in defending 
realism by relying on some notion of non-conceptual content, we are 'trying to be 
realists but going about it in the wrong way*. McDowell argues that the notion of 
non-conceptual constraints blocks rather than paves the way to realism It does so 
since, even if these constraints would be epistemically accessible to us as such, 
appealing to something non-conceptual cannot justify or falsify beliefs, it can only 
offer 'exculpations'. It may show what caused vs to have certain beliefs, but it fails 
to provide us with reasons for holding these beliefs to be true. As long as realism 
relies on the scheme-content dualism, it cannot articulate the idea that the world 
has rational influence over our thinking. Up to this point, McDowell sides with 
thinkers such as Davidson and Rorty, who reject the scheme-content dualism and 
the notion of Givenness as unintelligible. He sides with them in rejecting 
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empiricism. However, according to McDowell, Davidson and Rorty falsely suggest 
that the only alternative to the Myth of the Given is a coherentist position, which 
denies the possibility of justificatory link between beliefs and reality. According 
to coherentism, beliefs can only be justified by other beliefs and the relation 
between beliefs and extra-conceptual reality is a causal rather than a rational one. 
Since the link between the world and our beliefs can only be causal, and never 
justificatory, the 'space of reasons' will inevitably repose in splendid isolation. So 
coherentists can only let go of empiricism by abandoning realism. The coherentist 
line of thinking suggests we can do without the notion that the world rationally 
constrains our thinking. According to McDowell, this suggestion is not only 
counterintuitive but it also leaves it a mystery how thoughts can have content at 
all. 
Realism without empiricism is the claim that we can only make sense of 
thinking being rationally constrained by the world by rejecting the notion of non-
conceptual content. To drop the notion of given, non-conceptual content, without 
embracing coherentism, means to say that in perception, we are having access to 
reality in a way that is both direct, i.e. not mediated by non-conceptual input, and 
conceptual. Understanding receptivity not as providing us with extra-conceptual 
deliverances but as a taking in of facts, makes way for a conception of experience 
as being open to the world. What enables us to conceive of experience as a taking 
in of how things are, as a mode of openness to the world, is the notion of a 
passive involvement of conceptual capacities in experience. It is because 
conceptual capacities are passively drawn into receptivity, that the content of 
experience can be understood as a claim about how things are, as bearing on, as 
opposed to merely caused by reality. The notion of extra-conceptual deliverances, 
in which no conceptual capacities are involved, invites the concept of an interface 
between our network of beliefs (the conceptual sphere) and the world, an 
intermediary that is only causally and not cognitively related to 'external reality1. 
The notion of impressions as already possessing conceptual content undermines 
this idea of a gap between the space of reasons and the world. In short, Mind and 
World suggests there are two ways of rejecting the scheme-content dualism: the 
first leads to coherentism or metaphysical antirealism, the second to 'realism 
without empiricism' or the 'image of openness'. 
3.1.4 Metaphysical realism and foundationalism 
In sketching McDowell's diagnosis of the 'seesaw* between coherentism and the 
Myth of the Given, I have been presupposing that the distinction between foun-
dationalism and coherentism roughly coincides with the distinction between 
metaphysical realism and metaphysical antirealism. The link between coherentism 
and metaphysical antirealism has been clarified earlier in this section (3.1.2). 
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However, it may seem unwarranted to associate metaphysical realism with the 
Myth of the Given, for two reasons. First of all, it may seem misguided to 
construe metaphysical realism as a theory of perception to begin with. Con-
temporary metaphysical realism seems to be primarily concerned with the issue 
of truth and reference rather than the 'epistemological' issue of perception. I have 
however argued in the previous two chapters that the 'semantical' question of truth 
and reference cannot be separated from the question of our epistemic access to 
reality. I argued that the question of the nature of truth and reference cannot be 
separated from the question of our access to truth and reference. The question of 
access is clearly related to the issue of perception. Putnam remarks that the very 
idea that there is aproblem of reference and ^ problem of truth rests on the notion 
of a perceptual gap between language and the world. 
How could the question 'How does language hook unto the world? even 
appear to pose a difficulty, unless the retort "How can there be a problem 
about talking about, say, nouses and trees when we see them all the time? 
had not already been rejected in advance as question begging or "hope-
lessly naive'? The "how does language hook on to the world' issue is, at 
bottom, a replay of the old 'how does perception hook on to the world 
issue'. (Putnam, 1994a:456) 
In other words, metaphysical realism, even as a theory of truth and reference, 
takes a stance on the issue of perception in that it takes seriously the notion of a 
gap between our perceptual beliefs and reality. As I argued in chapter 1, 
metaphysical realism presupposes the intelligibility of scepticism with regard to 
the epistemic accessibility of the world With this presupposition, metaphysical 
realism is already, in McDowellian terms, on the seesaw. 
However, this does not show that the metaphysical realist's answer to the 
'problem of access' need be a foundationalist answer. This brings me to the second 
reason why it seems unwarranted to assume that the distinction between foun-
dationalism and coherentism coincides with the distinction between metaphysical 
realism and metaphysical antirealism. It may be unclear in what sense metaphysi-
cal realism relies on the dualism of scheme and Given, since most metaphysical 
realists nowadays will reject the traditional foundationalist picture of knowledge 
being grounded in the Given. However, McDowell's critique of the Given also 
applies to so-called weak versions of foundationalism, which let go of the idea of 
infallible basic statements, but which retain the idea that some statements are 
justified non-inferentially, i.e. that there are beliefs which are justified by 
something outside of the space of reasons (Dancy, 1985:62/3). Weak foun-
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dationalist programmes are still in vogue to day.9 However, as Fine suggests in 
Ms (1986), perhaps a more widespread approach among metaphysical realists 
towards the problem of access is to hold that we cannot have direct access to 
reality and that therefore, we need to find a principle of inference that entitles us 
to hold that we have mdirect access to reality.10 This approach is coherentist in 
that it tries to link 'the space of concepts' with reality not by means of a notion 
of gjvenness but by means of an inference to the best or only explanation. An 
example of this approach to the issue of our perceptual access to the world is 
provided by Brown (1987). He defends a version of the 
the causal-representative theory of perception, according to which the 
items that we perceive are effects of a causal interaction between our 
sensory apparatus and the physical world. As such, the items of immediate 
perceptual awareness are dependent on both the features of the physical 
world and the properties of our sensory system. These items are never 
numerically identical with external objects, and they need not reveal any 
of the features of those external objects. Still, because the items we 
perceive are caused by external objects, they carry information about 
those objects, and thus provide indirect access to the physical world (..) 
In order to learn about the physical world through perception we must be 
able to extract the relevant information from the items we perceive; and 
our available [scientific] theories (..) permit us to do this. (Brown, 1987:v) 
The principle of inference generally appealed to by metaphysical realists to show 
that we have indirect access to external reality, i.e. to show that a considerable 
amount of our (scientific) beliefs are (roughly) true or genuinely referring, is a 
version of 'inference to the best explanation'.11 Brown diverges from this 
abductivist approach in suggesting that, as science progresses, it may provide us 
with 'deductive inferences from descriptions of what we perceive to descriptions 
of items in the physical world' (1987:186). Apart from the fact that this claim 
merely expresses a promissory note, it is rather odd to suppose that empirical 
science will ever come up with deductive arguments against skepticism. The 
problems with the abductivist approach have been discussed in chapter 1 (section 
'See for a discussion of contemporary versions of foundationalism: Goldman (1986), Haack (1993), Sosa 
(1980a, 1980b), Dancy (1985), Fogelin (1994), Moser (1989). 
l0See chapter 1, section 1.3.1. 
"See Deviti (1991), Moser (1989), Boyd (1984, 1987, 1989, 1991), Musgrave (1988), McMullin (1984, 
1992). 
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1.3.1). Here, I just want to point out that there are versions of metaphysical 
realism that do not rely on the Myth of the Given. The 'indirect access' approach 
denies that non-conceptual content is phenomenologically given to us. However, 
although we cannot, on the phenomenological level, separate the conceptual and 
the non-conceptual factor in perceptual experience, the idea is that we may be able 
to do so at the level of science. The picture underlying this approach to the 
problem of access is strikingly illustrated by the opening sentences of Quine's 
Pursuit of Truth: 
From impacts on our sensory surfaces, we in our collective and cumula-
tive creativity down the generations have projected our systematic theory 
of the external world. Our system is proving successful in predicting 
subsequent sensory input. How have we done it? (Quine, 1990:1) 
Quine considers research into the evidential relations between the immediate 
sensory data and our full-fledged scientific image of the world to be the proper 
task of philosophy as 'naturalized epistemology' (1990:19). I will not discuss to 
what extent Qume's position is a metaphysical realist one. I only want to point at 
the possibility of a version of metaphysical realism, which pursues a non-foun-
dationalist, 'naturalist' approach to the problem of access. Furthermore, I want to 
point out that although this approach denies that non-conceptual input is given to 
us as such, it does retain the dualism of scheme and content as a notional 
distinction. The content of perceptual experience, insofar as it is representational 
content, is still thought of as the product of an interplay between external 'sensory 
impacts' and our 'conceptual scheme'.12 
Metaphysical realism does not necessarily coincide with a foundationalist 
theory of our epistemic access to the world. The 'indirect access' approach does 
not appeal to basic statements which are justified non-inferentially. However, 
whether the metaphysical realist takes a (weak) foundationalist or an abductivist 
approach to the problem of access, the dualism of scheme and world is presup-
posed at least as a notional distinction. As long as one keeps this distinction, 
McDowell's image of openness will not even figure as a genuine possibility. By 
taking for granted the distinction between scheme and world, the 'problem of 
'
2McDowell's objections to this line of thought have been sketched in the first part of this section With 
regard to the 'naturalist project', the problem is that even if we would be able to give a scientific reconstruction 
of the 'internal processing' of non-conceptual input, this would not solve the problem of access Because of the 
non-conceptual nature of the items marked as bare input, these could not possible provide us with reasons to 
believe or disbelieve See chapter 4, section 4 2, for a discussion of the relation between 'naturalist', sub-personal 
informations processing accounts of perception and McDowell's account of perception in terms of openness to 
the world 
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access' cannot but seem to be a genuine problem, and McDowell's notion of 
experience as openness cannot but seem to be naive and question-begging. 
3.1.5 Direct realism versus the interface theory of perception 
McDowell's aim is to criticize the assumptions that give rise to the skeptical 
predicament to which both metaphysical realists and metaphysical antirealists 
respond. We might say that his 'image of openness' expresses a version of what 
is traditionally called 'direct realism'. Although this name is rather unhappy13, it 
may be used to indicate that McDowell rejects a conception of sensory ex-
periences as intermedianes between us and the world. However, this does not 
mean, as some versions of direct realism hold14, that perception is not a conceptual 
activity. As Putnam puts it: 
When I say that perception need not involve mental intermediaries of the 
sorts postulated by either sense-datum theory or its materialist imitations, 
I am not saying that perceptions is not a conceptual activity. I am saying 
rather that the conceptual activity does not begin with the arrival 'in the 
mind' of some non-conceptual datum which we then 'process'. (Putnam, 
1994b: 287) 
As long as our sensory experiences are conceived as non-conceptual intermediaries 
between us and the world, we deprive ourselves of the idea that in empirical 
thinking we are having genuine cognitive contact with the world at all (Putnam, 
1994a:454). Theories that postulate an intermediary are often called i/jdirect 
theories of perception. Dancy defines indirect realism as the view that 'in percep-
tion we are indirectly aware of the physical objects around us in virtue of a direct 
awareness of internal, non-physical objects' (1985:152). The internal, non-physical 
objects are variously conceived as Cartesian 'ideas', Humean 'impressions', 
Machian 'sensations' or Russellian 'sense-data'. It may seem that nowadays, sense-
datum theory, and with it the whole notion of an immaterial intermediary, has 
"Putnam points out that the term 'direct' is unhappy for two reasons First, as Austin has shown in his ( 1962), 
the term 'direct' as used by traditional epistemologists is confused, largely due to the fact that it has become 
disentangled from the notion of directness as employed in ordinary speech (Putnam, 1994a.453) Second, 
Putnam's and McDowell's version of'direct realism' should not be conflated with the so-called adverbial version 
of direct realism, which tries to get nd of sense data by means of a simple linguistic reform (to the effect that 
we don't perceive visual experiences, we have them) The adverbial version of direct realism is compatible with 
the causal (interface) theory of perception, as Putnam points out, and of course it is precisely the latter theory, 
that he wants to reject (Putnam, 1994a.453) 
"See Dancy & Sosa (1992 336, 23/4) 
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long been abandoned However, as we will see in the next two sections, the 
assumptions underlying it are still very much alive. In contemporary versions of 
the interface theory, the intermediaries are often conceived as brain states, or 
states of the nervous system, in short as physical items. As for instance Brown 
stresses, his 'causal-representative theory of perception' does not invoke non-
physical intermediaries between perceivers and the world (Brown, 1987:viii). 
Nevertheless, the cartesian notion of a self-contained inner realm, in which things 
are as they are independently of external reality, remains intact, albeit in a 
materialist version (McDowell, 1986:151/2). As Putnam puts it: 
Although sense-datum theory itself has fallen into disrepute, the assump-
tions that underlay it remain very much in vogue. These include the 
assumption that there is a self-standing realm of experiences or mental 
phenomena; that these phenomena take place in the mind/brain; that the 
locus of this drama is the human head; and finally, that perception 
involves a special cognitive relation to certain of these 'inner1 experiences, 
as well as the existence of 'causal chains of the appropriate type' 
connecting them to 'external' objects. (Putnam, 1994a:475) 
The interface theory of perception in its contemporary garb retains the modem 
skeptical notion 'that our cognitive powers cannot reach all the way to the objects 
themselves' (Putnam, 1994a:453). I have argued that McDowell avoids this picture 
by rejecting the notion of non-conceptual gjvens and by conceiving of sensory 
experiences as already possessing conceptual content. As such, sensory experience 
can be understood as taking in that things are thus and so, as being open to the 
world. In the following two sections I will discuss two objections against 
McDowell's 'image of openness' in some detail. I will argue that these objections 
are question-begging with respect to McDowell's and Putnam's 'direct realism' in 
that they presuppose the interface theory rather than provide independent argu-
ments for it. In section 3.4 I will further explain what postmodem Aristotelian 
realism about perception amounts to. I will try to elucidate McDowell's image of 
openness in terms of the idea that in veridical perception, mind and world are 
formally identical. 
3.2 First objection to the image of openness: the argument from theory-
ladenness 
The idea that experience can be understood as being open to the world in virtue 
of the involvement of conceptual capacities may seem highly paradoxical. There 
is a familiar line of thinking that suggests that since perception is to an important 
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extent theory-laden, we cannot conceive of perception as a taking in of how things 
are. Usually, the theory-ladenness of perception is called upon precisely to show 
the naïveté of direct realism. The idea is that as perception involves complicated 
internal processing of data, we cannot simply assume that in perception we are 
being open to the world. So how can the involvement of conceptual capacities in 
experience possibly help us to the image of openness? 
There are two versions of the argument from the theory-ladenness of 
perception. Both argue that perception, insofar as it has representational content15, 
is supported by theory not derived from mere sensory input. Therefore, perception 
cannot be viewed as a direct taking in of how things are. The first version of the 
argument stresses the involvement of background beliefs in perception, whereas 
the second stresses the involvement of complex causal processing in perception. 
The first version I will call the 'Kuhnian argument from world-making' and the 
second I will call the 'argument from neurophysiologjcal complexity1. 
3.2.1 The Kuhnian argument from world-making 
The Kuhnian argument from world-making starts by pointing out that the 
traditional dichotomy of observational and theoretical concepts is untenable and 
that the idea of a neutral observation language is chimerical. Observation 
statements do not merely register facts about objective reality. Rather, they 
classify the world according to particular background assumptions, methodological 
tenets, values, in short a particular paradigm (Kuhn, 1970). Paradigms can be 
overthrown and in the case of a paradigm-shift, our perceptual classifications of 
reality are altered radically. Kuhn famously suggests that after a paradigm-shift, 
the scientist in a sense lives in a different world (1970:ch.X). The sense in which 
different paradigms constitute different worlds should be understood against the 
background of a particular view of perceptioa As Hoyningen-Heune points out, 
Kuhn conceives of the product of perceptual acts as co-determined by stimuli 'on 
the object-side' and conceptual categories 'on the subject-side' (1993:40). Stimuli 
are conceived as remaining constant through paradigm shifts but as not accessible 
as such. Members of different scientific communities, Kuhn says, 'are presented 
with different data by the same stimuli' (1977:309). They can be said to live in 
different worlds 'in the sense that the given world, whether everyday or scientific, 
is not a world of stimuli' (ibid). Rather, it is a world of data, i.e. interpreted 
stimuli. The world we experience, i.e. the world we have access to, is the 
phenomenal world constituted by a particular paradigm, i.e. a particular conceptual 
organisation of stimuli. Now, if this picture of perception, as a way of constructive 
"I.e. insofar as it is a full-fledged perceptual belief, as opposed to bare sensory input. 
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world-making, is right, McDowell's notion of perceptual experience as a taking in 
of how things are must be ruled out as terribly naive. 
However, the point of McDowell's image of openness is not to reinstate 
a notion of neutral observation, but to reject the particular notion of stimuli used 
by Kuhn. Kuhn's picture involves the notion of non-conceptual content, that can 
be organized in radically different, even incommensurable ways. The notion of 
non-conceptual input here used is the notion of something inaccessible in 
principle, the notion of something that cannot be said to make a noticeable 
difference to our epistemic practice. Kuhns 'plurality of phenomenal worlds thesis', 
as Hoyningen-Heune calls it, falls prey to Davidson's and Rortys attack on 
conceptual relativism, discussed in chapter 2. To make sense of a plurality of 
phenomenal worlds, one has to appeal to 'uninterpreted content' that can be 
organized in radically different ways. The notion of a plurality of phenomenal 
worlds only makes sense against the background of shared, non-conceptual input. 
However, to suppose that conceptual schemes constitute different worlds is to 
make the notion of non-conceptual input a completely vacuous one. Insofar as it 
is neutral with regard to the different conceptual schemes, non-conceptual content 
is like 'a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it' (Rorty, 
1982:xxxv). As Davidson argues, we cannot give any meaning to the notion of 
what it is that is organized by a scheme or language. Insofar as Kuhnian stimuli 
are inaccessible as such, they are ineffable and lack explanatory power. As such, 
they cannot provide 'an intelligible basis on which it can be said that schemes are 
different' (Davidson, 1984:198). Insofar as Kuhnian stimuli are accessible or 
effable, they must already have been interpreted by some conceptual scheme. As 
such, they cannot provide the common ground required to make sense of incom-
mensurability. 
Rorty and Davidson conclude that since the notion of a semantical or jus-
tificatory relation between unconceptualized sensory impressions and beliefs does 
not make sense, we have to conceive of the relation between experience and belief 
not as an evidential but as a causal one. Within their coherentist picture, the 
'plurality of phenomenal worlds thesis' cannot be stated coherently, since there is 
nothing left to serve as an epistemic intermediary between our beliefs and the 
world I have already indicated why McDowell holds that the coherentist picture 
does not genuinely overcome the sceptical predicament. McDowell argues that 
positing causal constraints on our beliefs not only fails to provide us with rational 
constraints, it also fails to explain how our empirical beliefs can have content at 
all. Thus, McDowell's objection to Kuhn's picture of perception as 'world-making' 
aims to establish a different point than the one made by Davidson and Rorty. 
McDowell agrees that the Kuhnian kind of skepticism, as relying on the scheme-
content dualism, cannot be formulated in a coherent way. He agrees that the 
relation between experience and belief can only be a causal one, //"experience is 
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conceived in terms of non-conceptual content. His point is however that since 
causal constraints cannot endow our empirical beliefs with representational 
content, we have to rethink our notion of experience. In other words, whereas 
Davidson and Rorty deny that there is a justificatory relation between experience 
and belief, McDowell insists that we have to alter our conception of experience 
so that we can allow for a justificatory relation between experience and belief. 
The problematic nature of the scheme-content dualism shows that we need to 
conceive of our sensory impressions as already possessed with conceptual content. 
In the Kuhnian picture, phenomenal worlds make up an interface between 
us and the world 'in itself. The Kuhnian skeptic wants to say that our empirical 
beliefs cannot be said to give us access to the world in itself. The point of 
McDowell's 'image of openness' is that the notion of an accessible world and the 
notion of belief, i.e. the notion of conceptual content, stand or fall together. The 
very notion of belief is 'world-involving' in the sense that without a world that 
offers semantical constraints, our beliefs would be empty, i.e. no beliefs at all. 
The 'image of openness' is required not primarily to ensure that most of our 
empirical beliefs are true, but to account for the fact that they have content at all.16 
The skeptical notion of a world inaccessible in principle does not just rob us of 
knowledge (truth), it robs us of meaning (content), and this is what makes 
skepticism unintelligible. The skeptic needs the notion of belief, i.e. empirical 
content, to claim that our beliefs could fail to give access to the world, but the 
notion of belief presupposes the epistemic accessibility of the world. 
In denying that the skeptical predicament as expressed by Kuhn's 
'plurality-of-phenomenal-worlds-thesis' makes sense, McDowell is not reinstating 
the notion of neutral observation. His notion of experience as 'taking in how 
things are' does not mean that perception is not 'theory-laden', but it implies a 
particular understanding of what theory-ladenness amounts to. Hoyningen-Heune 
points out that Kuhn's account of perception as involving the constitution of a 
phenomenal world starts with the recognition of an important feature of 
perception: 
Every completed act of perception is characterized by an as-structure, as 
manifested by a perceptual act which identifies an object as a particular 
individual or as a member of a particular natural family. By the as-
structure of perception, a perceptual act can't count as completed if its 
"This is why McDowell says that Davidson's argument for the intrinsic vendicality of belief comes too late. 
McDowell does not dispute Davidson's claim that the idea that most of our beliefs could be false, ι e. the notion 
of 'global error', does not make sense But the point of his image of openness is that we need the notion of 
experience as rationally constraining beliefs in order to be entitled to the notion of belief to begin with 
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objects hasn't been identified as some particular object. (Hoyningen-
Heune, 1993:83)17 
Now, McDowell's notion of perception is compatible with the idea that perceptual 
experience is characterized by an as-structure. In fact, McDowell's notion of 
sensory impressions as already possessing conceptual content could well be 
expressed by saying that in experience one is essentially taking in something as 
something. McDowell wants 'to bring responsiveness to meaning back into the 
operations of our natural sentient capacities as such' (1994b:77). With regard to 
the theory-ladenness objection, the point is that one can acknowledge the as-
structure of perception without conceiving of perception as 'worldmaking'. 
The as-structure of perception involves the ability to identify an object 'as 
sufficiently similar to some previously known individual object or to the members 
of some previously known natural family1 (Hoyningen-Heune, 1993:84). In order 
to perceptually identify an object as a particular object, one draws on learned 
similarity relations (ibid). Kuhn's picture suggests that seeing something as 
something involves the (unconscious) application of classificatory schemes on 
sensory input. In other words, Kuhn explains the as-structure of perception in 
terms of the scheme-content dualism. In McDowell's picture, similarity relations 
or criteria of identity for objects are not conceived ss projected onto mere stimuli. 
Conceptual capacities are, according to McDowell, passively involved in 
perception, which means that perception involves the ability to be responsive to 
similarity relations in the world. In saying that similarity relations are in the 
world, however, we are not reinstating metaphysical realism. The postmodem 
Aristotelian realist rejects both the metaphysical antirealist's and the metaphysical 
realist's interpretation of the ontological status of similarity relations. As I argued 
in the previous chapter, the criteria of identity for objects and kinds are neither 
'internal to a conceptual scheme' nor 'external to the conceptual sphere'. The philo-
sophical dualism of internal and external only makes sense against the background 
of the interface theory, according to which 'inner1 non-conceptual items are 
causally linked to an external reality, access to which is intrinsically problematic. 
To reject the notion of an interface is to claim that the as-structure of perception 
cannot adequately be analyzed in terms of the internal-external dualism. This is 
to say that meaning cannot be taken as a product of 'internal', subject-sided 
elements and 'external', object-sided elements. Similarity relations are neither 
mind-dependent, in the sense of being causally dependent on a conceptual scheme, 
nor mind-independent, in the sense of being part of the noumenal world, beyond 
"Hoyningen-Heune derives the notion of an 'as-stracture' from Heidegger (1927: §32, 149). 
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the reach of concepts. In other words, although similarity relations are causally 
independent of the mind, they are not external to the sphere of the conceptual. 
With the image of openness, McDowell in fact introduces a notion of 
what it means to be real, that departs from both metaphysical realism and 
metaphysical antirealism. According to this notion, worldly facts are mind-
independent in a causal sense, but they are not outside of the conceptual realm in 
the sense that facts are essentially 'embraceable by thought'. This notion was 
hinted at in the previous chapter, and it will be discussed extensively in the last 
section of this chapter and throughout the next chapter. For now, I want to point 
out that whereas Kuhn's picture explains the as-structure of perception in terms of 
a causal interplay between scheme and content, McDowell's picture suggests that 
we have to take the as-structure of perception, i.e. the notion of responsiveness to 
meaning, as primitive. McDowell's image of openness then is compatible with the 
tenet of theory-ladenness in the sense that openness does not mean 'neutrality1, but 
'responsiveness to meaning1. 
3.2.2 The argument from neurophysiological complexity 
To explain what it means to take the notion of responsiveness to meaning as 
primitive, it is helpful to consider the second version of the argument from theory-
ladenness. Dancy summarizes it as follows: 
This argument stresses the enormous complexity of the causal processes 
involved in perception, the details of which we are only beginning to 
glimpse. Given that complexity, it asks, how can we claim that we 
perceive the external object directly? There are many states or processes 
of the brain intermediate between the external object and the perception; 
surely then the object is separated from us, and can only be perceived 
indirectly by means of the effects which it has on our retinal surfaces etc. 
(Dancy, 1985:154) 
According to this argument, perception is a causal concept, to be analyzed in 
terms of the inner processing of extra-conceptual stimuli. Perception starts with 
the arrival in the brain of extra-conceptual stimuli, which are subject to intricate 
information-processing. In view of the complex causal processes required for an 
ordinary perceptual act to come about, we cannot, it is argued, simply assume that 
perception gives us direct access to 'external' reality. 
In 'The Content of Perceptual Experience', McDowell claims that this 
argument rests on a confusion between the level of'thepersonal and the level of 
the sub-personal, or more generally, the level of the animal (as a whole) and the 
level of its internal machinery (1994a:201). Internal information-processing 
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consists of informational transactions at the sub-personal level, i.e. transactions 
between parts of an organism. The notion of information here used is irreducibly 
metaphorical, since one part of an organism cannot literallly tell other parts of the 
organism anything. Sub-personal information systems are physical mechanisms 
that perform syntactic operations on physical impacts from outside. Although it 
might be convenient to say for instance that in seeing a cat my eye is giving 
information to my brain, the notion of content involved here is the notion of as-if 
content (McDowell, 1994a: 199). The attribution of sub-personal content is 
essentially parasitic on the attribution of genuine content, which belongs to the 
personal level. Therefore, it would be a category mistake to say that perception 
consists in our having access to the output of our internal information processing 
systems. To claim that perception involves the inspection of our interiors is not 
only phenomenologjcally off-key. The point is that sub-personal systems do not 
provide us with genuine content to begin with (McDowell, 1994a:200); they do 
not really tell us anything (198). Although perception could not take place without 
the syntactic operations performed by these systems, sub-personal information-
processing cannot be said to constitute our 'dealings with content'. 
The 'sub-personal' account of a sensory system, which treats it as an 
information processing device that transmits its informational results to 
something else inside an animal, cannot adequately characterize what its 
sensory systems are for the animal (as opposed to what they are, 
metaphorically speaking, for the internal parts that receive the results of 
information-processing): namely, modes of sensitivity or openness to 
features of the environment - not processors of information, but collectors 
of it. (McDowell, 1994a: 197) 
Dancy makes roughly the same point with regard to the second version of the 
theory-ladenness objection: 
This argument is a mistake. We can easily agree on the importance of 
recent neurophysiological discovery, but not so easily on its relevance to 
the point at issue. For what is the sense in which the brain processes 
occur as intermediaries between us and the external object? The sense in 
which this is so is causal; their occurrence is causally necessary for the 
perception to occur. But, crucially, we are not aware of their occurrence 
in any sense even distantly analogous to the sense in which we are aware 
of external objects. So the neurophysiological processes do not function 
as intermediary direct objects of perception. This argument, then, is not 
an argument for indirect realism at all. (Dancy, 1985:154) 
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McDowell does not deny that perception mvolves sub-personal information-
processing, but he argues that it is mistaken to construe informational transactions 
or as-if content as an interface between us and external reality. Information-
processing at the sub-personal level is in no way at odds with openness to the 
environment at the personal level.18 What makes it seem so is a conflation of two 
notions of information or 'telling1, that should be kept apart. The basic, non-
metaphoncal notion of telling is the sense in which an organism becomes 
informed of features of the environment. The notion of telling at the sub-personal 
level applies to intricate causal processes inside the organism which may, in a 
derivative sense, be called informational transactions. The point is that an account 
of sub-personal information-processing captures the enabling conditions for 
perception, but we should not mix an account of the enabling conditions for 
perception with a constitutive account of perception. It is proper to say that we can 
perceive our environment in virtue of sub-personal information processing, but 
only with 'in virtue of receiving a causal reading, not a constitutive one 
(McDowell, 1994a.204). 
At the level of internal machinery, it is useful to talk of sensory systems 
as information-processing devices; but for the animal its sensory systems 
are modes of openness to features of its environment. Information-
processing characterizations of the internal machinery figure in explana-
tions of how it can be that animals are in touch with their environments. 
The 'as if content that is usefully deployed at the lower level helps make 
intelligible the genuine content that appears at the higher level by way of 
'enabling' explanations, not as somehow constituting that content. 
(McDowell, 1994a:201/2) 
To put it differently, perception, as openness to the world, is not a causal concept. 
Although there may be intricate causal processing going on in perception, at the 
level of the whole organism perception is characterized by a responsiveness to 
meaning, which cannot be reductively explained in terms of the causal processing 
of in itself meaningless stimuli. Genuine content cannot be explained away by an 
account of as-if content. The notion of responsiveness to meaning is primitive in 
that it cannot be accounted for in terms of an interplay between conceptual, 
'internal' and extra-conceptual, 'external' components. 
McDowell's reply to the second version of the theory-ladenness objection 
consists in arguing that information-processing accounts of perception and the 
image of openness are fully compatible. If we keep in mind the distinction 
'"Therefore, McDowell argues, the usual cognitive-scientific criticisms of Gibson's theory of perception are 
misguided (1994a. 202/3) 
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between the personal and the sub-personal level of explanation, information-
processing accounts of perception do not pose a threat to the image of openness. 
The issue of the relation between the two levels of explanations is a difficult one 
and I do not claim it has been setttled by the above argument. In chapter 4 
(section 4.2) I will discuss McDowell's distinction between what he calls the 
'realm of meaning' and the 'realm of law1. The issue of the relation between the 
personal and the sub-personal level of explanation will then be dealt with in more 
detail. There I will discuss two objections against McDowell's line of argument 
in 'The Content of Perceptual Experience'. I will argue, contra McDowell, that we 
cannot conceive of the two levels as merely representing different stories, which 
peacefully coexist. I will argue that the personal level or the realm of meaning is 
not only autonomous but conceptually prior to the sub-personal level or the realm 
of law. For now, I only want to establish that McDowell and Dancy rightly point 
out that sub-personal information processing need not be construed as an 
intermediary or interface between us and the world. To say that perception 
involves complex causal processes or sub-personal informational transactions does 
not imply that direct realism or the image of openness is wrong. One can 
recognize the existence of sub-personal information processing without construing 
it as an interface between minds and reality. 
So far, I have argued that the tenet of theory-ladenness, as an argument 
against direct realism, is an instance rather than a defence of the interface theory 
of perception. Both versions of the theory-ladenness objection take the dualism of 
scheme and content for granted, whereas McDowell's image of openness is meant 
precisely to throw doubt on the intelligibility of this dualism. The tenet of theory-
ladenness as an argument against direct realism suggests that insofar as sensory 
experience has representational content, it is the product of exercizing conceptual 
activity on non-conceptual deliverances. As such, we cannot simply suppose that 
sensory experience gives us access to the reality that was causally responsible for 
the experience. The idea is that perception, as a highly 'constructive' activity, 
discloses reality 'for us'. Direct realism, it is argued, just takes for granted that 
reality 'for us' corresponds to or mirrors reality 'in itself. This is terribly naive of 
course. The point of McDowell's image of openness, however, is not that in 
perception we have direct access to reality 'in itself. The point is rather that the 
notion of reality 'for us', as a veil of representations between us and the world 'in 
itself, is deeply problematic. In chapter 2,1 argued that the notion of reality 'for 
us' or the notion of reality as 'internal to a conceptual scheme' relies on AMR. It 
gets its life from the notion of uninterpreted reality or non-conceptual input, which 
is the notion of something inaccessible in principle. As this concept is vacuous, 
I argued, the very dualism of reality 'for us' and reality 'in itself is unintelligible. 
The point of McDowell's image of openness is a point of intelligibility. He does 
not so much claim that the interface theory of perception is false as argue that the 
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notion of an interface springs from philosophical confusioa Insofar as the tenet 
of theory-ladenness is an expression of the interface theory, it is at best question-
begging as an argument against McDowell's image of openness. Insofar as the 
tenet of theory-ladenness is disentangled from the interface theory, it is compatible 
with the image of openness. Disjoined from the interface theory, the tenet of 
theory-ladenness implies either that perception is characterized by an as-structure 
(first version) or that perception involves sub-personal information-processing 
(second version). Both implications are compatible with the image of openness. 
3.3 Second objection to the image of openness: the argument from illusion 
The second objection against the image of openness is posed by the so-called 
'argument from illusion'. Here, it is argued that the phenomenon of non-veridical 
perception (illusions, hallucinations, etc.) can only be explained by introducing the 
notion of 'inner objects' that fail to be appropriately causally linked to external 
world-situations. It is then argued that since non-veridical and veridical empirical 
experiences are qualitatively similar qua 'inner object', we cannot understand 
veridical experience as non-mediated openness to the world. The argument of 
illusion consists of the following steps: 
(1) perception is fallible; there are non-veridical perceptual experiences 
(2) non-veridical experiences can only be accounted for by positing an inner 
object (appearance, sensation, impression etc.) that fails to be appropriate-
ly causally related to external reality 
(3) what is epistemically available in a veridical experience is indistin-
guishable from what is epistemically available in a non-veridical 
experience; veridical and non-veridical experiences are qualitatively 
similar qua 'internal' features 
(4) What we 'directly perceive' in veridical perception is an inner object too; 
to move from the inner component of experience, shared by veridical and 
non-veridical experiences, to real world situations, a principle of inference 
is required; in absense of such a principle, we cannot claim to ever have 
genuine epistemic access to reality 'itself 
therefore 
(5) we are not entitled to the notion of experience as a direct, i.e. non-
mediated taking in of real world situations. 
A widespread response to this argument is to accept the first three premises and 
to take up the challenge posed by (4): to find a principle of inference that allows 
us to move from the inner to the outer component of experience. If such a 
principle is available, we can avoid wholesale skepticism about the accessibility 
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of the external world without however embracing direct realism. The argument 
from illusion presents us with a predicament, in which the only way to re-establish 
contact with the world is by means of an inference that allows us to move 'from 
the inner to the outer'. 
Now, as a response to the skeptical challenge, McDowell's talk of 
openness is clearly question-begging. 
Of course if that is our predicament, we need to answer the traditional 
sceptical questions before we can talk of openness to the world. But my 
talk of openness is a rejection of the traditional predicament, not an 
attempt to respond to it. (McDowell, 1994b: 112) 
McDowell argues that the route from recognizing the fallibility of experience to 
accepting the skeptical predicament is not compulsory. His attitude towards the 
argument of illusion is that it is question-begging as an argument against the 
image of openness, since it presupposes rather than provides evidence for the 
interface view of perception. If we reject the dualism of scheme and content, and 
thereby the notion of non-conceptual givens that form an interface between us and 
the world, the skeptical challenge cannot get off the ground. 
Although McDowell does not go into the argument from illusion in great 
detail, it constitutes one of the main arguments against direct or 'naive' realism. 
Therefore I will discuss it rather extensively. The idea that the phenomenon of 
'non-veridical experiences' forces the interface conception of perception upon us 
has been attacked in several ways, probably most thoroughly by Austin (1962). 
I will distinguish four strategies: 
(a) to show that (2) is false, in the sense that we can explain perceptual 
illusions, hallucinations etcetera without invoking the notion of 'inner 
objects', i.e. epistemic intermediaries (Austin, Dancy) 
(b) to show that (2) is non-sensical, in the sense that 'inner objects' do not 
explain anything and that the very idea that illusions, hallucinations etc. 
form a single kind of occurrences, that requires a general philosophical 
explanation, is misguided (Austin, Putnam) 
(c) to show that (3) can only be maintained in a weaker version (Austin, 
McDowell) 
(d) to show that (4) does not follow from (2) and (3): even if we need 
epistemic inteimediaries to explain illusions, and even if veridical and 
non-veridical experiences are qualitatively similar, this does not mean we 
have to understand veridical perception in terms of epistemic inter-
mediaries. (Sartwell, Austin, McDowell, Hacker) 
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I will briefly discuss each of these critical responses. My purpose is to show how 
they reinforce McDowell's claim that the argument from illusion presupposes the 
interface theory rather than defends it. 
3.3.1 Openness and the fallibility of perception 
(a) Denying that the second premiss is true 
It is clear that any view of perception must recognize that perception is fallible. 
Opponents of direct realism have argued, however, that if we understand 
perception as the immediate taking in of facts, we have to conceive of perception 
as infallible. Or, more precisely, they argue that direct realism cannot account for 
perceptual illusions, dreams, hallucinations etcetera, since non-veridical ex-
periences can only be explained by acknowledging an inner, purely phenomenal 
aspect of experience, that may be there independently of any real world situation. 
Indirect realists explain perceptual error in terms of a mismatch between two 
objects, a sensum and an external object (Dancy, 1985:169). The mismatch is 
understood as the lack of an appropriate causal relation between the sensum and 
external reality. Since the direct realist only recognizes one object, it is argued that 
the notion of a mismatch is not available to him, so that he cannot account for 
perceptual error. In the case of extreme hallucination, where there is no external 
object present at all, the direct realist seems even more at a loss. Whereas the 
indirect realist has room for a perceptual state that obtains independently of the 
external world, the direct realist seems unable to grant that the hallucinator has a 
perceptual experience at all. He cannot endow the hallucinator's perceptual state 
with content, since he understands empirical content as constituted by how things 
are in the external environment. Therefore, as Dancy formulates the objection, 
'direct realism is unlikely to be able to provide an explanation of perceptual error 
without collapsing into indirect realism' (1985:151). 
I distinguished four kinds of responses to the argument from illusion. The 
one I am considering here consists of showing that to explain perceptual error and 
hallucinations, we need not invoke the notion of 'inner objects'. The first step is 
to distinguish between different sorts of non-veridical experiences. Perceptual 
illusions and hallucinations, for instance, differ in important respects. In the case 
of illusions, like for instance seeing a stick in water that looks bent but is straight, 
we are, as Putnam remarks, perceiving something 'out there'; 'it is just that it looks 
like something else, and that is why I take it for something else' (1994a:471). The 
fact that I can take something for something else, i.e. the fact that I can be 
mistaken about what I am perceiving, does not imply that I am perceiving 
something other than the external object, viz. an appearance on an 'inner screen'. 
Rather, if I am not aware that the stick merely looks bent, I am making a false 
judgement about the stick. Dancy suggests that the direct realist can understand 
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the mismatch involved in cases of perceptual illusion or error 'as an instance of 
the mismatch between belief and world that occurs when a belief is false.' This 
suggestion, Dancy remarks, can only work if we 'take perception to be a 
characteristic form of belief (or of a tendency to believe)' (1985:172)." This 
condition is met by McDowell's view of perception, according to which the 
content of perceptual experience is conceptual in that it is the sort of thing that 
can be the content of a judgement (1994b:9). What happens in cases of misleading 
perceptual experience, is that one falsely supposes that one is taking in how things 
are. Thus, the direct realist in the McDowellian sense may argue that perceptual 
errors and illusions are to be understood as false beliefs about reality. On this 
view, perception in the case of illusions is still 'direct' in that the object that we 
mistake for something else does figure in our thought.20 The content of my 
perceptual beliefs is not independent of a real world situation but in the case of 
error or illusions my beliefs are false. There may be problems in giving an 
account of false belief, as Dancy admits (1985:173), but at least the notion of false 
beliefs does not involve the notion of inner objects or 'seemings'. 
An account of'non-veridical experiences' in terms of false beliefs seems 
to be unavailable in the case of hallucinations. Hallucinations are not about 
anything external. There are no external objects figuring in the content of an 
hallucinator's experience. As opposed to illusions, hallucinations seem to be a 
genuine case of delusion, i.e of something being conjured up, something unreal 
(Austin, 1962:25). Austin argues that if there is anything amenable to be treated 
in terms of'sense data', it is only the very rare and abnormal case of hallucination. 
However, even here it is doubtful whether we have to construe hallucinations as 
'experiencing sense-data' (Austin, 1962:32). We might deny that the hallucinator 
perceives something. We might deny that his experience has content, i.e. that he 
is having a perceptual belief at all. McDowell suggests that someone may be in 
error about the contents of his own mind in the following way: 'he may think 
"Dancy points out that this view of perception need not ignore the 'sensory* element of perception. Nor does 
it amount to the view that perception is a combination of sensation and belief. Rather, the latter two elements 
are considered to be identical, in the sense that 'for the world to appear to us in that characteristic way just is 
for us to acquire a tendency to believe' (1985 172) 'Instead of taking perception to be a combination of two 
separable elements, cognitive and sensory, we should take perception to be a charactensticyômi of belief (or of 
a tendency to believe), one not shareable by those who lack the relevant sensory input, and one where the 
tendency to believe is not separable from the occurrence ofthat input1 (ibid). 
20Austin insists on this point in discussing the example of the stick that looks bent (1962 29/30). 
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there is a singular thought21 at, so to speak, a certain position in his internal 
organization although there is really nothing precisely there' (1986:145). And he 
adds in a footnote: 'nothing precisely there; of course there may be all sorts of 
things in the vicinity' (145n). The point is that although there may be all sorts of 
things going on in the mind of someone who is hallucinating, he is not entertain-
ing a perceptual belief at all, although he thinks he does. The 'thinking that he 
enjoys a sensory experience' is not the perceiving of an inner object, but simply 
a false belief about the contents of his own mind. If one rejects the Myth of the 
Given thoroughly, as McDowell proposes, fallibility also applies to 'inner 
experience'.22 Dancy summarizes this response as saying that 'seeing is a sort of 
state of mind only available when there is a suitable external object' (1985:175). 
If there is no such object present, the subject is not seeing anything. The direct 
realist might therefore say that in hallucinating, someone is not perceiving an 
appearance or sense-datum; rather, he is entertaining the false belief that he is 
perceiving an external object. 
The above explanation of perceptual illusions (as false beliefs about a real 
world situation) and hallucinations (as false beliefs about the content of one's 
mind) provides a way of understanding non-veridical experiences that does not 
invoke 'inner objects'. I do not however claim to have provided a general 
explanation of non-veridical experiences. As Austin remarks, there are plenty of 
cases, such as dreams, mirror-images and after-images, that are neither illusions 
nor hallucinations (1962:14). I will not try to explain these cases in a way that 
avoids an appeal to 'inner objects'23. Instead, I will discuss a different criticism of 
the second premiss, to the effect that both the indirect realist's explanation of non-
veridical experiences and his very demand for such a general explanation are 
misguided. Although this line of criticism provides a more efficient way of 
undermining the argument from illusion, I have discussed the possibility of 
explaining non-veridical experiences without invoking 'inner objects' in some 
detail for the following reason. An opponent of direct realism might say that even 
if the argument from illusion fails as an argument against the 'image of openness', 
21A singular propositie« is defined in a Russelhan way as a combination of a logically proper name (a 
genuinely referring expression) and a predicate. The mark of a singular proposition is that it would not be 
available to be expressed at all if the object referred to did not exist (McDowell, 1986:137). If one believes in 
singular thoughts in this sense, one will hold that they cannot obtain in the absense of an object (145n) In other 
words, a singular thought whose object does not exist is no thought at all 
=See McDowell (1994b 37/8) 
"But see Austin (1962) for a detailed analysis of a variety of cases, showing that we need not introduce 
sense-data to account for 'non-vendical sensory experiences' (I put this between quotation marks as Austin is 
suspicious of lumping together these experiences under a single name, see my second response to the argument 
from illusion) 
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the direct realist is faced with a problem: he cannot account for perceptual 
illusions, errors etcetera. The fact that he cannot do so may not prove the interface 
theory to be right, but it still makes for an important objection in its own right, 
so the opponent of direct realism might argue.24 I have tried to show how 
McDowell's notion of experience as being open to the world can be reconciled 
with the fact that perception is fallible. Perceptual illusion and hallucination can 
be understood as false beliefs. Openness then does not mean infallibility. Indeed, 
the notion of infallibility is associated par excellence with the notion of non-
conceptual givens (whether understood as sensations, ideas, sense data or im-
pressions), whose esse est percipe. Since the reality of non-conceptual givens is 
exhausted by their being known by us, they are infallible by nature. Non-
conceptual givens are infallible but they do not embody a truth-claim, i.e. they do 
not express claims about the world. McDowellian experiences, i.e. sensory 
impressions possessed with conceptual content, express a truth-claim, a claim 
about how things are in the world, but they are fallible. The crucial point of the 
image of openness is that experiences should be conceived as bearing on reality. 
As such, they are part of the space of reasons and that means that they are 
negotiable, subject to revision. 
3.3.2 Explorions and explanandum of the interface theory 
(b) Denying that the second premiss makes sense 
The second response to the argument of illusion consists of two points: first, that 
the interface theory does not offer an explanans of non-verdical experiences at all, 
and second, that the very formulation of the explanandum is misguided: it is 
biased in favour of the interface theory. As regards the first point, to conceive of 
a non-veridical experience as an 'appearance' or 'seeming' that is not causally 
related to the world in the right way is not really an explanation but a redescrip-
tion of the phenomenon involved. As Putnam remarks, the interface theory does 
not offer a mechanism which explains just how events in the brain produce "sense 
data", or how the mind "immediately observes" the postulated objects' 
(1994a:474). In fact, the explanation offered is 'in terms of utterly mysterious 
entities and processes, one that lacks all detail at just the crucial points, and 
possesses no testability whatsoever' (474/5).25 The explanation of non-veridical 
*See Brown (1987:117). 
•"Putnam argues that contemporary, materialist versions of the interface theory, which identify sense data 
Cqualia') with brain events, are no better off. Although materialist versions of the interface theory do not have 
the problem of explaining how material events in the brain can cause an immaterial event in the rrand, they have 
a lot of trouble explaining how 'qualia' are supposed to be observed, how we become conscious of them 
(1994a;476) Moreover, Putnam argues in extenso that it is utterly unclear what 'identity is supposed to mean 
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experiences in terms of the interface theory is no explanation at all, but just a 
redescription of ordinary phenomena in a jargon, which makes the notion of an 
interface seem inevitable. As regards the second point, the notion of'non-veridical 
experiences' as a single type of experience that requires a general philosophical 
explanation is not innocent. In Sense and Sensibilia, Austin points out at length 
that the so-called explanandum consists of a great variety of different cases, that 
cannot simply be supposed to constitute a single kind of things, unless one already 
presupposes that the interface theory is true. The important difference between 
illusions and hallucinations has been pointed out earlier, but there are all kinds of 
cases, such as dreams, after-images, perspective, refraction, mirror-images and 
double vision, that are not to be classified as either. Austin argues that 'the 
argument from illusion' makes the unwarranted assumption that all these cases can 
be assimilated to a form oí deception (Austin, 1962: 12-14) or delusion (22-28). 
In doing so, it suggests that what these cases have in common is that 'something 
is being conjured up' (25), something unreal that we nonetheless really perceive. 
And although this does not necessitate the introduction of sense-data, it sure 
makes it easier to swallow. If, however, we reject 'the argument's bland 
assumption of a simple dichotomy between "veridical and delusive experiences'" 
(48), then the very idea that we are in need of a general philosophical explanation 
of 'non-veridical experiences' becomes obsolete. 
3.3.3 Local versus global skepticism 
(c) Arguing that, even if the second premiss is true, the third is false 
Austin points out that the argument from illusion consists of two stages: it 'is 
intended primarily to persuade us that, in certain exceptional, abnormal cases what 
we perceive -directly anyway- is a sense-datum; but then there comes a second 
stage, in which we are to be brought to agree that what we (directly) perceive is 
always a sense-datum, even in the normal, unexceptional case' (1962:44). To 
arrive at the latter conclusion, i.e. to arrive at a general interface conception of 
perception, we need premiss (3): the claim that veridical and non-veridical 
experiences are indistinguishable or qualitatively similar. Is this true? Well, as 
Austin points out, at least in ordinary life we seem to be pretty good at 
distinguishing between the two. 
Consider a few examples. I may have the experience (dubbed 'delusive' 
presumably) of dreaming that I am being presented to the Pope. Could it 
be seriously suggested that having this dream is 'qualitatively indistin-
in this context (1994a; 475-483). 
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guishable' from actually being presented to the Pope? Quite obviously not. 
After all, we have the phrase 'a dream-like quality1. (..) But if the fact here 
alleged were a fact, the phrase would be perfectly meaningless, because 
applicable to everything. (..) 
Again, it is simply not true to say that seeing a bright green after-image 
against a white wall is exactly like seeing a bright green patch actually on 
the wall; or that seeing a white wall through blue spectacles is exactly like 
seeing a blue wall (..). (Austin, 1962:49) 
If the interface theorist wants to defend the tenet of qualitative similarity, he must 
claim that the 'plain man' is rather naive, as he fails to notice that his normal, 
veridical experiences are, qua inner experience, in fact exactly alike to the ex-
perience of dreaming or hallucinating. What is more imporant, if the interface 
theorist wants to throw doubt on the viability of the plain man's distinction 
between veridical perceptions and dreams, hallucinations etcetera, then he is 
midermining his own position. If he holds that the two kinds of experiences are 
completely indistinguishable in all cases, then he is giving up the whole 
distinction between illusions, dreams etc. and veridical perception. Explaining this 
distinction by appeal to the presence or absense of appropriate causal relations 
does not help here, since this does not provide us with an epistemically available 
criterion for drawing the distinction. If what is epistemically accessible in the case 
of a veridical perception is always exactly alike to what is given in the case of 
delusion, how could we ever check whether the right causal link is in place?26 It 
surely cannot be the intention of the interface theorist to throw doubt on the 
intelligibility of the veridical/non-veridical distinction, since his argument is stated 
in terms of this distinction.27 So if premiss (3) is to be intelligible at all, it has to 
be the claim that veridical and non-veridical experiences are sometimes or to some 
extent qualitatively similar. I am not going to discuss the plausibility of this claim, 
since I will presently argue that in this weakened version, premiss (3) does not 
provide us with a sufficient ground for inferring (4), i.e. for inferring that in 
normal, veridical perception we cannot be perceiving external reality directly. 
*In other words, the appeal to 'appropriate causal links' is subject to Putnam's objection to the causal theory 
of reference, as discussed in chapter 1, section 1.4. 
"Another way of putting this is to say that the notion of'global error1 or 'global deception' is absurd. This 
notion was already under discussion in chapter 1, where the correspondence theory of truth was criticized for 
implying that all our beliefs might be false. The idea that perception might be misleading all the time undermines 
the notion of what it is that perception gives us misleading representations of. To make sense of global error, 
one needs to make sense of the notion of reality an sich, that all of our perceptual beliefs could fail to represent, 
and this is what one cannot do. To make sense of false beliefs or perceptual error, one has to conceive of error 
as a local phenomenon, as a phenomenon that takes place against the background of vendicai perception. (See 
Austin, 1962· 11/12) 
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3.3.4 The asymmetry between veridical and non-veridical experiences 
(d) Arguing thai even if the third premiss is true, the fourth does not follow 
The second stage of the argument from illusion is to infer from the qualitative 
similarity of veridical and non-veridical experiences that in veridical experience, 
we cannot be directly taking in how things are. Rather, in veridical experience we 
are being presented with 'inner items' or appearances, which are appropriately 
causally related to external world situations. We have just seen that the qualitative 
similarity between non-veridical and veridical experiences must, as a matter of 
intelligibility, be local. The point of the fourth objection to the argument of 
illusion is that even if veridical and non-veridical experiences are qualitatively 
similar, this does not imply that veridical experiences should be assimilated to 
non-veridical ones. To put it more precisely, even if non-veridical experiences 
should be conceived in terms of sense-data, and even if non-veridical experiences 
are indistinguishable from veridical ones, this does not mean that veridical 
experiences must involve sense-data. As Putnam puts it: even 'if the experience 
of someone who dreams were more or less exactly like a "veridical experience" 
of, say, Harvard's Memorial Hall, there is simply no argument that the object of 
the veridical experience cannot be Memorial Hall itself ( 1994a:472/3). The crucial 
point here is that the interface theorist simply assumes that two things that appear 
to be alike must be the same thing, or, to put it the other way around, if two 
things are not of one kind, they cannot appear to be so (Austin, 1962:50/1). The 
interface theorist relies on the claim that apparent similarity indicates actual 
similarity. However, acknowledging the apparent similarity of veridical and non-
veridical experiences is perfectly compatible with the view that they are of 
radically different kinds (Sartwell, 1995:64-67). Since apparently similar things 
need not share an identical component, there is nothing that stands in the way of 
understanding normal perception in terms of the 'image of openness'. 
Now, at this point the interface theorist might reply as follows. The 
distinction between actual and apparent similarity may seem very obvious, he 
might argue, but the problem is that you are here appealing to a notion of 
'objective (dissimilarity, that is not available to you. Although, admittedly, it is 
possible that veridical experiences are radically different from non-veridical ones, 
we do not and cannot ever know whether this is the case. Your claim that veridical 
and non-veridical experiences are radically different and that veridical perception 
does not require intermediaries is a claim about the epistemically inaccessible. To 
say that apparent (subjective) similarity does not indicate actual (objective) 
similarity is to invoke the nature/access distinctioa It is to invoke the particular 
distinction between epistemology and ontology, that you have been attacking all 
along. 
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To show that this line of reasoning is unjustified, we have to remember 
that even the interface theorist had to recognize an epistemically available 
distinction between veridical and non-veridical experiences. As I put it earlier 
(under (c)), if the argument from illusion is to be intelligible at all, it has to be 
admitted that veridical experiences are not always or not completely indistinguish­
able from non-veridical ones. Now, it is the necessarily local character of the 
phenomenon of non-veridical experiences that allows us to draw a distinction here 
between apparent and actual similarity. The notion of objectivity involved in this 
distinction is not the notion of a God's Eye View, but the notion of a third-person 
perspective. Let me explain. In the case of dreams, hallucinations etcetera, we can 
and do know that the 'subjective similarity1 between non-veridical and veridical 
experience does not indicate 'objective similarity1, but the emphasis here is on we. 
Although the person having the dream, hallucination or whatever, may not know 
it, i.e. although he may mistake his experience for a genuine perception, a third 
person is in the position to know it. Hacker puts this point very clearly: 
It is tempting to argue that perceiving an M and having an hallucination 
of an M involve the same 'perceptual experience', the one caused by M, 
the other not so caused. It is true that A, who suffers an hallucination, 
typically thinks he perceives an M. It does not follow that he is having 
the same experience. (..) The [experiences] are so different indeed that 
they do not even look alike, for no observer would mistake Macbeth's 
having an hallucination of a dagger for Macbeth's seeing a dagger! (..) Do 
the 'experiences' not look alike to Macbeth? No, for he cannot see his 
seeing or his hallucinating. Of course, one does not say that one sees 
such-and-such on the basis of any criteria, but it does not follow that there 
are no distinguishing criteria between 'the experience of seeing an M and 
'the experience of having an hallucination of an M. What is, trivially, 
true, is that there is a complete and unmistakable distinction between 
seeing M and having an hallucination of an M, but one who suffers from 
an hallucination is not in the position to draw it. (..) In our reflections 
upon the first-person case we confuse the absence of any criteria of 
identity with the presence of identical criteria, and conclude, quite 
wrongly, that the experiences had are the same. (Hacker, 1987:234η) 
The fact that I, in having an hallucination of an M, cannot distinguish between 
seeing and hallucinating M, does not imply that there is no such distinction 
epistemically available. It is available not from a God's Eye View but from the 
ordinary third-person perspective. The notion of a third-person perspective does 
not invoke the nature-access distinction. It is a perfectly legitimate notion, and 
even a necessary one if we are to keep an intelligible distinction between illusions, 
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hallucinations, etcetera, and veridical perception. If the proponent of the argument 
from illusion would want to express the skeptical predicament by saying that we 
cannot transcend the first person stance, he would have to give up the very 
distinction between veridical and non-veridical experiences, on which his 
argument relies. 
3.3.5 Openness as accessibility in principle 
Having discussed the problems facing the argument from illusion, we are now in 
a position to show that the argument from illusion is question-begging as an argu­
ment against direct realism, since it presupposes rather than establishes the 
interface theory. The interface theorist argues from the fallibility of perception to 
what McDowell calls 'the highest common factor conception of our subjective 
position1: 'the idea that even when things go well, cognitively speaking, our 
subjective position can only be something common between such cases and cases 
in which things do not go well (1994b: 113). The idea that veridical and non-
veridical experiences have some inner component in common /?геумр>рсюеу that 
Veridical empirical experience, experience of the world, can be usefully bifurcated 
into inner and outer components' (Sartwell, 1995:55,68). The argument from 
illusion 
presupposes the legitimacy of isolating a purely internal, epistemically 
available aspect of veridical as well as hallucinatory experience; just what 
the argument purports in this context to prove. The argument presupposes 
that [direct realism] is false, that the epistemically available aspects of 
veridical experience are not fully fused to the object ofthat experience. 
If [direct realism] is true, then we cannot isolate an internal point of view 
in the first place. (Sartwell, 1995:67) 
The slide from fallibility to skepticism is compulsory only if one already adheres 
to the interface theory of perception. The traditional 'argument from illusion' 
becomes compelling only if one holds that in perception, we 'start from some 
anyway available data of consciousness, and work up to certifying that they 
actually yield knowledge of the objective world' (McDowell, 1994b: 112). Thus, 
the argument from illusion presupposes that the notion of 'inner objects' 
(sensations, qualia, ideas, impressions, appearances) makes sense. 
Direct realism, as defended by McDowell and Putnam, is not a theory of 
perception that seeks to provide an alternative to the interface theory. The image 
of openness expresses a point about the intelligibility of the notion of non-
conceptual gjvens that function as an interface between us and the world, about 
the intelligibility of the idea of a gap between minds and the world. I think that 
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we can hardly overemphasize that with the image of openness, McDowell is not 
trying to answer the skeptic. The notion of 'taking in how things are' is not meant 
to secure the objectivity of empirical knowledge; the image of openness is not a 
foimdalionalist picture. Openness is not givenness, in the sense of being immune 
to revision, but accessibility in principle, in other words, the image of openness 
conveys that the world is essentially thinkable. This is an awkward formulation, 
since its negation is a statement that is unintelligible rather than false. So it would 
be better to say that the image of openness is meant to bring home the point that 
the notion of a reality inaccessible in principle, the notion of something unthink-
able, is non-sensical. If taken in this way, the image of openness expresses a 
formal claim, a point of intelligibility, rather than a material claim about the 
relation between thought and reality. This formal claim is pithily expressed by 
Wittgenstein in the Tractatus: 
Was wir nicht denken können, das können wir nicht denken; wir können 
also auch nicht sagen, was wir nicht denken können (5.61) 
Instead of answering the skeptic, Mind and World seeks to give a 
phenomenologically accurate articulation of our commonsense intuitions about 
perception and it aims at showing that within this articulation, no foothold is left 
for global skepticism about the accessibility of the world. Moreover, Mind and 
World shows that the choice for a phenomenological approach in philosophy is 
not merely optional. Both traditional skepticism about the epistemic accessibility 
of the external world and the foundationalist response to it reflect what McDowell 
calls a 'sideways-on picture' of the relation between mind and world. Skepticism 
is the attempt to say from a God's Eye point of view that we cannot have a God's 
Eye point of view. Foundationalism is the attempt to show that we don't need a 
God's Eye View to show that we can have a God's Eye View. Both attempts 
aspire to a sideways-on understanding of our own thinking. A phenomenological 
conception of philosophy dispenses with this aspiration, not because it is 
unattainable but because it is nonsensical. The phenomenological method of trying 
to articulate our commonsense intuitions 'from within' becomes obligatory once 
we realize that the attempt to give a sideways-on picture of the relation between 
thought and world is an attempt to think the unthinkable.28 
"The question of method in philosophy will be discussed in chapter 5, section 5.Z 
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3.4 Openness as formal identity between mind and world 
In the first section of this chapter, I argued that McDowell shows the realism 
debate to be marked by a seesaw between the Myth of the Given and coheren-
tism. Both of these positions take for granted the intelligibility of the 'problem of 
access', i.e. the question of whether our perceptual experience gives us access to 
the external world. McDowell argues that the very idea of a 'problem of access' 
relies on the notion of an interface between us and reality. The notion of an 
interface or intermediary is kept alive by the empiricist notion of non-conceptual 
content. Paradoxically, while the Myth of the Given is meant to be an antidote to 
skepticism, it is the notion of extra-conceptual gjvens that initiates the skeptical 
problématique. McDowell argues that in order to overcome the problem of access 
we should drop the notion of non-conceptual content. Hence I argued that 
McDowell's 'image of openness' can also be called 'realism without empiricism'. 
In the previous two sections, I have defended McDowell's notion of sensory ex-
perience as unmediated openness to the world against two objections. In the 
course of that discussion, I tried to indicate more precisely what McDowell's 
realism without empiricism amounts to. The picture of postmodem Aristotelian 
realism that emerged from the previous sections can be summarized as follows. 
Postmodern Aristotelian realism rejects the skeptical 'problem of access' that is 
associated with the notion of an interface and the scheme-content dualism. It 
claims that our perceptual access to the world is direct in the sense of not 
involving epistemic intermediaries, either physical or non-physical. This directness 
or unmediated openness does not mean neutrality or infallibility, but accessibility 
in principle. The image of openness is not a foundationalist picture but an anti-
skeptical one, in the sense that it denies that the idea of a 'problem of access' 
makes sense. 
In this section I want to suggest an interpretation of the image of openness 
in terms of the notion oí a. formal identity between mind and world. With the help 
of this notion, I want to bring out how McDowell's view of perceptual experience 
suggests a conception of the relation between mind and world that departs from 
AMR. 
The image of openness conveys that in veridical perception, we are taking 
in that things are thus and so. That things are thus and so is both a real world 
situation and the content of my perceptual experience. Therefore, I think it is apt 
to say, in an Aristotelian vein, that in veridical perception, mind and world are 
formally identical. In succesful perception, the content of our perceptual ex-
perience is formally identical to a state of affairs in the world. With the notion of 
formal identity, I want to express that the relation between mind and world in 
veridical perception is not a causal relation between an 'inner object' and external 
reality. In veridical perception mind and world are, so to speak, more intimately 
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related than by way of representation, as Putnam puts it29. In veridical perception, 
mind an world are one, not in a material sense, but in a formal sense. Although 
a subject's brain is obviously numerically distinct from the things the subject 
perceives, the subject's mind is 'in'30 the world in the sense that its contents are 
made up of worldly facts. In his (1992), McDowell expresses this by saying that 
the mind is not in the head. 
3.4.1 "The mind is not in the head' 
McDowell discusses the claim that the mind is not in the head in the context of 
meaning externalism, as put forward by Putnam in the seventies. I will sketch this 
context briefly in order to explain the distinction that McDowell draws between 
a weak and a strong sense in which the mind can be taken to be outside the head. 
The strong reading that McDowell proposes can, so I will argue, also be 
formulated in terms of the notion of formal identity. 
In chapter 1, section 1.4,1 discussed Putnam's rejection of the description 
theory of reference and his claim that meanings are not in the head. It was argued 
that meanings are not determined exhaustively by a list of criteria known by the 
individual speaker. Meaning externalism says that, at least in the case of natural 
kind words, the environment of those who use them enters into determining their 
extension (McDowell, 1992:35). In the same section I argued that Putnam has 
shown that meaning externalism cannot be satisfactorily expressed in terms of the 
metaphysical realist's causal theory of reference. In chapter 2, section 2.3, I 
discussed Putnam's attempt to explicate meaning externalism within the framework 
of internal realism. I argued that Putnam's notion of experiential inputs as external 
constraints on meaning falls prey to the same problems facing causal constraints. 
The experiential inputs appealed to are like non-conceptual content in that they are 
inaccessible as such and in that they cannot provide us with semantical constraints. 
I argued that as an internal realist, Putnam held a 'two components conception of 
experience', a version of the dualism of scheme and content. If my arguments in 
chapter 1 and 2 are right, then neither metaphysical realism nor internal realism 
can provide us with an adequate articulation of meaning externalism. McDowell's 
MIn personal conversation. Putnam does not hold that the notion of'representation' should be abandoned tout 
court (Putnam, 1994b.300). Rather he holds, following McDowell, that the notion of representation is legitimate 
once it is disjoined from the notion of an 'inner object1 which has an intrinsic nature independently of what is 
outside the head (Putnam, 1994b 30677) See below for McDowell's notion of 'representation without 
representations' 
'"Not m a spatial sense of course; the notion of'in' used here is related to Heidegger's notion of'in der V\felt 
sein' Cbeing in the world') (Heidegger, 1927) The only way I know of explaining this use of'in' is by saying 
that in vendicai perception, rrand and world are formally identical 
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articulation of meaning externalism departs from both metaphysical realism and 
internal realism. 
McDowell argues that Putnam's meaning externalism expresses a duplex 
conception of the mind. It relies on a distinction between psychological states in 
the narrow sense, states whose attribution to a subject entails nothing about her 
environment, and psychological states in the wide sense, states whose attribution 
involve the subject in commitments about his environment (McDowell, 1992:36). 
Putnam argues that knowledge of a meaning is not exhausted by a narrow psycho-
logical state, as the traditional theory of meaning has it. Knowledge of a meaning 
is a psychological state in the wide sense. McDowell argues that although Putnam 
recognizes that we can characterize a psychological state as knowledge of a 
meaning only by taking into account the subject's placement in a physical and 
social environment, he still maintains the idea that knowledge of a meaning is, in 
itself, in the head (1992:37). By keeping the notion of a narrow psychological 
state, he still maintains 'the idea that states and occurrences "in" the mind have an 
intrinsic nature that is independent of how the mind's possessor is placed in the 
environment' (1992:39)31. Within this conception, the mind is partly in the head 
and partly not in the head. It is in the head in the sense that knowledge of a 
meaning is, in itself, a state in the head. It is partly outside the head, in the sense 
mat knowledge of a meaning can only be characterized as such by taking into 
account the subject's relation to the environment. 
The conclusion of this line of thought is that the concept of command of 
a meaning (..) is constitutively 'duplex' (..): it is the concept of something 
that is, in itself, in the head, but conceived in terms of its relations to 
what is outside the head. (...) The idea is that part of the complete truth 
about the mind is the truth about something wholly in the head; another 
part of the complete truth about the mind is the truth about how the 
subject-matter of the first part is related to things outside the head. 
(McDowell, 1992:37) 
The duplex conception of the mind allows for a weak reading of the claim that the 
mind is not in the head. This weak reading keeps intact the notion of an interface 
or inner realm, which can be considered in isolation from the 'external world'. The 
question of whether mental states are genuinely in touch with the world is an 
"In areply to McDowell (1992), Putnam argues that he did not hold this view after 1985 (Putnam, 1992b). 
I do not wish to take sides on this issue, as I only want to explain McDowell's distinction between a weak and 
a strong reading of the claim that the mind is not in the head I think it's fair to say that while Putnam's internal 
realism was committed to the weak reading, the transition from internal realism to natural realism in Putnam's 
work is not clearly marked In any case, Putnam at present sides with McDowell in endorsing the strong reading 
(see Putnam (1994a), (1994b 279-294 and 295-313) and Putnam (forthcoming)). 
151 
intelligible question on this view, since it holds that mental states 'cannot be 
intrinsically endowed with referential properties' (McDowell, 1992:43). 
McDowell's conception of experience as openness to the world or 
responsiveness to meaning aims at a rejection of the notion of an interface and the 
skeptical problématique it initiates. It involves a stronger reading of the claim that 
the mind is not in the head In explaining his reading, McDowell points out that 
in claiming that the mind is not even partly in the head, he is not suggesting that 
the mind is a kind of immaterial organ. Rather, he is rejecting the very conception 
of the mind as an organ, whether material or immaterial. 
What I mean by saying that the mind is conceived as an organ is that 
states of affairs and occurrences in the mind are, on this view [of the 
mind as an immaterial organ] no less than on the view that the mind is 
literally in the head, taken to have an intrinsic nature that is independent 
of how the mind's possessor is placed in the environment. It is just that 
this intrinsic nature is [on the 'immaterialist' view] not conceived as 
capturable in terms of any science that deals with matter, for instance, 
neurophysiological terms. (McDowell, 1992:39) 
In rejecting the whole idea of conceiving the mind as an organ, McDowell puts 
forward a radically non-solipsistic conception of the mind, that dispenses with the 
notion of an 'inner realm' that has an intrinsic nature independent of how a subject 
is situated in the world To reject the notion of an inner realm or interface 
between a subject and the world, we have to recognize that the idea of a 
psychological state cannot be the idea of a narrow state (McDowell, 1992:40). In 
the stronger reading of the claim that the mind is not in the head, we have to let 
go of the assumption that occurrences in the mind are, in themselves, 'narrow' 
(ibid,42). 
The assumption that there is such a thing as narrow content we already 
encountered in discussing the argument from illusion. This argument relies on 
what McDowell calls 'the highest common factor conception of our subjective 
position' (1994b: 113), the idea that veridical and non-veridical experiences have 
some inner component in common. The argument from illusion relies on the 
notion of narrow content in presupposing the legitimacy of isolating a purely 
internal, epistemically available aspect of veridical as well as non-veridical 
experience. In the previous section, I tried to show why this presupposition is 
unwarranted I argued on the basis of Austin's, McDowell's and Sartwell's 
arguments, that we need not and should not understand experience in terms of the 
'two components' conception. Rejecting the notion of narrow content or the notion 
of a highest common factor implies that the mind's access to the world is not 
conceived as an inferential move from the inner to the outer. The mind does not 
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'start with' non-conceptual givens from which it infers hypotheses about the 
external world Rather the mind is already 'out there' in the sense that mental 
states essentially involve a referential directedness at the world. The image of 
openness does not thereby involve the postulating of mysterious powers of mind. 
It suggests an altogether different conception of the mind, according to which the 
question Tiow does thinking hook on the world? is deeply misguided 
If we start from a conception of thinking as in itself without referential 
bearing on the world, we shall seem to be confronted with a genuine and 
urgent task, that of reinstating into our picture the way thinking is directed 
at the world But if we do not accept the assumption that what thinking 
is, considered in itself, is a mental manipulation of representations in 
Putnam's sense, no such task confronts us. The need to construct a 
theoretical 'hook* to link thinking to the world does not arise, because if 
it is thinking that we have in view at all - say being struck by the thought 
that one hears the sound of water dripping - then what we have in view 
is already hooked on to the world; it is already in view as possessing 
referential directedness at reality. (McDowell, 1992:44/45) 
In McDowell's view, the notion of mind essentially involves the notion of world-
involving conceptual contents. In rejecting the conception of mind as an organ, 
we reject a conception of the mind as a vehicle of content, which has an intrinsic 
nature independent of the environment in which a subject is situated 
3.4.2 Formal identity: closing the ontologica! gap 
By denying that thinking is the mental manipulation of representations, McDowell 
is not denying that thinking involves representatioa Rather, he is denying that 
there is a non-world-involving aspect to representational content. The image of 
openness suggests 'the possibility of mental representing without representations' 
(McDowell, 1992:44). In my view, this notion of 'mental representing without 
representations' can be elucidated by saying that in veridical perception, the mind 
becomes formally identical to a worldly fact. The mind is not in the head in the 
sense that its contents are facts rather than representations of facts. 
In a recent paper on Mind and World, Putnam defends McDowell's notion 
of experience as openness to the world and he agrees with a formulation of 
openness in terms of formal identity: 
When I perceive that the patch is blue, I take in the fact that the patch is 
blue, and I do not do this by forming a mental intermediary, a sense 
datum, which merely causes me to form the belief (thought of, very often 
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nowadays, as a 'formula in mentalese') that the patch is blue. That the 
patch is blue is at one and the same time a fact about the world and an 
exact description of something I experience. This aspect of the world and 
this aspect of my experience are 'formally identical' (to borrow Pamela 
Kribbe's term), but that does not mean that some object is both a piece of 
the wall, or wherever the patch may be, and a piece of my mind. (Putnam, 
forthcoming: 11) 
The notion of formal identity expresses not only that in perception, there is no 
epistemological 'gap' to be crossed between mind and world Formal identity also 
implies that 'how things are' can be, in Putnam's words, 'at one and the same time 
a fact about the world and an exact description of something I experience'. In 
other words, the image of openness also implies that there is no ontological 'gap' 
between the 'inner, mental realm' and the 'external, physical realm'. As McDowell 
puts it, 'the sort of thing one can think is the same as the sort of thing that can be 
the case' (1994b:28). The 'problem of realism', and the seesaw between foun-
dationalism and coherentism that it initiates, can only be overcome by changing 
not only our conception of the mind but also our notion of world. The strong 
reading of the claim that the mind is not in the head becomes available only when 
we conceive of the world as the totality of facts or the totality of thinkable 
contents. This notion of world, or this notion of what it means to be real, is the 
notion of what can be the content of judgements. This is not to say that the world 
is made of'mind-stuff, whatever that may mean. If we would want to put it that 
way we could just as well say that the mind consists of 'world-stuff. However, 
postmodern Aristotelianism is not an empirical claim, a sideways-on picture, about 
the origin of the world or the mind The claim that the notion of world is the 
notion of thinkable contents is a conceptual claim, by which we deny the 
intelligibility of the skepticism about the accessibility of the world. As McDowell 
puts it: 
the world that [thinking] is already hooked unto is not The World as 
contemplated by the metaphysical realism that Putnam has attacked My 
thought that I hear the sound of water dripping has its point of contact 
with reality in the fact that I hear the sound of water dripping, or perhaps 
in the fact that I do not hear the sound of water dripping. I use my 
conceptual capacities (I just did) in pinpointing which possible facts these 
are; the world (which is all the facts, as Wittgenstein said in the Trac-
tatus) is not here pictured as beyond the reach of concepts. (McDowell, 
1992:48, n21) 
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Metaphysical realism adheres to a notion of world, according to which the world 
is external to the space of concepts not merely in the sense of causal independence 
but in the sense that it might be inaccessible in principle. Of course, metaphysical 
realists want to argue that the world is not inaccessible or beyond the reach of 
concepts, but their assumption that the problem of access is a genuine problem 
entails that they take seriously the possibility that the world might be beyond the 
reach of concepts. The notion of formal identity as used by postmodem 
Aristotelian realism implies a rejection of the metaphysical realist's notion of an 
'external' world.32 
In saying that the notion of external does not make sense, postmodern 
Aristotelian realism is not saying that the world is mind-dependent in a causal 
sense. Rather, it rejects the dualism of internal and external by saying that the 
content of an experience and 'how it is in the world' do not belong to separate 
realms. The idea of formal identity implies that the notion of'the sort ofthing one 
can think1 and the notion of'the sort ofthing that can be the case' are conceptually 
interdependent. This means that, as McDowell stresses, we do not understand the 
notion of the sort of thing that can be the case in terms of a prior understanding 
of the sort of thing that one can think. Nor do we understand it the other way 
around. 'There is no reason to look for a priority in either direction' (McDowell, 
1994b:28). 
The notion of formal identity means a rejection of the nature-access 
distinction that is central to AMR. This distinction (reflected in the distinction 
between semantics, epistemology and ontology as separate projects) relies on the 
idea that the question of the nature of the world, or of the nature of truth and 
reference, makes sense independently of the question of our access to reality, truth 
and reference. It is a distinction that invokes skepticism or the problem of access 
in that it considers the notion of something inaccessible in principle, i.e. the notion 
of world or truth an sich, to be an intelligible notion. In this chapter, I have tried 
to show that rejecting the notion of 'inaccessibility in principle' or 'an sich' does 
not mean that one has to embrace a form of metaphysical antirealism. It does not 
mean that 'all we can know is the world fiir wis'. As Wittgenstein has put it, 'the 
great difficulty here is not to represent the matter as if there were something one 
32As Putnam puts it. '[McDowell's] aim is to restore the conception of perception as a taking in of how things 
are On this conception, the same proposition - e g "that is a blue patch on the wall" - is fit to describe how 
it is in "the external world" - except that the adjective "external" should now be dropped - and fit to describe the 
content of an experience. As a Dutch philosophy student recently put it, McDowell's position is a "postmodem 
Anstotelianism" - with respect to at least part of their content, mind and world are "formally identical" ' (Putnam, 
forthcoming. 6) 
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couldn't do.1331 have argued that postmodern Aristotelian realism provides a way 
of rejecting metaphysical realism without falling into the kind of 'confinement 
imagery' characteristic of internal realism McDowell's image of openness becomes 
available if we reject the nature/access distinction, and with it the idea of a 
problem of access, as unintelligible. The image of openness or the 'direct realism' 
defended by McDowell and Putnam is not a theory of perception but a rejection 
of the philosophical notion of an interface. I have argued that the image of 
openness reflects a radically non-solipsistic notion of mind and a notion of world 
as the totality of facts, where facts are understood as 'essentially capable of being 
embraced in thought' (McDowell, 1994b:28). In the next chapter, I will discuss the 
notion of world defended by postmodern Aristotelian realism in greater detail. 
McDowell argues that we can only dismount from the seesaw between foun-
dationalism and coherentism, if we reconsider our conception of nature. If we are 
to reinstate the notion of 'responsiveness to meaning' or 'openness to the world', 
we have to reject the modem notion of nature as 'devoid of meaning' or 'dis-
enchanted'. Postmodern Aristotelian realism, so I will argue in the next chapter, 
is realism without physicalism. 
"Quoted by Conant in his Introduction to Putnam (1994b), p.xxiv. 
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CHAPTER4 
REALISM WITHOUT PHYSICALISM 
In chapter 3,1 have argued that to reject AMR means to reject the idea that there 
is a genuine problem about the epistemic accessibility of the 'external' world. The 
idea of a problem of access rests on the questionable assumption that our 
perceptual and conceptual access to the world is mediated by an interface or 'veil 
of representations'. I have tried to show that the two main arguments for the 
interface theory of perception, the theory-ladenness argument and the argument 
from illusion, are question-begging. If we reject the philosophical notion of an 
interface, we reject the problem of access as a genuine problem. This makes 
availiable McDowell's 'image of openness': a notion of experience as openness to 
the world This notion of experience departs from the empiricist tenet that 
knowledge 'starts with' unconceptualized sensory data. In being open to the world, 
one finds oneself saddled with content that is already representational. 
At the end of chapter 3, I said that McDowell's image of openness 
expresses a kind of realism that deviates from metaphysical realism. In other 
words, the image of openness implies a conception of the meaning of realism that 
departs from AMR. In this chapter, I will discuss this conception by going into 
McDowell's notion of world Postmodern Aristotelian realism, I will argue, is 
realism without physicalism. In section 4.11 will discuss McDowell's claim that 
the image of openness requires that we rethink our conception of nature in such 
a way that the notion of'responsiveness to meaning' becomes available. McDowell 
argues that 'the deep-rooted mental block that prevents us from understanding the 
world as rationally constraining our thinking is a dualism of Reason and Nature. 
According to this dualism, the intelligibility that is proper to the space of reasons 
cannot be part of the natural world. What makes this dualism compelling is the 
idea that the 'mathematization of nature', carried through by 17th century science, 
forces upon us a conception of the world as 'in itself devoid of meaning. The root 
assumption of the modem realism debate is that nature should be equated with the 
'thinned-out' nature of physics or with what McDowell calls the 'realm of law". 
McDowell argues that we should reject the modem dualism of Reason and Nature 
and that we can make sense of a 'partial re-enchantment of nature' without lapsing 
into pre-scientific superstition. This partial re-enchantment implies that we 
recognize both the 'realm of meaning' and the 'realm of law* to be part of nature. 
I will defend McDowell's rich notion of nature against the objections raised by 
Bumyeat. In section 4.2 I will discuss McDowell's conception of the relation 
between the 'realm of law* and the 'realm of meaning'. His distinction between the 
two realms mirrors his distinction between the level of the personal and the level 
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of the sub-personal, discussed in chapter 3 (section 3.2.2). I will focus on two 
objections, raised by Bilgrami (1994) and Bermudez (1995), to McDowell's view 
of the autonomy of the personal level or the realm of meaning. I will claim that 
McDowell can only overcome these objections by arguing that the realm of 
meaning is conceptually prior to the realm of law. The notion of a partial re-
enchantment implies that although nature is more than the realm of natural law, 
we should not blur the distinction between the realm of law and the realm of 
meaning. McDowell stresses that we should not try to re-enchant what was 
disenchanted by modem physics. I will argue that the notion of a partial re-
enchantment is problematic and that McDowell should recognize the realm of law 
to be part of the realm of meaning. I will argue that there are neither ontologjcal 
nor epistemological criteria available to McDowell for separating the realm of law 
from the realm of meaning. In that sense, I will argue in favour of complete re-
enchantment. In section 4.31 will discuss the issue of mind-independence, or more 
precisely, the way in which postmodern Aristotelian realism rejects the fourth 
tenet of AMR: the idea that what is at stake in the realism issue is whether the 
relation between mind and world is a relation of causal dependence or causal in-
dependence. I will argue that McDowell's notion of the conceptual sphere as 
unbounded does not imply idealism, understood as the claim that the world is 
causally dependent upon the mind. It does imply that the notions of mind and 
world are conceptually interdependent. In McDowell's view, mental contents and 
worldly facts do not belong to separate ontologjcal realms, between which an 
epistemological gulf yawns. I will elucidate McDowell's notion of world further 
by discussing his interpretation of Kant and the objections raised against it by Bird 
(1996). 
4.1 Re-enchanting nature 
In order to make sense of the notion of openness, we have to rethink both the 
notion of mind and the notion of world In the previous chapter, I pointed out that 
McDowell's notion of openness goes hand in hand with a radically non-solipsistic 
conception of mind, which rejects the notion of representations as inner items that 
have an intrinsic nature independently of the subject's environment.1 The interface 
'Since my main subject is the realism issue and not the philosophy of mind, I will not discuss McDowell's 
theory of mental content further See McCulloch (1995) and Sleutels (1994) for an elaborate discussion of the 
debate between internalist and externalist theories of content Although McDowell's theory of content is often 
classified as (radically) externalist (Dancy, 1985 175,181), it might be more appropriate to call it, in Sleutels' 
terms, relationist Sleutels shows that both lntemalism and extemalism are 'committed to the claim that content 
is determined intrinsically, either by internal factors 'given' to the subject, or by external factors remotely 
controlling it Relationism is basically the rejection of all intrinsic content* (Sleutels, 1994 259). In a similar vein, 
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theory of perception is not only closely linked to a particular conception of the 
mind, it is also closely linked to a particular conception of the world. McDowell's 
notion of openness suggests a notion of world as the 'totality of facts', where facts 
are understood as essentially capable of figuring as the content of judgements. In 
that sense, facts are not external to the conceptual sphere, as McDowell puts it, 
although they are by no means causally dependent on it. In this section my aim 
is to explain this notion of world in greater detail. 
4.1.1 Physicalism or the idea that modern corpuscularism refuted Aristotelian 
hylomorphism 
In the previous chapter, I discussed two arguments in favour of the interface 
theory: the theory-ladenness argument and the argument from illusion. I argued 
that both are question-begging and that they do not pose a real threat to 
McDowell's image of openness. However, even if the criticisms of the interface 
theory I sketched are right, the notion of experience as openness to the world may 
still seem 'too good to be true'. This is because the argument from theory-
ladenness and the argument from illusion only partly explain the appeal of the 
interface theory. To understand why the interface theory seems coercive, 
McDowell argues, we have to take into account its affiliation with a conception 
of nature that was introduced with the rise of modem science. It is only by 
questioning this particular conception of nature that we can make the image of 
openness available. 
What is at work here is a conception of nature that can seem sheer 
common sense, though it was not always so; the conception I mean was 
made available only by a hard-won achievement of human thought at a 
specific time, the time of the rise of modern science. Modem science 
understands its subject matter in a way that threatens, at least, to leave it 
disenchanted, as Weber put the point in an image that has become a 
commonplace. The image marks a contrast between two kinds of 
intelligibility: the kind that is sought by (as we call it) natural science, and 
the kind we find in something when we place it in relation to other 
occupants of 'the logical space of reasons', to repeat a suggestive phrase 
from Wilfrid Sellare. If we identify nature with what natural science aims 
McDowell argues that we can understand mental content neither in terms of givermess (foundahonahsm) nor in 
terms of causal constraints (coherentism). McDowell rejects the picture underlying both intemahsm and 
cxtemalism In his view, content cannot even nohonally be separated into inner, 'subjective' factors and external, 
'objective' factors. 
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to make comprehensible, we threaten, at least, to empty it of meaning. 
(McDowell, 1994b:70/l) 
At the time of the rise of modem science, the Aristotelian ontology of forms was 
rejected in favour of the ontology of corpuscularism. The new corpuscularist 
ontology offered an explanation of qualitative and perceptual properties such as 
colour, sound, taste etcetera in terms of miniscule particles acting in strictly 
mechanical fashion. The modem scientific conception of nature as the realm of 
mathematical law seemed to imply that our every-day description of things (as 
coloured, warm, etc.) cannot apply to things as they are in themselves (Putnam, 
1994:468). Galileo and Descartes held that objects in themselves have only 
geometrical and numerical properties (Hacker, 1987:8). The sensible qualities of 
things, also dubbed 'secondary qualities', were widely claimed to reside 'in us', in 
a kind of inner realm that is only causally related to the external world As Farrell 
puts it, 'the qualities that things were once taken to have on their own migrate 
across the subject/object divide and are seen to be determinations imposed by the 
self (secondary qualities, substance, causality, value, and the like)' (Farrell, 
1994:2). As Hacker puts it: 
If the laws governing the physical universe are essentially mathematical, 
it seemed almost irresistible to conclude that what is quantative and 
susceptible to mathematicization is more real than what is merely 
qualitative and perceptual. Kepler drew this conclusion. It was no less 
tempting, especially in the light of the corpuscularian hypotheses about 
perception, to conclude that qualitative and perceptual properties, i.e. 
secondary qualities, are not objective properties of reality at all. (..) 
Galileo and subsequently Descartes drew that conclusion. (Hacker, 
1987:178)2 
The ontology of corpuscularism seemed to necessitate a distinction between 
primary qualities, understood as mind-independent, intrinsic properties of reality 
'in itself, and secondary qualities, which are conceived to be 'in us', produced by 
the action of objects on our sense organ (Hacker, 1987:8). In this way, the 
'mechanization of nature' gave rise to a kind of scepticism about the possibility of 
perceptual knowledge, which had been absent during the premodem era3 
Meyering points out that despite the various disagreements between medieval 
2See also Hacker(1987206 and 180S). 
3See Meyenng ( 1989) and Spruyt (1995) for a detailed discussion of the profound philosophical indications 
of the transition from hylomorphism to corpuscularism for the theory of perception 
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theories of perception, they all agreed on what he calls the 'identity theory of 
perception', 'according to which the essential characteristics of the world are 
identically present in the knower and the known' (1989:15). As long as the tenet 
of the formal identity in perception of knower and known was not questioned, the 
aim of the theory of perception was to explain how perceptual knowledge comes 
about. The aim was not justificatory (Meyering, 1989:14). The identity theory 
lacks both the notion of an ontological gap and the notion of an epistemological 
gap between the realm of the mind and the realm of natural reality. The 
mechanization and mathematicization of nature proposed by modem science, 
however, suggested that knower and known belong to distinct ontological realms, 
between which an epistemological gulf yawns. Within the new world-view, 
'natural reality is explained in terms which had no ostensible connection with the 
concepts of phenomenal experience.' (Meyering, 1989:9) It became doubtful 
whether the concepts of phenomenal experience referred to anything 'external' at 
all.4 
Thus, more accutely than ever before the need is felt to give a methodo-
logical account of all knowledge. For the cognitive is now regarded 
simply as the mechanical (..) transfer of physiologically transformed in-
formation without there being any metaphysical ground for believing that 
the essential attributes of things will be retained in the subjective sensa-
tions (..). The question whether reality really is what it appears to be now 
becomes radically problematic. Since phenomenal experience distorts not 
only occasionally but systematically, it is best regarded as a veil which 
hides reality rather than revealing it. (Meyering, 1989:3) 
The modem 'problem of access' originates from an interpretation of the findings 
of modem science, according to which the objects of our phenomenal experience 
are to be located in an 'inner realm' or 'veil of representations' that is only causally 
and not cognitively related to the external world In Appearance arid Reality, 
Hacker closely scrutinizes this interpretation, arguing that it rests on philosophical 
confusion rather than empirical fact. Hacker focuses on the distinction between 
primary and secondary qualities and he discusses at length the conceptual 
4Russell has summarized the central reasoning behind this modem kind of skepticism about our phenomenal 
experience as follows. "Physics assures us that the occurrences which we call "perceiving objects" are at the end 
of a long causa] chain which starts from the objects, and are not likely to resemble the objects except, at best, 
in certain very abstract ways We all start from "naive realism", i e, the doctrine that things are what they seem. 
( ) [But] the observer, when he seems to himself to be observing a stone, is really, if physics is to be believed, 
observing the effects of the stone upon himself Thus science seems to be at war with itself when it most means 
to be objective, it finds itself plunged into subjectivity against its will Naive realism leads to physics, and 
physics, if true, shows that naive realism is false. Therefore naive realisti, if true, is false' therefore it is false' 
(Russell, 1950· 15). 
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confusions involved in interpreting this distinction in terms of a dualism of 
properties 'in us' and properties 'in themselves'. He argues, like Austin, that we 
cannot make sense of the notion of 'sensory experiences' in us, which form a veil 
of representations between minds and the world. Moreover, he points out that it 
is misguided to suppose that corpuscularian or mechanist explanations of sensible 
qualities explain these qualities away. The fact that we can explain perceptual 
qualities such as colour, tastes, sounds, etcetera in terms of molecular or atomic 
structures and their properties does not show these qualities to be 'merely apparent' 
(Hacker, 1987:24). 
It is altogether mistaken to suppose that characterizing objects in terms of 
their secondary qualities is not a description of things as they are indepen-
dently of observers. (...) Replacing the descriptions in terms of colours by 
such as are given in terms of spectral reflection curves is not a more 
accurate description of an object, but a different description, indeed a 
description (if so it be called) of an altogether different kind, for very 
different purposes. And those purposes are not to approach closer to being 
an 'absolute description of reality1, but to construct theories of light, 
electro-magnetic radiation, physico-chemical structures of objects. These 
do not supersede, since they do not conpete with, ordinary descriptions 
of the perceptible world. (Hacker, 1987:188, 190) 
Although physics provides us with powerful explanations of the perceptible world, 
this does not mean that reality should be equated with the items which physics 
considers to be explanatory indispensable. 
Physics is concerned with classifying certain features of the physical 
world (..). It starts from ordinary descriptions of those features of the 
perceptible world. (..) These descriptions are not overthrown, shown to be 
false or only 'relative'. But, of course, they are sometimes not very useful 
for certain purposes which scientists have in constructing theories. (...) But 
lack of concern involves no ontologjcal insight. (Hacker, 1987:189) 
The idea that anything which does not figure in physics' description of the world 
must be located in an 'inner realm' is not implicated by the findings of empirical 
science. More likely, it rests on a distinctly philosophical confusion. The notion 
of 'secondary qualities' is just the notion of sense data which are only causally 
related to 'external' reality. I am not going to sketch Hacker's criticism of the 
interface theory in greater detail, since I have already discussed the problems 
confronting the particular dualism of'internal' and 'external' characteristic of this 
theory in the previous chapter. My aim in this chapter is not to add further 
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arguments against the interface theory, but to explain what is involved in rejecting 
it. McDowell argues in Mind and World that the image of openness requires a 
partial re-enchantment of nature. Another way of putting this is to say that if we 
want to make sense of the notion of'responsiveness to meaning', we have to reject 
a notion of world as devoid of meaning. McDowell is aware that the notion of're-
enchanting nature' evokes images of pre-scientific superstition. 
According to the picture I have been recommending, our sensibility yields 
states and occurrences with conceptual content. That enables us to see an 
experiencing subject as open to facts. The conceptual sphere does not 
exclude the world we experience. To put it another way: what we 
experience is not external to the realm of the kind of intelligibility that is 
proper to meaning. (..) But in so far as what we experience includes 
merely natural facts, this can look like a call to regress into a pre-
scientific superstition, a crazily nostalgic attempt to re-enchant the natural 
world (McDowell, 1994b:72) 
To see that 'a naturalism that makes room for meaning' is not 'crazily nostalgic', 
we have to realize that, as Hacker stresses, the notion of nature as devoid of 
meaning is not dictated by science. Rather, what makes it seem compulsary is a 
particular philosophical interpretation of science. Putnam similarly argues that 
there is nothing anti-scientific about natural realism (i.e. postmodem Aristotelian 
realism). In rejecting the interface theory, we are not rejecting any part of science, 
rather we are trying to dispel 'the illusion that we have labored under since the 
beginning of the seventeenth century, that the mathematicization of nature^ô/res 
the traditional view of perception upon us' (Putnam, 1994a:465). 
The 'mechanist conception of nature', introduced by seventeenth century 
physics, seemed to falsify direct realism about perception. If the world 'in itself 
only consists of miniscule particles acting in strictly mechanical fashion, then our 
perception of colours, smells, etcetera cannot be conceived as openness to the 
world. Dancy defines direct realism as the view 'that in sense-perception we are 
directly aware of the existence and nature of the surrounding physical world' 
(Dancy, 1985:147). If'the physical world' is understood as 'the world as described 
by physics', then direct realism is indeed hardly a tenable position. However, by 
this definition, postmodem Aristotelian realism is not direct realism. The world 
we are being open to according to McDowell's notion of experience is a world 
which includes colours, sounds, tastes, etcetera. The deepest assumption 
underlying the interface theory and the modem worry about the epistemic 
accessibility of the 'external' world is the equation of nature with the realm of law. 
The point of McDowell's and Putnam's 'direct realism' is, like the point of Austin's 
and Hacker's critique of the notion of a 'veil of sensory experiences', that there are 
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no valid reasons for equating nature with the thinned-out world of physics. In fact, 
the equation is disastrous since it makes it a mystery how thought can be in touch 
with reality at all. 
4.1.2 Bumyeat's objection to re-enchantment 
In a recent discussion about the question whether Aristotle's views can be inter-
preted in terms of the functionalist theory of mind, Burnyeat has argued, against 
Nussbaum and Putnam, that Aristotle's notion of mind, as it figures in his view 
of perception, is not available to us, since it relies on an indefensible, premodem 
notion of nature (Burnyeat, 1992). The issue of the possibility of a functionalist 
interpretation of Aristotle is outside the scope of my concern here. Nonetheless, 
it is interesting to see why Burnyeat holds that the premodem notion of nature is 
unavailable to us, since McDowell's image of openness implies a partial 
reinstatement of this premodem, 'rich' notion of world. Nussbaum and Putnam 
argue that the Aristotelian form-matter view constitutes an alternative conception 
of the mind, superior to materialist reductionism and eliminativism on the one 
hand and Cartesian dualism on the other (Nussbaum and Putnam, 1992). They are 
not so much interested in arguing for a functionalist theory of mind5 as in showing 
the possibility of a non-reductionist account of intentionality and perception, in 
which the modem mind-body problem does not arise. Burnyeat argues that we are 
stuck with this problem, since although we might try to get rid of the 'mind side 
of Cartesian dualism', the 'matter half of the dualism' has been firmly and 
irreversably established by modem science (Burnyeat, 1992:16). Burnyeat claims 
that the untenability of the Aristotelian conception of the physical is particularly 
clear in the context of the theory of perception. He examines the Putnam-
Nussbaum thesis by considering 'the most mysterious of Aristotelian doctrines, the 
doctrine that in perception the sense-organ takes on the sensible form of the object 
perceived without its matter' (1992:16). 
Burnyeat argues, first, that according to Aristotle the reception of sensible 
forms is not to be understood as a literal physiological change of quality in the 
organ (1992:21,22). Taking on the sensible form of objects is not identical to a 
physical process. Rather it is a 'becoming aware of colours, sounds, smells and 
other sensible qualities' (ibid.). Secondly, Burnyeat argues that this becoming 
aware does not involve any physiological change in the relevant organ (22). Not 
only is perceptual awareness not identical with a material process, neither is it 
'Putnam has explicitly rejected functionalism in his (1989); at present, he still holds that mental states are 
compositionallyplastic, but he argues that 'the "intentional level" is (..) not reducible to the "computational level", 
anymore than it is to the "physical level" ' (Nussbaum and Putnam, 1992:49). In his view, mental states are not 
only compositionally plastic but also computationally plastic (ibid 48). 
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accompanied by one. Perceptual awareness is considered primitive by Aristotle in 
the sense that an animal's perceptual capacities do not require explanation (22). 
For Aristotle, [perceptual] capacities are part of animal life and in 
Aristotle's world the emergence of life does not require explanation. For 
Aristotle it is the existence of life which explains why animals have the 
physical constitutions they do, not the other way round. The unity of 
science is achieved from the top down, not from the bottom up, which is 
the way we have seen it since the seventeenth century. Aristotle simply 
does not have our task of starting from the existence of matter as physics 
and chemistry describe it and working up to the explanation of the 
secondary qualities on the one side and animal perceptual capacities on 
the other. The secondary qualities (so called by us) are already out there 
in his world, fully real; these are the sensible forms. All that is needed for 
perception to take place is for these qualities or forms to act on the 
corresponding faculties in us to bring about an awareness of themselves. 
(...) What makes it true that animals perceive and that their perceiving 
plays the part it does in their lives is simply this: they have a faculty of 
perceptual awareness. (Bumyeat, 1992:22) 
Bumyeat concludes that Aristotle's view of perception reflects a 'deeply alien 
conception of the physical' (1992:26), which cannot be taken seriously in our 
century. It requires postulating the existence of'essentially ensouled matter1, since 
'the physical material of animal bodies in Aristotle's world is already pregnant 
with consciousness, needing only to be awakened to red or warmth' (19). This 
notion is, Bumyeat holds, matched by an 'equal mysteriousness on the object side 
of perception', in that Aristotle's world is 'a world in which colours, sounds and 
smells are as real as the primary qualities' (19,20). An Aristotelian view of 
perception is absurd in that it not only denies the possibility of a bottom-up 
explanation of the emergence of life and mind, it also denies that physical facts 
determine mental facts in the sense of providing sufficient conditions for them to 
occur (23). In other words, a return to Aristotelianism would not merely imply the 
epistemological tenet that mental vocabulary cannot be reduced to physicalist 
vocabulary. It would also mean denying that physical facts are ontologically more 
fundamental than mental facts. The latter claim, Bumyeat holds, is indigestable 
to the educated, modem mind. 
Nussbaum and Putnam argue that Aristotelian hylomorphism is not incom-
patible with a modem conception of matter. In particular, they argue that although 
the reception of sensible forms in perception cannot be identified with a 
physiological transition in the relevant organ (Bumyeat's first claim), this does not 
show that becoming aware of sensible forms does not involve any concomitant 
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material change (Bumyeat's second claim) (Nussbaum and Putnam, 1992:36)6. 
Although the becoming aware of sensible forms is not to be identified with a 
literal physiological change in the organ (40), it nevertheless should be charac-
terized as a transition realized in matter (37). Nussbaum and Putnam argue on the 
basis of textual analysis 'that Aristotle conceives of perceiving (..) as thoroughly 
enmattered' (41). The fact that perceptual awareness is necessarily accompanied 
by material change does not however imply the possibility of a reductive Txrttom-
up' explanation of perceptual awareness in physical terms. We can explain the 
phenomenon of perception 'neither apart from matter nor according to the matter' 
(28). Does this mean that we have to take the 'emergence of mind and life' for 
granted? 
If 'explaining the emergence of mind' means explaining how the brain 
works, (...) then - as long as this work is not understood in a reductionist 
way - why on earth should an 'Aristotelian' object to it? (..) On the other 
hand, if'explaining the emergence of mind' means (..) saying in reductive 
terms what 'thinking there are a lot of cats in the neighborhood' is (...), 
etc., why should we now think that that's possible? (Putnam and 
Nussbaum, 1992:47,48) 
Nussbaum and Putnam here stress the same point as McDowell did in arguing that 
information-processing accounts of the brain do not provide a constitutive 
explanation of perception, although they provide enabling conditions.7 Bumyeat 
claims that such a constitutive, reductive explanation must be possible, if we do 
not want to regress to a magical worldview. The central question is whether 
Bumyeat here refers to a philosophical 'must' or a scientific 'must'. McDowell, 
Nussbaum and Putnam argue that it is a philosophical 'must', the appeal of which 
rests on the prior assumption that 'what external objects are' is 'what is described, 
and, "in themselves", no more than what is described, by the formulae of 
mathematical physics' (Nussbaum and Putnam, 1992:46). Bumyeat takes for 
granted the equation of nature with the realm of law. Starting from this 
assumption, the fact that our 'dealings with content' in perception cannot be 
reductively explained in physiological terms makes the reception of sensible forms 
amysterious phenomenon. However, McDowell's, Putnam's andNussbaum's point 
is that Bumyeat's equation of reality with the realm of law is unacceptable, since 
it makes a mystery out of the plainest fact there is: the fact that we can perceive 
and think about the world 
6Cf. Cohen (1992 64) and Sorabji (1992:211). 
7Sce chapter 3, section 3 2 2, this point will be discussed more thoroughly in the next section of this chapter 
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Physicalism, understood as the equation of nature with the thinned-out 
world of physics, is a philosophical claim McDowell, Putnam and Nussbaum 
argue against physicalism by way of a reductio. Starting from the physicalist 
worldview, we are forced to draw the distinction between primary or 'intrinsic' 
qualities and secondary or 'phenomenal' qualities. We are forced to posit the 
existence of mysterious entities called 'sense data' or 'sensory experiences'. We are 
forced to understand perception and cognition as mediated by an interface or 'veil 
of representations' between minds and reality. We are forced to take wholesale 
skepticism about the accessibility of the 'external' world as a genuine problem We 
are forced to deny the basic realist intuition that, in perception and cognition, we 
are in touch with and rationally constrained by the world. In absence of such a 
rational constraint, we are unable to understand our empirical beliefs as endowed 
with content at all. The physicalist worldview leads to 'mental suicide'. The 
prospect of mental suicide does not imply that we should set ourselves upon a 
heroic attempt to drastically alter our self-conception, as philosophers such as the 
Churchlands and Dennett suggest. The prospect of eliminating concepts such as 
'thought', 'meaning' and 'truth' is not a coherent option at all.8 It is simply absurd 
to suppose that we can entertain a worldview which dispenses with the notion of 
a 'worldview1 ! The skepticism that accompanies the physicalist worldview violates 
the bounds of sense. 
Postmodern Aristotelian realism is not incompatible with physics, but with 
physicalism, which is a questionable, philosophical claim Burnyeat argues that the 
Aristotelian account of perception relies on the mysterious notion of'essentially 
ensouled malter* on the subject-side and on the equally mysterious notion that 
secondary qualities are as real as the primary ones on the object-side. As regards 
the latter, I have already pointed out that the possibility of a scientific description 
of for instance colours in terms of spectral reflection curves does not justify the 
philosophical claim that colours are 'really1, i.e. in themselves, 'nothing but' 
spectral reflection curves. The possibility of a 'corpusculariari analysis of colours 
does not make colours 'subjective' or 'mind-dependent'. As regards the former 
claim, Putnam and Nussbaum argue that an Aristotelian view of perception does 
not so much posit the existence of'essentially ensouled matter' as suggest that the 
explanation of perception must proceed in a top-down manner. Now, as it stands, 
this reply does not fully address the issue raised by Burnyeat. As noted above, 
Burnyeat suggests that reinstating Aristotelian hylomorphism does not merely 
involve claiming -on the epistemological level- that we cannot reductively explain 
the emergence of life and mind in materialist terms. It also implies the more 
radical, ontologjcal claim that physical facts cannot be said to determine mental 
'See Putnam (1987:15,16). 
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facts. And this is the truly objectionable part of the Aristotelian doctrine, Burnyeat 
argues. 
Does Putnam and Nussbaum's insistence on the irreducibility of the 
intentional or McDowell's conception of the autonomy of the realm of meaning 
imply that physical facts do not ontologjcally determine mental facts? One 
possible response to Bumyeat's line of reasoning would be to point out that 
dualism (or non-reductionism) at the epistemological level need not rule out 
monism at the ontologjcal level. Top-down explanation at the epistemological 
level does not preclude bottom-up determination at the ontologjcal level, one 
could argue.9 This rejoinder clearly relies on a strict distinction between the level 
of epistemological claims and the level of ontologjcal claims. As I have argued 
throughout the previous chapters, such a distinction is dubious. The ontologjcal 
claim involved (i.e. that despite the irreducibility of intentional discourse, physical 
facts determine mental facts) would at best be gratuitous, since it would have no 
practical bearing on our explanations. If the explanation of (f.i.) perception is 
essentially top-down, then the insistence on ontologjcal monism neither serves an 
explanatory purpose nor is there any way of backing it up with independent 
evidence. In that sense, the ontologjcal determination thesis is not so much false 
as empty.10 Its only role is to save physicalism, which, so I argued, is a 
philosophical dogma rather than a doctrine dictated by modem science. 
Does this mean that the postmodem Aristotelian realist denies that 
physical facts determine mental facts? It does, in a particular sense. It is of crucial 
importance not to interpret McDowell's and Putnam's denial of the ontological 
determination thesis as an empirical claim, to the effect that mental facts constitute 
a self-standing ontological realm or even that the mental determines the physical. 
In arguing against a physicalist ontology (whether combined with epistemological 
reductionism or not), McDowell and Putnam are not putting forward a dualist 
ontology, or -the other option- a mental monism which says that mental facts 
determine physical facts.11 Strictly speaking, the postmodern Aristotelian realist 
This view is baptized 'non-reductive physicalism1 by Kim, who argues that this is currently the 'received 
view" (Kim, 1995). 
10I will discuss this point further in the next section of this chapter. 
"Schematically put, die following options can be distinguished on the epistemological and ontological menu: 
Epistemological Ontologica! 
Dualism Non-reductionism (Functionalism) Cartesian dualism 
Hininafavism Dual aspect theories 
Monism Reductionism Physicalism 
"Mentalism" 
Within the current debate, participants by and large agree about physicalist monism at the ontological level. The 
discussion to a large extent focuses on the epistemological issue of the status of intentional vocabulary or 'folk 
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is not putting forward any positive ontologjcal claim. His aim is rather to question 
the assumption that gives rise to the problem of the relation between the physical 
and the mental. This problem arises only when nature is identified exclusively 
with the realm of law as described by modern, mechanist physics. Nature in this 
narrow conception consists of certain ultimate material constituents and their 
mathematically describable properties (the primary qualities). As Frede remarks, 
'such an impoverished of the physical then creates a considerable pressure to 
introduce something non-physical to account for mental phenomena, as we can see 
in Descartes' (Frede, 1992:94). Aristotle, on the other hand, treats the so-called 
mental functions such as desiring and thinking as on a par with the physical 
functions in the sense that he considers both as the ordinary living functions of a 
whole organism (ibid.). Frede points out that Aristotle may even allow for a 
distinction which comes reasonably close extensionally to our distinction between 
physical and mental doings. The point is however that both doings are considered 
to be natural doings, 'to be explained alike as the kind ofthing an organism which 
is complicated enough will do in the appropriate circumstances' (1992:97).12 
Within an Aristotelian framework, the 'mind-body problem' does not arise, 
since the notion of a living organism is considered more basic than, or prior to, 
the division between mental and physical facts. From a hylomorphist perspective, 
the relation between body and mind is conceived as the relation between matter 
and form. The relation between matter and form is too intimate, so to speak, to 
be a relation of causal determination. A particular piece of matter can only be 
identified as such in virtue of its form. 'What makes matter matter-of-a-certain-
kind, such as animal-matter, is form' (Cohen, 1992:71). Similarly, a particular 
psychology Accordingly, we can distinguish between three main positions reductionist physicalism, elimmanvist 
physicalism and non-reductionist physicalism. According to Kim, ηοη-reducûonist physicalism is 'the received 
view1 at present (Kim, 1995) By questioning the near consensus about physicalist monism, Putnam and 
McDowell are not trying to defend any of the other ontologica] options. Rather, they are trying to throw doubt 
on the assumption responsible for creating the distinctly modem mind-body problem: the notion of a 'thinned-our/ 
or disenchanted nature dualistically set over against an 'inner realm' of phenomenal experiences As I will argue 
below, the postmodem Aristotelian realist considers the notion of a living organism to be prior to or more basic 
than the division between mental and physical facts 
12McDowell tries to make the same point by introducing the notion of 'second nature' (McDowell, 
1994b 84ff ) With that notion, he seeks to 'recapture the Aristotelian idea that a normal mature human being is 
a rational animal, with its rationality part of its animal, and so natural being, not a mysterious foothold in another 
realm1 (91). In this view, our rational capacities or our capacity to be responsive to meaning is to be conceived 
as our second nature What makes such a conception possible is a refusal to equate nature with the realm of law 
'In Aristotle's conception of human beings, rationality is integrally part of their animal nature, and the conception 
is neither naturalistic in the modem sense (there is no hint of reductiveness or foundahonalism) nor naught with 
philosophical anxiety. What makes this possible is that Aristotle is innocent of the very idea that nature is the 
realm of law and therefore not the home of meaning' (109) 
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instantiation of form can only be identified as such in virtue of it being 
enmattered. If an individuated material item is dependent on form for its very 
identity, then it cannot be said to cause the form. In that sense, i.e. in the sense 
that matter cannot intelligibly be said to cause form, the Aristotelian rejects the 
ontologjcal tenet that physical facts determine mental facts. He does not thereby 
commit himself to substance dualism or the view that mental facts determine 
physical facts. Rather, he rejects the problem of the relation between the mental 
and the physical, since he argues that this particular dualism relies on a 
questionable reduction of nature to the realm of mathematical law. To be an anti-
reductionist in this context is to hold that the notion of a living organism, i.e. an 
embodied form, is more basic than, or precedes, the dualism of physical and 
mental facts. 
Transposed into McDowellian terminology, another way of putting this is 
to say that sub-personal information-processing accounts of perception presuppose 
rather than explain the notion of an organism involved in contentful dealings with 
the environment. If this claim, for which I will argue in the next section, is right, 
then Aristotle's view of perception in terms of a formal identity of knower and 
known has, pace Bumyeat, in an important sense not been rejected by modem 
science. Although Aristotle's empirical claims about the physiological facts 
involved in perception may be outdated, the insight that perception is an un-
mediated taking in of facts about the world is not at odds with modem science. 
Rather, as I will argue in the next section, McDowell's notion of experience as 
openness to the world is presupposed by (cognitive-)scientific explanations of 
perception. 
The problem of the relation between physical facts and mental facts recurs 
in McDowell's position as the problem of the relation between the realm of law 
and the realm of meaning, or the relation between personal level explanations and 
sub-personal level explanations of perception. In the next section I will discuss 
this issue in more detail. I shall consider two objections against McDowell's 
conception of the autonomy of the realm of meaning, I will argue that McDowell's 
view of the relation between law and meaning is unsatisfactory. I will try to show 
that McDowell should conceive of the realm of meaning as not merely autono-
mous but as prior to the realm of law. I will argue that this priority should be 
understood as neither epistemologjcal nor ontological. Rather, the priority claim 
involved is aphenomenological claim, by which I mean, as I will explain below, 
a claim about the limits of sense. 
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4.2 The realm of meaning and the realm of law 
In Mind and World, McDowell argues that the possibility of rejecting the Given 
without embracing coherentism, i.e. the possibility of direct, conceptual access to 
reality, depends on the possibility of 'a knowing counterpart of Aristotle's 
innocence' (1994b: 109). In clarifying this notion, McDowell says we should try 
'to keep nature as it were partially enchanted, but without lapsing into pre-
scientific superstition or a rampant platonism' (85). By partial rather than complete 
re-enchantment, McDowell means that we should not blur the modem distinction 
between the 'realm of law*, which is the subject-matter of science, and the 'realm 
of meaning'. We should not, McDowell urges, attempt at re-enchanting that part 
of nature which was disenchanted by modem science (1994b:72). We should 
instead insist that nature cannot be equated with the realm of law. 
I am not urging that we should try to regain Aristotle's innocence. It 
would be crazy to regret the idea that natural science reveals a special 
kind of intelligibility, to be distinguished from the kind that is proper to 
meaning. To discard that part of our intellectual inheritance would be to 
return to mediaeval superstition. (...) But instead of trying to integrate the 
intelligibility of meaning into the realm of law, we can aim at a postlap-
sarian or knowing counterpart of Aristotle's innocence. We can acknow-
ledge the great step forward that human understanding took when our 
ancestors formed the idea of a domain of intelligibility, the realm of law, 
that is empty of meaning, but we can refuse to equate that domain of 
intelligibility with nature, let alone with what is real. (McDowell, 
1994b: 109) 
In this section I will go into the relation between the realm of meaning and the 
realm of law, thereby coming back to the issue of the relation between the level 
of the personal and the level of the sub-personal, raised in chapter 3, section 3.2.2. 
I will argue that the notion of partially re-enchanting nature is problematic in that 
it tries to reconcile two notions of what it means to be real, which are in fact 
incompatible. Given McDowell's notion of experience, there are neither 
epistemological nor ontologjcal criteria available for his separation of the realm 
of law and the realm of meaning. I will argue that what McDowell should say is 
that the realm of meaning is not only irreducible to, but also conceptually prior 
to the realm of law. I will argue for 'complete re-enchantment' in the sense that 
I will claim that the realm of law is not outside of the realm of meaning. 
Accordingly, I shall argue that sub-personal information-processing accounts of 
perception not just peacefully coexist with, but presuppose the notion of openness 
to the world at the personal level. 
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I will explain my claim about the priority of the realm of meaning by 
discussing two attacks on McDowell's conception of the autonomy of the 'personal 
level', raised by Bermudez (1995) and Bilgrami (1994). I will start by summari-
zing Bermudez's objection. 
4.2.1 The autonomy of personal level accounts of perception: 
Bermudez's objection 
Bermudez questions McDowell's conception of 'folk psychology1 and cognitive 
science as fundamentally different projects, concerned with different levels of 
explanatioa In McDowell's view, cognitive science deals with the sub-personal 
level in terms of mechanical and physiological explanation, i.e. explanation 
formulated in terms of brain events and neural networks. Folk-psychological 
explanations deal with the personal level and they are phrased in terms of 
conscious experiences, prepositional attitudes and agency. Bermudez points out 
that McDowell explains the distinction between the sub-personal and the personal 
in terms of the distinction between syntax and semantics. Syntactic accounts of 
for instance perception only ascribe as-if content to sub-personal processes; 'real 
content comes in only at the personal level' (Bermudez, 1995:362). 
Bermudez argues, contra McDowell, that 'the idea that at the sub-personal 
level organisms should properly be viewed as syntactic engines is deeply 
problematic' (ibid:362). He mentions that for instance Marr's influential 
information-processing theory of vision, while formulated at the sub-personal 
level, individuates the visual processes involved in terms that seem clearly 
intentional (ibid.:362). Marr's account of vision at the computational level 
'involves considering which features of the environment the organism needs to 
model, and hence viewing the organism as a semantic engine' (ibid:363). 
Bermudez puts the point more generally as follows: 
The claim that sub-personal content is 'as-if content must rest on the 
indispensability of such content-ascriptions. It must be the case that 
cognitive scientists only talk about sub-personal states in intentional or 
representational terms as a matter of convenience, something they could 
dispense with if they so chose. As emerges very clearly from McDowell's 
comments, what sustains his position is the possibility of a purely 
syntactic account of the 'sub-personal enabling conditions of cognition'. 
And this is the real problem with his position, for there are good reasons 
for thinking that such a purely syntactic account is a pipe-dream, and that 
when cognitive scientists refer to sub-personal states in intentional terms 
they do so out of necessity rather than convenience. (Bermudez, 
1995:363) 
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McDowell's claim that sub-personal states lack genuine content, Bermudez argues, 
derives its plausibility largely from the claim that the explanation of sub-personal 
psychological states is similar to the explanation of a language. In studying natural 
language, 'we can hive off syntax from semantics, and so it seems a natural 
thought that a similar, non-intentional approach is possible in explaining, for 
example, early visual processing' (1995:363). However, Bermudez goes on to 
argue, specifying the syntactic aspects of a language is possible only against the 
background of a prior understanding of the language which includes some of its 
semantical aspects. In trying to translate a completely unfamiliar language, for 
example, the 'radical interpreter' has to formulate some hypotheses about its 
semantics in order to form hypotheses about its syntax. To specify what syntactic 
category a word belongs to one first has to establish what one takes the word to 
mean. 
One cannot decide what category a given word falls into without 
speculating about its semantics. At the very least, for example, one will 
have to decide whether a word refers to an object before deciding whether 
it is a noun. The general point to be extracted is that we can only ascribe 
to a given word a syntactic role in a language by according it a certain 
semantic characterization. Of course, this does not mean that we cannot 
have a syntactic understanding of a given language. That would be absurd 
The point is rather that we can only have a syntactic understanding once 
we have fixed the syntactic properties, and we shall not be able to fix the 
syntactic properties without fixing some semantic properties. (Bermudez, 
1995:364) 
The question of course is whether a syntactic account of sub-personal psychologi-
cal states presupposes hypotheses about semantic properties in the same way. 
Bermudez argues that it does. A syntactic theory of the brain is concerned with 
specifying the functional role of brain states that link up sensory input and 
behavioural output. It tries to explain behavioural output in terms of the way in 
which sub-personal states are causally connected up to sensory input and to each 
other. The question is whether such an explanation is constrained by semantical 
considerations in the same way that linguistic radical interpretation is. Bermudez 
argues that there are two such constraints on the 'radical interpretation' of sub-
personal processes, for example states of the visual processing system. Both 
constraints point at the need to fix at least some semantic/intentional properties 
before fixing the syntactic properties of a sub-personal system. 
The first [constraint] is that any such interpretation requires distinguishing 
inputs with no genuine causal role to play (because they are just noise) 
173 
from those that have one. (..) Second, it is important to identify causal 
properties that derive from the physical instantiation/realization of a 
particular state, rather than from its functional role. The problem for the 
notion of conceiving the mind as a purely syntactic engine is that, 
explanation of how the brain works is causal explanation, we need to 
distinguish relevant causal relations from irrelevant ones (Bermudez, 
1995:364). 
To discriminate the functionally relevant causal properties, we need to appeal to 
semantical hypotheses about 'how an animal needs to represent its environment' 
(Bermudez, 1995:365). In other words, causal explanations which pertain to 
phenomena in the realm of law start from an 'explanation space' that is fixed by 
the realm of meaning. Sub-personal information-processing accounts of perception 
must start from certain criteria of relevance which are to be specified at the 'folk-
psychological', personal level. 
What are the consequences of this argument for McDowell's conception 
of the relation between the realm of law and the realm of meaning? Bermudez 
claims that McDowell's conception of the sub-personal as a syntactic engine rests 
on an implausible narrow notion of syntactic properties as purely physical. 
Syntactic properties, in the context of both syntactic theories of language and 
syntactic theories of the brain, should be understood as relational and functional, 
as opposed to purely physical (Bermudez, 1995:364). Within this broad conception 
of syntactic properties, Bermudez argues, there is no clean break between syntax 
and semantics (ibid.365). From this he draws the conclusion that we are entitled 
to ascribe genuine content to sub-personal states or processes. The indis-
pensibility of as-if content ascriptions to sub-personal states, he suggests, shows 
that we have to conceive of these states as genuinely content bearing and hence 
that we, pace McDowell, have to conceive of the brain as a semantic engine 
(Bermudez, 1995:365). Accordingly, the explanatory level of the personal should 
not be conceived of as autonomous. 
Although I agree with Bermudez's argument for the claim that sub-
personal level explanations presuppose personal level explanations, I do not think 
it is right to conclude from this that subpersonal states and processes are to be 
conceived as genuinely content-bearing. The indispensibility of semantic 
hypotheses at the subpersonal level of explanation, I will argue, does not so much 
show that 'the brain is a semantic engine' as indicate that the level of jM¿vpersonal 
explanation is not autonomous. Why doesn't Bermudez's argument make the 
notion of'genuine sub-personal content' available? Bermudez ignores McDowell's 
remarks about the different notions of 'information' involved in the notion of 
"becoming informed about the environment' and the notion of 'informational 
transactions at the sub-personal level'. McDowell stresses that, in saying that a 
174 
sub-personal part transmits information to another sub-personal part, one employs 
a notion of telling that is irreducibly metaphorical (McDowell, 1994:197). Literally 
speaking, sub-personal parts do not really tell anything either to other parts of the 
system or to the organism (ibid 198). An internal information-processing device 
cannot be said to really tell, perceive or know anything, since the notions of 
telling, perceiving and knowing only make sense as applied to persons, or as 
McDowell more liberally puts it, whole animals. To attribute genuine content to 
sub-personal processes is to commit the homunculus fallacy, i.e. to attribute 
predicates to parts of a human being or sentient creature that can only sensibly be 
attributed to the living creature as a whole. To say that the brain cannot be 
considered a 'semantic engine' is thus not to put forward an empirical claim but 
a statement about the bounds of sense. As Hacker puts it, 'the "cannot" here is 
logical, signifying not inability, but senselessness' (Hacker, 1987:19). 
Scientists can, to be sure, investigate the organic perceptual mechanisms 
of a perceiving creature, but to do so they must first establish that the 
creature they are investigating can perceive. For this it is not sufficient to 
establish the sensitivity of a given organ to, say, light or sound; rather one 
must establish that it is a perceptual organ. It must be an organ the 
creature uses in discerning features of its environment as it pursues its 
goals and shuns those things it apprehends as dangerous ot threatening. 
That a creature can perceive is established by observing its behaviour, its 
discriminatory, conative and affective responses to visibilia, audibilia, etc., 
its use of its perceptual organs in discerning objects, sounds, smells or 
warmth in its environment. It is not the eye, brain, mind or soul that 
perceives, but, as the Aristotelian tradition prior to Descartes insisted, the 
living creature. (...) One commits the homunculus fallacy when one 
extends predicates which can only be intelligibly be applied to a human 
being (or sentient creature) as a whole to parts of the creature. (..) It is 
noteworthy that the homunculus fallacy is rife in the writings of con-
temporary psychologists and neurophysiologists who endeavour to explain 
the mechanisms of perception by attributing cognitive capacities and their 
exercise to the brain. (Hacker, 1987:19) 
The fact that we need to appeal to semantical categories for explanations on the 
sub-personal level to get off the ground does not show that we have to conceive 
of sub-personal information processing as trading in genuine content. Rather, it 
shows that accounts of perception in terms of as-if content presuppose the notion 
of a person or living creature enmeshed in purposeful interaction with the 
environment. Sub-personal accounts presuppose responsiveness to meaning at the 
personal level. Thus, not only can genuine content not be explained away in terms 
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of as-if content. Accounts of as-if content, belonging to the space of the realm of 
law, are moreover conceptually dependent on personal level explanations, that 
belong to the space of the realm of meaning. Hence, sub-personal 'informatiori-
processing accounts of perception presuppose the 'image of openness' in stead of 
offering a competing image, viz. one that throws doubt on the possibility of 
openness by suggesting that an organism's dealings with the world are mediated 
by an interface of content-bearing subpersonal processes. In other words, if 
Bermudez argument is right and if, moreover, we are to avoid homunculus 
fallacies, the proper conclusion to draw is that the explanation of perception is 
essentially top-down: the distinction between syntax and semantics has to be 
drawn within the realm of meaning. The notion of contentful dealings with the 
environment is presupposed by 'syntactic' accounts and hence cannot be 
constitutively explained by these. More generally put, explanations in the realm 
of law can only get off the ground against the background of constraints fixed 
within the realm of meaning. 
Whereas McDowell suggests that the different levels of explanation 
associated with the realm of meaning and the realm of law should properly be 
understood as two autonomous realms which peacefully coexist, I have argued that 
the realm of meaning is not only irreducible but conceptually prior to the realm 
of law. I have argued that Bermudez has rightly pointed out that there is no clean 
break between syntax and semantics: sub-personal level explanations essentially 
rely on decisions which are semantically motivated. Whereas Bermudez 
concluded, falsely I argued, that sub-personal states and processes are genuinely 
content-bearing, I argued that the 'logical space' of the realm of law is not 
autonomous in that it requires explanatory constraints supplied by the realm of 
meaning. The realm of law is not outside of the realm of meaning. In that sense, 
I have argued in favour of a complete rather than a partial re-enchantment of 
nature. 
Gaiming the conceptual priority of the realm of meaning to the realm of 
law is characteristically ambiguous. The question which rises immediately is 
whether the priority involved is epistemological or ontological. Is the realm of 
meaning prior to the realm of law only in the order of knowing or also in the 
order of being? As mentioned in the previous section, the need for a top-down 
explanation of perception may well be reconciled with bottom-up determination 
of the personal level by sub-personal, physical processes. In talking of a 'complete 
re-enchantment of nature', am I not confusing a claim about the relation between 
levels of explanation with a claim about the relation between the phenomena to 
be explained? Interestingly, Bermudez raises precisely this question in the context 
of his argument against McDowell. His argument establishes the epistemological 
priority of personal level explanations and from this he seems to derive the 
ontological claim that sub-personal states are genuinely content-bearing. One 
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might object, on McDowell's behalf, that sub-personal states themselves may be 
purely syntactic properties, although we can have no episteme access to these 
states independently of personal level explanations. As Bermudez himself remarks: 
It might be objected here that the argument is sliding from epistemic to 
constitutive issues. The various points made add up to the claim that we 
cannot identify syntactic properties without identifying semantic proper-
ties. But this, it might be countered, is no reason to reject the idea that 
information systems are syntactic engines. It is a fact about us, rather than 
a fact about the information system, and yields only an epistemic 
constraint. There is a (limited) sense in which this is quite right, but a 
more important sense in which it is irrelevant. The point at issue is what 
theories we can construct and what explanations we can give, and 
epistemic constraints are constraints on theory construction and explana-
tion. It is no use saying, as McDowell does, that information systems are 
syntactic engines, and hence that sub-personal content is merely 'as-if 
content, unless this can be backed up with a syntactic explanation of those 
information systems. (Bermudez, 1995:365) 
Bermudez admits that his conclusion that the brain is after all a semantic engine 
is in fact stronger than his argument allows for. Strictly speaking, it only follows 
from his argument that McDowell's (allegedly) ontological claim about the brain 
being merely a syntactic engine is gratuitous as it completely lacks evidential 
support. But this, as Bermudez admits, does not show that the brain is in fact a 
semantic engine. Nonetheless, it may be argued that as long as as-if content 
attributions are not shown to be dispensable in principle, the claim that the brain 
is a semantic engine has more warrant on its side. As I pointed out above, my 
objection to this line of reasoning is not that it rests on inconclusive evidence, but 
that it is guilty of the homunculus fallacy. Bermudez's suggestion that the brain 
is a semantic engine is ruled out on grounds of intelligibility. Accordingly, 
McDowell's claim about the brain being a syntactic engine should not be read as 
an empirical, ontologjcal claim but as a point about the limits of sense. 
Bermudez's main point however is that the ontologjcal or 'constitutive' 
issue is 'in an important sense irrelevant'. The main issue at stake, he suggests, is 
epistemological. The question whether sub-personal states are in themselves 'purely 
physical' or 'relational and functional' properties seems to have no bearing on the 
epistemological issue of the autonomy of levels of explanation. Both ontological 
claims are strangely gratuitous in this context. The epistemological issue can be 
settled without deciding the ontological issue. Does this show that my claim about 
the priority of the realm of meaning to the realm of law is a priority in the order 
of knowing? Does it entail that it is only in the epistemological sense that the 
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realm of meaning is prior to the realm of law, whereas ontologically the realm of 
law may be fully autonomous or even 'more basic' than the realm of meaning? If 
so, the notion of a complete 're-enchantment of nature' would be at least 
misleading. 
I will presently argue that my priority claim should not be understood as 
merely epistemological (prior in the order of knowing). Nor should it be 
understood as an ontological claim in the sense of an empirical, material claim 
about what determines what in the order of being. Rather, to claim the priority of 
the realm of meaning is to make a phenomenological claim or, to put it 
differently, a conceptual claim about the limits of sense. If this claim is right, we 
cannot intelligibly separate the question of our access to the realm of law and the 
question of the ontological status of the realm of law. The point of calling my 
priority claim a phenomenological as opposed to an epistemological claim is that 
I want to question the nature/access distinction as applied to the realm of law 
rather than make a claim about the ontological status of the realm of law. To 
question the nature/access distinction is to deny the possibility of a sideways on 
picture of the realm of law. It is to advocate a complete re-enchantment of nature 
in the sense that the realm of law is considered a part of the realm of meaning. 
I will argue that, as a matter of intelligibility, the world should be understood as 
coinciding with the realm of meaning. 
4.2.2 The phenomenological priority of the realm of meaning 
To substantiate my claim about the phenomenological priority of the realm of 
meaning, I will briefly discuss the way in which McDowell presents the 
distinction between the realm of law and the realm of meaning in Mind and 
World. McDowell insists that, although the realm of meaning and the realm of law 
are houipart of nature, they each have their own logic. The realm of meaning and 
the realm of law are both in the world, but they exist separately, so to speak; 'the 
structure of the space of reasons cannot be integrated into the layout of the realm 
of law1 (1994b:88). What kind of distinction is McDowell drawing here, an 
epistemological one or an ontological one? What is the difference between the 
kinds of logic associated with the realm of law and the realm of meaning? The 
realm of law, McDowell says, is marked by the kind of intelligibility that is 
sought by natural science; it is the intelligibility of phenomena as governed by 
law. The realm of meaning is marked by the intelligibility of a phenomenon as 
placed in relation to other occupants of the space of reasons. We can distinguish 
between two ways of understanding the difference between these two kinds of 
intelligibility: first, as a difference on the epistemological level, and second, as a 
difference on the ontological level. I shall argue that within the outlook advocated 
by Mind and World, no criteria are available for drawing the distinction either 
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way. I will, in other words, argue that McDowell should conceive of the realm of 
law as part of the realm of meaning. I will now consider the first, epistemological 
interpretation. 
Strictly speaking, if the law-governed connections between phenomena, 
as discerned by natural science, do not belong to the realm of meaning, it follows 
that to conceive of a phenomenon as a law-governed process is not to situate the 
phenomenon in the space of reasons. The problem which then arises is one of 
epistemic access. How can we have epistemic access to the realm of law, if its 
intelligibility is alien to the logic of the space of reasons? McDowell is aware of 
this problem and he grants that our epistemic access to the realm of law cannot 
be different from our access to the realm of meaning. The faculty of spontaneity, 
which is marked by the kind of intelligibility that is proper to the space of 
reasons, is operative in sensibility, and hence also in our experience of the non-
human, 'merely natural' world. 
Conceptual capacities, capacities for the kind of understanding whose 
correlate is the kind of intelligibility that is proper to meaning, are 
operative also in our perception of the world apart from human beings. 
(McDowell, 1994b:72) 
In fact, McDowell cannot but argue that our epistemic access to the realm of law 
is constituted by the conceptual capacities which also operate in our being 
responsive to the realm of meaning. The very aim of Mind and World is to argue 
for a notion of sensibility which is essentially characterized by responsiveness to 
meaning. To drop the notion of direct, conceptual access with regard to the realm 
of law would be to undermine the very project of Mind and World. It would be 
to reinstate the traditional dilemma of foundationalism and coherentism. If our 
access to the realm of law is not characterized by 'responsiveness to meaning', the 
only alternatives would be to reintroduce the notion of non-conceptual input, or 
to consider the relation between the mind and the realm of law to be merely 
causal. Of course, these are precisely the two options that McDowell seeks to 
overcome. 
Hence, McDowell must conceive of our epistemic access to the realm of 
law-governed processes as shaped by the same conceptual capacities as those 
belonging to the realm of meaning. However, if this is the case, then it must be 
the law-governed processes themselves which lack the kind of intelligibility 
displayed by meaning. If so, the difference between the realm of meaning and the 
realm of law is not a difference on the epistemological level, but on the 
ontologjcal level. If our epistemic access to the 'merely natural' world is shaped 
by the kind of intelligibility which is proper to meaning, the only way to make 
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sense of the claim that the realm of law still has its own intelligibility, is to read 
this as a claim on the ontologjcal level. 
I have now arrived at the second interpretation of McDowell's claim that 
the realm of law and the realm of meaning display a different kind of intelli-
gibility. If McDowell wants to hold on to an ontological difference between the 
realm of law and the realm of meaning, this difference cannot be the traditional 
one, which separates the realms by crediting the realm of law with an 'intrinsic', 
mind-independent existence, while the realm of meaning is denied this status. This 
traditional line of thinking would prescribe that, whereas the realm of meaning 
exists in virtue of human nature or what McDowell calls 'second nature', the realm 
of law exists independently of this. McDowell clearly rejects this reading of the 
ontological difference between the realm of law and the realm of meaning. The 
realm of law cannot be outside the sphere of the conceptual, i.e. external to the 
sphere of thinkable facts. The notion of a reality in itself, which is external to and 
independent of the realm of thinkable facts, suggests that the relation between 
mind and world is either a merely causal relation or a relation of givenness. It is 
only when we conceive of the world as an unbounded sphere of thinkable facts, 
that we can go beyond a foundationalist and a coherentist understanding of the 
relation between mind and world So, if the realm of law is to be distinguished 
ontologjcally from the realm of meaning, this must be an ontological distinction 
within the boundaries of the realm of thinkable facts. 
But then the pressing question becomes what could possibly be the ground 
for such an ontological distinction. If the realm of law is not external to the sphere 
of the conceptual and if our access to it is shaped by the kind of intelligibility 
proper to meaning, by what criterion can it be ontologically distinguished from the 
realm of meaning? I think that no such criterion is available to McDowell. 
The only way of holding on to the dualism of meaning and law as an 
ontological distinction is by simply insisting that both are ontologically primitive 
within the realm of thinkable facts. But this is unsatisfactory, since it has the 
peculiar implication that the realm of thinkable facts is somehow larger than the 
realm of meaning, as it also contains the realm of law. Attributing ontological 
primitiveness to the realm of law thus forces us to distinguish between the realm 
of meaning and the realm of thinkable facts. But this is incomprehensible by 
McDowell's own standards. The notion of thinkable facts is essentially linked with 
our faculty of spontaneity, 'our capacity to recognize and bring into being the kind 
of intelligibility that is proper to meaning'. Facts, McDowell says, are essentially 
capable of being embraced in thought in exercises of spontaneity (19946:28). So, 
for something to be a fact is for it to display the intelligibility of meaning, for it 
to be in the realm of meaning. To suppose that there is a set of thinkable facts 
outside the realm of meaning is not coherent. Therefore, it is not clear at all what 
it means to say that the realm of law is ontologically primitive. 
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I think the main reason for insisting on an ontological dualism between 
the realm of meaning and the realm of law is a remnant of physicalist prejudice 
on McDowell's part. McDowell argues that at the time of the modem scientific 
revolution, a clear-cut understanding of the realm of law became available 
(1994b:78). There is nothing wrong with this understanding, he claims, as long as 
we do not equate the realm of law with nature. I have argued that McDowell 
cannot leave this 'clear-cut understanding of the realm of law* intact and defend 
his conception of what it means to be real. We either re-enchant nature complete-
ly, or leave it dis-enchanted. The idea of a peaceful coexistence of the realm of 
law and the realm of meaning is problematic. I have tried to show that the only 
way to make room for McDowell's conception of world as the unbounded realm 
of thinkable facts is to deny the very idea of an autonomous realm of law. Since 
there are no criteria available to McDowell to separate the realm of law and the 
realm of meaning either epistemologically or ontologically, it follows that the 
realm of law cannot be located outside of the realm of meaning. This does not 
mean that there is no way of distinguishing between the kinds of logic associated 
with the realm of meaning and the realm of law. Nor does it imply a return to 
'medieval superstition'. It does imply that explanations pertaining to the realm of 
law presuppose the conceptual framework of the realm of meaning. To insist that 
this is a merely epistemological priority relation is misguided for the following 
reason. 
In order for talk about entities and processes in the realm of law to make 
sense, these entities and processes must have at least partly accessible identity or 
individuation conditions. As Strawson puts it, paraphrasing what he calls Kant's 
principle of significance: 
If we wish to use a concept in a certain way, but are unable to specify the 
kind of experience-situation to which the concept, used in that way, would 
apply, then we are not really envisaging any legitimate use ofthat concept 
at all. In so using it, we shall not merely be saying what we do not know, 
we shall not really know what we are saying. (Strawson, 1966:16) 
Our concepts of the entities and processes in the realm of law must have 
application conditions if they are to have content. Since these application 
conditions cannot be specified without recourse to the realm of meaning, the 
question is if there is any sense in claiming the ontological independence of the 
realm of law from the realm of meaning. What are we claiming to be metaphysi-
cally independent from the realm of meaning? Normally, in claiming the existence 
of processes and entities in the realm of law, we are not claiming the existence of 
some inarticulate physical glob or TJrstoff. We are claiming the existence of items 
with more or less fixed identity conditions. But in doing so, we are presupposing 
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that the realm of law possesses an as-structure, a set of similarity relations which 
objects and processes get their identity from, no less than items in the realm of 
meaning. To account for our legitimate use of concepts for physical entities and 
processes, we have to assume that in our perception and conception of both the 
realm of law and the realm of meaning, we are being responsive to meaning or 
open to as-structures displayed by the world. Thus, we have to assume, as a matter 
of intelligibility, that the entities and processes in the realm of law have meaning's 
'mode of being'. In that sense, the realm of law is part of the realm of meaning.13 
The attempt to distinguish the realm of law ontologically, while granting that our 
epistemic access to it is characterized by the intelligibility characteristic of 
meaning, rests on an unintelligible nature/access distinction. By calling the priority 
of the realm of meaningphenomenological, as opposed to either epistemologica] 
or ontological, I want to express the impossibility of separating the question of the 
nature of the realm of law and the question of our access of it. 
From the claim that the realm of law must be conceived as having 
'meaning's mode of being', it does not follow that it is mind-dependent. We do not 
of course by mind-power create the entities and processes of the realm of law. Nor 
am I claiming that we 'project' identity conditions into the merely physical. Rather, 
in saying that talk about syntactic or physical properties as individuated items 
involves being responsive to an as-structure in the world, I am proposing a 
conception of world, according to which the world and the realm of meaning 
coincide. As will be further explained in the next section, the world in this 
conception is mind-wdependent in a causal sense but it is not, as McDowell puts 
it, external to the conceptual sphere, in that it is 'essentially embraceable by 
thought'. In the next section I will discuss the objection of idealism, that is likely 
to be raised against this notion of world. Before turning to the objection of 
idealism, I will discuss one other objection to McDowell's conception of the 
autonomy of the personal level in perception, raised by Akeel Bilgrami (1994). 
13My point about the relation between the realm of law and the realm of meaning can also be phrased as a 
point about the relation between causal constraints versus rational constraints In chapter 1 (section 1 4), in 
discussing the issue of reference, I introduced the notion of metaphysical causality, as opposed to empirical 
causality I argued that Putnam's point about the interest-relativity of causal explanation shows not so much that 
metaphysical (or 'noumenal') causality is inaccessibile to us, but that the notion of metaphysical causality lacks 
sense since causes can only be said to have identity conditions within a particular explanation space What 
follows from the above critique of McDowell's dualism of meaning and law is that the realm of law should be 
conceived as the realm of empirical causality Empirical causes have meaning's mode of being This implies that 
the distinction between causal and rational constraints is a distinction that can only be drawn within the realm 
of meaning 
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4.2.3 The autonomy of personal level accounts of perception: 
Bilgrami's objection 
As mentioned before, McDowell denies that a cognitive-scientific account of 
perception in terms of sub-personal 'informational' transactions can provide us 
with a constitutive (as opposed to an enabling) explanation of perception. Bilgrami 
argues that McDowell's objections to the 'inferential picture of visual perception' 
(defended by Dennett among others) are motivated by the need to overcome 
Humean epistemological skepticism about 'our right to the idea -obvious to 
everyone- that we inhabit a world of objects external to us' (Bilgrami, 1994:210). 
The inferential (sub-personal processing) picture suggests that our access to the 
'external' world is indirect and highly tenuous. McDowell argues that a constitutive 
explanation of perception in terms of the inferential (interface) picture must be 
rejected since it makes a mystery out of the plainest phenomenological fact there 
is: that we are in touch with and rationally constrained by a world not of our 
making. 
Hume, in [McDowell's] story, had a defective picture of experience in 
which objects were treated as extrinsic to the experience itself. This 
generated in Hume an epistemological pessimism which amounted to an 
insight because it was a pessimism appropriate to the inadequacy of his 
own picture of experience. It was a pessimism about our right to the idea, 
a pessimism about the rational reconstructibility of the idea - obvious to 
everyone - that we inhabit a world of objects external to us. Kant, the real 
hero of the story, is awakened by this suggestive pessimism, and he 
proceeds to remove the ground for the pessimism by offering a superior 
notion of experience, in which objects, by way of a transcendental 
synthesis, are no longer thought of as a extrinsic to our experiences. Now, 
(...) Dennett's commitment to objects as inferred from the deliverances of 
visual subsystems, is a pre-Kantian commitment to, at best, an empirical 
rather than a transcendental synthesis, which, were he to reflect on the 
epistemological implications of his philosophy of mind, would induce in 
him a deep Humean pessimism. And it is part of McDowell's complaint 
that a substantial infantry of philosophers who exploit the cognitive-
scientific framework march blindly on with constitutive rather than 
enabling accounts of conscious visual experience because they do not pay 
attention to these epistemological implications of their view. (Bilgrami, 
1994: 210) 
I think this is a fair summary of McDowell's reasons for rejecting the inferential 
picture of perception as a constitutive account of our 'dealings with content'. 
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McDowell's point is that the complex sub-personal processes involved in a 
creature's contentful dealings with the environment should not be interpreted as 
an interface made up of subpersonal contents or representations. Such an 
interpretation would have disastrous epistemological consequences, in that it 
induces a radical form of skepticism about the accessibility of the 'external' world. 
This kind of skepticism, I tried to show in the previous chapters, borders on 
absurdity as it threatens to make senseless the very notion of content or of belief. 
As Bilgrami points out, McDowell holds that 'the infantry of philosophers who 
exploit the cognitive-scientific framework' are blind to these consequences as they 
implicitly allow themselves 'an unjustified pre-Humean epistemological optimism' 
(Bilgrami, 1994:210). 
Bilgrami argues that McDowell's diagnosis of the situation is false. He 
claims that the inferential picture of perception can be saved as a constitutive 
account of our 'dealings with content' since we may safely reject 'deep Humean 
pessimism'. Bilgrami focuses on Dennett as a representative of the inferential 
picture and he suggests the following line of defence on Dennett's part: 
Granted that my view [he may say] has as an essential implication that 
objects in the world we take ourselves as obviously inhabiting are 
inferences from something more purely inner which is delivered by the 
visual subsystem, we may allow ourselves the optimism my use of 
'obviously1 here reflects, on the following grounds. There are general, 
philosophical reasons to conclude that we could not in general have the 
vast panoply of experiences we have (experiences describable contentfully 
as 'I have a visual experience that that cat is asleep') but to whose 
contents external objects are extrinsic, without these objects in general 
being the causes of these experiences. (...) It is vital here that what we 
have concluded is that these objects merely cause our experiences, for that 
makes it clear that nothing like McDowell's demand that the objects be 
directly taken in as present in the content of experiences is being 
conceded. (Bilgrami, 1994:211) 
Bilgrami appeals to an abductive strategy to counter deep Humean pessimism 
about the accessibility of the external world. He argues that our having the 
experiences we have can only be explained by their being causally linked to 
external objects. This does not mean, as Bilgrami stresses, that we have to 
conceive of perception as a direct taking in of how things are. The idea of a 
merely causal link between our experiences and external objects falls well short 
of McDowell's image of openness. Nevertheless, the need to posit causal relations 
to external objects underlying our experiences 'fully justifies our optimism about 
our inhabiting a world of external objects. If so, we have reconciled the 
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extrinsicness of the objects to experience with a new-found post-Rumean 
epistemological optimism' (Bilgrami, 1994:211). 
I think that Bilgrami's attempt to disarm skepticism in a pre-Kantian 
fashion founders on the following stumbling blocks. The first problem is that the 
need to posit causal links with external objects is strictly speaking not obligatory. 
Once we grant that skepticism is a coherent option, a hypothetical skeptic may 
legitimately retort that an Evil Demon or Evil Scientist might be causally respon-
sible for creating the perceptual experiences we have. In other words, Bilgrami 
offers one possible explanation for the fact that we have the 'vast panoply of 
experiences we have', but there is no way of ascertaining that this is the only, or 
even the best explanation. 
The second, more interesting problem is that positing merely causal links 
with the external world deprives us of the possibility to conceive of our empirical 
beliefs as rationally constrained by the world. As McDowell puts it, causal 
relations only offer exculpations where we want justifications. Denying a 
semantical or cognitive link between the content of our perceptual experiences and 
the 'external' world is, as we saw in the previous chapter, characteristic of a 
coherentist position. The problem with this position, as McDowell has argued, is 
that it tries to account for the content of our empirical beliefs by leaving out the 
'external world' as a semantical factor. In chapter 3 (section 3.1.2), I have 
discussed McDowell's argument for the claim that the individuation of contents 
is essentially world-involving. I will not repeat this argument here. Bilgrami 
admits that content cannot be constitutively explained in terms of the merely 
formal features of a syntactic engine. But he claims the problem of content can 
be solved without turning to McDowell's version of direct perceptual realism. 
Bilgrami points out that Dennett's idea of a syntactic engine not just involves 
syntax or formal features but also notional or fictional worlds, in other words 
agents' conceptions of things (1994:212). 'And', so he adds, 'I do not see why 
something as rich as that should not be described as content' (ibid.). Thus, 
Bilgrami argues, we can account for content while excluding the environment in 
content-individuation, i.e. while rejecting McDowell's view of the autonomy of the 
personal level. In my view, this conclusion does not follow for the same reason 
that Bermudez's argument failed. To attribute genuine content to sub-personal 
states and processes is to commit the homunculus fallacy. The notion of an agent's 
conception of things is not available at the juò-personal level of explanation. 
Moreover, apart from this difficulty, the notion of perceptual experiences 
envisaged by Bilgrami is basically the notion of sense data, i.e. the notion of 
sensory experiences which are not world-involving in a semantical way. The 
problems facing this notion have been discussed in chapter 3. 
The third and final problem that Bilgrami's line of reasoning runs into is 
the problem of miderdetermination as raised by Putnam's model-theoretic 
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argument. If we recognize merely causal relations between perceptual experiences 
or 'seemings' and external objects, we get stuck with the problem of how to pick 
the 'appropriate causal link' between an already fixed content and the environment. 
As was discussed in chapter 1, section 1.4, the standard response to this argument 
is to claim that we need not be able io pick out the relevant causal chain for it to 
be there. I argued there that this response to the model-theoretic argument fails as 
it rests on an untenable distinction between the level of epistemologica! claims and 
the level of ontologjcal claims. To claim the existence of causal chains 'out there' 
without providing an account of our epistemic access to them is to make a claim 
that is not just gratuitous, but empty. The notion of causality appealed to by 
Bilgrami is a notion of metaphysical causality which, lacking in principle 
accessible identity conditions, is devoid of meaning. The problem with Bilgrami's 
positing of causal links with external objects is, to quote Strawson again, that 'we 
shall not merely be saying what we do not know; we shall not really know what 
we are saying' (1966:16). 
Sofar, I have argued that the objections raised by Bermudez and Bilgrami 
fail to provide us with an argument for rejecting the autonomy of the personal 
level or the realm of meaning. However, I have also argued that McDowell's 
conception of the relation between the realm of meaning and the realm of law 
should be modified in such a way that the realm of meaning is conceived as 
phenomenologjcally prior to the realm of law. I argued that the realm of law has 
'meaning's mode of being' in the sense that there are neither epistemological nor 
ontological criteria available for locating the realm of law outside of the realm of 
meaning. I argued that we should conceive of the world as coinciding with the 
realm of meaning. What it means to be real is to be part of the sphere of thinkable 
facts, which has, as McDowell puts it, no outer boundary. To be real is to have 
meaning's mode of being, i.e. to be essentially epistemically accessible or 
'embraceable by thought'. Does this conception of what it means to be real imply 
an idealist notion of world? It is to this question that I will turn in the next and 
final section of this chapter. 
4.3 Idealism 
Metaphysical realism and to an important extent internal realism rely on four 
assumptions about the meaning of realism (AMR), so I have argued. The first 
three tenets have to do with a rigorous nature/access distinction, which has been 
criticized in the previous chapters. The fourth one, which will be under discussion 
in this section, states that within the realism debate, the relation between mind and 
world is to be captured in terms of either an independence relation or a 
dependence relation. Metaphysical realists often accuse internal realism, both in 
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Putnam's and Rorty*s version, of implying idealism, which they understand to be 
the thesis that the world is wholly or partly created by, and thus causally 
dependent on, the mind. Curtis Brown describes idealism as 'an ontologica] view 
[which] holds that what there is depends on our own mental structure and activity1 
(1987:145). He quotes Perry, who has formulated the cardinal principle of 
idealism as the principle that "being is dependent on the knowing of it' (Brown, 
1987:145). Dancy and Sosa, in their A Companion to Epistemologa, distinguish 
a number of'epistemic versions' of idealism, which are less strong than the above-
mentioned 'ontological idealism', in that they do not go as far as saying that the 
world is dependent on the mind in a causal or constitutive way (1992:187-191). 
It is not easy to determine what kind of idealism, if any, internal realists 
are committed to. In Reason, Truth and History, some of Putnam's formulations 
surely support an idealist reading of internal realism, as when he says that 'the 
empirical world depends upon our criteria of rational acceptibility' (1981:134) and 
that 'the "real world" depends upon our values and vice versa' (ibid., 135). Or, in 
Realism and Reason, Putnam states that 'objects and reference arise out of 
discourse rather than being prior to discourse' (1983:xvi). Putnam's well-known 
dictum 'the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and world' suggests that 
the dependence relation is to be understood as going both ways. But in any case, 
the use of phrases such as 'depend', 'anse' and 'make up' in the above formulations 
indicate an idealist position in that they either posit a causal dependence relation 
between mind and world or a relation of constitution in the Kantian sense. 
Curtis Brown argues that internal realism is a species of transcendental 
idealism in that it holds that we can only determinately refer to (i.e. have access 
to) items in the 'phenomenal world', which is 'constituted' by our conceptual 
scheme (Brown, 1987:146). Brown claims that Putnam's internal realism is 
committed to the notion of an unknowable, noumenal reality. I have argued in 
chapter 2 that internal realism is an attempt precisely to overcome the pheno-
menal-noumenal distinction or the distinction between 'intrinsic' properties and 
properties 'for us'. I have also argued however that this attempt did not succeed. 
Internal realism is ambiguous. Briefly put, it tries to pull the plug out of the 
realism debate but it ends up in metaphysical antirealism. If my diagnosis is right, 
then Brown's interpretation is not so much inadequate as one-sided.14 
More recently, Putnam has admitted that his talk of dependence was 
unfortunate and actually beside the point. He points out that his disagreement with 
'
4However, to classify internal realism as transcendental idealism is ambiguous in another respect The 
question is what 'transcendental idealism' entails, see my discussion of Bird (1996) below (section 4 3 2) Bird 
attacks the 'traditionalist reading' of transcendental idealism, according to which it entails positing an unknowable 
reality 'underlying1 the phenomenal one Arguably, internal realism is a Kantian position in the traditionalist 
sense, but this position is, according to Bird, not the position defended by Kant 
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the metaphysical realist is not over the causal or logical independence of the 
world: 
Talk of independent existence makes little sense when what is at stake is 
neither ordinary causal nor ordinary logical independence. ( ) For these 
reasons, I have, especially in recent years, tried not to state my own 
doctrine as a doctrine of the dependence of the way things are on the way 
we talk (perhaps Rortys retention of this way of speaking betrays his deep 
linguistic idealism). (Putnam, 1994:301) 
If the issue at stake between the metaphysical realist and his opponent is not the 
independent existence of reality, what is the bone of contention? In this chapter 
and the previous one, I have tried to show the possibility of a postmodem 
Aristotelian realism, which pursues the quietisi15 line in internal realism, while 
avoiding its metaphysical antirealist tendencies. Now, the disagreement between 
the metaphysical realist and the 'postmodern Aristotelian realist' is not about the 
causal or constitutive independence of the world, but about the extent to which we 
can coherently raise doubt about the epistemic accessibility of the 'external' world 
The metaphysical realist thinks that we can intelligibly separate the (ontological) 
question of the nature of the world and the (epistemologjcal) question of our 
access to it. Accordingly, he holds that skepticism about the accessibility of the 
external world is a coherent option and a genuine challenge, to be answered by 
philosophical theories of perception, truth and reference. The postmodem 
Aristotelian realist argues that existence claims involve (minimal) accessibility 
claims, if they are to have content at all. In saying that existence claims and 
accessibility claims are conceptually tied, the postmodem Aristotelian realist does 
not put into question the causal independence of the world. Rather, he argues that 
skepticism about the accessibility of the world is necessarily local. 
4.3.1 McDowell's reply to the objection of idealism 
The notion of world proposed by McDowell, and by Putnam in his recent work, 
is unlike the metaphysical realist's one in that it is a conception of world that 
makes essential reference to thinkers, albeit not in a causal sense. The point of 
postmodem Aristotelian realism is that there is a conceptual dependence between 
the notion of mind and the notion of world, which goes both ways. Putnam's 
dictum that the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world 
"Quietisi in the sense of rejecting the skeptical problématique to which the realism controversy is a response. 
See chapter 5, section 5.2, for a further elucidation of the quiehst attitude and for a distinction between two 
versions of quietism. 
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should be rephrased as the claim that the notion of world cannot be given content 
without mentioning the notion of mind, nor can the notion of mind be understood 
in abstraction from the notion of worldly facts, i.e. thinkable contents. McDowell 
clarifies his notion of world in the second of his John Locke Lectures, in which 
he responds to the objection of idealism. 
The image of openness to reality is at our disposal because of how we 
place the reality that makes its impression on a subject in experience. 
Although reality is independent of our thinking, it is not to be pictured as 
outside an outer boundary that encloses the conceptual sphere. That things 
are thus and so is the conceptual content of an experience, but if the 
subject of the experience is not misled, that very same thing, that things 
are thus and so, is also a perceptible fact, an aspect of the perceptible 
world. (1994b:26) 
As we have seen above, McDowell has argued that neither foundationalist nor 
coherentist accounts of knowledge can make room for the idea that the world 
rationally constrains our beliefs. By portraying the relation between beliefs and 
reality as either one of givenness (for a privileged set of beliefs) or one of mere 
causation, both the foundationalist and the coherentist locate reality outside of the 
space of reasons. McDowell urges that we should conceive of the space of reasons 
as unbounded and that we should conceive of the world as essentially within the 
reach of it. 'We must not picture an outer boundary on the sphere of the 
conceptual, with a reality outside the boundary impinging inward on the system' 
(1994b: 34). Within the latter picture, the world cannot be said to exert a rational 
influence on thinking, since the 'space of reasons' is held in place, so to speak, by 
extra-conceptual links, which can only be causal and not rational. McDowell's 
point is that we should delete the outer boundary around the sphere of the 
conceptual and that we can do so without falling into idealism (1994b: 34). 
If we say that there must be a rational constraint on thought from outside 
it, so as to ensure a proper acknowledgement of the independence of 
reality, we put ourselves at the mercy of a familiar kind of ambiguity. 
'Thought' can mean the act of thinking; but it can also mean the content 
of a piece of thinking: what someone thinks. Now if we are to give due 
acknowledgement to the independence of reality, what we need is a 
constraint from outside thinking andjudging, our exercises of spontaneity. 
The constraint does not need to be from outside thinkable contents. It 
would indeed slight the independence of reality if we equated facts in 
general with exercises of conceptual capacities -acts of thinking- or 
represented facts as reflections of such things; or if we equated perceptible 
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facts in particular with states or occurrences in which conceptual 
capacities are drawn into operation in sensibility -experiences- or 
represented them as reflections of such things. But it is not idealistic, as 
that would be, to say that perceptible facts are essentially capable of 
impressing themselves on perceivers in states or occurrences of the latter 
sort; and that facts in general are essentially capable of being embraced 
in thought in exercises of spontaneity, occurrences of the former sort. The 
fact that experience is passive, a matter of receptivity in operation, should 
assure us that we have all the external constraint we can reasonably want. 
The constraint comes from outside thinking, but not from outside what is 
thinkable. (McDowell, 1994b:28) 
In arguing that we should not conceive of reality as external to, or outside of, the 
sphere of the conceptual, McDowell is not so much committing himself to an 
idealist position as trying to debunk the particular dualism of 'internal' and 
'external', associated with the interface theory.16 According to this dualist picture, 
mind and world belong to separate ontological realms, viz. the mental and the 
physical, between which an epistemological gap yawns. In my view, the most 
challenging thought put forward in Mind and World is the idea that we cannot 
close this epistemological gap without questioning the notion of an ontological 
gap. The image of openness (marking the closure of the epistemological gap) 
becomes available only when we conceive of the world as the realm of thinkable 
facts, i.e. as coinciding with the realm of meaning (closure of the ontological gap). 
The notion of an epistemological gap and the notion of an ontological gap stand 
or fall together. To reject the idea of an ontological gap is to reject physicalism. 
McDowell's notion of Openness to the world' is to be understood in terms of 
'responsiveness to meaning'. This implies that the world coincides with the realm 
of meaning. Meaning is here not conceived as the product of an interplay between 
conceptual scheme(s) and non-conceptual content. We do not create meaning or 
project it into the mere physical. The point of'realism without physicalism' is that 
we reject the notion of a reality that is 'in itself devoid of meaning. 
There is no ontological gap between the sort of thing one can mean, or 
generally the sort ofthing one can think, and the sort ofthing that can be 
the case. When one thinks truly, what one thinks is what is the case. So 
since the world is everything that is the case (..), there is no gap between 
thought, as such, and the world Of course thought can be distanced from 
'
6See chapter 3, especially section 3.4. 
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the world by being false, but there is no distance from the world implicit 
in the very idea of thought. (McDowell, 1994b:27) 
The realm of meaning is not dependent on us in a causal or constitutive way and 
yet the very idea of meaning is linked to the notion of thinkers and agents. 
Whereas the idealist (and to some extent the internal realist) holds that the world-
as-we-know-it is dependent on the mind in a causal or constitutive sense, the 
postmodem Aristotelian realist holds that there is a conceptual connection between 
the notion of mind and the notion of world which goes both ways. McDowell's 
conception of world as the unbounded sphere of thinkable facts makes essential 
reference to thinking, but his notion of thinking makes essential reference to the 
notion of world as well. There is no priority in either direction. 
By saying the world is made up of the sort of thing one can think, a 
phobia of idealism can make people suspect that we are renouncing the 
independence of reality - as if we were representing the world as a 
shadow of our thinking, or even as made of some mental stuff. But we 
might just as well take the fact that the sort of thing one can think is the 
same as the sort of thing that can be the case the other way round, as an 
invitation to understand the notion of the sort of thing one can think in 
terms of a supposedly prior understanding of the sort of thing that can be 
the case. And in fact there is no reason to look for a priority in either 
direction. (McDowell, 1994b:28) 
The idea that there is no ontologjcal gap between mind and world can also be 
expressed with the help of the notion offormal identity. In saying that in veridical 
perception, mind and world are formally identical, we are expressing the idea that 
the contents of one's mind in veridical perception are worldly facts, rather than 
representations of facts. As McDowell puts it in his (1986), 'objects themselves 
can figure in thoughts' (146). Insofar as the relation between mind and world is 
understood in terms of formal identity, i.e. as a 'unity of knower and known', there 
is no conceptual room for the standard distinction between question of the nature 
of the world, or the nature of truth and reference, on the one hand, and the 
question of our access to the world or our access to truth and reference on the 
other. There is, in other words, no room to state the modem skeptical problematic. 
The notion of formal identity is incompatible with an ontological dualism between 
a self-standing internal or inner mental realm on the one hand and an external, 
semantically irrelevant, physical realm on the other. 
According to the fourth tenet of AMR, what is at stake in the realism 
debate is whether the world is mind4Ìependent or mind-independent in a causal 
or constitutive sense. Metaphysical realists equate being real with being mind-
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independent in both senses. The postmodern Aristotelian realist does not so much 
want to deny that the world is mind-independent in a causal or constitutive sense. 
His claim is that the question what it means to be real should not be answered in 
terms of a causal dependence or independence relation to begin with. In the 
context of the problem of realism, talk about the relation between mind and world 
in causal terms misses the point in that it presupposes that both relata can be 
described independently, i.e. that they can be described as separate, autonomous 
realms. But this is precisely the assumption that is responsible for creating the idea 
of an epistemological gap and the ensuing seesaw between foundationalism and 
coherentism. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, postmodem Aristotelian realism 
denies the notion of an epistemological gulf between minds and reality. Crucial 
to this denial is a rejection of empiricism (the notion of non-conceptual input). In 
this chapter, I tried to show that the notion of an epistemological gap is closely 
associated with the notion of an ontologjcal gap between the mental and the 
physical. The 'image of openness' and the notion of formal identity put forward 
by the postmodem Aristotelian realist are available only when one denies the 
notion of an ontologjcal gap between mind and world. Crucial to this denial is a 
rejection of physicalism. 
4.3.2 McDowell and Kant 
I will close this chapter by discussing a recent commentary on McDowell's notion 
of world, put forward by Bird (1996). By discussing this paper, I hope to further 
clarify what McDowell's conception of what it is to be real amounts to. 
McDowell's argument in Mind and World, with its emphasis on the need 
to conceive of 'spontaneity1 as 'inextricably implicated in the deliverances of 
receptivity', is to an important extent phrased in Kantian terminology. At several 
places, McDowell explains his notion of world in relation to Kant's notion of 
'empirical reality1. It is central to Kant's view that, from the standpoint of 
experience, we cannot credit receptivity with a separable contribution to its co-
operation with spontaneity (McDowell, 1994b:41). The idea that we could, in 
experience, distinguish such an extra-conceptual contribution, that would constitute 
the ultimate grounding for everything conceptual, is characteristic of the Myth of 
the Given, which Kant seeks to overcome (ibid). The empirical reality we are 
being open to in experience is, in the Kantian picture, not outside the sphere of 
thinkable content. 'If we restrict ourselves to the standpoint of experience itself, 
what we find in Kant is precisely the picture I have been recommending: a picture 
in which reality is not located outside a boundary that encloses the conceptual 
sphere' (ibid). However, the Kantian picture of the relation between mind and 
world is multi-layered in that it seeks to illuminate that relation not only from the 
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'standpoint of experience' but also from the transcendental perspective. From the 
latter viewpoint, 
there does seem to be an isolable contribution from receptivity. In the 
transcendental perspective, receptivity figures as a susceptibility to the 
impact of a supersensible reality, a reality that is supposed to be 
independent of our conceptual activity in a stronger sense than any that 
fits the ordinary empirical world. (McDowell, 1994b:41) 
McDowell holds that, while Kant's notion of empirical reality presents us with a 
viable alternative to both the Myth of the Given and coherentism17, the potentially 
liberating force of this picture is spoilt by the transcendental story in which it is 
embedded.18 The transcendental perspective, McDowell argues, represents a 
sideways-on picture of the relation between mind and world (42). This picture 
reintroduces the fatal distinction between reality 'in itself, conceived as external 
to the sphere of the conceptual, and reality 'for us', understood as the 'product' of 
subjectivity in interaction, with supersensible, noumenal reality. Once the transcen-
dental story is in place, the independence of the empirical world cannot but seem 
to be fake compared to the noumenal world's radical mind-independence. 
The [transcendental] frame spoils the insight because the radical rrrind-
independence of the supersensible comes to seem exemplary of what any 
genuine mind-independence would be, and then when Kant purports to 
attribute mind-independence to the ordinary empirical world (...) , that 
looks merely disingenuous. (McDowell, 1994b:96) 
McDowell argues that Kant's transcendental story is an unfortunate and un-
necessary addition to the empirical story. He thinks we can disjoin Kantian 
empirical realism from the transcendental context in which it is embedded 
(McDowell, 1994b:95-96). McDowell argues that Wittgenstein points at a way of 
preserving 'empirical realism' without transcendental idealism: 
we might begin by trying to find in Wittgenstein a thought on these lines: 
world and mind (...) are transcendentally made for each other. What 
"These terms are of course alien to Kant However, as Bird points out, 'the swing which McDowell marks 
between the Mythical Given and an extreme coherentism matches Kant's explicit picture of an endless oscillation 
between dogmatism and scepticism, or between a Lockean realism and a Berkeleyan idealism' (Bird, 1996:221-
222). See Bird for references to Kant. 
18McDowell largely accepts Strawson's reading of Kant in The Bounds of Sense (1966). 
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makes it appropriate to call the Kantian version of such a thought 
'idealism' is, to put it crudely again, that the constituting of this harmony 
between world and mind is supposed to be a transcendental operation of 
mind: not, of course, the empirical mind, which is in constituted harmony 
with the world, but an off-stage transcendental mind. But nothing matches 
that in Wittgenstein. 'How we go on' is just our mindedness, which is ex 
hypothesi in constituted harmony with our world; it is not something that 
constitutes the harmony, as it were from outside. And now we should be 
struck by the thought that there is nothing in Wittgenstein's picture to do 
the constituting of the harmony. (McDowell, 1994b: 159) 
Graham Bird has recently argued that McDowell's (and Strawson's) account of 
Kant represents a widespread but nonetheless misguided interpretation of what the 
'transcendental perspective' amounts to. In this 'traditionalist' reading, Bird argues, 
the transcendental story is mistaken for a 'material', empirical account of the 
relation between noumena and phenomena Conceived in that way, the transcen-
dental story is interpreted as an empirical story about our psychological make-up 
(Bird, 1996:229). It is thought to posit a supersensible reality and to be committed 
to a causal relation between noumena and our senses (226). In this 'material' 
reading of Kant's project, the transcendental story in fact becomes a transcendent 
story or, in McDowell's terms, a sideways-on picture. However, Bird stresses, this 
reading is in conflict with the explicit, threefold distinction that Kant draws 
between empirical claims, transcendent claims and transcendental claims. 
Whereas both empirical and transcendent claims are material claims about the 
world, transcendental claims are formal claims which seek to articulate the 
preconditions for some aspect of experience. What makes these claims formal as 
opposed to material is that they do not aim at unraveling the pre-conditions for 
experience in a temporal sense (Bird, 1996:228/9), by giving an empirical account 
of the causal origins of some aspect of experience. Rather, they seek to explicate 
'the a priori, formal, rules, which govern our experience in contrast to the a 
posteriori, material realization of those rules' (Bird, 1996:228). A transcendental 
claim is 
a claim about the formal conditions presupposed by some aspect of ex-
perience, and not a material reference to some supersensible item which 
chronologically precedes it (Bird, 1996:231). 
Accordingly, the 'transcendental story1 does not represent a sideways-on picture 
of the relation between mind and world, but a 'descriptive inventory of our 
experience' (Bird, 1996:239), or, as I would put it, aphenomenological articulation 
of what is involved in experiencing the world as we do. 
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If understood that way, the transcendental distinction between noumena 
and phenomena does not involve claiming the existence of a reality inaccessible 
in principle. That would be a material, transcendent claim. And as Bird points out, 
it is Kant himself who urged that all our attempts to talk about the transcendent 
in a material mode end up in antinomies. Nevertheless, according to Kant we need 
the concept of noumenal reality as a formal notion to account for normativity both 
in the epistemic and the moral sphere. The anti-traditionalist picture that Bird 
proposes 
represents Kant's commitment to noumena not as a material commitment 
to a supernatural world, but as a commitment to its conceivability. It 
claims that that conceivability is required if such features as normativity, 
even in the moral sphere, are to be properly located. (Bird, 1996:243) 
In Bird's interpretation of the noumena/phenomena distinction, to construe the 
reality of noumena as 'more independent' than the reality of phenomena is 
misguided. Kant does not claim the reality of noumena to begin with. 'The reality 
of appearances has priority and the supposed reality of noumena is an illusion' 
(Bird, 1996:234). In putting forward the notion of'things in themselves', Kant is 
not committing himself to the existence of a reality inaccessible in principle. He 
is neither affirming nor denying the reality of a supersensible reality but he is 
stating its conceivability. To say anything more than that would amount to an 
attempt to make material claims about the transcendent.19 That would be to give 
in to a characteristic metaphysical impulse, due to the fact that 'our concepts, 
essential as they are for empirical experience, carry with them the temptation to 
transcend it' (Bird, 1996:228). The distinction between 'things in themselves' and 
'appearances' is intended to guard us against this temptation. Thus conceived, 
Kant's transcendental story does not present us with a sideways on picture, as 
McDowell has it, but it is intended precisely to remind us of the impossibility of 
a 'sideways on picture' or 'God's Eye View1. 
Moreover, Kant's emphasis on the impossibility of a sideways on picture 
should not be be understood as a version of skepticism about the accessibility of 
"Since all such attempts lead to antinomies, Putnam has suggested that our attitudes towards the transcendent 
are to be located in the realm of religion rather than that of discursive discourse- 'I am not inclined to scoff at 
the idea of a noumenal ground behind the dualities of experience, even if all attempts to talk about it lead to 
antinomies. Analytic philosophers have always tried to dismiss the transcendental as nonsense, but it does have 
an cene way of reappearing (..) Because one cannot talk about the transcendent or even deny its existence 
without paradox, one's attitude to it must, perhaps, be the concern of religion rather than of rational philosophy1. 
(Putnam, 1983 226) 
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the 'external' world Since on the above reading, the notions of noumena and 
phenomena do not correspond with different worlds (Bird, 1996:229), there is no 
way of construing appearances as standing 'in between' us and reality 'in itself. 
Talking in the material mode, the reality of appearances is the only reality there 
is. Our access to the world is not mediated by appearances. As Bird stresses, Kant 
departs from traditional empiricism in refusing to conceive of appearances as 
'subjective' mental states or sensations (Bird, 1996:233/4). 
The traditional question of how, or whether, our appearances relate to 
reality simply does not arise; in general and apart from the incidence of 
illusions, those appearances, those representations, just are our reality. 
That sceptical issue arises only in the context of a dualism, and a 
tradition, which Kant evidently rejects. (Bird, 1996:243) 
If Bird's interpretation of Kant's project is right, then the Kantian position comes 
much closer to McDowell's stance than McDowell himself realizes. McDowell 
points out that his 'image of openness' roughly coincides with Kant's conception 
of our access to 'empirical (phenomenal) reality1 as being direct as well as 
involving conceptual capacities. From 'the standpoint of experience', the relation 
between mind and world is one of formal identity: 'the appearances just are our 
reality1, as Bird puts it. However, pace McDowell, the transcendental story does 
not so much undermine this 'liberating insight'. Qn the contrary, it serves to 
highlight the point that we cannot make sense of an epistemological-cum-
ontological gap between worldly facts and the contents of our minds. The attempt 
to make sense of such a gap rests on the idea that we can untie the conceptual 
link between existence claims and accessibility claims, i.e. that we can intelligibly 
posit the existence of a reality that is inaccessible to us in principle. But such an 
existence claim would amount to a material claim about the realm of the transcen-
dent. Thus, on Bird's reading, the point of Kant's transcendental story is precisely 
that a sideways on picture of the relation between mind and world founders on an 
unintelligible separation of the question of the nature of reality and the question 
of our epistemic access to reality. Accordingly, the skeptical question of the 
accessibility of the 'extemal' world comes out as a misplaced question. 
Bird remarks that 'Kant's account of experience is anthropocentric, but not 
traditionally idealist' (Bird, 1996:241). Idealism20, just like metaphysical or 
'dogmatic' realism, is itself a transcendent claim, a sideways on picture of the 
relation between mind and reality. Another way of saying that Kant's position is 
anthropocentric is to say that his account of experience is intended as a 
"In its mtological version, distinguished at the beginning of this section, in which it claims the causal or 
constitutive dependence of the world on the mental. 
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phenomenologjcal description, not as a reply to the skeptic. According to Bird, 
'Kant's project is that of constructing a descriptive "inventory" of our experience121, 
an inventory moreover, 'which goes against a standard traditionalism whose central 
task is to seek a philosophical justification for knowledge against skepticism' 
(Bird, 1996:139). Instead of offering a reply to the skeptic, 'we might conjecture 
that his response is to say that [his] inventory (..) shows that sceptics have 
misdescribed our experience.' On this view, what is wrong with skepticism is that 
its account of the 'human condition' is phenomenologically inaccurate. Thus, 
Kant's notion of transcendental claims brings with it a particular conception of 
philosophy. A conception, moreover, which should be sympathetic to McDowell, 
since it fits in with a quietist attitude towards the problem of skepticism, which 
McDowell praises in Wittgenstein. 
I have discussed Bird's reflections on McDowell's interpretation of Kant 
in some detail not to establish to what extent McDowell has provided an adequate 
historical rendering of Kant's intentions. My aim was to clarify McDowell's notion 
of world further. I have tried to show that McDowell's position is in fact very 
close to the position that Bird ascribes to Kant. What is interesting about Bird's 
interpretation, as a systematic point, is that he points at the possibility of a non-
skeptical reading of the Ding an sich notioa Moreover, he shows how Kant's 
conception of the relation between mind and world goes hand in hand with a view 
of philosophy as the project of providing a phenomenologically accurate 
description or inventory of our experience. In the next chapter (section 5.2), I will 
come back to this notion of philosophy. 
21The notion of sudi a project is, as Bird remarks, similar to what Strawson has called 'descriptive' as 




POSTMODERN ARISTOTELIAN REALISM 
In chapters 3 and 4 I sketched a conception of what it means to be real, which 
departs from AMR. This conception provides an alternative to both metaphysical 
realism and internal realism. However, postmodern Aristotelian realism can hardly 
be called a 'middle-position' or a 'synthesis' of the latter two positions. The kind 
of realism I have defended in the previous two chapters is in the first place a 
rejection of the modem 'problem of realism' or the 'problem of the accessibility 
of the external world'. It claims that this problématique starts from a set of 
assumptions about what it means to be real, which are in the end unintelligible. 
Postmodern Aristotelian realism tries to make room for a 'second naïveté' about 
our realist intuitions. 
In the first part of this chapter (5.1), I will explore what the consequences 
of such an attitude are for the issue of truth and the issue of reference. In chapter 
1, in discussing metaphysical realism, I criticized the correspondence theory of 
truth and the causal theory of reference. In chapter 2, in discussing internal 
realism, I argued against both verificationist and deflationist notions of truth and 
against the internal realist view of reference. The question which now arises is 
whether postmodern Aristotelian realism is able to come up with notions of truth 
and reference which avoid the problems confronting the above-mentioned 
positions. In section 5.11 will discuss the issue of truth and reference. I will not 
attempt to cover the extensive issue of truth. What I will do is try to clarify the 
postmodem Aristotelian's approach to truth by discussing two papers, by Putnam 
(1995) and Dodd (1995), which both reflect on the possibility of a notion of truth 
that is realist without being non-epistemic. Putnam argues that although truth 
cannot be reduced to any notion of justifiability, the notions of truth and 
justifiability nevertheless have to be conceived as 'conceptually connected'. Dodd 
claims that McDowell, in Mind and World, implicitly embraces a version of the 
so-called 'identity theory of truth'. He argues, moreover, that McDowell's version 
of the identity theory is untenable in that it equivocates between two incompatible 
notions of fact. In discussing these two papers, I will try to provide a rough sketch 
of the postmodern Aristotelian's approach to the problem of truth. I will argue 
that, although his notion of truth is realist, it does not run foul of the 'sentence-
shaped chunks objection' or the 'God's Eye View objection'. Furthermore, I will 
briefly discuss the way in which the postmodem Aristotelian's notion of world 
makes available a realist notion of reference which is nonetheless not non-
epistemic (or 'metaphysical realist'). 
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In the second part of this chapter (5.2), I will indicate what 'postmodern' 
means in 'postmodern Aristotelian realism' or, what comes to the same, what 
'second' means in 'second naïveté'. Haldane has argued that Putnam's recent plea 
for a -qualified- return to 'Aristotelian innocence' in fact marks a return to 
metaphysical realism. Of course, it is crucial to my argument that postmodern 
Aristotelian realism differs significantly from metaphysical realism. To explain 
one important aspect of this difference, I will take up the issue (touched upon at 
the end of the last chapter) of how postmodern Aristotelian realism is connected 
with a particular conception of philosophy, incompatible with the metaphysical 
realist's project. On this non-foundationalist conception, philosophical claims are, 
or should be, formal or conceptual claims about aspects of our experience. The 
notion of a second naïveté, I will argue, indicates that we cannot simply go back 
to 'Aristotelian innocence' in the sense of re-endorsing it as a material, ontologjcal-
cw/n-epistemological claim about the world. Rather, postmodern Aristotelian 
realism is a formal claim about the unintelligibility of skepticism regarding the ac-
cessibility of the 'external' world. In its postmodern version, Aristotelian realism 
should be understood as aphenomenological claim about the limits of sense. More 
generally, I will argue in favour of a conception of philosophy as a conceptual or 
phenomenological entreprise, which seeks to articulate the bounds of sense 'from 
within'. As the notion of 'conceptual analysis' has become suspect since Quine's 
attack on the notion of analyticity, I will briefly go into Putnam's and McDowell's 
response to this attack. To spell out in greater detail what the postmodern 
Aristotelian's conception of philosophy amounts to, I will discuss Strawson's view 
of the aim of analytical philosophy and in particular his notion of 'descriptive 
metaphysics'. I will point out that, although the descriptive metaphysician is 
quietist about the 'problem of realism', he leaves room for systematic philosophical 
inquiry. 
5.1 Truth revisited 
In chapter 1,1 pointed out that the correspondence theory of truth relies on a rigid 
distinction between the question of the nature of truth and the question of our 
access to truth. I argued that the sophisticated version of the internal realist 
critique of correspondence shows this nature/access distinction to ultimately 
collapse into incoherence. This does not mean that truth should be reduced to an 
epistemic notion such as warranted assertibility or even ideal justifiability. The 
internal realist conception of truth, in Putnam's version, is, as I tried to show in 
chapter 2, an unstable mixture of verificationism and quietism. In Rortys version, 
the verificationist element is eliminated, but the price is that truth as a normative 
notion has to be considered redundant. I argued that this price it too high. 
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Postmodern Aristotelian realism is an attempt to take the internal realist 
critique of metaphysical realism to heart without collapsing into metaphysical 
antirealism Its central claim therefore is that there is a way of moving beyond 
both metaphysical realism and metaphysical antirealism. If the realism-antirealism 
controversy is to be depicted as a seesaw, then the postmodern Aristotelian's 
suggestion is that AMR constitutes the motionless part in the middle. By removing 
that part, the seesaw will fall apart. The claim is mat, by abandoning AMR, we 
reject the conceptual constellation from which the 'problem of realism' arises. 
What does this mean for the issue of truth? As I pointed out before, to 
reject the nature/access distinction as formulated in AMR is to reject the problem 
of 'the accessibility of the external world'. To attack AMR is to question the 
intelligibility of skepticism. To question the intelligibility of skepticism is to reject 
the quest for a definition or theory of truth, insofar as such a theory seeks to 
provide a reply to the skeptic. So, in that sense, the postmodern Aristotelian takes 
up a quietist stance towards the 'problem of tram'.1 As will be explained in 
section 5.1.3, such a quietist stance implies that one declines the attempt to 
provide a non-circular, reductive definition of truth. However, this does not mean-
that there is nothing more to say about the concept of truth. Renouncing the 
foundationalist project leaves (or makes) room for the project of providing a 
phenomenologically accurate articulation of the concept of truth.2 Such a 
phenomenological description or 'inventory* aims at a non-reductionist exploration 
of the conceptual connections between the notions of truth, reference, meaning, 
justification, etcetera. In this section I will give an outline of such an exploration. 
I will sketch the postmodem Aristotelian realist's approach to truth, which can be 
summarized as an attempt to show how we can understand truth in a realist way 
without conceiving of it as a non-epistemic notion. I will clarify this approach to 
truth by discussing two papers, Dodd (1995) and Putnam (1995). 
Dodd attributes an 'identity theory of truth' to McDowell, according to 
which a proposition is true if and only if it is identical with a fact. Dodd argues 
moreover that McDowell is confused about the ontological status of facts and that, 
therefore, his conception of truth equivocates between triviality and absurdity. I 
will argue that Dodd misunderstands McDowell's notion of world. I shall claim 
that McDowell's notion of world allows him to coherently conceive of true 
propositions as identical to worldly facts. Moreover, I will argue that it allows him 
to adopt a realist notion of facts while avoiding the 'sentence-shaped chunks' 
objection, discussed in chapter 1. 
'It thereby pursues one side of Putnam's Janus-faced conception of truth during the 1980"s; see chapter 2, 
section 2.1. 
2The difference between these two projects will be discussed in section 5.2.3. 
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Putnam suggests that although truth transcends even ideal rational ac-
ceptibility3, the notions of truth and justifiability are nevertheless conceptually 
connected through the notion of understanding. I will argue that recognizing this 
connection enables the postmodern Aristotelian to capture the realist aspect of 
truth without running foul of the God's Eye View objection, on which the 
metaphysical realist's notion of truth was seen to founder in chapter 1. 
5.1.1 The identity theory of truth 
In 'McDowell and Identity Theories of Truth', Julian Dodd discusses the view of 
truth that he thinks is implicated by (rather than explicitly stated in) Mind and 
World. He argues that McDowell adopts an identity theory of truth. In the past, 
this theory has in various forms been defended by, among others, Russell, Moore 
and Bradley.4 Dodd defines the identity theory as follows: 
According to an identity theory of truth, a proposition is true if and only 
if it is identical with a fact. Whereas a correspondence theorist holds that 
facts are extralinguistic items which make propositions true, an identity 
theorist, by contrast, believes true propositions to be facts. From the 
perspective of the identity theorist, the correspondence theorist is guilty 
of double vision: she looks for correspondence where there can only be 
coincidence. (Dodd, 1995:160) 
Dodd argues that McDowell in fact embraces the identity theory when he rejects 
the notion of an ontological gap between mind and world, and when he says 
things such as: 'When one thinks truly, what one thinks is the case' and 'the world 
is made up of the sort ofthing one can trunk1.5 However, Dodd goes on to argue, 
there are actually two versions of the identity theory, a robust and a modest one. 
McDowell, he claims, conflates these two versions, which are not only distinct but 
incompatible. 
A robust identity theory conceives of facts as constituted by particular, 
mind-independent objects and properties.6 'A robust identity theory, in identifying 
'Putnam here explicitly distances himself from his former 'internal realist1 view of truth. 
*See Baldwin (1991) for a discussion of the various versions of the identity theory defended by Moore, 
Russell, and Bradley. 
'Quoted by Dodd (1995) on p.160 and p.161 respectively; the quotes are from McDowell (1994b:27) and 
(1994b:27-28) respectively. 
'Dodd considers G.E Moore to be a main representative of the robust identity theory (Dodd, 1991:161). 
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true propositions with such worldy items, eradicates the gap between content and 
reality" (Dodd, 1995:161). The robust identity theorist accepts the correspondence 
theorist's notion of facts as mind-independent entities. He differs with the 
correspondence theorist in holding that true propositions and facts are identical 
rather than ontologjcally distinct items. Dodd considers this account of truth to be 
substantial, as opposed to the modest identity theory, which may be called truistic. 
According to the modest identity theory, which Dodd attributes to Frege, facts are 
identified with true Thoughts. But true Thoughts, on this account, have senses as 
their constituents and not objects and properties. Frege considers objects and 
properties to belong to the 'realm of reference', as opposed to the 'realm of sense'. 
Therefore, facts are here not considered to be worldly things. 'For Frege, facts are 
true Thoughts rather than occupants of the world' (Dodd, 1995:161/2). 
Thus, there is an important metaphysical difference between the robust and 
the modest version of the identity theory. Dodd summarizes it as follows: 
According to the modest theory, facts are ushered out of the world and 
into the realm of sense, the occupants of the world remaining as they 
were. The robust theorist, by contrast, takes facts to be worldly, and 
denies that there is a realm of sense at all. (Dodd, 1995:162) 
Dodd argues that although McDowell claims that his rejection of a gap between 
thought and the world expresses nothing but a truism7, he is in fact committed to 
a robust identity theory, since he considers facts to be in the world. In other 
words, he considers true propositions to be identical with worldly items. However, 
as Dodd points out, McDowell obviously does not deny that there is a realm of 
sense. On the contrary, he considers facts to be constituted by senses, or as I have 
put it before, he considers the world, as the totality of facts, to coincide with the 
realm of meaning. Thus, it seems that McDowell wants to embrace a robust 
identity theory while holding on to the Fregean idea that true propositions have 
senses, rather than objects and properties, as constituents. McDowell appears to 
defend a version of the robust theory, 
according to which, facts, while worldly items, are identified with true 
Thoughts. On this alternative view, the world is the totality of facts, but 
'Dodd quotes the following passage from Mind and World: 'But to say that there is no gap between thought, 
as such, and the world is just to dress up a truism in high-flown language. All the point comes to is that one can 
think, for instance, that spring has begun, and that the very same thing, that spring has begun, can be the case. 
That is truistic, and it cannot embody something metaphysically contentious, like slighting the independence of 
reality (McDowell, 1994b:27). 
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these facts are composed of senses; hence the world is composed of 
senses. (Dodd, 1995:162) 
According to Dodd, this version of the robust identity theory 'ultimately collapses 
into coherence' (162), as it tries to combine two incompatible accounts of facts 
(163). On the one hand, McDowell wishes to identify facts with worldly items, 
i.e. objects and properties. On the other hand, he conceives of facts as the contents 
of true Thoughts. The only way to do both is to conceive of the world (i.e. objects 
and properties) as composed of senses. 
This, however, prompts the following problem: facts (if worldly) and 
Thoughts are in quite different categories, and so the identification cannot 
be made good. And it is no use saying that senses just are objects and 
properties. Senses are modes of presentation of objects and properties; 
they cannot be identified with them. (Dodd, 1995:163) 
Dodd suggests that McDowell should opt for the modest, Fregean theory. I 
disagree. To identify true propositions with facts and then to 'usher facts out of 
the world into the realm of sense' is precisely to reinstate that ontological gap 
between thought and reality which McDowell seeks to overcome.8 It is crucial to 
McDowell's project in Mind and World that the realm of meaning is not conceived 
as ontologjcally separate from 'the external world'. According to McDowell, the 
realm of meaning should be conceived as part of the natural world, on a par with 
the realm of law (partial re-enchantment). In the previous chapter (section 4.2) it 
was argued moreover that this proposal should be radicalized; I argued that the 
realm of meaning should be understood as coinciding with the world tout court 
(complete re-enchantment). 
The question which Dodd in fact raises about this proposal is this: what 
happens to the realm of reference, the realm of objects and properties, if the world 
is identified with the realm of sense? Dodd suggests that it is nearly self-evident 
that we must retain an ontological distinction between the realm of reference, 
populated by objects and properties, and the realm of meaning, composed of the 
contents of true propositions. In my view, the implication of rejecting AMR is 
precisely that this distinction should be abandoned and that it can be abandoned 
without lapsing into incoherence. 
Dodd urges that the distinction between the realm of sense and the realm 
of reference is inevitable since we have to distinguish between modes of 
presentation of objects (senses) and objects themselves. Now, what we have here 
"Dodd admits that McDowell would 'probably be unhappy" with a modest, 'truistic' identity theory, since it 
has nothing to say about mind-world relations (Dodd, 1995:164). 
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is a distinction that for its intelligibility relies on a separation between the question 
of the nature of an object and the question of our access to it. The notion of an 
object in abstraction from its mode of presentation is the notion of a 'something' 
as it is in abstraction from our epistemic access to it. The point of my critique of 
the nature/access distinction is that the notion of an object 'in itself cannot be 
coherently stated The notion of an object has content only insofar as it is the 
notion of a particular, individuated item. ТЧо entity without identity1, to quote 
Quine's dictum again. Another way of putting this is to say that an object derives 
its identity as that particular object from the facts in which it figures or in which 
it can possibly figure. The notion of an object thus brings with it the notion of a 
web of (dis)similarity relations which linio the object to other objects. Thus, as 
a matter of intelligibility, we have to conceive of an object as embedded in an as-
structure. In other words, the notion of facts, as composed of senses, is 
conceptually or phenomenologically^no/' to the notion of objects. Or, what comes 
to the same, the realm of sense is conceptually or phenomenologically prior to the 
realm of reference. 
In making this priority claim, we are not 'slighting the independence' of 
objects and properties. I am not saying that the 'realm of reference' has no mind-
independent existence in a causal sense. Rather, I am saying that there is no 
meaningful way of distinguishing the realm of reference ontologically from the 
realm of sense. This does not mean that there are no objects and properties 'out 
there', as "bodily chunks' so to speak. It does mean that we have to conceive of 
these 'chunks' as having meaning's mode of being, i.e. as located within the realm 
of sense. Existence claims about objects, in abstraction from their mode of 
presentation, are empty. To locate the realm of reference outside of the realm of 
meaning is problematic. It is to posit a metaphysical dangler, which does no work 
and which is actually harmful in that it introduces a gap between thinkable 
contents (the realm of sense) and 'external' reality (the realm of reference). To 
attack the dualism of sense and reference as an ontological dualism is not to say 
that we cannot draw a distinction between sense and reference, but rather to say 
that we have to draw it within the realm of meaning. 
Dodd, however, argues that it is 'extraordinary, unbelievable and 
incoherent' to say 'that the world is made up of Thoughts' (Dodd, 1995:164). Of 
course, the notion of'thought' is ambiguous between the act of thinking and the 
content of a thought. To say that the world coincides with the realm of meaning 
is to say that the world is made up of thinkable contents, of facts that are 
essentially 'embraceable by thought', although they are by no means causally 
dependent on acts of thinking. However, clearing up this ambiguity does not 
remove the incoherence, according to Dodd He argues that the main problem for 
McDowell's position is not that it commits him to idealism. The main problem is 
that worldly facts and true Thoughts (in the sense of contents, not acts) are in 
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different categories and that it is absurd, even incoherent, to identify them (Dodd, 
1995:163). At bottom, then, the -rhetorical- question seems to be: how can 
something as ephemeral and elusive as thoughts (thinkable contents) possibly be 
identified with physical chunks? 
As it stands, Dodd's objection is question-begging. It presupposes a 
distinction between 'the physical' and 'the mental', which it is precisely 
McDowell's aim to attack. The whole point of McDowell's 'robust identity theory1 
is that the supposed incoherence of equating reality with thinkable contents 
follows from a questionable dualism between 'the physical' and 'the mental'. Dodd 
seems to presuppose that worldly things (objects and properties) have to be 
equated with physical things in the narrow sense, in which 'physical' is understood 
as 'falling under the subject-matter of natural science' or "being part of the realm 
of law*. Accordingly, Dodd presupposes that the realm of sense is non-physical 
and that it must therefore be located either in the head or in a Third Realm. The 
realm of sense cannot be located in the world on Dodd's view, since he considers 
the world to be the realm of'disenchanted nature' by definition. McDowell's aim, 
however, is to crush the aura of self-evidence that surrounds this narrow definition 
of nature. I will not here repeat his arguments for a partial re-enchantment of 
nature, as they have been discussed extensively in chapter 3 and 4.1 just want to 
point out that Dodd's objection to McDowell's notion of truth simply presupposes 
that the idea of an ontological gap between the realm of sense and the realm of 
reference is inevitable. The supposed incoherence of the equation of reality and 
thinkable contents stems from the prior assumption that something cannot both be 
an object or property and have meaning's mode of being. However, the point of 
McDowell's 'rich' conception of world is that the realm of meaning should be 
conceived as part of the natural world, in stead of being regarded as a non-
physical, supernatural realm. In addition to this 'partial re-enchantment', I have 
argued that rejecting AMR implies that 'what it means to be real' is 'to have 
meaning's mode of being1.1 have argued in favour of radicalizing McDowell's re-
enchantment of nature to the effect that the world is conceived as coinciding with 
the realm of meaning. McDowell will probably not accept my proposal for a 
'complete re-enchantment of nature'. But whether we opt for partial or complete 
re-enchantment, the point of the re-enchantment is that it is, pace Dodd, not 
incoherent to say that something can be both a worldly object or property and the 
content of a true Thought. 
I have argued that Dodd's incoherence objection fails, as it relies on a 
questionable ontological dualism between the realm of sense and the realm of 
reference, which in turn relies on AMR What about Dodd's claim that if 
McDowell clings to a robust identity theory, his view of truth is substantial rather 
than truistic? Is McDowell wrong in saying that his view of truth is truistic? That 
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depends on what one takes 'truistic' to mean. I think we should distinguish 
between two readings. 
McDowell's claim that the truth of a proposition consists in its (the 
propositional content's) being identical with a (worldly) fact is truistic in the sense 
that it is not an ontological, 'material' claim about the relation between mind and 
world The 'robust' identity theory, in McDowell's version, is not, pace Dodd, a 
substantial, 'metaphysically extravagant' claim, but an intelligibility claim. The 
notion of world as coinciding with the realm of meaning follows from rejecting 
the skeptical problem of access as incoherent. In claiming that there is no 
ontological gap between content and reality, McDowell is not drawing another 
metaphysical or 'sideways on' picture, but he is trying to dispense with it. 
Admittedly, this is a delicate matter. To say that the world is 'embraceable by 
thought' sounds like a deep metaphysical statement. When McDowell urges that 
it actually is a 'truism dressed up in high-flown language' (1994b:27), he means 
that he is trying to put into words the ordinary realist intuition that we, as 
perceivers and thinkers, are in touch with and rationally constrained by the world. 
The difficulty here is one of vocabulary: how to overcome certain traditional 
metaphysical dualisms without using the very terms in which the dualisms are 
phrased? Although McDowell's choice of terminology may at places be considered 
unfortunate or unduely 'vague', it should be noted that the problem of vocabulary 
is inherent in the very project of undermining traditional dualisms. Since our 
standards of clarity are itself often dictated by the particular philosophical 
convictions we adhere to, it is rather short-sighted to blame someone who tries to 
question these convictions for violating our standards of clarity. 
Although McDowell's notion of truth is not 'substantial' in the sense 
intended by Dodd, i.e. 'metaphysical', we may still deny that it is truistic in the 
sense of being trivial. McDowell proposes a notion of world which breaks with 
a widespread ontological distinction between the realm of sense and the realm of 
reference. By attacking the notion of an ontological gap, McDowell's position 
marks a departure from a traditional consensus, and, so I have argued, a 
'postmodem' return to Aristotelian realism. Thus, we might say that McDowell's 
identity notion of truth is truistic but at the same time far from trivial. 
5.1.2 Again: the sentence-shaped chunks objection 
The identity theory of truth as sketched above provides us with a realist 
understanding of truth without portraying truth as a relation of correspondence. 
Whereas the correspondence theorist depicts the relation between true propositions 
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and worldly facts as a relation of resemblance, fittingness or correlation9, the 
identity theorist conceives of it as a relation of identity. Γη chapter 1,1 discussed 
two objections to the correspondence theory, the God's Eye View objection and 
the sentence-shaped chunks objection. To explain the difference between the cor­
respondence theory and the identity theory, I will show why and how the latter 
can avoid these objections, while the former could not. Γη section 5.1.4 I will 
reconsider the God's Eye View objection. In this section, the sentence-shaped 
chunks objection will be under discussion. 
In chapter 1, the notion of fact, appealed to by the correspondence theorist 
to explain truth, was criticized for being question-begging and for bloating our 
ontology with 'sentence-shaped chunks'. The correspondence theorist's notion of 
fact is question-begging in that it is dependent upon the notion of a true sentence 
for its identity criteria. Since the notion of a fact does not add anything to the 
notion of a true sentence, the notion of'correspondence with facts' cannot provide 
an explanatory definition of truth. Moreover, positing the existence of facts which 
are 'extra-linguistic' but whose identity criteria coincide exactly with those for true 
sentences, amounts to positing the existence of peculiar, sentence-shaped chunks. 
The correspondence theorist is guilty of 'reifying facts'. 
Now, the question is whether the notion of fact as used by the identity 
theorist falls prey to the same problem. I will argue that it does not. I will first 
explain why the identity theory is not committed to an unwarranted reification or 
hypostatization of facts. Then I will point out why the objection of explanatory 
circularity does not affect the identity theory. 
To reify or hypostasize something is to suppose that it exists as an object 
or material thing. Γη a recent paper on McDowell, Putnam considers McDowell's 
notion of facts in the light of Quine's doctrine that to quantify over something is 
to be ontologically committed to the existence of it (Putnam, forthcoming:7-10). 
He argues that although McDowell's position involves quantifying over facts, it 
is not guilty of unwarrantedly reifying them, since claiming the existence of facts 
need not involve claiming that they exist in the way of objects, just like 
quantifying over numbers does not involve claiming the existence of im­
perceptible, intangible objects (ibid.,8). Putnam thus objects to the idea that 'really 
existing' should be equated with 'existing like a material object'. His suggestion 
is that there are different ways of being real or, as he has put it elsewhere, that 
'existence' can have a different meaning in different contexts of use (Putnam, 
1987:19,20). A more liberal notion of existence would take the sting out of the 
reification objection. In my view, this réponse fails to address the main reason 
why McDowell's version of the identity theory of truth can escape the 'sentence-
'See chapter 1, section 1.1 for these three versions of the correspondence theory. 
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shaped chunks objection', while the (metaphysical realist) correspondence theorist 
cannot. 
I think that the main reason why the objection of reifying facts is 
misplaced here is that it takes for granted an Ontology of objects'. 'Reifying facts' 
is objectionable only against the background of an ontology, which considers an 
object's mode of being as the paradigm case of what it means to be real. Starting 
from this assumption, facts can be called 'real' at most in a derivative sense. 
However, to conceive of the realm of sense as prior to the realm of reference, as 
I argued we should, is precisely to question an Ontology of objects'. My tenet of 
the phenomenological priority of the realm of meaning can also be expressed by 
saying that facts are phenomenologically prior to objects, or what comes to the 
same, that the notion of facts is conceptually prior to the notion of objects. If one 
starts from an 'ontology of facts', as opposed to an ontology of objects, what 
counts as an object is determined by the facts in which such an object figures or 
can figure.10 Echoing the Tractatus, an object is then conceived as primarily 'a 
possible constituent of states of affairs'.11 Since objects have their identity in virtue 
of the states of affairs in which they can occur, the notion of an object 'in itself, 
i.e. in abstraction from the facts it can be part of, is an empty notion.12 To reject 
an ontology of objects in favour of an ontology of facts is to propose a different 
conception of what it means to be real. According to this conception, to be real 
is to have meaning's mode of being. Facts, on this view, are not a kind of 'extra 
entities' over and above ordinary objects. Rather, they are the stuff that the world 
is made of. It is objects that have a 'derivative' reality. 
"To make determinate reference to an object possible, some distinction has to be drawn between facts that 
an object can essentially figure in and facts that an object incidentally figures in The boundary between the two 
may however be somewhat vague, varying with explanatory context Objects have a fixed set of identity 
conditions only within a particular explanation space, but that does not mean -as I argued in chapter 2, section 
2 3 2- that they are 'mind-dependent1 in a causal sense. 
"Tractatus 2011: 'Es ist dem Ding wesentlich, der Bestandteil eines Sachverhaltes sein zu können' 
(Wittgenstein, 1984.11). This Statement follows the rejection of an 'ontology of objects' in 1 1 : 'Die Welt ist die 
Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, nicht der Dinge' (Wittgenstein, 1984.11). 
12
Іп the Tractatus, Wittgenstein seems to underwrite this point in 2013, when he says- 'Jedes Ding ist, 
gleichsam, in einem Räume möglicher Sachverhalte Diesen Raum kann ich mir leer denken, nicht aber das Ding 
ohne den Raum'. (See also 20121 and 20122) However, Wittgenstein does maintain the notion of'simple 
objects' (einfache Gegenstände) (202 ff), which is the notion of objects insofar as they are not part of any state 
of affairs. As Mounce points out, since none of the objects of ordinary experience can be called simple, we 
cannot say what simple objects are. Wittgenstein nevertheless held that their existence was 'a requirement of 
language' He later however abandoned the notion of simple objects as 'radically confused1 (Mounce, 1981.20) 
In the view I am defending, the notion of simple objects is rejected since the notion of an object cannot be 
disjoined from the notion of its identity conditions, which are fixed within the realm of meaning. 
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The danger of 'reifying facts' only exists against the background of an 
ontology of objects, in addition to which the positing of facts must necessarily 
appear as metaphysically extravagant. If, however, we reject the idea of a realm 
of reference as an ontologically separate realm, we take the sting out of the 
'reifying facts' objection. On this account, facts are not 'extra entities', in addition 
to objects or in addition to true propositions. Facts are, so to say, the only things 
there are. Not only is the world understood as the 'totality of facts', the mind is 
conceived along the same line. The mind is defined by the totality of its contents 
(as opposed to inner states which have an intrinsic nature independent of the 
environment) and, except for cases of error and hallucination, the mind's contents 
are worldly facts. 
Does this mean that McDowell is, after all, putting forward an ontological 
claim, to the effect that the world and the mind are ultimately composed of facts? 
Putnam points at the apparent similarity between McDowell's stance and the 
'neutral monist metaphysics' once defended by James and Russell (Putnam, 
forthcoming:?). 
As in neutral monism there is a single kind of object of which the world 
consists - only now it is not James' 'pure experience', but facts - and my 
mind consists of the same kind of object, and some parts of my mind are 
also parts of the 'external' (i.e., previously -but mistakenly- thought of as 
'external') world (Putnam, forthcoming: 10) 
Putnam however argues that whereas Russell and James became mixed up in 
undesirable metaphysical speculation, McDowell does not intend to propose a new 
ontology at all. Putnam suggests that McDowell's position is innocent of 
metaphysical extravagance in that it is not guilty of objectionable reifícation. As 
mentioned above, Putnam argues that we can take the sting out of the 'reifícation 
objection' by rejecting Quine's narrow definition of existence. 
I do not want to dispute this suggestion. But I argued that the main 
rejoinder to the 'reification objection' should be that it presupposes an 'ontology 
of objects', which is rejected by the postmodem Aristotelian, who considers facts 
(the realm of meaning) to be phenomenologically prior to objects (the realm of 
reference). Now, as I have argued before, a claim of'phenomenological priority' 
should not be understood as an ontological claim -or as an epistemological claim-
but as a claim about the limits of sense. The postmodern Aristotelian's 'monism 
of facts' follows from rejecting as incoherent the notion of an epistemological-
сши-ontological gap between mind and world The phenomenological priority of 
the realm of meaning results from an attack on the intelligibility of skepticism 
about the accessibility of the 'external' world Thus, the reason why McDowell 
'does not intend to propose a new ontology" is that the postmodem Aristotelian's 
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claims are claims not 'on what there is' but 'on what we have to suppose there is'. 
In the next section I will come back to this category of claims, in discussing 
Strawson's notion of 'descriptive metaphysics'. 
Having dismissed the claim that McDowell's notion of facts leads to 
objectionable reification, we now have to turn to the question whether the identity 
theory of truth fares any better than the correspondence theory as an explanatory 
account of truth. Does defining truth in terms of identity -rather than cor-
respondence- with facts provide us with an explanatory, non-circular definition of 
truth? The answer is that it does not. As the identity theory holds true propositions 
and facts to be identical, it views the notion of facts and the notion of true 
propositions as interdependent: we cannot define or elucidate one without 
mentioning the other. The identity theory therefore does not provide us with a 
reductive account of truth.13 However, that facts and true propositions have the 
same identity entena is not a problem for the identity theory, as it is for the cor-
respondence theory, since the identity theory does not seek to establish the non-
epistemic nature of truth in terms of a correspondence with facts that are 'external 
to the conceptual sphere'. The interdependence between the notion of facts and the 
notion of true propositions is problematic only when the notion of facts is 
intended to bndge an ontological gap between propositions and a reality which is 
located outside of the conceptual sphere, i.e. a reality about which all of our 
statements might fail to be true. It is only when we adhere to this notion of reality 
(central to metaphysical realism), that facts have to have identity entena which are 
independent from the identity entena for true sentences. In the absense of such 
independent entena, a 'substantial' notion of truth, as envisaged by the metaphysi-
cal realist, cannot get off the ground The identity notion of truth, in the hands of 
McDowell, is not 'substantial' in that it does not intend to provide a reply to the 
skeptic. The postmodern Anstotehan realist does not, with his 'theory of truth', 
seek to cross an alleged gulf between minds and reality. Rather, he questions the 
assumptions -the central one being a ngid nature/access distinction- that give nse 
to the notion of such a gap. It is precisely because the identity theory is realist 
without being substantial, that 'the identity theory may say correctly what the cor-
respondence theonst tnes and, by overreaching, fails to say1 (Dodd & Homsby, 
1992:321). 
"Dodd and Homsby point out that, if we go along with Frege in holding that 'identity" is an undefinable 
notion, the identity theory fails to provide a non-circular definition of truth in another way (Dodd and Homsby, 
1992 320) Frege states that 'Since any definition is an identity, identity cannot itself be defined' (ibid 321n) 
In that sense, the identity theory would, properly speaking, not be a theory at all 
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5.1.3 The conceptual connection between truth and justifiability 
The postmodern Aristotelian realist, instead of offering a reductive definition of 
truth, seeks to articulate the conceptual connections between the notions of truth, 
fact, and justifiability. One might say that the above account of truth in terms of 
a (numerical) identity between facts and propositional contents captures the realist 
or evidence-transcendent aspect of truth. If truth is understood as a relation of 
identity between true propositions and worldly facts, then the identity obtains 
whether we know it or not. Thus, the identity theorist agrees with the cor-
respondence theorist that truth cannot be defined in terms of epistemic notions 
such as rational acceptibility or warranted assertibility. But if truth transcends 
justifiability, what does the identity theorist have to say about the accessibility 
aspect of truth? It may seem that the identity theory is committed to a non-
epistemic notion of truth and by that to the same nature/access distinction that the 
correspondence theory relies on. 
Above, I pointed out that the identity theory, in McDowell's version, is 
incompatible with the correspondence theory, in that it goes together with a notion 
of world as essentially accessible or 'embraceable by thought'. In rejecting the idea 
of an ontological-cum-episternological gap between content and reality, the 
postmodem Aristotelian realist rejects the notion of a reality that might be 
inaccessible in principle. One might also express this by saying that, although the 
postmodern Aristotelian is a realist about truth, he does not conceive of truth as 
a non-epistemic relation in the metaphysical realist sense. To explain more clearly 
in what sense truth is not non-epistemic according to the postmodem Aristotelian 
realist, we have to clarify his stance towards the issue of the accessibility of truth. 
Taking a recent paper by Putnam as my lead, I will presently argue that 
postmodern Aristotelian realism is able to combine the evidence-transcendent 
aspect of truth with the idea that the notion of truth, although irreducible, is 
conceptually linked with the notion of justifiability. It is this conceptual 
connection, I shall contend, that opens up the possibility of a 'realism without 
metaphysical realism'. 
In 'Pragmatism', Putnam discusses the 'rise and fall' of verificationism in 
both its positivist and its (more liberal) pragmatist version.14 As noted before, 
Putnam at present rejects his former truth theory, which was committed to a kind 
of verificationism in suggesting that truth should be equated with ideal rational 
l4Putnam points out that in positivism, the verification principle was associated, initially at least, with 
methodological solipsism and with the idea that the meaningfulness of a sentence entails the possibility of its 
conclusive verification The pragmahsts (Peirce and James m particular), on the contrary, rejected the idea of 
privileged knowledge of the inner and they held that the unit of verification is a whole scientific theory or 
metaphysical system rather than an individual sentence The verification principle, in their hands, was meant to 
apply to metaphysics, not to exclude it (Putnam, 1995· 292,293). 
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acceptibility. Although he points out that he never meant 'ideal rational ac-
ceptability1 as a reductive definition of truth, Putnam now explicitly states that 
idealized rational acceptibility is not even a necessary condition for truth. He now 
holds 'that we cannot say that conformity to any verification principle is even a 
necessary condition for meaningfulness, (Putnam, 1995:295). To illustrate the 
untenability of verificationism, Putnam discusses the following statement: 
There do not happen to be any stars arranged as the vertices of a regular 
100-gon anywhere in space-time, (ibid.,294) 
Putnam points out that there is no way for us to find out whether this statement 
is true. Nonetheless, we understand perfectly well what it means. In other words, 
there are, pace verificationism, unverifiable statements which are nevertheless 
perfectly meaningful. 
Although truth transcends justifiability, in the sense that a statement can 
be both meaningful and have an inaccessible truth-value, Putnam claims that there 
nonetheless is an important insight in verificationism He argues that, although we 
can understand statements whose truth-value we can never come to know, this is 
possible only because for the great majority of terms, our understanding of them 
is intimately connected with verification (ibid.,298). Grasping an ordinary concept 
such as 'chair' involves knowing what chairs look like and what they feel like. 
Normal possessors of a concept have 'the practical ability to verify (..) perceptual-
ly that they are in the presence of something that falls under the concept' (298). 
The insight in verificationism is, according to Putnam, that 
there is a conceptual connection between 'grasping an empirical concept 
(not necessarily a perceptual one)' and 'being able to recognize a 
perceptually justified application ofthat concept'. (Putnam, 1995:295)15 
To return to the example first mentioned, it seems that we grasp the concept 
'groups of stars arranged as the vertices of a regular 100-gon' without knowing 
what would justify its application. However, Putnam points out, what we do not 
know how to justify in mis case is a negative existential generalization involving 
the concept. But, so he adds, 'if we were in a position to refer to something we 
saw in a telescope by the description "group of stars arranged as the vertices of 
"In arguing for the conceptual link between truth and justifiability, Putnam is primarily interested in ordinary 
concepts such as 'cat1 and 'charr1. With regard to concepts of inobservables, the possibility of a 'justified 
perceptual application' seems to be unavailable. However, I have argued elsewhere that Putnam's tenet, in a 
generalized version, also applies to these concepts. If so, truth and justifiability cannot be fully disconnected with 
regard to claims about the unobservable By consequence, global skepticism about the episteme accessibility of 
the unobservable world, as espoused by Van Fraassen, cannot be coherently stated (Knbbe, forthcoming) 
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a regular 100-gon", we would know how to justify that referring use. So even in 
the case of an empirical concept that appears in an unverifiable quantified state-
ment, we do know how to verify a (hypothetical) direct application' (Putnam, 
1995:296). 
Of course, we are able to construe an empirical concept whose application 
we might never know how to verify, for example 'group of stars outside our light 
cone arranged as the vertices of a regular 100-gon'. Putnam remarks that the 
existence of descriptions like this shows 'that quantifiers and other logical 
constants extend our conceptual powers beyond the range of the verifiable', but, 
so he adds, 'this does not mean that we could grasp a language without grasping 
any terms whose understanding is intimately connected with verification' 
(1995:297). 
In sum, Putnam argues that, although verificationism is untenable, there 
is a valuable insight in verificationism that should not be thrown away with the 
bathwater. Although truth cannot be equated with any notion of justifiability, not 
even ideal rational acceptibility, there is nonetheless a conceptual connection or 
interdependence between the notion of truth and the notion of justifiability. We 
might say that they are linked through the notion of understanding, since the 
connection that Putnam speaks of is an 'interdependence between our grasp of 
truth-claims and our grasp of verification' [my italics] (1995:305). This 
interdependence is compatible with the fact that there are meaningful but 
unverifiable statements. The point is that the concepts figuring in such statements 
must have a descriptive content which refers to verifiable facts in at least some 
situations if our truth claims are to have content at all. Applied to for instance the 
concept 'chair', Putnam's view implies that our understanding of the concept of a 
chair depends on our ability to verify some statements with the term 'chair1 in it, 
which does not preclude that the term 'chair" can also figure in ideally unverifiable 
statements. But if absolutely nothing would ever count as verifying the presence 
of chairs, we could not understand the concept of a chair. One cannot disjoin the 
concept of an object completely from the concept of its practical bearing on us. 
This idea is reminiscent of the classical pragmatist maxim, stated by Peirce as 
follows: 
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearing, we 
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of 
these effects is the whole of our conception of the object, (quoted by 
Putnam, 1995:291) 
Putnam's argument against verificationism above shows that, as it stands, this 
pragmatist version of the verificationist principle is too strict. Putnam's point is 
however that there is a vital grain of truth in this maxim. I think we can express 
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this grain of truth by formulating a weaker version of the maxim, which avoids 
both verificationism and metaphysical realism. Metaphysical realists hold that 
knowledge of meaning is completely independent of knowledge of verification. 
Verificationists hold that knowledge of meaning is nothing but knowledge of 
verification method. The postmodem Aristotelian holds that, for the majority of 
concepts, knowledge of meaning goes together with knowledge of verification, not 
because the former should be defined in terms of the latter, but because the ability 
to recognize justified applications of empirical concepts is a prerequisite for 
understanding a language at all (Putnam, 1995:299). Rephrasing Peirce's maxim, 
we should say that 'our conception of an object can neither be equated with nor 
be disjoined from our conception of its practical bearing or effects on us'. If the 
notion of an object is divorced completely from the notion of how it affects us, 
the notion lacks intelligibility in the sense that the notion of'Ding an sich' lacks 
intelligibility. Thus, knowledge of meaning presupposes the possibility of 
verification in a broad range of situations. If truth would not be accessible in this 
way, the notion of truth would become vacuous. 
My aim in this section has been to show the possibility of a position that 
is neither verificationist nor metaphysical realist. In chapters 1 and 2 I tried to 
show the need for such a position. By sketching Putnam's view on the link 
between truth and justifiability, I want to show that there is conceptual room for 
a position which conceives of truth as both evidence-transcendent and globally 
accessible. In the next section I will, by going back to the God's Eye View 
objection, explain further how this position diverges from metaphysical realism. 
To be sure, the view sketched above does not give a solution to the 
'question of truth', understood as a skeptical question. The postmodern Aristotelian 
does not attempt to define truth to begin with. As will be explained in section 5.2, 
the notion of conceptual connection stands opposed to the notion of analytical 
reduction. Instead of offering a 'theory of truth', which seeks to provide the skeptic 
with an -either relativist or foundationalist- answer, the postmodern Aristotelian 
claims that the idea of a conceptual connection between truth and verifiability 
provides us with a phenomenologjcally accurate articulation of the concept of 
truth, an articulation in which global skepticism about the accessibility of truth 
does not figure as a coherent option. 
5.1.4 Again: the God's Eye View objection 
In chapter 1,1 argued that the correspondence theory of truth does not survive the 
sophisticated version of the God's Eye View objection. In this version, I argued, 
the objection is an attack on the intelligibility of the metaphysical realist's 
distinction between the question of the nature of truth and the question of our 
access to truth. In this section I will contend that postmodern Aristotelian realism 
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makes available a realist view of truth, that does not run foul of the -sophisticated-
God's Eye View objection. 
The problem for the correspondence theorist is that his definition of truth 
is in terms of a notion of world which is ultimately vacuous. To parry the naive 
version of the God's Eye View objection, the metaphysical realist invokes a 
distinction between the question of the nature of truth and the question of our 
access to truth. He argues that the correspondence theory of truth does not 
presuppose a God's Eye View, from which to compare assertions with reality, 
since it is completely agnostic about our access to truth. The sophisticated internal 
realist argues that it is exactly this presumption of agnosticism that drains the cor-
respondence theory of content, as an account of the nature of truth. The 
metaphysical realist assumes that we can sensibly claim the existence of a reality 
that might be completely inaccessible to us. He thereby recognizes skepticism to 
be an intelligible option. In other words, he considers the 'problem of access' as 
a genuine challenge, to be answered by a theory of knowledge. Such a theory 
would seek to establish a link between truth and justifiability, which secures that 
our criteria of justified belief are indicative of -objective- correspondence with 
reality. Starting from this picture, the link envisaged will have to be an inferential 
one (the most likely candidate being a form of abductive reasoning). 
According to the postmodem Aristotelian, truth and justification are linked 
by a relation that is more intimate than inference. It is more intimate in the sense 
that the possibility that all of our criteria of justification might fail to be truth-
indicative is ruled out on grounds of intelligibility. The postmodem Aristotelian 
realist claims that the 'problem of access' as regards truth cannot be coherently 
raised, in virtue of the conceptual connection between truth and justifiability. 
Another way of putting the connection between truth and justifiability is by saying 
that we cannot sensibly entertain the possibility of truth being globally inac-
cessible, since understanding a language involves being able to verify a large 
number of (ordinary, everyday) statements about the world around us. In saying 
that grasping a concept involves knowing what would justify its application, the 
postmodern Aristotelian is not denying that truth is evidence-transcendent, but he 
is denying that truth could be globally inaccessible. 
Postmodern Aristotelian realism is a 'realism without metaphysical 
realism'. It is realist in that it rejects any identification of truth with some notion 
of justifiability. It is realist in its articulation of truth in terms of an identity with 
worldly facts, discussed in section 5.1.1. However, postmodern Aristotelian 
realism is not metaphysical realism, in that it conceives of truth and justifiability 
as conceptually connected in such a way that we have to reject the metaphysical 
realist's strict separation of the question of the nature of truth and the question of 
our access to truth. Giving up this rigid nature/access distinction means denying 
that we can intelligibly doubt the epistemic accessibility of truth in a more than 
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local way. To insist on a conceptual link between truth and justifiability, while 
abstaining from a definition of truth in terms of justifiability, is to reject the 
problem of access while taking a realist view of truth. 
Perhaps superfluously, I will close this sketch of the postmodern Aris-
totelian's view on the issue of truth by briefly pointing out that rejecting 
skepticism does not entail rejecting fallibilism To reject the problem of access or 
to say that the world is essentially accessible or 'embraceable by thought' is not 
to detract anything from our never-ending fallibility. On the contrary, to view the 
relation between minds and reality in perception as well as conception as a 
rational relation, as the postmodern Aristotelian does, rather than as a causal 
relation or a relation of gjvenness, is at the same time to say that none of our 
beliefs, even the more basic perceptual ones, are immune to revision. The fact that 
truth cannot sensibly taken to be globally inaccessible does not release us from the 
'standing obligation to be ready to rethink the credentials of the putatively rational 
linkages that constitute the space of reasons as one conceives it at any time' 
(McDowell, 1994b: 186). 
5.2 The possibility of a second naïveté 
In this section I will explain in more detail what is indicated by the prefix 
'postmodem' in 'postmodern Aristotelian realism'. To clarify the phrase 'post-
modem' in this context is at the same time to clarify the possibility of a second 
naïveté about our realist intuitions. The notion of a 'second naïveté' expresses an 
ambiguity or, one might even say, a paradox. It suggests that, while we may 
reaffirm the commonsense intuitions articulated by Aristotelian realism, we have 
to do so in a qualified way: we cannot return to the 'pre-modem' state of a first 
naïveté. We are asked to adopt a posture of deliberate naïveté, an attitude of 
composed insouciance. Now, the question is whether one can be naive or 
insouciant in a knowing, deliberate manner. It is this paradox that I wish to 
explore in this section. My main contention will be that postmodern Aristotelian 
realism differs from Aristotelian realism in that its claims are formal rather than 
material, or transcendental rather than empirical. Whereas a first naïveté goes 
together with a particular ontological and epistemological stance, a second naïveté, 
so I will argue, has to be formulated as a phenomenological claim or a claim 
about the limits of sense. 
I will elucidate my conception of postmodem Aristotelian realism as a 
formal claim about the limits of sense by confronting it with two objections. The 
first has been put forward by Haldane (1996), who suggests that what I call 
postmodem Aristotelian realism is in fact nothing but metaphysical realism 
revisited The second objection that I will discuss is Quine's critique of the 
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distinction between conceptual (formal) and empirical (material) claims, which 
seems to throw doubt on my notion of philosophical claims as phenomenological 
claims about the limits of sense. 
Finally, I will clarify the term 'postmodem' by indicating how the attitude 
of second naïveté goes together with a quietist attitude about the problem of 
realism Following Strawson, I will distinguish between two versions of quietism, 
roughly speaking a negative and a positive one, which correspond with two 
conceptions of philosophy. The postmodern Aristotelian seeks to create room for 
a type of philosophical exploration that is not preoccupied with traditional 
skeptical worries and yet aspires to be more than a negative, therapeutic 
entreprise. 
5.2.1 A sort of home-coming 
In a paper called 'On Coming Home to (Metaphysical) Realism', Haldane has 
argued that Putnam's recent plea for 'regaining Aristotelian innocence' in fact 
marks a return to metaphysical realism Haldane claims, rightly I think, that 
Putnam's direct realism view of perception is strikingly reminiscent of the 
Thomist-ci/m-Aristotelian doctrine of the formal identity of act and object in 
perception. He suggests that Putnam's present stance 
call[s] for something akin to the idea that content-determining principles 
of perception are one and the same as the character-determining principles 
of the objects of perception - the identity of act and object. (This being 
an instance of the Thomist doctrine of the unity of the knower and the 
known). (Haldane, 1996:196) 
Haldane argues that such a view of perception implies metaphysical realism since 
it requires that there are objective natures in the world (1996:291). Understanding 
perception as an unmediated openness to the world commits one to 'the thesis that 
the objects of perception are things themselves, there being no cognitive causal 
intermediaries' (ibid). In other words, the 'image of openness' presupposes the 
existence of objective kinds that we are being open to. 
Haldane defines metaphysical realism as the view that, first, there is a 
mind-independent world construed thus and so independently of our conception 
of it and that, second, in thought and perception we may have knowledge of it 
(295/6). He points out that in this version, metaphysical realism is compatible with 
Putnam's rejection of physicalism. There is nothing in the above two tenets which 
suggests that meaning, truth or reference should be reducible to some scientifically 
identified physico-causal mechanism (ibid). According to Haldane, Putnam's 
Aristotelian realism is at bottom nothing but a non-physicalist or non-reductionist 
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version of metaphysical realism. 'The new "non-metaphysical" realism of the 
Dewey Lectures is as close as makes no substantial difference to the old 
orthodoxy of Thomist metaphysical realism' (293). 
Of course, it is crucial to my argument that postmodern Aristotelian 
realism differs significantly from metaphysical realism, even from a non-
reductionist version of metaphysical realism. Before pointing out the difference, 
I first want to question Haldane's equation of'premodern Aristotelian realism with 
metaphysical realism. Although both these positions subscribe to the twin theses 
mentioned by Haldane, they do so from crucially different historical perspectives. 
Whereas contemporary metaphysical realism is essentially a response to the 
cartesian skeptical predicament, Aristotelian realism is completely unfamiliar with 
the notion of an ontological-a/m-epistemological gap between mind and world. 
What distinguishes Aristotelianism from metaphysical realism is that the latter 
conceives of the cognitive relation between mind and world in terms of a 
representational relation between knower and known, whereas the former 
conceives of it as a unity of knower and known. In the Aristotelian conception, 
there is thus no room to state the metaphysical realist's nature/access distinction 
and, consequently, there is no room to state the skeptical 'problem of access'. 
It is because the notion of a gap between mind and world has not yet 
come into view, that the Aristotelian may be called naive. The metaphysical 
realist, on the other hand, accepts the notion of a gap as an intelligible notion. His 
philosophical agenda is set by this notion. His aim is to bridge the gap and 
thereby to justify the realist intuitions naively embraced by premodern Aristotelian 
realism. I have argued that the metaphysical realist's project is doomed to failure. 
The point of'postmodern Aristotelian realism is that we should not try to bridge 
the gap but that we should undermine the line of thought that creates the very idea 
of a gap. By equating what he calls Orthodox Thomist metaphysical realism' with 
metaphysical realism in the modem sense, Haldane is being insensitive to the fact 
that the two positions start from radically different philosophical agenda's. Because 
of these different agenda's, we should say that, although they subscribe to the 
same epistemological and ontological theses, premodern Aristotelian realism is 
naive (in a non-pejorative sense), whereas metaphysical realism is untenable (and 
that surely is pejorative). 
If the first naïveté of premodem Aristotelian-ci/w-Thomist realism is not 
available to us anymore and if (modem) metaphysical realism is untenable, the 
question is what distinguishes postmodem Aristotelian realism from both of these 
positions. Haldane suggests that Putnam's present view of perception commits him 
to the existence of objective kinds. If I am right, the postmodem Aristotelian's 
attitude towards kinds is realist but not metaphysical realist. The postmodern 
Aristotelian realist agrees with the metaphysical realist that kinds are not causally 
dependent on acts of thinking. Kinds are mind-independent in a causal sense. 
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Nonetheless, the notion of kinds, as involving the notion of similarity relations, 
is conceptually connected to the notion of explanatory interests. That does not 
mean that we create kinds by projecting similarity relations onto an inarticulate 
world. It does imply that we have to conceive of the world as displaying an as-
structure. In other words, we have to think of kinds as having 'meaning's mode of 
being'. In McDowellian terms, kinds are mind-independent but not outside the 
sphere of the conceptual. Kinds are part of the realm of thinkable contents. 
Although I have argued that we should refrain from putting the question of 
realism as a question about the dependence or independence of the world on the 
mind, we might formulate the postmodem Aristotelian's position by saying that 
there is a mind-dependence but not a causal one. Although meaning is not mind-
independent in a causal sense, the notion of meaning essentially refers to thinkers, 
to what can become the content of a mind 
The postmodern Aristotelian, unlike the metaphysical realist, proposes a 
conception of what it means to be real, which dispenses with AMR- According to 
this conception, to be real is to have meaning's mode of being. Since the world 
is equated with the realm of meaning, there is no conceptual room for the 
metaphysical realist's distinction between the question of the nature of the world 
and the question of our access to it. As the problem of access cannot get off the 
ground without this distinction between epistemology and ontology, the 
postmodem Aristotelian is entitled to adopt an attitude of second naïveté towards 
our commonsense realist intuitions. Unlike the metaphysical realist, he holds that 
our realist intuitions are not in need of justification. The foundationalist attempt 
to justify our realist intuitions is premised on the assumption that we can bracket 
these intuitions and judge them from an outsider's point of view. The postmodem 
Aristotelian argues that such an external vantage point is not so much unattainable 
as unintelligible. The difference between these two predicates is crucial. The claim 
that an external point of view is unattainable is characteristic of a skeptical 
position. The claim that the very idea of a God's Eye View or a 'sideways on 
picture' is unintelligible is characteristic of a quietisi position, which denies that 
the questions motivating the foundationalist's project make sense. 
Thus, what distinguishes postmodem Aristotelian realism from both 
premodem Aristotelianism and modem metaphysical realism is its attitude towards 
skepticism. Premodem Aristotelian did not have an attitude towards skepticism, 
understood as 'the problem of access', to begin with. Metaphysical realism accepts 
the skeptical problématique as a genuine challenge, to be answered by theories of 
truth, perception etcetera. The postmodem Aristotelian claims that (global) 
skepticism about the accessibility of the 'external' world cannot be formulated in 
a coherent way. He holds that skepticism violates the bounds of sense. 
If my criticism of Haldane is correct, postmodem Aristotelian realism, 
although it does constitute a sort of home-coming, is not a 'coming home to 
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metaphysical realism'. I hesitate to invoke Hegelian images of synthesis, but we 
might illustrate the paradox inherent in a second naïveté with the image of a spiral 
movement. To be deliberately naive is to have come full circle, without having 
returned to one's original starting-point. 
5.2.2 Post-Quinean inquiry into the bounds of sense 
What makes postmodern Aristotelian realism postmodern is that it is a formal or 
transcendental16 claim rather than a material or empirical claim. According to the 
postmodern Aristotelian, philosophy should abandon the 'justification project' in 
favour of a phenomenological inquiry into the limits of sense. Philosophical 
claims, on mis view, are intelligibility claims. They seek to articulate the 
conceptual connections between notions that are central to our self-understanding. 
The question that immediately springs to mind if one characterizes 
philosophical claims in this way is whether the distinction between empirical and 
conceptual claims is a tenable one. Is not the notion of 'conceptual truths' 
hopelessly outdated? Or, as Putnam puts it, is not the very idea of conceptual 
connections liopelessly pre-Quinean'? (Putnam, 1995:300). In 'Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism', Quine attacked the notion of analytic judgments or judgments that 
are true by virtue of meaning alone. He argued that every judgment has an 
empirical component, in the sense that its truth partly depends on the world: 'truth 
in general depends on both language and extralinguistic fact' (Quine, 1953:36). 
In 'Two Dogmas Revisited', Putnam has argued that Quine failed to 
distinguish between two notions of analyticity. According to the first notion, an 
analytic judgment is one whose negation reduces to a contradiction. According to 
the second, an analytic truth is a truth that is confirmed no matter what (Putnam, 
1983:87). Putnam argues that it is only the latter notion of analyticity, which is 
the notion of an α priori or unrevisable statement, that is undermined by Quine's 
critique. Quine rightly points out that the history of science shows that we often 
have had to give up principles that were once regarded as a priori. No statement 
is immune from revision, arguably not even the laws of logic. However, if we go 
along with this thoroughgoing fallibilism, Putnam argues, we do not have to give 
up the first notion of analyticity. We can retain the notion of a truth whose 
negation is unintelligible ramer than false, since such a conceptual truth need not 
be conceived of as a priori or unrevisable. 
In 'Pragmatism', Putnam points out that 'the statement that two terms have 
the same meaning is a statement that involves interpretation, and (...), interpreta­
tion is an endlessly révisable process" (Putnam, 1995:301). Thus, conceptual 
"As denned by Bird; see chapter 4, section 4.3.2. 
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claims are negotiable or fallible, but what distinguishes conceptual or analytical 
claims is that they can only be revised in the light of a new kind of theory 
(Putnam, 1983:101/2). As an example, Putnam mentions the statement 'two 
straight lines can be perpendicular to a third straight line and still meet at a point'. 
It took the invention of a new kind of theory to give sense to these words. Thus, 
conceptual truths may be called 'contextually a priori' (Putnam, 1983:95). They 
'cannot be falsified unless someone invents a kind of theory, or better, a kind of 
use of language, that we cannot presently foresee' (Putnam, 1995:302). 
Although conceptual claims are falsified in a different way than empirical 
claims, we should not explain this difference by saying that the truth or falsity of 
empirical claims depends on the world, whereas the truth or falsity of conceptual 
claims does not. We can conceive of the revision of conceptual truths as guided 
by worldly pressures no less than the revision of empirical truths, but we can do 
so only if, as the postmodem Aristotelian insists, we regard claims about meaning 
as not opposed to claims about the world Rather, conceptual claims are a special 
kind of claims about the world. Although they are not empirical, material claims, 
they are formal claims about the world To explain in what sense formal claims 
are 'about the world', I have to briefly go into McDowell's comments on Quine's 
attack on analyticity. 
McDowell (following Davidson) points out that by saying that 'truth in 
general depends on both language and extralinguistic fact', Quine rejects the 
dualism of the analytic and the synthetic, while retaining the empiricist dualism 
of scheme and content. Quine leaves intact a 'dualism of endogenuous and 
exogenuous factors'; his point is that we cannot separate these factors out 
statement by statement (McDowell, 1994b: 131-136). Quine expresses this point 
by saving that 'our statements about the external world face the tribunal of 
experience not individually but only as a corporate body* (Quine, 1953:41). 
However, McDowell argues, the notion of experience adopted by Quine is still the 
notion of something that stands opposed to the endogenuous factor. On Quine's 
account of experience as 'the stimulation of sensory receptors', experience cannot 
be in the order of justificatioa The experiential constraints, provided by 
'extralinguistic facts', can only be causal constraints. The problem with Quine's 
picture is that, paradoxically, it becomes a mystery how synthetic judgments can 
be subject to rational worldly pressures. The image of sensory impressions 
impinging on the edges of the space of reasons cannot explain how our empirical 
beliefs can be endowed with representational content. Quine's 'extra-linguistic 
facts' are not thinkable contents but the remote causes of our empirical beliefs. 
They are outside of, or external to, the space of reasons. 
To make available a notion of facts as thinkable contents, McDowell 
argues, we should reject the scheme-content dualism and, with it, the idea of a 
boundary that encloses the space of reasons. If we do so, we cannot identify 
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meaning with the endogenuous factor, or with the exogenuous factor, or even with 
a mixture of both. 'The need to make this kind of determination simply lapses' 
(McDowell, 1994b: 157). The point of postmodern Aristotelianism is that the quest 
for a reductive analysis of meaning is misplaced If we try to capture the reality 
of meaning (or content) in terms of an interaction between 'internal' factors and 
'external', extra-conceptual factors, we end up either presupposing the reality of 
meaning or -absurdly- denying it. 
If we accept McDowell's notion of an unbounded sphere of the con-
ceptual, conceptual schemes are not dualistically set over against the world. We 
may still use the notion of a scheme, but it will not refer to a 'tertium' that 
mediates between us and the 'external' world. Rather, schemes in the innocent 
sense are embodied in languages or cultural traditions, which are 'constitutive of 
our unproblematic openness to the world' (McDowell, 1994b: 155). What makes 
this conceptually informed mode of openness to the world unproblematic is that 
the world in this conception is conceived as 'the realm of meaning'. The world on 
this account is, as explained above, not external to the space of reasons, although 
it is causally independent of it. 
If, as I suggested, the notion of a conceptual scheme need not belong to 
the dualism [of scheme and non-concepual content], meaning can 
constitute the stuff of schemes in an innocent sense. We can reject the two 
factors without threatening the idea that there are limits to what makes 
sense: that our mindedness, as Jonathan Lear puts it, has a necessary 
structure. The idea of a structure that must be found in any intelligible 
conceptual scheme need not involve picturing the scheme as one side of 
a scheme-world dualism. And analytic truths (in an interesting sense, not 
just defmitionally guaranteed truism such as 'A vixen is a female fox') 
might be just those that delineate such a necessary structure. (McDowell, 
1994b: 157/8) 
If we are still in the grip of the scheme-content dualism, we are inclined to ask: 
but are those necessary structures also worldly structures? They may be necessary 
for us, we might say, but are they really out there? The most straightforward 
answer is: yes, they are, not in an ontological sense however, but in a formal 
sense: the concept of world cannot be disjoined from the concept of those 
particular structures. A more adequate response to the above question would be 
to say that the question is confused. The point of rejecting the nature/access 
distinction, as I argued we should, is precisely to reject the idea that there is room 
for this question. It makes no sense to ask whether a formal or transcendental 
claim corresponds with the world in itself, since formal or transcendental claims 
are an articulation of the very concept of world. We may dispute whether an 
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allegedly necessary structure is really necessary -conceptual claims are fallible-, 
but we cannot sensibly ask whether the world in itself has these structures. The 
latter question is a transcendent one. This is where the 'Ding an sich' notion, as 
conceived by Bird17, comes in. What this notion is meant to bring out, according 
to Bird, is not that we can only have knowledge of the world 'for us', but that 
claims about the transcendent violate the limits of sense. 
Philosophical claims, on the postmodern Aristotelian's conception, are 
claims that seek to articulate the limits of sense. Both Putnam and McDowell in 
this context refer to what Wittgenstein has called 'hinge propositions' (McDowell, 
1994b: 158n). 'What has been called "conceptual analysis" is best (re-)conceived 
of as the description of the hinges on which the very understanding of our 
language turns' (Putnam, 1995:305). I have argued that the equation of Tiinge 
propositions' or 'conceptual truths' with 'unrevisable truths' is unwarranted. 
Conceptual or formal claims, which seek to articulate the limits of sense, are 
fallible, not only because they may fail to adequately capture these limits, but, as 
I will argue below, also because the limits of sense are themselves subject to 
change. Conceptual or formal claims can be said to be both analytic and a 
posteriori: they are claims about 'the limits of sense as we presently experience 
those limits in our lives and in our thought' (Putnam, 1995:302). 
5.2.3 Philosophy as phenomenological articulation of the limits of sense 
To reject the nature/access distinction, central to AMR, is to embrace a conception 
of what it means to be real, in which there is no room to state the 'problem of 
access'. Another way of saying this is, as I have put it before, that the postmodern 
Aristotelian adopts a quietisi attitude towards 'the problem of access'. The term 
'quietism', however, might be misleading. It is often associated with a conception 
of philosophy, according to which the aim of philosophical analysis is purely 
negative. Although the postmodern Aristotelian rejects the traditional skeptical 
problématique, he does not hold that there is nothing philosophically interesting 
to say about notions such as truth, world, meaning, justification, perception 
etcetera. In this section I will, drawing on Strawson, distinguish between two 
versions of quietism, a negative and a positive one. I shall briefly indicate how 
postmodern Aristotelianism is linked to the positive version of quietism. 
In Analysis and Metaphysics, Strawson distinguishes between several 
conceptions of philosophy and in particular between three views of the aim of 
analytic philosophy. For the sake of clarity, I will label these aims as reductive 
"See chapter 4, section 4.3.2. 
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analysis, therapeutic analysis, and phenomenological analysis.18 According to the 
first view, philosophy aims at unraveling a set of basic concepts, from which all 
our other concepts are -ultimately- derived In epistemological terms, it seeks to 
find the basic building blocks on which our knowledge of the world ultimately 
rests. In semantic terms, 'the aim would be to get a clear grasp of complex 
meanings by reducing them, without remainder, to simple meanings' (Strawson, 
1992:17/18). To reduce a complex concept without remainder, we would have to 
state the necessary and sufficient conditions of the correct application of the 
concept. Moreover, our statement of these conditions would have to include only 
basic or simple concepts. 
Strawson points out that, although the project of reductive analysis seems 
rather implausible when stated this bluntly, it has been rather influential 
throughout the history of philosophy. The appeal of reductionism is clearly present 
in the physicalist's project. As I tried to show in the previous chapter, even 'mild' 
versions of physicalism, which recognize the irreducibility of intentionalist 
discourse, are essentially reductionist in that they regard the level of the physical 
to be ontologjcally, if not epistemologjcally, fundamental. Accordingly, the reality 
corresponding to intentionalist discourse has to be accorded an inferior status 
(ontologically speaking). In the previous chapter, I tried to show that non-
reductive physicalism relies on a problematic nature/access distinction. I will not 
repeat my criticism of this position. Here, I want to draw attention to a general 
point that Strawson makes about the project of reductive analysis, namely that 
such a project is, phenomenologically speaking, essentially distortive or 
revisionist. Any project that takes one discipline, whether physics, biology, 
economics or sociology, as 'the master-key to general understanding', will 
highlight certain aspects of our experience and fail to do justice to other aspects. 
Accordingly, it will suggest that our ordinary scheme of things should be revised 
so as to fit in with the unified picture presented 
ш his (1959), Strawson baptized this kind of reductive project 'revisionary 
metaphysics', as opposed to 'descriptive metaphysics' (9). Revisionary or 
reductionist metaphysical pictures are bom from 'the desire for a single master-
key1 and as such, Strawson grants, they may have a certain inevitability as well 
as a certain utility (Strawson, 1992:15). 
The productions of revisionary metaphysics remain permanently interest­
ing, and not only as key episodes in the history of thought. Because of 
their articulation, and the intensity of their partial vision, the best of them 
are both intrinsically admirable and of enduring philosophical utility. But 
"As will become clear below, reductive analysis is linked iofoundationalism, therapeutic analysis to negative 
quietism, and phenomenological analysis Xo positive quietism. 
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this last merit can be ascribed to them only because there is another kind 
of metaphysics which needs no justification at all beyond that of inquiry 
in general. Revisionary metaphysics is at the service of descriptive meta-
physics. (Strawson, 1959:9) 
With the notion of 'descriptive metaphysics', Strawson introduces a second view 
of the aim of analytic philosophy. According to this view, philosophy should aim 
at a descriptive inventory of the human experience, instead of a justification of our 
knowledge-claims in the face of skeptical worries. The aim of descriptive 
metaphysics is to provide a phenomenologically accurate articulation of central 
features of 'the human condition'. In Strawson's words: Oescriptive metaphysics 
is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, 
revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure' (1959:9). 
Before clarifying the notion of descriptive metaphysics or (in my terms) 
phenomenological analysis, I will first consider another alternative to revisionary 
metaphysics or (in my terms) reductive analysis. This is the alternative of 'thera-
peutic analysis'. According to this view of the aim of philosophy, often associated 
with Wittgenstein, the failure of revisionary or foundationalist metaphysics shows 
that we should reject the very attempt at positive, systematic theorizing in 
philosophy. The idea is that the questions underlying traditional metaphysical 
theories are ill-posed and misguided. It is only when we take concepts out of their 
ordinary contexts of use and 'allow them to float or race idly through our minds' 
(Strawson, 1992:4), that we get stuck with typical philosophical problems. These 
problems or questions are formulated in terms of concepts which, detached as they 
have become from their actual use, have lost their significance. The revisionary 
metaphysician is not engaged in an intelligible inquiry, so it is argued. Rather, he 
suffers from obsessive confusions, from intellectual disorders. He is in need of 
therapy, not theory. Philosophical analysis may offer a cure. The hold of these 
illusory pictures can be broken by carefully showing how particular words and 
concepts have, in the hands of the philosopher, become detached from their 
ordinary use. To free ourselves of philosophical muddles, we should constantly 
attend to, and remind ourselves of, the actual employment of particular words and 
concepts. The aim of analytic philosophy in this view is purely negative. The 
philosopher who favours therapeutic analysis adopts a negative version of 
quietism. As applied to the realism issue, he rejects the debate between meta-
physical realists and antirealists as unintelligible and he holds that, once the 
skeptical predicament underlying this controversy is overcome, no room is left for 
a general philosophical inquiry into notions such as knowledge, truth, meaning, 
etcetera 
There is something unsatisfying about quietism negatively conceived. 
Perhaps the paradoxical element in this attitude is that, while it claims the primacy 
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of phenomenology, it at the same time violates our ordinary self-understanding. 
As Strawson remarks, and he is not the first to do so, the inclination to raise meta-
physical questions seems to be 'natural to the species' (1992:15). In other words, 
the idea that there are a number of quite general questions, not dealt with by the 
sciences, but nevertheless genuine and intelligible, may be deeply embedded in the 
human mind. If so, the negative quietist, by denying the legitimacy of these 
questions altogether, fails to do justice to a rather central phenomenological aspect 
of the human condition. If the desire for metaphysical inquiry is central to our 
self-understanding, then a call to drastically eradicate this tendency is revisionary19 
and phenomenologically distortive. 
Recognizing metaphysical questions as inherent in the human condition 
does not imply that we cannot criticize the project of metaphysics. In the previous 
chapters, we have done nothing but criticizing the metaphysical project underlying 
the realism debate, viz. the project of answering the (cartesian) skeptic. It does 
mean however that we have to leave room for metaphysical inquiry, albeit in a 
qualified sense. This is exactly what Strawson does by introducing the notion of 
'descriptive metaphysics'. He thereby points at the possibility of a philosophical 
project that, while discarding the quest for foundations, still aims at positive 
theorizing. This project, which I have labelled 'phenomenological analysis', may 
also be characterized as a positive version of quietism. According to this line of 
thought, to be a quietist about the 'problem of access' is to make room for a 
different, non-skeptical type of questions about notions such as truth, meaning, 
knowledge, etcetera. Instead of aiming at a 'sideways on picture' of the relation 
between minds and reality, the descriptive metaphysician seeks 'to lay bare the 
most general features of our conceptual structure' (Strawson, 1959:9). In Kantian 
terms, instead of devising a transcendent picture of the relation between mind and 
world, the descriptive metaphysician seeks to articulate the transcendental 
conditions for actual human experience. 
Strawson clarifies his view of the aim of philosophy by comparing it to 
the study of grammar. The basic conceptual structure which philosophy seeks to 
articulate is pre-theoretically known to us in a way similar to the rules of 
grammer. We master the conceptual equipment involved in this structure without 
explicit knowledge of the principles governing it, just like we can have a working 
mastery of the grammar of our native language without having the ability to 
explicitly state the rules which we constantly apply. 
Just as the grammarian (..) labours to produce a systematic account of the 
structure of rules which we effortlessly observe in speaking grammatical-
"Revisionary, but not a form of revisionary metaphysics, since the call is not based on an overall systematic 
theory or unified picture. 
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ly, so the philosopher labours to produce a systematic account of the 
general conceptual structure of which our daily practice shows us to have 
a tacit and unconscious mastery. (Strawson, 1992:7) 
Strawson's view of the aim of analytic philosophy is, if we take phenomenological 
accuracy as the criterion, more balanced than quietism in its negative version. It 
leaves room for a kind of metaphysical inquiry, while discarding transcendent or 
'material' metaphysics. The difference between descriptive, transcendental meta-
physics and revisionary, transcendent metaphysics is pertinent. Whereas the latter 
seeks to reduce complex ideas to simple ones, the former seeks to clarify complex 
notions by showing how they are related to other complex notions. This 
clarification does not consist of providing the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the application of concepts. Rather, the clarification essentially moves in a 
circle. Since the concepts at stake depend for their meaning on the elaborate 
network of connected items in which they function, we cannot clarify one concept 
without presupposing some others.20 If we adhere to the ideal of a reductive 
analysis, which seeks to dismantle complex structures into simpler elements, cir-
cularity objections are fatally damaging. If we adopt 'the connective model·, 
however, the demand for a non-circular explanation comes out as misplaced The 
point of the phenomenological, descriptive project is not to avoid circularity, but 
to move 'in a wide, revealing, and illuminating circle' (Strawson, 1992:19/20). 
Although foundationalist aspirations are alien to the project of descriptive 
metaphysics, Strawson does retain the notion of a basic structure or basic concept. 
In his conception, however, basic concepts are both complex and irreducible. 
A concept or concept-type is basic in the relevant sense if it is one of a 
set of general, pervasive and ultimately irreducible concepts or concept-
types which together form a structure - a structure which constitutes the 
framework of our ordinary thought and talk and which is presupposed by 
the various specialist or advanced disciplines that contribute, in their 
diverse ways, to our total picture of the world. (Strawson, 1992:24) 
Descriptive metaphysics is the project of clarifying the interconnections between 
the complex but irreducible notions which form the basic structure of our 
20Putnam's analysis of the conceptual connection between truth and rational acceptibility, discussed in section 
5.1.3, is an example of this kind of circular elucidation. 
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thinking.21 Or, as Charles Taylor puts it, philosophy is 'an exploration of the limits 
of the conceivable in human life, an account of its "transcendental conditions" ' 
(Taylor, 1989:32). In Taylor's view, philosophy aims at an articulation of the 
limits of sense 'from within'. It takes the phenomenological facts, i.e. our pre-
theoretical intuitions, as a starting-point and it seeks to articulate them in a way 
that makes them come out as maximally coherent. 
Strawson suggests that what I call 'the phenomenological facts', i.e. what 
he calls 'the basic structure of our thinking1, is ahistorical. He thinks that 'there are 
categories and concepts which, in their most fundamental character, change not 
at all' (1959:10). I think this statement, in the light of Strawson's reflections on the 
question of method in philosophy, is strangely naive. In the way he presents it, it 
amounts to a transcendent claim. To portray the limits of sense, or the transcen­
dental conditions for experience, as fixed once and for all, is to draw a nature/ 
access distinction which does not make sense by Strawson's own standards. It 
places the limits of sense outside phenomenal reality. It thereby invokes a 
phenomenal/noumenal distinction that I argued is unintelligible22. 
Above, I have argued, following Putnam, that the limits of sense are 
'contextually apriori'. Philosophy articulates the limits of the conceivable as we 
presently experience them in our thought and our lives. The point is that it makes 
no sense to say that the limits of sense are 'out there', independently of how we 
experience them, waiting to be discovered To relinquish the notion of'the limits 
of sense as-they-are-in-themselves' does not mean that we arbitrarily create the 
limits of sense. By articulating our pre-theoretical intuitions or unreflected 
abilities, we discover Пае limits of sense as they presently structure our experience. 
To say that the limits of sense are ahistorical, as Strawson does, is to succumb to 
the Myth of the Given. If we discard this myth, as I -following McDowell- argued 
we should, we are not swamped by a morass of arbitrariness. To discard the myth 
does imply that phenomenological analysis is 'circular' not only in the sense that 
Strawson intends, but in the following sense as well. 
The 'phenomenological facts' are not only not given to us, nor are they 
fixed once and for all. Not only do we have no neutral access to our intuitions, 
our intuitions are themselves subject to change. Our intuitions themselves are part 
of, and influenced by, 'the circle of elucidation'. For example, it may be argued 
"Although Strawson slides to the phrase 'analysis', he points out that what he has in mind is 'elucidation 
rather than analysis' (1992:19). The notion of analysis has reductionist connotations. It is reminiscent of the 
'atomistic model' (1992:21) adopted by the revisionary metaphysician. The aim of descriptive metaphysics is, by 
way of slogan, 'connection rauta than reduction'. Therefore, I prefer to describe the activity of the descriptive 
metaphysician as one of phenomenological articulation rather than conceptual analysis. 
22A distinction moreover that, according to Bird, Kant himself rejected as unintelligible (see chapter 4, section 
4.3.2). 
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that the doctrine of physicalism, alien to pre-modem thinking, has acquired the 
status of an intuition in the modem era.231 argued, following McDowell, that 
physicalism violates a deeply embedded intuition we have, viz. the idea that in 
perception we are being responsive to a meaningful world, which rationally (not 
merely causally) constrains our thinking. Intuitions, in other words, may be in 
conflict. McDowell's attack on physicalism shows that physicalism leaves our 
realist intuitions in shambles. McDowell's and Putnam's arguments against 
physicalism are reductios. Metaphysical realism and internal realism are both 
incoherent, since they want to do justice to our realist intuitions, while leaving 
physicalism -the equation of nature with the thinned-out world of physics- intact.24 
McDowell shows that we cannot do so. One of the two intuitions has to be given 
up. McDowell claims -rightly I argued- that the physicalist intuition should go, 
since the price of abandoning our realist intuitions is too high. The criterion here 
is phenomenological. What makes the postmodern Aristotelian's account of the 
relation between mind and world superior to the physicalist's account is that it can 
make more sense of our ordinary self-understanding. Physicalism entails that we 
eliminate concepts, such as normativity and meaning, which are so central to our 
self-understanding, that we cannot even understand what it would mean for us to 
give them up. These concepts are, according to the limits of sense as we presently 
experience them, phenomenologically indispensable to us. The consequences of 
giving up physicalism are far more palatable, probably even beneficial.25 
What this example shows is that philosophy starts not so much with 'the 
phenomenological facts', but with different, often conflicting interpretations of the 
phenomenological facts. What makes one interpretation superior to the other is the 
extent to which it does justice to central aspects of the 'human condition'. What 
particular aspects are to be counted as central, i.e. what is to be the touchstone of 
adequacy for a particular phenomenological account, is itself a matter of debate.26 
There is, in other words, no stage in the descriptive metaphysician's inquiry in 
which he can point at an intuition which is intrinsically unrevisable. There are no 
final decisions. However, to say that the process of interpretation is unending is 
"The physicalist doctrine is often accompanied by a typically modem relativism about values, which 
pervades contemporary thought to such an extent that it may be said to have acquired the status of an intuition 
(see Taylor 1989). 
"Internal realism is physicalist insofar as it adheres to the interface theory of perception. Insofar as it adheres 
to the interface theory, internal realism is indistinguishable from metaphysical antirealism (see chapter 2 and 3). 
29As argued by Taylor (1989), who takes up arms against a characteristically modem version of moral 
relativism, which is often justified by appeal to physicalism 
*See Kribbe (1996). 
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not to say that it is arbitrary. In any case, what makes interpretation non-arbitrary 
is not the presence of (allegedly) undisputable facts, but the standing obligation 
to give reasons for one's interpretation. 
Thus, to discard the project of revisionary metaphysics in favour of 
descriptive metaphysics, or, more precisely, to put the former at the service of the 
latter, is not 'to settle for less'. Roger Trigg thinks that to claim the primacy of 
phenomenology is to give up on realism 
There are philosophers who only view metaphysics through the functio-
ning of language. (..) The issue, though, must always be not what we 
mean in our language, but what is the character of the world which we 
encounter in our use of language. (..) Concentration on meaning can easily 
be accompanied by the tacit assumption that our world is constructed by 
language. The realist will always deny that... (Trigg, 1993:117/8) 
Trigg mistakenly opposes aphenomenological account of the connections between 
concepts to an Objective' account of the world. Phenomenological claims, in the 
sense I intend, are claims about the limits of sense. The opposite of'phenomeno-
logical' is not 'objective' but 'transcendent'. Trigg fails to see that, by opposing 
statements about meaning to statements about the world, he appeals to an 
unintelligible notion of ontological claims, i.e. to a nature/access distinction which 
cannot be stated coherently. Insofar as an Ontological claim' can be contentful, it 
has the form of aphenomenological or transcendental statement. Accordingly, the 
criterion of justification for a phenomenological or transcendental account is not 
whether it corresponds to 'objective' reality, but whether it can make sense of our 
ordinary intuitions, i.e. whether it does mil justice to the richness of human 
experience. 'To be real' and 'to be phenomenologjcally indispensible' are notions 
that are interdependent or conceptually connected. 
Postmodem Aristotelian realism is a transcendental or formal claim about 
what it means to be real. If my diagnosis of the modem realism debate as being 
in the grip of an unintelligible distinction between ontological and epistemological 
claims is right, then the kind of realism I propose cannot consist of an alternative 
set of ontological and epistemological claims. If my critique of AMR is right, 
Aristotelian realism can only be coherently expressed today as a formal claim 
about the limits of sense. We cannot simply go back to 'Aristotelian innocence' in 
the sense of re-endorsing it as a material, ontological-cum-epistemological claim 
about the world Rather, postmodern Aristotelian realism is a formal claim about 
the unintelligibility of skepticism regarding the accessibility of the 'external' world. 
I have argued that postmodem Aristotelian realism goes together with a 
particular conception of the status of philosophical claims. It adopts a positive 
version of quietism. It conceives of philosophy as an exercise in descriptive 
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metaphysics. In its postmodern version, Aristotelian realism has to understand both 
itself and philosophy in general as making phenomenological claims about the 
limits of sense. 
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Postmodern Aristotelisch realisme 
de mogelijkheid van een tweede naïviteit 
In het leven van alledag is iedereen realist. Wij gaan ervan uit dat we in interactie 
staan met een wereld die onafhankelijk van ons bestaat. Wij ervaren onszelf als 
gesitueerd in een wereld die beperkingen oplegt aan ons denken en handelen. Dit 
is common sense. 
Nu de paradox. Wanneer filosofen onze pre-theoretische, realistische 
intuïties trachten te rechtvaardigen, stuiten zij op grote problemen. Hun pogingen 
tot rechtvaardiging zijn tot dusver niet overtuigend geweest. Paradoxaal genoeg 
hebben ze er eerder toe geleid dat onze realistische intuïties ons steeds twijfelach-
tiger voorkomen. Sommige filosofen stellen dat wij ons moeten neerleggen bij 
deze situatie, dat wij moeten accepteren dat onze realistische intuïties niets anders 
zijn dan een aantal onbewezen assumpties. Deze filosofen noemen zichzelf 
antirealisten. 
Volgens Arthur Fine is het 'realistische programma' in de contemporaine 
wijsbegeerte dood (Fine, 1984:83). Er is weliswaar een scala van posities dat zich 
'realistisch' noemt. Het aantal steeds verfijnder versies van realisme lijkt zelfs 
eerder groeiende dan tanende te zijn. Maar in Fine's opinie is deze driftige 
proliferatie een teken van degeneratie. Ze vormt liet eerste stadium in het 
rouwproces, het stadium van ontkenning" (ibid.). 
Zelfs al zou Fine's diagnose wat overdreven zijn, ze wijst wel op een 
karakteristieke trek van het huidige realismedebat. Het debat concentreert zich 
steeds minder op de vraag of realisme juist is en steeds meer op de vraag wat 
realisme inhoudt. Terwijl sommigen beweren dat realisme primair een claim over 
de wereld is, namelijk een claim over het onafhankelijk bestaan van de wereld, 
beweren anderen dat realisme een claim is over onze relatie tot de wereld, 
namelijk over ons vermogen om de wereld te kennen of naar de wereld te 
verwijzen. Met andere woorden, terwijl sommigen menen dat realisme allereerst 
een ontologische claim is, benadrukken anderen dat realisme wezenlijk geken-
merkt wordt door bepaalde epistemologische en semantische claims. Daarnaast zijn 
er verschillende domeinen met betrekking tot welke men realist kan zijn. Een 
realist met betrekking tot 'waarneembare, middelgrote objecten' hoeft nog geen 
realist te zijn met betrekking tot electronen. Een realist met betrekking tot beide 
genoemde domeinen hoeft nog geen realist te zijn met betrekking tot waarden. 
Etcetera Verschillende combinaties van realisme en antirealisme zijn dus 
denkbaar. 
Het huidige realismedebat vertoont een verwarrende hoeveelheid definities 
van realisme. Tot op zekere hoogte is het realismedebat een debat geworden over 
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wat het betekent om realist te zijn. Het debat is daardoor steeds complexer en 
scholastieker geworden. We kunnen twee reacties op deze situatie onderscheiden, 
een pessimistische en een optimistische. De pessimistische reactie, die we 
aantreffen bij Fine en bij Richard Rorty, is er één van gelatenheid De pessimist 
maant ons te erkennen dat het realisme debat is verworden tot een onvruchtbare 
en irrelevante controverse. We doen er volgens hen goed aan onze pogingen om 
onze realistische intuïties te rechtvaardigen te staken. We moeten simpelweg 
berusten in onze pre-theoretische of'natuurlijke ontologische attitude', zoals Fine 
het noemt (Fine, 1984). De optimistische reactie is er één van ongeduld. Volgens 
de optimist moeten we de verwarring en het gebrek aan consensus over hoe 
realisme te definiëren zo snel mogelijk de wereld uit helpen, zodat het echte 
realismedebat weer van start kan gaan. 
Naar mijn mening zijn beide reacties misplaatst. Beide worden gevoed 
door een bepaalde visie op waar het in het realismedebat om gaat. Volgens deze 
gedeelde opvatting is het realisme debat er wezenlijk en uitsluitend op gericht 
onze realistische intuïties te rechtvaardigen. Met andere woorden, het debat zou 
draaien om de vraag wat als werkelijk beschouwd mag worden. Het voornaamste 
conflict tussen de verschillende realistische en antirealistische posities gaat dan 
over de vraag welke delen van de werkelijkheid realistisch geïnterpreteerd mogen 
worden. Echter, de vraag wat als werkelijk bestaand beschouwd mag worden 
vooronderstelt het antwoord op een andere, meer basale vraag. Dit is de vraag wat 
het betekent om werkelijk te bestaan. Alvorens een realistische attitude ten aanzien 
van een deel van de werkelijkheid te verdedigen, moet men helderheid hebben 
over wat het betekent om realist te zijn, dw.z. over wat het betekent om een deel 
van de wereld als werkelijk bestaand te beschouwen. In andere woorden, voordat 
we onze realistische intuïties trachten te rechtvaardigen, dienen we op te helderen 
wat deze intuïties eigenlijk inhouden. De vraag wat het betekent om werkelijk te 
bestaan, i.e. de vraag die centraal staat in de verschillende pogingen om realisme 
te definiëren, is niet een omslachtige voorbereiding op het eigenlijke realisme-
debat. In deze studie wordt betoogd dat het de meest fundamentele en de de meest 
interessante vraag is die in dit debat aan de orde is. 
Zowel de optimist als de pessimist negeren de vraag wat het betekent om 
werkelijk te zijn. De pessimist meent dat de realisme kwestie oninteressant wordt 
zodra we inzien dat al onze pogingen om onze realistische intuïties te rechtvaar-
digen mislukken. Echter, het meest treffende aspect van de 'realisme kwestie' is 
wellicht niet dat we niet in staat blijken om onze realistische intuïties te 
rechtvaardigen, maar dat we menen dat deze intuïties rechtvaardiging behoeven. 
Waar komt deze vraag naar rechtvaardiging vandaan? Wellicht ontstaat de 
behoefte aan rechtvaardiging alleen wanneer we onze realistische intuïties op een 
bepaalde manier definiëren. Als dat het geval is, dan hoeft de huidige verschuiving 
van de vraag hoe realisme te rechtvaardigen naar de vraag hoe realisme te 
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definiëren geen teken van degeneratie te zijn. Deze kan ook als een overgangsfase 
beschouwd worden, die ruimte schept voor een andere en, zo betoog ik, meer 
vruchtbare soort van vraagstelling. 
De vraag wat we als werkelijk bestaand mogen beschouwen en de vraag 
wat het betekent om werkelijk te bestaan worden vaak met elkaar verward in 
discussies tussen realisten en antirealisten. Binnen het huidige realismedebat 
kunnen we een groffe scheidslijn trekken tussen metafysisch realisme en intern 
realisme. In deze studie tracht ik te laten zien dat het conflict tussen deze posities 
op twee manieren geïnterpreteerd kan worden. Ten eerste kan het geïnterpreteerd 
worden als een conflict over wat we als werkelijk bestaand mogen beschouwen. 
In deze interpretatie zijn metafysisch realisten en intern realisten het met elkaar 
eens over wat het betekent om werkelijk te zijn. In de tweede interpretatie wordt 
het conflict tussen beide posities opgevat als een conflict over wat het betekent om 
werkelijk te zijn. In deze interpretatie wordt intern realisme beschouwd als een 
poging om de richting van het realismedebat te wijzigen door de vooronder-
stellingen van de metafysisch realist over wat het betekent om realist te zijn ter 
discussie te stellen. 
De tweede interpretatie, die zich concentreert op de vraag naar de 
betekenis van 'realisme', is, zo poog ik althans aan te tonen, de meest verhelderen-
de. Betoogd wordt dat metafysisch realisme gekenmerkt wordt door vier onderling 
samenhangende assumpties over wat het betekent om realist te zijn. Intern 
realisme, zo betoog ik, is ambigu met betrekking tot deze assumpties. Enerzijds 
vooronderstelt het deze assumpties en inzoverre het dat doet vormt het het 
spiegelbeeld van metafysisch realisme; het mondt uit in (metafysisch) antirealisme. 
Anderzijds stelt intern realisme deze assumpties juist ter discussie en tracht het het 
traditionele dualisme van realisme en antirealisme te overstijgen. 
Als we uitgaan van de eerste interpretatie van het conflict tussen 
metafysisch realisme en intern realisme, dan ontstaat het volgende standaardbeeld 
van het strijdtoneel. 
Volgens het standaardbeeld vindt het realismedebat plaats op drie niveaus: 
het ontologische, het epistemologische en het semantische. Op het ontologische 
niveau gaat het realismedebat over de vraag of de wereld onafhankelijk bestaat 
van ons denken. Op het epistemologische niveau is het de vraag of en in welke 
mate wij kennis kunnen verkrijgen van de onafhankelijke werkelijkheid, hetzij via 
waarneming, hetzij via theoretische wetenschap. Op het semantische niveau wordt 
de vraag gesteld naar de aard van waarheid en referentie, i.e. naar de aard van de 
(verwij zings)relatie tussen taal en werkelijkheid. Uitgaande van dit standaardbeeld 
worden metafysisch realisme en intern realisme als volgt gedefinieerd. De 
metafysisch realist claimt op ontologisch niveau het onafhankelijk bestaan en op 
epistemologisch niveau de kenbaarheid van de wereld. Hij stelt bovendien - op 
semantisch niveau - dat waarheid en referentie objectieve (non-epistemische) 
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noties zijn: hij verdedigt meestal een correspondentie theorie van waarheid en een 
causale theorie van referentie. De intern realist stelt volgens het standaardbeeld op 
ontologisch niveau dat de wereld zoals wij die kennen gedeeltelijk of in bepaalde 
zin afhankelijk is van ons denken. Op epistemologisch niveau benadrukt de intern 
realist dat onze toegang tot de wereld al op het niveau van de waarneming 
beïnvloed wordt door conceptuele schema's die zowel selectief als constructief 
zijn. Op het semantisch niveau stelt de intern realist dat waarheid en referentie 
epistemische noties zijn, in de zin dat ze niet losgekoppeld kunnen worden van 
noties als verifieerbaarheid en rationele aanvaardbaarheid. 
Het boven geschetste standaardbeeld van de realisme controverse gaat uit 
van de eerste interpretatie van het conflict tussen metafysisch realisten en intern 
realisten. Volgens deze interpretatie gaat het conflict over de vraag wat als 
werkelijk bestaand beschouwd mag worden, en is er consensus over wat het 
betekent om werkelijk te bestaan. Als we deze standaard interpretatie omarmen, 
dan kunnen we intern realisme bijna niet anders begrijpen dan als een vorm van 
metafysisch anrirealisme. 
Volgens de tweede interpretatie van het realismedebat, die ik verdedig, is 
het conflict tussen metafysisch realisten en intern realisten een conflict over wat 
het betekent om werkelijk te bestaan. Uitgaande van deze interpretatie zal ik 
betogen dat het boven geschetste standaardbeeld vier vooronderstellingen bevat 
over de betekenis van 'realisme', die de metafysisch realist vanzelfsprekend acht. 
De houding van de intern realist tegenover deze vooronderstellingen is veel 
kritischer, maar niet volledig afwijzend Intern realisme, zo betoog ik, is 
ambivalent ten aanzien van de betreffende vooronderstellingen, die als volgt 
kunnen worden samengevat: 
Ontologische, epistemologische en semantische vraagstellingen vormen 
drie onafhankelijke niveaus van vraagstellingen, die gescheiden moeten 
worden gehouden. 
Op het ontologische niveau: reëel bestaan betekent causaal onafhankelijk 
zijn van de geest; het realismedebat gaat over de causale onaf-
hankelijkheid dan wel afhankelijkheid van de wereld. 
Op het epistemologische niveau: de vraag naar de kenbaarheid van de 
wereld en de vraag naar de aard van de wereld kunnen op intelligibele 
wijze worden onderscheiden en dienen onafhankelijk van elkaar benaderd 
te worden. 
Op het semantische niveau: de vraag naar de aard van waarheid en 
referentie en de vraag naar de kenbaarheid van waarheid en referentie 
kunnen op intelligibele wijze worden onderscheiden en dienen onaf-
hankelijk van elkaar benaderd te worden. 
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In deze studie wordt betoogd dat als we uitgaan van deze assumpties, de poging 
om onze realistische intuïties te rechtvaardigen gedoemd is te mislukken. Hoewel 
de metafysisch realist deze assumpties als de kern van realisme beschouwt, toont 
de intern realist aan dat deze assumpties de verdediging van metafysisch realis-
tische noties van waarheid, referentie en wereld in een vicieuze cirkel doen 
belanden (hoofdstuk 1). De intern realist laat zien dat, willen we recht doen aan 
onze realistische intuïties, we een andere conceptie moeten ontwikkelen van wat 
het betekent om realist te zijn. Ik zal betogen dat de intern realist hierin niet slaagt 
(hoofdstuk 2). Dit is mi. te wijten aan een fundamentele ambiguïteit in de intern 
realistische houding tegenover de bovenstaande assumpties over wat het betekent 
om realist te zija Aan de ene kant vooronderstelt de intern realist deze assumpties 
in zijn noties van waarheid, referentie en wereld. Voorzover hij dat doet is hij een 
metafysisch аи/ñrealist. Aan de andere kant laat hij deze assumpties achter zich. 
Voorzover hij dat doet, verliest de term 'intern' in 'intern realisme' echter haar 
betekenis. 
Hoewel de intern realist de bovenstaande assumpties niet overtuigend weet 
te 'overwinnen', duidt het recente Mind and World van John McDowell op een 
conceptie van realiteit die dat wel doet. Deze conceptie noem ik postmodern Aris-
totelisch realisme. Ze wordt gekenmerkt door vier stellingen: 
Ontologische, epistemologische en semantische vragen zijn geen 
gescheiden niveaus van vragen; ze kunnen niet onafhankelijk van elkaar 
beantwoord worden. 
'Reëel bestaan' kan niet gelijkgesteld worden met 'causaal onafhankelijk 
zijn van de geest'. 'Reëel bestaan' is in eerste instantie 'de zijnswijze van 
betekenis hebben'. De zijnswijze van betekenis is sui generis in de zin dat 
de realiteit van betekenis niet opgesplitst kan worden in een geest-
afhankelijk en een geest-onafhankelijk element. Daarom is het definiëren 
van realiteit in termen van causale geest-onafhankelijkheid niet zozeer 
onwaar als irrelevant. 
De vraag naar de aard van de wereld kan niet op intelligibele wijze 
gescheiden worden van de vraag naar de kenbaarheid van de wereld; 
bijgevolg is de skeptische notie van een ontologische-cww-epistemo-
logische kloof tussen geest en wereld niet coherent formuleerbaar. 
De vraag naar de aard van waarheid en referentie kan niet op intelligibele 
wijze gescheiden worden van de vraag naar de kenbaarheid van waarheid 
en referentie. Waarheid en referentie kunnen realistisch geduid worden 
zonder als non-epistemisch te worden opgevat. 
Postmodern Aristotelisch realisme tracht recht te doen aan onze realistische 
intuïties, niet door deze te rechtvaardigen, maar door deze op zo'n wijze te 
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articuleren dat de rechtvaardigingsvraag zich niet aandient. Het tracht ruimte te 
maken voor een 'tweede naïviteit' ten aanzien van onze realistische intuïties. 
In hoofdstuk 1 en 2 probeer ik de noodzaak te laten zien van een 
postmoderne versie van Aristotelisch realisme. De betoog dat zowel de metafysisch 
realistische als de intern realistische opvatting van waarheid en referentie in 
problemen komen doordat zij vasthouden aan bovengenoemde assumpties over wat 
het betekent om reëel te bestaan. In hoofdstuk 3,4 en 5 tracht ik de mogelijkheid 
van een postmoderne terugkeer naar Aristotelisch realisme aan te tonen. 
Postmodem Aristotelisch realisme is realisme zonder empirisme (hoofdstuk 3). De 
empiristische idee is dat (perceptuele) kennis Tjegjnt' met non-conceptuele 
inhouden of gegevenheden, die vervolgens via complexe conceptuele bewerkingen 
resulteren in representaties. De vraag die in dit model rijst is in hoeverre onze 
representaties nog een afspiegeling vormen van de exteme werkelijkheid die, via 
zintuiglijke prikkels, causaal verantwoordelijk is voor onze waarneming. Hoewel 
McDowell niet ontkent dat waarneming beschreven kan worden in termen van 
complexe bewerkingen van zintuiglijke prikkels, benadrukt hij dat zo'n beschrijv-
ing niet articuleert wat waarneming primair inhoudt voor een mens (of organisme), 
namelijk open staan naar een betekenisvolle wereld. Deze openheid naar de 
wereld, zo betoogt McDowell, wordt niet verklaard maar voorondersteld door 
informatie-verwerkingstheorieèn van waarneming. In McDowells beeld van 
openheid naar de wereld wordt onze toegang tot de wereld gedacht als zowel 
direct (niet bemiddeld door een sluier van representaties) als oordeelsmatig (het 
veronderstelt conceptuele vermogens). 
Om ruimte te maken voor het idee van Openheid naar een betekenisvolle 
wereld' dient men niet slechts empirisme te verwerpen maar ook fysicalisme. 
Postmodern Aristotelisch realisme is een realisme zonder fysicalisme (hoofdstuk 
4). Fysicalisme is het idee dat de werkelijkheid (uiteindelijk) samenvalt met wat 
de fysica als werkelijk bestaand erkent. De fysicalist gaat uit van een in zich 
betekenisloze wereld, waarop wij met behulp van een 'conceptueel schema' 
betekenisrelaties projecteren. Voor McDowells notie van openheid of'ontvanke-
lijkheid voor beíckenis' is dan geen plaats. McDowell bepleit een partiële 're-
enchantment of nature', die inhoudt dat het 'domein van betekenis' net zo reëel 
bestaat als het 'domein van (fysische) wetmatigheden'. Mijns inziens dient 
McDowells re-enchantment geradicaliseerd te worden, in de zin dat het domein 
van betekenis beschouwd wordt als voorafgaand aan het domein van wetmatig-
heden, niet in ontologische of epistemologische zin, maar in fenomenologische 
zin. Dat wil zeggen, de prioriteit van het domein van betekenis is niet een 
empirische, maar een formele of transcendentale prioriteit. 
Postmodern Aristotelisch realisme is een articulatie van onze realistische 
intuïties, waarbinnen de skeptische vraag naar de kenbaarheid van de 'externe' 
wereld niet van de grond kan komen. Toch is het geen terugkeer naar Aristotelisch 
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realisme (als 'eerste naïviteit'). Als een empirische, 'materiële' claim over de aard 
en kenbaarheid van de wereld is Aristotelisch realisme voor ons een onbeschik-
bare, transcendente claim geworden. De enige wijze waarop wij de naïviteit van 
het Aristotelisch realisme kunnen hervinden is als een transcendentale of 
fenomenologische claim over de intelligjbiliteit van het moderne (cartesiaanse) 
skepticisme (hoofdstuk 5). Postmodem Aristotelisch realisme beschouwt filosofie 
als een poging tot articulatie van de grenzen van het zinvol zegbare, zoals wij die 
grenzen op dit moment ervaren. 
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